

Key Triggers and Constraints for Civic Action in Mozambique:

Bad Things Come in Threes (“Não Há Duas Sem Três”)

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I. Introduction

“***Bad things come in threes***” – This seems to be the closest translation to the Portuguese popular proverb (“***Não há duas sem três***”); a literal translation would be something like “*There is no two without a three*”, but the former looks more familiar to the English speaking people.

So, if this popular proverb is right, it foresees no good news for peace and stability in Mozambique in the coming years. This rather determinist expectation is likely to be taken as a surprise by many participants at this workshop, for it counters the mood and widespread view of Mozambique as a successful case of transition to a post-conflict society-building.

The scarcity of long-lasting and really sustainable peaceful cases in Africa makes several analysts and politicians rather prone to holding sway upon the few successful cases available, such as Mozambique, while in turn they play down de many bad cases emerging, such as Ivory Coast and Kenya, to mention just two. For many years peace in these two countries was taken for granted.

I. Introduction

But what is really becoming astonishing is the stance of regional leaders towards shocking human tragedy such as the one in Zimbabwe. Some are even going as far as denying that the Zimbabwean post-election crisis is “no crisis”. This reminds me the funny lyrics of Mr. Bobby McFerrin’s song:

“Don’t Worry, Be Happy”.



We might have to admit that some SADC’s countries are increasingly becoming fans of Mr. McFerrin’s moto:

**“... In every life we have some trouble
When you worry you make it double
Don’t worry, be happy ...”.**

Botswana raps 'no crisis' Mbeki



Zim 'increasing the decibels of insanity'

Wendell Roelf | Cape Town, South Africa


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Zimbabwe's harassment of diplomats and aid groups shows it will fail to respect the rule of law during the June 27 presidential election run-off, the country's main opposition party said on Friday.

Mbeki 'not fit' to mediate in Zimbabwe
Chris McGreal,
Johannesburg

June 3, 2008

Page 1 of 2 | [Single Page View](#)



20 May 2008

['No crisis' Mbeki must go](#)



Mbeki must go.

<http://iluyisa.blogspot.com/2008/05/no-crisis-mbeki-must-go.html>

**AFRICA LETTER
Mbeki should blame himself for South Africa's troubles**

In this environment, to raise the concern about potential conflicts in Mozambique might seem an obsessive pessimism, or perhaps a nonsense joke. In any case, those who have not yet joined the “No crisis” stance may want to look at the historical evidence regarding the message of the above popular proverb.

Over the past half century Mozambique experienced two tragic, long and unfortunate wars (see more in the Annex 1):

1) The independence war (1964-1974)

2) The civil war (1977-1992)

Irrespectively of the causes these two wars, if the proverb that says “Bad things come in threes” is right, then we need to admit the third part of Mozambique’s bad luck has not arrived yet. In other words, depending on what we decide to do with our country another war can still emerge in the next future.

I am not going to back up this view with arguments such as the one put forward by Vaux et al. (2006: 9) in a paper called *Strategic Conflict Assessment in Mozambique*. With regard to the likelihood of new conflicts in Mozambique, this paper refers to World Bank research, suggesting the strongest indicator of future conflict is that such conflict has occurred in the past; so Vaux et al. concluded that Mozambique must be regarded as ‘at risk’ at least in principle.

It is not correct to speak in terms of “such conflict has occurred ...”. This is a rather weak explanation for it adds nothing new to the reasoning of the above proverb. One cannot simply assume that because a conflict occurred in the past, a new one is likely to occur in the future. If that was true, at least in principle we should also regard many European countries ‘at risk’ of a conflict, for in the past they had conflicts as well.

In practice conflicts usually occur for very different reasons. This was the case with the two major wars in Mozambique over the past half century. And if another war does occur in the next future it will be for its own reasons.

But there might be a catch here for another sort of explanation. In spite of the sharp differences between the independence and the civil wars, can we grasp any **common feature** in the past two wars likely to trigger yet a third war? Is there anything, say, a sort of an addition or propensity likely to trigger another major conflict in Mozambique?

I do think there is. And if I am right, such a common feature can then become a better justification for taking the above popular proverb seriously. I will keep that **common feature** hidden for now and come back to it below for two reasons. Firstly, I don’t want to sound that I am spoiling this workshop on civil society building with unjustified fears. Hence I better move directly to the issues I was asked to discuss.

Secondly, by first addressing the issues of this workshop I hope the concern behind the provocation raised by the above proverb will be taken more seriously.

