



Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance Review 2007

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1. Introduction, methodology and indicators

1.1 Introduction and methodology

This is the fourth *independent evaluation of the Programme Aid Partners* (PAPs) performance in Mozambique.¹ These evaluations form part of the mutual accountability exercise in Mozambique, by which the performance of the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and of the group of donors that provide general budget support (GBS), the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs), are evaluated against the performance indicators that the GoM and the PAPs jointly adopt. The *performance indicators* for each party, GoM and PAPs, form the *Performance Assessment Framework* (PAF). Thus, *this report assesses the performance of the PAPs in 2007 against their PAF for that year.*²

The mutual accountability exercise, by which all parties involved in the aid system are evaluated against their PAFs, is a central component of the process that aims to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid in supporting social and economic development for poverty reduction. The Rome and the Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)³ between the GoM and the PAPs establish the vision, the principles and the rules of engagement between donors and recipient governments, aiming to improve harmonization (between donor's procedures and mechanisms) and alignment (of donors' activities relative to recipient government policies, priorities and procedures).

In this context, the main principle of aid effectiveness is that the recipient government provides the political leadership and the practical tools and mechanisms around which the aid process is harmonized and aligned and the decisions on aid allocation are taken. Another key principle of aid effectiveness is that both parties, donors and recipient governments, have obligations and responsibilities and that the

¹ The first evaluation was carried out in 2005 by a team led by Tony Killick, which evaluated the PAPs' performance in 2004 (*T. Killick, C. Castel-Branco and R., Gester. 2005. Perfect Partners? The Performance of Programme Aid Partners in Mozambique 2004*). The second evaluation was carried out in 2006 by an Ernst & Young team led by Carlos Castel-Branco, which evaluated the PAPs' performance in 2005 (*Ernst & Young. 2006. Review of PAPs' Performance in 2005 and PAPs' PAF Matrix Targets for 2006*). The third was carried out in 2007 by a team led by Carlos Castel-Branco with research support from Nelsa Massingue and Tonecas Rafael, which evaluated the PAPs' performance in 2006 (*C. Castel-Branco (with research support from Nelsa Massingue and Tonecas Rafael). 2007. Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance Review 2006*). These reports can be downloaded from the Programme Aid Partners website www.pap.org.mz. Links to these reports are also available from IESE's website www.iese.ac.mz.

² The PAPs' PAF for 2007, which includes the ranking mechanism based on points given to the achievement of each indicator, can be downloaded from the PAPs website www.pap.org.mz.

³ The Rome and the Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness and the MoU between the GoM and the PAPs can be downloaded from the PAPs' website www.pap.org.mz.

effectiveness of aid in supporting social and economic development for poverty reduction depends on the performance of both parties in meeting such obligations and responsibilities. These obligations and responsibilities are summarized in each party's annual PAF.

At this stage, four key points about this study and report should be clarified.

First, *this is an independent report* produced by a team of consultants to the best of their ability provided the information and knowledge that are available to them, the terms of reference of the study, and the PAFs' PAF matrix and its rating system.⁴ This report does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the GoM or of the PAFs, although the report has benefited from interviews with all PAFs and GoM officials from key Ministries, and from critical comments made by both parties on the draft version of the report. It is up to the GoM and the PAFs to decide how to use the report, what lessons should be learned and what practical actions should be taken to improve the PAFs' performance and the overall effectiveness of aid in Mozambique.

Second, *the methodology adopted to evaluate the PAFs has limitations*, such that the results presented in the report should be taken cautiously and should not be read mechanically. As mentioned, the PAFs' performance is assessed against a matrix of commitments and a rating (points) system. Any such a system is biased towards one or another view of what the major inputs to aid effectiveness are and how they merge together to achieve the desired results, and this bias should reflect a consensus about priorities. The current matrix gives significantly more weight to portfolio composition of ODA and predictability of disbursements (a total of 50% of the points) because of the focus on aid as a public finance resource. Given that 85% of aid from the PAFs finance public projects – 36% of which is actually delivered through General Budget Support (GBS) – then a matrix biased towards portfolio composition and predictability seems to be the obvious consequence of such aid dynamics, as well as complying with an intentional decision to consolidate such aid dynamics. Nonetheless, even if one considers that the current bias is “the right thing to do”, the matrix is still biased.

