

# Economic Integration of Mozambique in the IOR-ARC Region



António Francisco and António Chichava

Paper prepared for the

***Trade and investment issues in the IOR-ARC region***

26-27 March 1999, Maputo, Mozambique

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
## 2. The prospects for an regional integration in the Indian Ocean rim

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# Abstract



- ⌘ The IORC-ARC's Charter commits the organisation to concentrate on improving economic conditions in the region, particularly through trade facilitation, promotion and liberalisation. In examining the prospects of Mozambique's economic integration in the IOR-ARC region, this paper argues that the extent to which its ultimate objective will, or will not, be achieved depends mainly on whether in the long-run the IOR-ARC members remain together simply for greater trade with each other, or they move beyond that towards 'economic integration'. The former option is associated with the often called 'trade as an engine of growth', and in theoretical terms, with the neoclassical approach to economic growth and development in general and international trade in particular. Based on some recent theoretical and empirical evidence the likely outcome of this option will be a vicious cycle of regional development. The latter strategy assumes that economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for national and regional development. In turn, the second alternative entails the view that if the IOR-ARC members are to achieve their main goal of promoting trade and regional economic integration, they must combine simultaneously and strategically an inward- and outward-looking approach towards trade facilitation, promotion and liberalisation. In this context, the IOR-ARC, and its the Academic Group of the Association in particular, should concentrate on studying both ways, rather than only one-way, of the expected causality. That is, economic conditions in the region may be improved through trade and investment liberalisation and promotion and, vice-versa, trade and investment liberalisation may be promoted and facilitated through improving economic conditions of the IOR-ARC's poorer members.



# **There is nothing so practical as a good theory (Lewin)**

- If this say is right, we wished we could come here with such a theory and show why Africa's experience on Intra-regional economic integration has often been not very good and effective:
- How can one understand the large, and perhaps still growing, number of regional integration schemes in SSA in general and Southern African region in particular?
  - Do African countries have a more outward-looking stance and are investing more attention to promoting intra-regional economic integration than countries from other regions of the world?

# 1. Regional integration, trade liberalisation and investment



- **Current regional integration schemes in Southern Africa**

- ↖ The African continent contains perhaps, the largest number of regional integration schemes
- ↖ Similarly, the African continent contains perhaps the largest number of GATT/WTO members(Oyejide, 1998: 108).
- ↖ ...it appears that neither the peer pressure that should emanate from membership in regional integration schemes nor the disciplines of the GATT/WTO framework enabled many African countries to pursue national-level trade policies that could have escaped the strictures noted above (Oyejide, 1998: 108).

**Table 1. Summary of regional groupings in Eastern-Southern Africa and the IOR-ARC**

SADC 1/	IOC 2/	COMESA 3/	SACU 4/	CBI 5/	EAC 6/	IOR-ARC 8/
Angola		Angola				Australia
Botswana			Botswana			
Congo, D.Rep.	Comoros	Burundi Comoros Congo, D.Rep Djibouti Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia		Burundi Comoros		
Lesotho		Kenya	Lesotho	Kenya	Kenya	India Indonesia Kenya
Malawi	Madagascar	Madagascar Malawi		Madagascar Malawi		Madagascar
Mauritius Mozambique	Mauritius	Mauritius		Mauritius		Malaysia Mauritius Mozambique
Namibia		Namibia	Namibia	Namibia		Oman
Seychelles	Seychelles	Rwanda Seychelles		Rwanda Seychelles		Singapore South Africa Sri Lanka
South Africa			South Africa			
Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe		Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Uganda	Swaziland	Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Uganda	Tanzania  Uganda	Tanzania  Yemen
Internal liberalization by 2006; no commitment on external liberalization	Promoting cooperation in economic, commercial and industrial development	Internal trade liberalization by 2000; objective of common external tariffs by 2004		Internal liberalization and low harmonized external tariffs by end 1998	Internal trade liberalization and common external tariffs by 2000	

**Source:** COMESA, 1998.

1/ Southern African Development Community (SADC)

2/ Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

3/ Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

4/ Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

5/ Cross-Border Initiative (CBI)

6/ East African Cooperation (EAC)

7/ Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) countries

8/ Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)

# As Table 1 shows



Of the 14 SADC members,  
10 are COMESA,  
5 are members of SACU  
1 is EAC  
2 are IOC  
3 are IOR-ARC.