Let us see ...

2. Main Issues to be addressed

In responding to the invitation for this workshop and in particular its main aim – **to identify main challenges in civil society building** – I will focus on three main issues:

1. What are the main constraints and triggers for civic action in Mozambique nowadays?
2. Under what conditions do citizens decide to act, and in particular, how do Mozambicans have dealt with fear, regarding political constraints?
3. How citizens will be able to overcome their constraints and what is the role of external actors (Who? What role can they play?)

Let me start by setting up the stage within a relatively old, but simple and insightful typology, I used last year in at least two occasions, including the paper with Konrad Matter made available to the participants of this workshop: “[Poverty Observatory in Mozambique](#)” (Francisco and Matter, 2007, <http://www.sarpn.org.za/index.php>).

3. Citizens Participation and Action

3.1. What Do We Mean by Participation?

- I respond to this question by borrowing Serry Arnstein's 1960s definition:
“Citizen participation is citizen power” (Arnstein)
- But what kind of power? And power for what? Two main aspects:
 - a) **Power to decide, influence decision-making**, determine the way to go, make leaders and the powerholders accountable;
 - b) **Increase negotiating power** that depends chiefly on the **means** (legal and non-legal instruments) and **resource** people have and own. These two things determine what economist like to call **“scarcity power”**, which determines the negotiation power of different actors: leaders, government officials, private entrepreneurs, CSOs, local leaders, women, men, minority groups, and so forth.
- Empty rituals, non-participatory means (manipulation and therapy) lead to disempowerment of citizens.
- KEY FEATURE HERE: **WEAK** VERSUS **STRONG** SCARCITY POWER OF THE **HAVES/POWER-HOLDERS** VERSUS THE **HAVE-NOTS**.

3.2. What is Civil Action?

- **What sort of action? Action for what?**

- President Guebuza often appeals to run, rather than wall only. Time and again he urges people to “accelerate the speed”. But where to?
- We know from traffic experience that if you over speed may be fined. So, what about in the development process? Is there a speed limit?
- I agree that in Mozambique we should be running fast to be able to remain in the same place.
- But again, the issue remains. Where to? Towards the quagmire or the precipice, as in the first decade of independence?


Participation and action processes are eminently political, rather than technical or administrative. The very process of selecting indicators and setting up a monitoring system is a complex procedure of political bargaining relationship, which has the potential to stimulate or constrain a debate on development priorities and strategies.

- **So let us consider two types of action:**

POSITIVE ACTION (Empowering civil society)	NEGATIVE ACTION (Desempowering civil society)
1. Enlarging people choices and opportunities, in the sense of the UNDP's definition of human development.	1. Constraining and depriving people's choice and opportunities
2. Srenghtening scarcity power of civil society.	2. Weak and/or bad institutions

4. On the Two First Issues: Triggers and Constraints of Civic Action

- The typology proposed by Sherry Arnstein in the 1960s comprises eight types in a ladder pattern, grouped in three main levels, where the rungs correspond to the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product.
- The bottom rungs of the ladder:
 - **Rungs 1 (Manipulation) and 2 (Therapy).** These two rungs describe levels of false or "non-participation" that substitute for genuine participation.
 - **Rungs 3, 4 and 5 progress to levels of "tokenism"** that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing, (4) Consultation and (5) Placation. Citizens may indeed hear and be heard, but they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. As for rung (5) Placation, it is simply a higher level of tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but the power-holders retain the right to decide.
 - Further up the ladder are the higher levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a **(6) Partnership** that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At the topmost rungs, **(7) Delegated Power** and **(8) Citizen Control**, have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power.




4.1 Key Constraints: Non-participation

4.1.1. MANIPULATION

- **Instead of genuine citizen participation**, the bottom rung of the ladder signifies the **distortion of participation** into a public relations vehicle by power-holders.
- **Cheating** has become one of the major threats to trust election processes. Increasingly, in several countries organized efforts by non-governmental groups and international organizations try to discourage cheating.
- Together with other CS disempowering processes (e.g. **corruption, deception, inefficiency**) cheating leads to distrust, or a growing withdrawal, alienation, self-exclusion and abstention from elections and mechanisms of citizen power.