This means that for each PAF there are elements that are not assessed, such that the matrix does not necessarily capture the entire dynamics of the aid process. As long as a PAF provides the *adequate* (relative to the target) shares of GBS and program aid and is predictable, it is going to be included in the group of top performers. PAFs that are good all round but do not provide the *adequate* share of GBS and program aid are very likely to be in the group of weak performers. Thus, readers should be

⁴ See annex 9 for the terms of reference for the current study.

aware that the relative position of the PAPs is, generally, dependent on the structure of the PAPs' PAF matrix. This exercise does not intend to, or claim to, make a detailed assessment of each PAPs' overall performance. The assessment that is presented in this report refers to performance relative to a matrix with a given structure, weights and biases.

Third, the PAPs, particularly those that rank low in the overall evaluation, are likely to criticize the results and the methodology and, rightly, claim that this exercise does not capture the overall performance of PAPs (nor was the study intended to do so, as has already been mentioned). However, although the assessment and the report have been produced by an independent team of consultants, the framework for the evaluation was provided by the PAPs – the definitions, the indication of projects that fall within the different categories, the matrix with its indicators and targets and the scoring system. Thus, while the PAPs may be right in their criticism, they should bear in mind that they defined the framework and the terms of reference of the evaluation. Hence, what the PAPs and the GoM can do to improve the quality of the evaluation is to change its framework, including the PAF's targets, rather than criticizing the results of the evaluation *per se*.

Fourth, Austria, which became the 19th PAP in the middle of 2007, is not evaluated in this study because its commitments as a PAP only take effect from 2008.

1.2. Comments on indicators

1.2.1. Adjusted indicators

Some of the PAPs' PAF indicators are not as fair and clear as they should be, do not necessarily address the problem they were intended to, or strongly depend on assumptions about what the other party is going to do. Some examples will help to clarify the point:

- Targets for indicator 7 (*ODA disbursed by PAPs as % of its aid recorded in GoM budget*) have not been defined when the matrix was approved, so that the PAPs cannot be evaluated on this indicator. However, we collected the information for 2007 which may be a useful baseline to set up targets for 2008.

As a result, the team decided to eliminate the points from this indicator for all PAPs, and hence reduce the total number of points available.

- Indicator 10 (*strict harmonization between new bilateral agreements for GBS and the MoU*) creates a problem for individual PAPs that have no *new* bilateral agreements in place. Furthermore, not all bilateral agreements have already been evaluated for “*strict harmonization with the MoU*”. Hence, if this indicator is strictly applied, some PAPs are penalized by losing points only because their agreements are not yet new or have not been evaluated.

As a result, the team decided to eliminate the points from this indicator for all PAPs individually and hence reduce the total number of points available.

- The target for indicator 14 (missions) is going to be slightly adjusted. Note that “missions” are defined according to the OECD/DAC). As it stands in the matrix, a PAP that has only one mission, but which is not joint, is penalized relative to another that has, for example, 20 missions, of which 6 are joint. Given that the indicator is attempting to reduce burden on GoM, its current logic does not make sense. To adjust this indicator, we took the maximum number of missions allowed for the group (140), excluded 30% (the defined target for the share of joint missions), divided the remaining number of missions by the donors and gave different weights to large multilateral and individual donors. So, we came up with a different formulation for the target, which sets the following:
 - The group target sets a limit of 140 missions for the group. If each bilateral has 7 missions and each multilateral 12 (as they have more projects and are bigger donors), the total number of missions reaches 141. Thus, independently of the share of joint missions, bilateral donors should not exceed 7 missions and multilateral donors should not exceed 12, or the group target will not be achieved.
 - Individual PAPs should have not more than 7 missions each, of which at least 30% should be joint; or have 3 missions or less and none of them needs to be joint. Failing to achieve one of these two conditions, no points are awarded. This also means that a PAP with 4 missions but only 1 (25%) joint also gets the points. From 5 missions onwards (up to a maximum of 7), the PAP needs to have 30% joint to get the points.
 - Large multilateral donors should have no more than 12 missions each, of which at least 30% need to be joint; or have 6 missions or less, none of them needing to be joint. Failing to achieve one of these two conditions, no points are awarded. This also

means that a PAP with 7 or 8 missions will get the points even if the share of joint missions does not exceed 25%.