Five of the 14 SADC countries are members of four different regional trade arrangements.

## **In terms of absences:**

South Africa and Mozambique are not COMESA, yet in 1997 Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania joined the IOR-ARC.

# Have African regional groupings promoted trade among their members?

- ↖ In general, the papers we have reviewed recognise the important role that trade policy plays in the African development process.
- ↖ Explicitly or implicitly the papers defend the need for reforming African trade policy, though they have conflicting views as to what openness, regional integration and integration with the world economy really mean.
- ↖ While opinions differ about what exactly constitutes openness and integration with the world economy, there is little disagreement that most African economies need to liberalise their international trade regimes significantly over the next decade (Wang and Winters, 1998: 1).

# 'broad consensus'



- ↖ If one assumes that the referred 'broad consensus' is true, does this mean that even the so-called protectionists and middle-of-the-road economists, have all become free traders advocates as well? Not necessarily so, both for theoretical and empirical reasons.
- ↖ while Wang and Winter's (1998) paper proposes the abolition of trade preference, Oyejide's (1998) paper suggests a more comprehensive and unique preference scheme embedded in the multilateral principles of the WTO.

- 
- It appears that little progress has been made with respect to ECOWAS's objectives of increasing economic integration, suggesting that the promotion of serious trade liberalisation among members has not been strong enough
  - Hanink and Owusu (1998: 363-364) highlight three main reasons as to why SSA trade is considered problematic with respect to its effects on the region's economic:
    - (1) the primary sector dominates the economies of most countries in the region, and their lack of export diversification limits their gains from trade.
    - (2) the volume of SSA trade with Europe countries and other industrial economies has been decreasing relatively and may decrease in absolute terms as preference effects decline.
    - (3) there does not seem to be much potential for intra-regional trade to make up for declines in extra-regional markets..

## ⊙ On the positive side

- 
- ✦ Hanink and Owusu refer to some recent research that 'has shown that there is significant intra-regional market potential even within the primary sector'.
  - ✦ And yet, 'Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) have demonstrated that intra-SSA trade is actually more than expected given the small size of most national economies in the region'

# ‘Why is trade reform so difficult in Africa?’

Rodrick, 1998

➤ Rodrick’s answer to this question identifies three main reasons

1. distribution issues,
2. time inconsistency, and
3. incomplete information

➤ Rodrik, Oyejide’s and Land and Wangwe’s papers identify several other difficulties for trade reform in the African continent:

1. the negative fiscal impact and the balance-of-payments effects of import liberalisation in the reversals of policy reforms in several SSA countries;
2. the industrial protection objective of trade policy;
3. the severe costs that rapid liberalisation imposes on an economy when it is not accompanied by complementary measures aiming at simultaneously upgrade the capacity of enterprises to respond.

# **In short**

**the literature regarding Africa's recent experience on trade and investment issues provides a portrait somewhat disappointing and pessimist**



The promise of trade as the engine of growth often seems to have been broken for many of the world's developing countries. Nowhere does trade seem less promising than in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region with the world's largest concentration of least-developed economies ((Hanink and Owusu, 1998: 363).



✉ Thus, besides the consensus that open economies grow faster than closed ones, the literature regarding specifically Africa's experience seems to agree in several other aspects relevant for an association such as the IOR-ARC.

1<sup>o</sup> Africa's experience with trade liberalisation and regional integration has been disappointing.

2<sup>o</sup> There are conflicting views about what exactly constitutes openness, intra-regional integration and integration with the world economy.

# The three key-promoters of economic integration in Southern Africa



## 1<sup>o</sup> key-promoters: Representatives of the world trade system

the group of international co-sponsors of regional economic integration in SSA hand in hand with the global trade system:

- ↑ European Union (EU)
- ↑ World Bank (WB)
- ↑ International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
- ↑ African Development Bank (ADB).

## → 2<sup>o</sup> key-promoters

includes countries nations, namely nations such as Mauritius and Singapore, that have reached a relatively high level of economic growth and strength that cross-boarder cooperation and expansion becomes imperative for their continuous growth and development.