4.1.2. Features and Examples of Manipulation

FEATURES	EXAMPLES
<p>1. Cheating in the elections</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the past Renamo and its leader has often complained about cheating, claimed that he has been robbed; • Faked elections at Eduardo Mondlane University to pretend students have elected
<p>2. Meetings that are not meaningful or even intending no meaningful outcomes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The citizen fatigue, see Francisco & Matter, 2007) • Negrão (2003) and Matsinhe (2006) refer to instrumentalization of CSOs;
<p>3. In the name of citizen participation, people are placed on rubber stamp advisory committees or advisory boards for “educating” them or engineering their support</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Placing traditional healers into Government programmes • Placing some women in some commission to simply avoid criticisms for not taken them into consideration
<p>4. Corruption and deception</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There are many report on this.
<p>5. “Manufacturing Consent”</p>	<p>Pequenino (2006), Mosse (2006) refer to the o people voice or business through CS projects.</p>
<p>6. Demagogy and populism</p>	
<p>7. Mandjermanes’ case – former migrants in the now defunct German Democratic Republic (GDR</p>	<p>The former migrants (known colloquially as "Mandjermanes") allegations of cheating, manipulation and misuse of their money.</p>



4.1.3. Non- participation: Therapy

- Groups masked as citizen participation, but on a dishonest and arrogant basis, or under a masquerade of involving citizens in planning:
 - Very often people complain they have been engaged in some extensive activities with purposes not very clear.
 - Gatherings, seminars or workshops, both in political and religious fora

(See Francisco & Matter, 2007)


FEATURES	EXAMPLES
1. Meeting for entreaining expectations	▪ Let the people speak, complain because in the end they feel better
2. Misuse of media	▪ Often Talk-shows provided by TVM and other stations pretend their programs are an effective way of participation and communion with the power-holders.
3. Some religious movements	▪ Misuse of people's fears and suffering
4. Mia Couto on "Queixa-Andar"	▪ This book provide interesting examples of therapy and manipulation

4.1.4. Consequences of Non-participation

There is an increasing number of examples of direct or indirect consequences related to civil non (positive) participation:


A) Increasing citizen withdrawal, abstention and disempowerment

Increasing Level of Abstention between 1994 and 2004 in General Multi-Party Election, Mozambique



Fonte: de Brito, 2006

Only the Presidents of the Republic and the 33 Municipalities (25% power holders) are directly elected by the people




B) Another consequence is alienation by dispossession from resources:

What kind of decentralization can be drawn from the pictures in the previous slide and the following two on the state and SCO budgets?


The State Budget Allocation

Despesas Correntes e de Investimento por Âmbito de Decisão, Moçambique 2007



The CSOs Budget Sources

State Budget Expenses Orçamento Level of Decision-making, Mozambique 2007



Consequences of Non-participation

- C) In a country with one single-absolutist landlord (the State), while the people are by the Constitution only allowed to becoming informal tenants, where else citizens can search for economic power?**
- The argument of power-holders has been rather cynical and demagogic. For more than thirty years the ruling politicians claim the land is own by the state because this the best way to protect people from foreigners' grabbing. Yet, throughout the years people have seen those who claim to protect the public good to turn into the private grabbers and speculators with the land that by the Constitution cannot be sold or bought, mortgaged or by no other means exchanged.
 - The ironic paradox is that ever since Independence the ruling power has alienated and disempowered the very people from its own land. The current Land Law made a slight attempt to minimize that disempowerment by recognizing the community rights. But this has been a flawed move for two reasons. First, in practice land continues to be claimed by two owners: the 'de jure' and the 'de fact' one. Second, the few attempts towards turn out to being a nightmare.
 - In the end, the land issue continues to be a taboo, rapped up by ideological arguments to cover up private interests. And whenever criticisms are raised the reply is something like Mr McFerring's lyrics: "Don't Worry, Be Happy" ... We are just protecting you.


Consequences of Non-participation

C) What is citizens' economic power in a country with one single-absolutist landlord (the State) while the citizens are legally converted into informal tenants?


- On this the argument of power-holders has been rather cynical. “We are just protecting people from foreigners' grabbing. Can't they find more effective protection ways? Curiously, when the current protectors become the grabbers and speculate with land, they reply “Don't Worry, Be Happy ... We are just protecting you”.

D) Lets look at the distribution of human and financial resources in the CSOs

Lorenz curve for CSOs' human resources (Gini=0.739)




Lorenz curve for CSOs' financial resource (Gini=0.940)



Consequences of Non-participation

C) Perhaps Mr. Mbeki has not totally cynical, as far as Zimbabwe deep crisis. Yes, Zimbabwe is in political troubles and has an inflation running at a ridiculous 100,000% and an estimated four million of the population seeking livelihoods outside the country.