- Indicator 15 (*analytical work that is coordinated*) is aimed at maximizing synergies and minimizing transaction costs for the GoM. However, it produces some weird results. A significant number of donors do not undertake any analytical work at all, and a few have a huge agenda of analytical work. Very few of the studies are done jointly (involving more than one PAP). It is almost impossible to define studies that are not, in a broad sense, aligned with GoM priorities, as such priorities, as defined by the PARPA, are very wide ranging. Now, PAPs that undertake no studies get all the points, while PAPs with a large number of studies of which not enough (55%) are jointly done, do not get the points. Thus, this indicator rewards free riding as those PAPs that do not undertake analytical work rely, for their decision making, on the PAPs that do undertake analytical work. Yet, the first group gets the points for using the information and knowledge produced by the second group; while the second group, which produces the knowledge and information, is penalized.

Additionally, it is not realistic to believe that most of the analytical work can be done jointly, because agencies have different areas of expertise, interest and focus and different capacities to perform studies. Thus, while it is desirable that different agencies undertake the same study separately, it is to be expected that if the initiative for analytical works comes mostly from donors studies are not necessarily going to be jointly done (although they can be jointly financed).

Of course this indicator was aimed at providing incentives for harmonization and alignment of analytical work, which is a valid aim. However, it might be possible that such an aim is better achieved through more direct approaches: for example, by the development of a joint (GoM and PAPs) medium term plan of analytical work to be carried out in order to improve different areas of economic and financial governance and sector policy and planning according to the priorities of GoM medium term development framework and provide information and knowledge for policy and strategy development, analysis and monitoring and evaluation. (DNEAP, in the Ministry of Planning and Development, could become the focal point to develop and coordinate this agenda of articulated analytical work.)

As a result, the team decided to eliminate the points from this indicator for all PAPs individually and hence reduce the total number of points available, such that no PAP would be unfairly penalized. However, the indicator is evaluated for the group analysis.

1.2.2. *Indicators that need to be adjusted for the next exercise*

- There are donors whose portfolio is dominated by projects rather than more programmatic modalities and activities. In some of these cases, donors are in projects at the request of the GoM – for example, the “Caixa Escolar” project in education – or because they are involved in large scale public investment in infra-structure run as a project (in some cases not even reported in the budget) by choice of the GoM. Yet, the matrix has no mechanisms to differentiate between donor driven project aid that is not programmatic by nature and intention, and project aid that is recipient government led. Thus, all PAPs with large project aid based portfolios are penalized in the same way, which is less than fair. This problem should be corrected for the ext evaluation, as it contributes to reduce the credibility and accuracy of the analysis.
- In relation to the previous point, the matrix needs to be adjusted because of another problem related to portfolio composition. There are PAPs that do not achieve the PAF’s matrix targets for portfolio composition but are above the Paris Declaration targets for programmatic aid (for example, Denmark).⁵ Because they do not achieve the PAF’s targets they get no points. This problem should be corrected for the next evaluation. There are different ways of correcting this. First, PAPs that are on or above Paris target should get part of the points even if they are below the PAF’s targets – this is the first best solution because it still rewards the leading PAPs but gives credit to those that at least comply with Paris targets. Second, the PAF’s matrix should be aligned with Paris targets – this is a second best solution because it does not take into consideration the experience and progress that has already been achieved in Mozambique.
- It might be necessary to revise the share of points allocated to portfolio composition, because two indicators (10% of the total number of PAF indicators) get 22% of the points. Although aid modalities are a key component of aid effectiveness, indicators directly related to predictability, utilization of government systems and coordinated technical cooperation are as important. Furthermore, given the Mozambican and international experience, and the international set of indicators, it might be necessary to give more points to the share of programmatic aid than to the share of GBS. Hence, the PAPs and the GoM should consider the need to: (i) reduce slightly the share of points given to portfolio composition and increase the share of points given to predictability and other key indicators (such as coordinated technical cooperation); and (ii) within

⁵ The Paris Declaration does not include targets for GBS, but sets targets for the share of aid delivered through programmatic forms.

the group of indicators for portfolio composition, increase the share of programmatic aid relative to the share of GBS.