### Mauritius

(with a population of about the same size of Maputo city's population) in 1997 produced in about **5 weeks** and exported in about **4 months** what Mozambique produced and exports in one full year.

### Singapore

(with a population about the size of Maputo city and Maputo and Gaza provinces) in 1997 produced in **6 days** and exported in less than **1 single day** what Mozambique produced and exported in one full year

# 3<sup>o</sup> third key-promoter of regional integration in Southern Africa



## South Africa

The gap in terms of production and exports between Mozambique and South Africa is by far much more impressive than the one mentioned above with regard to Mauritius.

In 1997 South Africa produced and exported in less than **one week** the correspondent to the production and exports of Mozambique during the whole year.

⌘ **The historical regional economic integration**

# What about the other countries?

## SADCC-SADC versus COMESA

- ⌘ It appears that in practice while SACU is closely associated with SADC, CBI and EAC are closer to COMESA than to SADC, and finally, IOC and IOR-ARC comprises members of both SADC and COMESA.
- ⌘ Wang and Winters (1998), in one of the papers mentioned above, consider the multi-groupings membership theoretic and practically inconsistent:
  - ☒ One theoretical complication ... is multiple bloc membership. The countries of UEMOA are also members of ECOWAS, and many from the CBI and some from SADC also belong to COMESA. These countries would need to decide with whom to combine. In fact, however, neither ECOWAS nor COMESA looks sufficiently coherent or active to negotiate with the EU, so this problem will probably not arise for some time (Wang and Winters, 1998: 21).



This negative view about the coherence and activity of COMESA is worrying for several reasons.



- 1 One would think that COMESA and CBI were more advanced than SACU and SADC
  - 2 South Africa is not a member of COMESA, but it is currently engaged in negotiations with the EU
  - 3 bloc membership grouping can have a negative side effect (case of Mozambique versus Malawi)
- ⌘ The change in the very name of **SADCC** (South African Development and Coordination Conference) to **SADC** (South African Development Community)

# What about the other countries?

## SADCC-SADC versus COMESA



# Blumenfeld (1992)



both the

- 'dependence' and
- the 'interdependence'

approaches have so far proved not to be a satisfactory or fruitful point of departure

Blumenfeld envisaged that a post-apartheid regional economy would lead to renewal and prosperity:

- In particular, the belief is again growing that the motive force of the South African economy will create a **virtuous cycle of development** in the wider region via a substantial extension of trade, investment and institutional links with the neighbouring states. Visions of common markets and other forms of economic union are once again emerging in some quarters (Blumenfeld, 1992: 161).

## 2. The prospects for a regional integration in the Indian Ocean rim



### Growth in East Asia: what we can and what we cannot infer (M. Sarel, 1997)

- ✦ Is growth the result for the most part of an accumulation of manpower and machinery, or is it the result of employing the latest technology?
- ✦ three other angles:
  - the influence of government intervention,
  - the extent to which investments and exports can be considered the main engines of growth,
  - and the significance for sustained growth of the economic conditions prevailing at the very beginning of the countries' period of extended growth.

# The positive versus de normative viewpoints

## ← The need to consider

the **initial conditions**

in which the IOR-ARC

is emerging

⌘ what specific strategy

should the IOR-ARC


pursue, beyond the

standard set of

policies aimed at

**getting the basics**

**right.**



# The initial conditions of the IOR countries



## As Table 2

- ↖ of the 24 countries in the Indian Ocean rim
  - 2 are high-income ( Australia and Singapore)
  - 11 are between high and low:
    - 5 are upper-middle-income countries,
    - and 6 lower-middle-income.
  - 11 are low-income countries.

## Tables 3 and 4

- ↖ Evidence about the IOR countries' output and Export of goods and services.

These are the tables that contain the data used above to highlight the great discrepancies between the production and exports in Mozambique and more developed countries of the IOR-ARC, such as Australia, Singapore, Mauritius and South Africa.