So, what? Have a look at the current Top Company ranking in Southern Africa. If we exclude South African company, and within the country the multinationals and public company, 18 of the top 50 companies in Southern African are Zimbabwean. Where does the so-called successful country stands? The last one, with just one company, the beer company. Which one is in crisis? Zimbabwe? Yes, on some grounds, but as far as performance of individual complains, as one of the indicators of overall conditions of national economies, Mozambican economy is far from healthy.



GRANDE SONDAJEM SACANA

O SACANA realizou, a nível nacional, uma sondagem para saber qual a solução que a maioria dos moçambicanos prefere para resolver os seus problemas económicos.

Publicamos hoje os resultados:

"Sacana"

5.4.2002

p2



Pedir apoio à comunidade internacional

82%



Alugar uma pistola a um polícia e ir assaltar

13%



Arregaçar as mangas e ir trabalhar

5%

E) How are citizens dealing with fear due to factors like negligence, arrogance, authoritarianism ...




Tragedy in Maputo on 22nd March 2007:
Explosions at a military weapons depot. More than one hundred people were killed and several hundreds injured when shells and shrapnel blew into the air, as the initial blasts caused further detonations, in what can be considered the country's worst man made disaster outside a war zone.
Nobody was made publicly responsible and charged for such a disaster.

... or repression, increasing cost of living, and state failure to protect citizens?



November 2000 - Mozambique has been rocked by 80 mysterious deaths in a prison. Mozambique's president blamed Renamo, the main opposition party, for the violence, while Renamo blamed Frelimo, the party in power. In Montepuez, above, 46 fresh graves of Renamo supporters.



**Lynching
symptom of
state failure?**

**Maputo, Manica
and several other
parts of the
country have been
rocked by a series
of lynchings.**



**Maputo City: On
February 5,
2008 protests
swept across
the capital over
bus fares rises,
which led the
Government to
suspend them
and start
subsidising
some
transporters**




4.2. Triggers for Participation and Action: Tokenism and Citizen Power

4.2.1 Tokenims or “Symbolic participation” 3^o (INFORMATION) & and 4^o (CONSULTATION) Rungs

Information is a step towards legitimate citizen participation, while **Consultation** involves citizens’ opinions. These are legitimate steps towards full participation, but overall they involve no decision power, commitment, mutual deal and partnership

INFORMATION: One-way participation	CONSULTATION: Two-way participation
1. Government informs the society at the Parliament or elsewhere	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Goverment & Donor Joint-review invites CSOs as observers
2. Information on PARPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consultation groups
3. Surveys and opinion polls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 3. Poverty Observatory in Mozambique – its often called a partnership between CSOs and the Government, but in realitit is more a consultative forum (Francisco & Matter, 2007).



4.2.2. Tokenism - “Symbolic participation”

5º RUNG: PLACATION – It is at this level that citizens begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism is still apparent. However, a sort of negotiating or bargaining power is exercised, including through some potential threat.

These are not effective means towards good solutions, but they force power-holders to waken up, or to reconsider their position or yet to relax their arrogance.

PLACATION	INFORMALITY
1. “Madjermame case” -	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Informal occupation
2. “Operation espelho” (Mirrow operation) against street informal vendors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ People dispute State’s claims of property rights of land: thus, de juri and de fact property rights are in dispute.
3. “Grupo Mocambicano da Divida”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mozambican Debt Group helped the Government to get the relief on an increasing debt.
4. Lobbying groups – CTA, Trade Unions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There has been several lobbying groups, though very often lobbying as been more effective on an informal basis through networking
5. Protests, strikes, complaints,linchings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least in the surface these mass processes have no connection with CSO or even the main political parties.

4.3 . Citizen Power: Partnership, Delegated Power & Citizen Control

4.3.1. 5^o RUNG: PARTNERSHIP – At this rung power is in fact redistributed through negotiation between citizens and powerholders

Look at the scarcity power of each partner and figure out where the bargaining power lies

FEATURES	Bargaining Power
1. Government-Donors - The Joint Review (JR) between the Government and Aid Partners (PAPs)	▪ Donors supply 70% of state budget (on & off budget) - Agreements, Memos, ...
2. Government-CSOs	▪ Government provides 3% for CSOs
3. Private-CSOs	▪ Private/individuals provide 25% for CSOs
4. Donors-CSOs	▪ Donors provide 75% for CSOs
5. Private-Private	• Deals, contracts, memorandums of understanding

4.3.2. Citizen Power – Delegated Power and Citizen control

6° (DELEGATED POWER)– Negotiations between citizens and public officials can result in citizens achieving dominant decision-making authority over a particular plan or programme. Nowadays Mozambican society delegates too much power political parties, precisely the parties that in the first decade of independence messed things around, showed a rather arrogant and incompetent views in terms of find out a quick solution for a peaceful and tolerant institutional setting.