The revision of the structure of points in the matrix could become a common practice in order to make the matrix a dynamic instrument that at different stages helps to push forward the areas of aid effectiveness that have become more problematic or have been left behind. Over the past 3 years, the PAPs made considerable progress with respect to portfolio composition, in part due to the pressure related with the PAF's commitments, but in areas like predictability, alignment, government systems and coordinated technical cooperation progress has been much slower. This, by itself, might justify a change in the structure of the matrix, as long as the PAPs agree at least to maintain the progress made in portfolio composition.

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Despite its shortcomings, the methodology adopted reflects the commitments that the PAPs made with respect to their performance in 2007. Thus, whereas the reader is warned that the evaluation based on the PAPs' PAF matrix does not always reflect the whole truth and that the subsequent results should be treated with care, the matter of fact is that the PAPs are assessed, in this report, against their own commitments reflected in their PAF and their decisions taken to implement such commitments in 2007.

The report is organized in four further sections. Section two provides an overall picture of the performance of the PAPs group as a whole, while section three discusses the assessment of each individual PAP. Section four raises some more general issues that are related to the exercise. The annexes include all the processed and organized data that was utilized for the analysis.

The authors would like to thank the PAPs Troika, particularly Jolke Oppewal and Per Mogstad, and the PAPs Secretary, Benilde Garrine, for their unlimited and unconditional support provided during the study. We would also like to thank GoM officials, particularly the Directors António Laíce, Domingos Lambo, Adriano Ubisse, Gamiliel Munguambe, Cristina Matusse and Amélia Muthemba, as well as Caroline Ennis, Hanifa Ibrahim, Arginaldo and Aristotle, for their contribution to the study. In some of the interviews with PAPs, the study also benefitted from the presence of the OECD/DAC consultant, Roberto Tibana, who sometimes helped to clarify OECD/DAC definitions for some of indicators. Finally, we would like to thank all PAPs for the interest, efforts and responses to the demands of the study, and for critical suggestions that will help to improve the quality of the assessment and final report.

2. Group Evaluation

2.1. *Performance with respect to PAPs' PAF indicators*

Tables 2.1 (below) and A.1.2. (Annex 1), show the performance of the PAP group, as a whole, relative to the PAPs' PAF matrix for 2007. Progress has been made in several areas of the PAF indicators:

- The shares of GBS and Program Aid in total ODA from the PAPs to the GoM have increased, between 2006 and 2007, from 34% and 55% to 36% and 61% respectively, thus getting closer to the targets, and contributing to strengthen the tools and conditions for government leadership and coordination and for greater aid alignment and effectiveness;
- The number of agencies with GBS financial agreements of less than 3 years has been reduced from 5 in 2006 to 3 in 2007, thus contributing to increase medium term predictability;
- All agencies made their commitments for 2008 within four weeks of the Joint Review (JR) in 2007 (in 2006, one agency had failed to do so);
- All agencies disbursed confirmed GBS in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled (in 2006, two agencies had failed to do so) and only one agency failed to disburse according to the quarterly schedule (five had failed in 2006), thus improving short term predictability;
- The share of PAP's ODA reported in the GoM budget increased from 67% in 2006 to 98% in 2007, thus strengthening the role of the GoM and public finance management systems in macroeconomic policy development and management;
- The share of PAP's ODA disbursed using GoM budget execution procedures increased from 44% to 61%, thus strengthening GoM control of aid resources;
- Four agencies eliminated some Annex 10 exceptions (see MoU), but not all, in 2007, thus contributing to increase harmonization;
- Between 2006 and 2007, the number of missions involving GoM officials has been reduced from 203 to 191 and the share of joint missions increased from 10% to 18%, thus contributing to reduce the administrative burden and transaction costs faced by GoM.