**Table 2. General Background information**

	Surface area and population			GNP measured at US\$ 1997			Classification of By income <sup>3</sup>
	Population 1997	'000 km <sup>2</sup> 1995	Population	Billions of 1997			
					Dollars	World	
Australia	19	7,682	2	380.0	20,540	16	high-income
Bangladesh	124	130	920	33.2	270	116	low-income
Comoros	0.5	1,9	232	0.21	400	-	low-income
Djibouti	0.6	23,2	27	-	-	-	lower-middle-income
India	961	2,973	313	373.9	390	102	low-income
Indonesia	200	1,812	107	221.9	1,110	75	lower-middle-income
Iran	61	1 622.0	38	113.5	1,780	-	lower-middle-income
Kenya	28	569	47	9.3	330	109	low-income
Madagascar	14	582	23	3.6	250	120	low-income
Malaysia	21	329	61	98.2	4,680	35	upper-middle-income
Maldives	0.3	0,3	874	0.3	1,150	-	lower-middle-income
Mauritius	1	2	553	4.3	3,800	40	upper-middle-income
Mozambique <sup>1</sup>	16.5	784	22	1.7	90	133	low-income
Myanmar	46.7	657.6	71	-	-	-	low-income
Oman	2	212	10	10.6	495	33	upper-middle-income
Pakistan	137	771	169	67.2	490	97	low-income
Seychelles	0.1	0.5	173	0.54	6,880	-	upper-middle-income
Singapore	3	1	4896	101.8	32,940	4	high-income
Somalia	10.1	627.3	16	-	-	-	low-income
South Africa	38	1 221	30	130.2	14510	23	upper-middle-income
Sri Lanka	18	65	280	14.8	800	83	low-income
Tanzania	31	884	34	6.6	210	127	low-income
Thailand	61	511	116	169.6	2800	50	lower-middle-income
Yemen	16	528	29	4.3	270	117	Low-income
East & Asia Pacific	1,753	15,869	108	1,707.3	970		
South Asia	1,289	4,781	260	501.9	390		
Sub-Saharan Africa	614	23,628	25	309.1	500		
Low income	2,048	30,175	65	721.7	350		
Middle income	2,855	68,983	40	5,401.9	1,890		
High income	926	30,971	30	2,3802.1	25,700		
World	5,892t	130,129t	44w	29,925.7t	5,130w		

(t) if the aggregate includes estimates for missing data and nonresponding economies

(w) weighted averages

<sup>1</sup> Population updated according to INE (1998)

<sup>2</sup> For South East & Asia Pacific

<sup>3</sup> Classification according to 1997 GNP per capita in US\$ calculated using the World Bank *Atlas* method. The groups are: Low income, \$785 or less; lower-middle-income, \$786–\$3,125; upper-middle-income, \$3,126–\$9,655; and high-income, \$9 656 or more.

Sources : INE (1998), UNDP (1998), World Bank (1998).

**Table 4. Goods and services**

	Goods and services											
	Exports											
	1980	1996	1980	1996	1980	1996	1980	1996	1980	1996	1980	1996
Australia	21,279	78805										
Bangladesh		4508										
Comoros												
Djibouti												
India		42690										
Indonesia		51160										
Iran												
Kenya		3027										
Madagascar		803										
Malaysia		83322										
Maldives												
Mauritius		2701										
Mozambique <sup>1</sup>		411										
Myanmar												
Oman		7352										
Pakistan		10317										
Seychelles												
Singapore		156052										
Somalia												
South Africa		33309										
Sri Lanka		4861										
Tanzania		1372										
Thailand		71416										
Yemen		2409										
E. Asia Pac.												
South Asia												
SS Africa												
Low income												
Middle income												
High income												
World												

Sources : World Bank, 1998: 228

## TABLE 5: Human development indicators

### ➤ In Sub-Saharan Africa

- Seychelles the best HDI=0.845
- Mauritius the best GDI = 0.753
- South Africa the best GEM = 0.531