It looks like Mozambican politicians need about 10 to 15 years to work out and find a compromised (e.g national anthem – 10 year; recognition of HIV-AIDS 15 years; Peace agreement was reached after 16 years.

7° (CITIZEN CONTROL) – Power to decide over citizens' lives

DELEGATED POWER	CITIZEN CONTROL
1. About 95% of political power is delegated power to political parties, the presidents and government	▪ About 5% of political power-holders are elected through direct vote
2. CTA might be delegated by associate members	▪ Demand for community-controlled areas should increase
3. In principle citizens and members delegate power in several way	▪ Have-nots should press for greater degrees of power over their lives

5. Turning to the above Proverb – Two Common Features in Past Two Major Wars?

1. FUNDAMENTALIST AUTHORITARIANISM

Both the Portuguese Government (before 1975 – Salazar/Caetano Dictatorship) and the Mozambican Government (before 1990 – Dictatorship of proletariat) advocated a government based on an established system of authority, rather than on explicit or tacit consent.


Authoritarians believe either that it is good that government should be ordered in this way, or at least that it is necessary. More radical authoritarians argue there is a need to ensure stability against the advance of sceptical reflections. In practice from authoritarianism to fundamentalism no step is needed. A refusal to depart from a fundamental stance or doctrine in order to accommodate extraneous social or moral requirements is both in authoritarianism and fundamentalism.

So, if fundamentalist authoritarianism becomes unchecked and neither international community and the civil society counter it in an effective way, the potential for a new conflict emerge.

2. VERY WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY

During the colonial period (before 1975 – Salazar/Caetano Dictatorship) and also during the first 15 years of independence (before 1990 – Dictatorship of proletariat) Mozambican civil society was rather weak. As from the second post-independence Constitution in 1990, things have changed and improved in many respects. However, the overall Mozambican Civil Society has been unable to counter and show a relevant bargaining power in relation to both the Government and Donors.

Very soon the Foundation for Community Development (FDC) and CIVICUS will release the English version of the first report on Mozambique's 2007 Index of Civil Society. Should we simply "Don't worry and be happy" with the situation of civil society in Mozambique depicted below?



The diagram, depicting the state of Mozambican civil society in 2007, shows that civil society in Mozambique is generally balanced but relatively weak in its main dimensions.

The 2007 Mozambican Civil Society Index comprises 80 indicators. Each indicator was attributed a score between 0 and 3 (0 being the lowest value and 3 the highest). Among the 80 indicators 74% were ranked below the average score (1.5), and the remaining 26% mostly between 1.5 and 2 score

5.1. Bad Things Come in Threes? – Evidence for potential threes

The above common features in past conflict leads to a set of questions, which I will just enumerate and answer briefly:

QUESTION	SHORT ANSWER
1. Is there evidence for another authoritarian regime to introduce another dictatorship in Mozambique?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes! There is, though for the time being it remains in limbo. On this, see the latest Editorial by Salomao Moyana from Magazine, April 16, 2008, p. 7: “Coup agains democracy in Zimbabwe!”
2. Is there evidence of authoritarianism and confrontational approaches in the current political environment?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes! As illustrated below several cases of civic action have been dealt with repression and killing, namely: in November 2000, the Renamo’s street manifestations; the killing of Carlos Cardoso and Siba-Siba Macuacua; the Manjarmer protests; the recent fuel riots in Maputo City;
3. How do international observers assess the issue of autoritarism and confrontation in lthe leadership of the country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The latest Economist Unit speaks explicitly about Mr. Guebuza’s more authoritarian and confrontational approach than his predecessor, Joaquim Chissano.
4. How do people deal with the fear, with political constraints?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The reactions are multiple and are likely to remain so for the next future. Probably most people do not consider the likelihood of yet another war, but the seeds are emerging more often than not.
5.	