Table 2.1: Matrix of performance of the PAPs group

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1b	% of GBS in PAPs total ODA	40% (4)	36%	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid in total PAPs ODA disbursed	72% (4)	61%	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	% PAPs with multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	100% (3)	83% (3 PAPs failed)	0
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	100% (3)	100%	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	100%(4)	Fiscal Year = 100% ; Schedule = 94% (One PAP failed).	0
	ODA in the government budget	6	% of PAPs ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	98%	2
		7	PAPs ODA disbursed as percentage of aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	94%	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAPs adhere to GBS common conditionality.	100%	94% (One PAP failed)	0
		9	Number of PAPs with NO Annex 10 exceptions	14 (1)	12 have NO exceptions; 4 PAPs eliminated some exceptions in 2007; One did nothing; One is in consultations with HQ	0
		10	Strict harmonization between new bilateral agreements for GBS and MoJ	100% (1)		-
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAPs ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	61%	2
		11b	% PAPs ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	37%	0
		11c	% PAPs ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	49%	2
		12	% PAPs ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	51%	2
		14a	% of total missions that are joint	30%	18%	0
14b	Total number of missions	140	191	0		
15	% of analytical work that is coordinated	55% (1)	71%	1		
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs	27 (2)	21	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAPs TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	38%	0
		19	% sector-wide TC as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	21%	1
Total points						15

However, the figures also show that:

- Only in one indicator (commitments for GBS within 4 weeks of the JR) all PAPs met the target established and that, *on average*, each indicator was met by only two thirds of the PAPs;
- Of the 18 aggregate matrix indicator targets that can realistically be estimated, only 8 were met by the PAPs as a group. This means that the PAPs, as a group, failed to meet 56% of the targets set in the PAPs' PAF;
- For the PAPs, the most difficult areas continue to be those related to portfolio composition (% of GBS and Program Aid in total ODA to GoM), use of national auditing systems, number of missions and joint missions, and coordinated technical cooperation (TC). In these indicators, the PAPs failed to meet the group targets and also less than 45% of the PAPs met the individual targets. These areas, hard public finance management issues (portfolio composition, auditing) and typical collective action problems (missions, TC), had been the most difficult ones also in 2006 and 2005.

If points were to be given to the group as a whole, the PAPs as a group would receive 15 out of a maximum of 37 points, which is 41%. This is a weak overall performance relative to PAF's indicators and targets. Additionally, in 2006, the overall result of the group was 69%, so that the group, as a whole, has had a worse performance in 2007 relative to 2006.

How can this overall weak result be explained when the group has improved on so many indicators, as mentioned before? First, the group gets all the points for achieving the target, and none for not achieving it. There are no points for progress. Thus, no matter how far or how close to the target the group is, as long as the target is not met the group gets no points. Hence, despite some significant progress in the problematic areas, the group continues not achieving the target, although it is getting closer to it. To illustrate the point, the group lost 15 points in 18 available for the first 4 indicators, all related to portfolio composition and predictability, where significant progress (though not enough to meet the targets) was made in 2007. Second, the structure of the matrix and of the points was also slightly changed in 2007 such that the two matrices (2006 and 2007) are no longer fully comparable.

2.2. Qualitative assessment of PAPs' performance made by the GoM and by the PAPs

2.2.1. GoM's assessment of the PAPs in 2007

As part of the assessment of PAPs' performance in 2007, Directors and other staff of the Ministries of Planning and Development (MPD), Finance (MdF) and Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINEC) were interviewed (see Annex 7 for the list of interviews).