### ➤ In South-East Asia and the Pacific

- Singapore has the best HDI = 0.896  
GDI = 0.848  
GEM = 0.467

### ➤ High human development = 6

Medium human development = 6

Low human development = 12

**Table 5. Humand development indicators**

	Human development index						Gender-related development index			Poverty	Classification of countries in terms of the human development
	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995	Adult literacy rate (%) 1995	Combined 1 <sup>o</sup> , 2 <sup>o</sup> and 3 <sup>o</sup> level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1995	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$)	HDI	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) minus HDI rank	GDI	HDI rank minus GDI rank	GEM		
Australia	78.2	99.0	79	19,632	0.932	5	0.918	6			High
Bangladesh	56.9	38.1	37	1,382	0.371	-4	0.342	-3		46.5	Low
Burkina Faso	56.5	57.3	39	1,317	0.411	3	0.402	1		-	Low
Burundi	49.2	46.2	20	1,300	0.324	-17	-	-		-	Low
Cameroon	61.6	52.0	55	1,422	0.451	1	0.424	1		35.9	Low
Indonesia	64.0	83.8	62	3,971	0.679	-19	0.651	0		20.2	Medium
India	68.5	69.0	67	5,480	0.758	-10	0.643	-21		22.2	Medium
Kenya	53.8	78.1	52	1,438	0.463	2	0.459	5		27.1	Low
Madagascar	57.6	45.8	31	673	0.348	15	0.345	4		47.7	Low
Malaysia	71.4	83.5	61	9,572	0.834	-18	0.785	8		-	High
Maldives	63.3	93.2	71	3,540	0.683	2	0.668	10		-	Medium
Mauritius	70.9	82.9	61	13,294	0.833	-28	0.753	0		12.1	High
Mozambique <sup>1</sup>	46.3	40.1	25	959	0.281	-7	0.264	-1		48.5	Low
Nepal	58.9	83.1	48	1,130	0.481	22	0.478	1		27.5	Low
Niger	70.9	59.0	60	9,383	0.771	-27	0.580	-40		28.9	Medium
Pakistan	62.8	37.8	41	2,209	0.453	-16	0.399	-3		46.0	Low
Reunion	72.0	88.0	61	7,697	0.845	-6	-	-		-	High
Singapore	77.0	91.0	68	22,604	0.896	-21	0.848	-1		65	High
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	Low
South Africa	64.1	81.8	81	4,334	0.717	-9	0.680	8		-	Medium
Sri Lanka	72.5	90.2	67	3,408	0.716	9	0.700	13		20.6	Medium
Zambia	50.6	67.8	33	636	0.358	20	0.354	3		39.8	Low
Thailand	69.5	93.8	55	7,742	0.838	-10	0.812	12		11.9	High
Yemen	56.7	38.0	49	856	0.356	12	0.336	-2		48.9	Low
South-East-Asia Pacific	64.7	87.3	61	3,852	0.683 <sup>2</sup>		0.665				
South Asia	61.8	50.5	52	1,724	0.462		0.430				
East Asia	69.3	82.4	65	3,359	0.676		0.665				
Sub-Saharan Africa	50.6	56.9	42	1,407	0.378		0.376				
Low h. development	56.7	50.9	47	1,362	0.409		0.388				
Medium h. development	67.5	83.3	66	3,390	0.670		0.656				
High h. development	73.5	95.7	79	16,241	0.897		0.861				
World	63.6	77.6	62	5,990	0.772		0.736				

Sources : UNDP (1998)

# Beyond getting the basics right:

## Vicious versus virtuous cycles of development



- ⌘ The free market school requires only that the government "get the basics right" and opposes any other kind of government intervention.
- ⌘ Getting the basics right means creating an environment in which the economy will thrive by, for example, making sure that the exchange rate reflects the economic fundamentals, that interest rates yield a positive return, that inflation is kept under control, and that taxes are not so burdensome as to discourage economic activity.

## The IORARC's Charter commits the organisation to concentrate on what we may call a minimalist goal and agenda



- ☒ 'Towards promoting liberalisation, to remove impediments to, and lower barriers towards, freer and enhanced flows of goods, services, investment and technology within the region'.

⌘ However, the first and perhaps ultimate goal of the IORARC is set as being the following:

- ☒ 'To promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the Members States, and to common ground for regional economic cooperation'.