6. Final Remarks

Mozambique's successful transition to a post-conflict society-building has been its most relevant achievement, between earlier 1990s and nowadays. To argue this is the only relevant achievement in about 16 years of peace would be unfair. If for nothing else, at least for Lurdes Mutola, the remarkable 800 m runner, who emerged earlier in the 1990s from nowhere, grabbed the leadership of international 800 women's athletics and became one of the greatest champion in the world.

I have little doubt that both the 16 years peace experience so far and Mutola's remarkable performance helped to change Mozambique's bad image internationally. Particularly with regard to that unfortunate and shameful image of the 1980s, when the World Bank ranked Mozambique as the (first of the worst) poorest country in the world.

For a country that a decade earlier was ranked as the leading international cashew and tea producer and was producing famous soccer players like Eusébio and Coluna, undoubtedly we really messed things up in the first decade of independence . Some prefer to blame the external, but we know why they do so.

Contrary to very few African countries, such as Botswana and Mauricias, Mozambique cannot claim enough good reasons to take peace for granted yet. This doesn't mean there is reasons for no hope. Not at all! What it mean is that there is no reason to deceiving ourselves.

Mozambique is too short of TRUST, in many respects.

Those who prefer deception rather than critical and professional thinking may not like this stance. But we need to understand the motives of wishful thinkers and ad hoc voluntarists; that is those who prefer to interpret facts, reports, events and perceptions according to what they would like them to be, rather than according to the actual evidence and things actually are in reality.



Most of my concerns and fears regarding the recent political experience and prospects in Mozambique are drawn more from empirical than ideological evidence. There might certainly be biases, implicit assumptions, and false expectations. I also admit that for some purposes Mr. McFerrin's might be a good "panadol". As the song goes, in our life we have to expect some trouble. This is certainly right. But does this mean that worrying with urgent and relevant issues make them double? I don't think so .

Although Mozambican civil society is generally weak, in terms of its structure, organization, values and most importantly impact and bargaining power (with both Government and Donors), this situation needs to be changed substantially in the coming years. Strengthening civil society and society in general might be the best way to prevent further conflicts in the long-run. Indeed, if potential fundamentalist authoritarianism becomes unchecked I see no reason for discarding the popular proverb that says: **"Bad things come in threes".**

Annex 1: THE FIRST WAR - INDEPENDENCE WAR (1962-1975)

The former Portuguese regime, ruled by Salazar and then Marcelo Caetano, was overthrown by the coup d'état of April 25, 1974 in Lisbon, following ten years of war in the countries comprising Portugal's African Empire. Earlier in the 60s, Salazar thwarted the military plot against him, a major motive of which had been the military's reaction to his intransigent position on Africa. He refused to get into any deal with Eduardo Mondlane and other nationalists.

- My key point here, for the purpose of explaining the fear for yet another war, is that Salazar's long intransigency, arrogance and delay in following his European neighbours in coming to terms with African nationalism, fostered the creation of The Liberation Front of Mozambique, better known by the acronym FRELIMO, which in 1964 began a war that only stopped after the April 1974 Carnation Revolution, and the September 7, 1994 peace agreement between Portugal and FRELIMO.
- But as soon as FRELIMO got power by in 1975, Machel's Government established a one-party state based on the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" and set the stage for a new fight, this time aiming at a tolerant and tolerable democratic society



THE SECOND WAR:CIVIL WAR (1975-1992)

In 1977 a new resistance movement was formed by the name of Renamo, the Mozambique Resistance Movement. This force was formed to counter the Frelimo government and to disrupt the logistical flow of weapons to ZANLA guerrilla fighters based in Mozambique's border areas who were fighting against neighboring Rhodesia.

- After Rhodesia became Zimbabwe South Africa then became Renamo's chief sponsor. Machel refused to acknowledge the raison etre of RENAMO's fight. Instead, as from earlier 1980s started to engage into deals with those who until then were regarded as the most horrendous devils on Earth, namely: the apartheid regime and the US administration.
- Regardless of the rhetoric of each of the fighting parts, like in the previous war, Frelimo's the intransigency, arrogance and long delay in acknowledging and coming to terms with the fact that Independence did not really brought about democracy for all Mozambican people, fostered the anti-communist political faction RENAMO. It is true that the Rhodesian and later South African apartheid governments supported RENAMO, but so did the dictatorship of the Government provide enough reasons to turn against the establishment. Following the adoption of the 1990 Constitution, in 1992 Joaquim Chissano signed the Rome General Peace Accords with Afonso Dlakama, that at last put an end to the 16-civil war.