In these interviews, GoM officials considered the following as the areas of significant improvement in 2007:

- In the mid-term review, donors respected the principle of alignment between the strategic matrix of PARPA and the GoM's PAF, such that no new indicators were introduced. This decision was highly appreciated by the GoM;
- The introduction of indicative commitments for the projects has been considered, by the GoM, a very useful innovation to be consolidated over time;
- The need to respect the planning and budgeting cycle has become clearer for most donors, and this is beginning to show, through increasing alignment of information flows, commitments and disbursements, including at sector level, with this cycle;
- The introduction and adoption of the principles of the EU code of conduct and division of labor are seen as important steps towards the implementation of the principles of Aid Effectiveness;
- Finally, it was mentioned that the mutual evaluation process in 2007, namely the JR and the Mid-Year Review (MYR), was more effective and efficient than in previous years, at working group level, mostly due to accumulation of experience over the years. There continues to be a need for further thought on the second phase (drafting of Aide memoire) to ensure that the document truly reflects consensus, or failing that, both PAP and GoM views of key issues are clearly expressed. The inclusion of the civil society in the process is mentioned as very important, although it is acknowledged that the dominant structure and goals of the exercise are not yet fully conducive to a clear and proactive role for the civil society organizations.

On the other hand, the following were mentioned as problems that remain and areas in which significantly more joint work needs to be done:

- While it can be said that programmatic aid is working well, there is still a lot of work to be done with projects, namely: consolidation of the system of indicative commitments; formalization of all projects with the GoM through approved project documents and registration in the budget; improving predictability and implementation capacity in both common funds and projects (current rate of budget execution even in priority sectors and projects averages 61%); elimination of parallel conditionality in both projects and sector aid (such as the ADB and the World Bank's demand of additional legal and auditing requirements and different disbursement conditions); elimination of the "no objection" clause when conditions exist for implementation of the GoM's procurement system;
- Pressure to incorporate all ODA on budget is mounting, and so is the pressure to convert projects into common funds. However, some of these projects operate with specific conditionality and within specific institutional conditions that are not consistent with common funds and on-budget ODA. Hence, the key question is how to change such conditionality and other institutional conditions in order to make such projects consistent with programmatic, on-budget ODA and to avoid forcing inappropriate conditionality and other rules into the budget system;
- There are still many projects (particularly those involving NGOs, small donors and non harmonized/aligned donors) that even the sector groups do not know about. Many of these projects are not implemented through the GoM but are complementary to mainstream projects implemented by or through GoM departments. Some donors are trying to include this type of projects in the budget but they are run with different rules and are very difficult to monitor (hence, it is difficult to collect information on execution);
- Concern over decentralization is having an impact on changing the structure of ODA to sectors away from programmatic aid. For example, in the health sector vertical funds have become, by far, the most important channel for funds into the sector because of the strategic choice made by two or three donors (most of the other important donors finance one or more of the common funds). Although it could be claimed that the vertical funds are, broadly speaking, aligned with GoM policies for the sector, they are basically managed by the donors according to their own priorities and vision. The share of programmatic aid in this sector is falling sharply.
- Concern about possible increase in transaction costs and complexity of evaluation in the light of the new EU "MDG Contract" approach to GBS.

- The manner in which unspent funds are re-incorporated in the budget contributes to reduce the credibility of the budget. This issue needs to be discussed further at technical level;
- Technical cooperation (TC) is an area where a lot more progress needs to be made and can be made, but many donors insist on maintaining the *modus operandi* of uncoordinated TC. Progress with coordinated TC will help public sector reform and will be helped by public sector reform.
- The terms and the process of dialogue at political level need to be respected by all parties. The letter with the issues for discussion at political level should include all issues and be agreed with the GoM, and no further issues of substance should be included at the last minute by individual donors or GoM institutions. During reviews there is a need for broader joint discussion at the correct level (i.e. not simply within the drafting team) of key issues prior to incorporation in the Aide Memoire. Given that the aid process is supposed to be a *partnership* for development, parties need to work as partners, with the final document representing either a consensus reached following extensive discussion, or both views.;
- The question of the rationalization and structure of the working groups needs to be discussed further and agreed between all parties involved, in a coordinated manner. Groups are many, transaction costs are high and capacities are limited, but the issue needs a coordinated discussion;;
- Finally, the GoM officials mentioned that the PAPs Secretariat needs to be much strengthened, as it can play, and has played in the past, a key role in coordinating, processing and analyzing information, guaranteeing the coordination of the key events at technical level, liaising between GoM departments and PAPs at the technical level (where things happen), promoting or organizing the implementation of action plans and other initiatives that develop from the performance evaluations and other studies, etc. Challenges related to the harmonization and alignment process will only increase over time, and the group needs to do some serious thinking about the executive, full time organization that needs to be in place to deal with these challenges.