- ⌘ Does Mozambique exports so little because it is too **inward-looking**, interventionist and protectionist, while the other pure **outward-looking** and free traders?
- ⌘ Export versus output/production
  - ☑ Well, Mozambique produces in one year what Mauritius produces in six months, South Africa in one week, and Australia just in two days.
- ⌘ For instance, the 1998 COMESA's document already mentioned above, states:
  - ☑ If the Eastern and Southern African region is to achieve significant economic growth, it must do this through full integration into the world economy within the framework of GATT/WTO (COMESA, 1998: 11).



- ⌘ Why can not be the other way around?
- ⌘ That is, if the Eastern and Southern African region is to achieve full integration into the world economy within the framework of GATT/WTO, it must do this through significant economic growth ... and, indeed, development.

**Table 3. Structure of IOR countries' output**

Economy	Gross domestic product (GDP)		Value added as a % of GDP							
	Millions of dollars		Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing		Services	
	1980	1997	1980	1997	1980	1997	1980	1997	1980	1997
Australia	160,109	391,045	5	4	36	28	19	15	58	68
Bangladesh	12,950	32,838	50	30	16	17	11	9	34	53
Comoros	..	(208)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Djibouti	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
India	172,321	359,812	38	27	26	30	18	19	36	43
Indonesia	78,013	214,593	24	16	42	42	13	25	34	41
Iran	..	(113,506)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kenya	7,265	9,899	33	29	21	17	13	11	47	54
Madagascar	4,042	3,552	30	32	16	13	-	12	54	55
Malaysia	24,488	97,523	22	13	38	46	21	34	40	41
Maldives	..	(301)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mauritius	1,132	4,151	12	10	26	32	15	23	62	58
Mozambique	2,028	1,944	37	39	35	23	-	-	27	38
Myanmar	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Oman	5,989	13,438	3	-	69	-	1	-	28	-
Pakistan	23,690	64,360	30	26	25	25	16	17	46	50
Seychelles	..	(537)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Singapore	11,718	96,319	1	0	38	36	29	26	61	64
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
South Africa	78,744	129,094	7	5	50	39	23	24	43	57
Sri Lanka	4,024	15,128	28	22	30	26	18	17	43	52
Tanzania	..	6,707	..	48	..	21	..	7	..	31
Thailand	32,354	157,263	23	11	29	40	22	29	48	50
Yemen	..	5,442	..	18	..	49	..	11	..	34

.. Implies data are not available

Figures between brackets refer to GNP rather than GDP

Sources : World Bank, 1998



- ☒ A minimalist goal and agenda:
  - 'Towards promoting liberalisation, to remove impediments to, and lower barriers towards, freer and enhanced flows of goods, services, investment and technology within the region'.
  
- ☒ But a first and perhaps ultimate goal of the IOR-ARC is set up as being
  - 'To promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the Members States, and to common ground for regional economic cooperation'.




⌘ The extent to which this ultimate objective of the IOR-ARC will, or will not, be achieved seems to depend mainly on whether, in the long-run, the IOR-ARC members remain together simply for

✔ **greater trade with each other?**

➤ or they move beyond that in the direction of 'economic integration' by assuming **economic growth as a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving a regional development.**

The current heterogeneity and extreme inequalities in the economic performance and strength of Indian Ocean countries is detrimental and, indeed, may in the long run jeopardise the ambition for a gradual regional integration





### Virtuous, Vicious and Lop-sided Performance 1960-1992

	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1992
<b>Africa</b>			
Kenya	Vicious	Virtuous	Vicious
Madagascar	Vicious	HD lop-sided	Vicious
Mauritius	HD lop-sided	EG lop-sided	EG lop-sided
South Africa	Virtuous	Vicious	Vicious
Tanzania	Vicious	Vicious	Vicious
<b>South Asia</b>			
India	Vicious	Vicious	EG lop-sided
Pakistan	EG lop-sided	Vicious	EG lop-sided
Sri Lanka	Vicious	Virtuous	Virtuous
Bangladesh	Vicious	Vicious	Vicious
<b>East Asia</b>			
Indonesia	HD lop-sided	Virtuous	Virtuous
Malaysia	Virtuous	Virtuous	Virtuous
Myanmar	HD lop-sided	Vicious	Vicious
Singapore	Virtuous	Virtuous	Virtuous
Thailand	Virtuous	Virtuous	Virtuous

Source: Ramirez et al. (1989).