The GoM officials identified six main challenges for 2008 and beyond, namely:

- The development of a practical and solid aid policy and strategy that guides, encourages and promotes international development partnerships;
- The formulation of the new MoU for GBS and development of the sector and common fund MoUs within similar lines;
- The strengthening of the GoM and the PAPs executive institutional framework for analysis of aid dynamics, trends, effectiveness and policy impact;
- The consolidation, development and expansion of progress already achieved in terms of portfolio composition, predictability, utilization of GoM systems and mutual accountability at GBS and sector levels;
- Achieving significant progress in coordination of technical cooperation along the lines of programmatic aid; and
- Making ODAMoz work to facilitate and improve macroeconomic policy analysis as well as the assessment of aid effectiveness, trends and dynamics in Mozambique.

2.2.2. PAPs assessment of themselves in 2007

As part of the assessment, the PAPs were asked to comment on individual and group issues related to the PAPs' performance in 2007 in which significant improvement was made and/or which are still lagging behind and represent challenges for the future. On the improvements, the PAPs mentioned the following issues:

- Impact on the state budget and public finance management: all donors have committed within 4 weeks of the JR; all donors, but one, disbursed in the fiscal year and according to the quarterly schedule; a higher share of aid is recorded in the budget; an overall increase in the share of GBS and programmatic aid was registered and this improves the conditions for harmonization, alignment and GoM leadership; the alignment between commitments and disbursements of GBS and sector aid was improved and this has a strong impact on predictability, budget credibility and public finance management; significant progress has also been achieved with respect to increasing the share of aid that uses national procurement systems;

- Progress with respect to MoUs: the GBS MoU has been consolidated as a reference point to developing sector MoUs; some significant progress has been achieved with the health sector MoU; work has started, involving all PAPs, to develop the new MoU for GBS, which confirms the commitment of donors towards the aid partnership in Mozambique.
- The implementation of the letter and spirit of the EU Code of Conduct and Division of Labor has given a new impulse towards a more rational and focused approach to the construction of the aid portfolios of each donor. This is raising new challenges with respect to cooperation and delegation amongst PAPs, but it has already been reflected in better focused new donor strategies and some rationalization of the number of donors per sector.
- ODAMoz works, although a lot more work is required to improve the quality and relevance of the data, to coordinate codes and procedures, to produce timely and needed reports for evaluation of the PAPs and for GoM policy making, evaluation and monitoring, and to guarantee that information on planned ODA is not erased by the system.
- Rationalization of the Working Groups has started, and the mapping exercise that was concluded in 2007 will be extremely useful for future discussion, analysis and decision making towards a more functional and rational structure of work.

As far as issues that are still lagging behind, the PAPs mentioned the following:

- Coordinated TC (which has not developed very much after the 2005/2006 study), Working Groups structure (which is still too heavy and costly) and the parallel auditing procedures that still apply for most common funds, are significant problems to address, where progress has been very slow and the need for change is very strong;
- Division of labor is still a significant problem: cases of delegated cooperation are few and short lived and many donors are still reluctant to adjust their strategies and priorities to GoM needs and requests. These problems will raise significant challenges for the practical implementation of the EU Code of Conduct.
- The MoU in the health sector was not signed in 2007, showing that, despite progress, there remain significant problems in muddy zones between sector budget support, basket funds and other related issues.

- Despite very significant progress, the process of aid evaluation and mutual accountability is still too heavy and costly in terms of coordination, administration, and the implications of these for the magnitude of transaction costs for donors and GoM. The question is how to streamline the process without losing the experience of working group based discussion and joint evaluation. Creating a stronger Secretariat might be one of the steps forward.
- The process of aid evaluation and mutual accountability is still driven mostly by donors. In addition to all the problems that this creates in terms of leadership and ownership, it also affects the quality of the partnership.
- There is a real risk of transforming some of the PAPs organizations into a sort of parallel or shadow government, as they tend to become too involved in management, decision making and policy development. Some donors are still measuring progress (or lack of it) as a function of the GoM implementation of policy priorities developed or suggested by donors, irrespective of their adequacy and of the endogenous policy debate. The perception that large donors or international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, can provide the capacity for policy development, analysis and monitoring and that the recipient government needs little more than managerial and procurement capacities to implement such policies, is still present and strong with some donors.

The biggest challenges identified by PAPs for the coming years are:

- The development of a new GBS MoU and new MoUs for sector-wide aid and common funds;
- Bringing forward the issues of coordinated TC, Working Groups, division of labor and the clarification and strengthening of the harmonization and alignment process at sector level;
- The improvement of the quality of ODAMoz and of the effectiveness of linking it on a more solid basis with other GoM information and policy analysis systems.
- Significantly improving alignment with budget execution, reporting, auditing and other systems of public finance management, such as procurement;
- Revision of the PAPs' PAF indicators and targets, in consultation and agreement with the GoM.

3. Individual Evaluation

As was mentioned before, the individual PAPs are not going to be evaluated on three indicators:

- Indicator 7, because it does not have an established target. Information on achieved results is going to be given, as this may be a useful baseline to set up targets for 2008 and beyond;
- Indicator 10, because not all PAPs had new bilateral agreements in 2007 and not all those that had new agreements had been evaluated for strict harmonization with the MoU;
- Indicator 15, because it rewards free riding, even if this is not the intention of the indicator.

As a result, the total maximum number of points available for the each individual PAP is 36, rather than the original 40. Although the individual PAPs are not evaluated against these indicators (such that they do not gain or lose points), information on performance relative to the indicators is given in the tables.

For the ranking of PAPs, two related figures are used: the total number of points (with a maximum of 36) for the absolute rank; and the percentage of points (total number of points achieved by the PAP divided by 36 and multiplied by 100) for the relative position on the scale of 0 to 36.

3.1. African Development Bank (ADB)

Table 3.1. illustrates ADB's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. ADB's performance received 19 out of possible 36 points, this is 53%.

Table 3.1: African Development Bank (ADB) 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	40	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	43	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2

	All ODA to government	7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	70	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	no	0
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	no	0
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	40	0
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	40	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	40	0
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	40	0
14a		% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	18 22% joint	0	
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	25			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	11	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	8	0
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	0	0
Total points						19

ADB has improved with respect to portfolio composition relative to 2006, although it failed to meet the programme aid target. ADB has made significant improvements with respect to predictability, but it is still very weak in all areas of harmonization and alignment and in technical cooperation.

Almost half of ADB's portfolio is in large public infra-structure projects. While this is vital for the country, ADB has been "punished" for focusing on such projects. The same happens, to various degrees, with other donors such as the World Bank and the European Union. It would be important to review the classification of such projects prior to the next donor evaluation, because they are important and in some cases it is more efficient and effective to run them as projects.

3.2. Belgium

Table 3.2. illustrates Belgium performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Belgium's performance received 32 out of possible 36 points, this is 89%, which is a good improvement on the already good

performance of 2006. Belgium had a very strong all round performance. Their only weak point is related to the fact that most of their non-GBS aid goes to projects, such that they failed to meet the target of indicator 2 (programme aid). In all other aspects, Belgium's performance was very good.

Table 3.2: Belgium 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	49	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	65	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	88	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	113	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	65	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	49	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	65	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	65	2
14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	1 0% joint	1		
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	100			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	77	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	46	1
Total points						32

3.3. Canada

Table 3.3. illustrates Canada's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Canada's performance received 22 out of possible 36 points, this is 61%. This is a good improvement on the 2006 performance by Canada.

Table 3.3: Canada 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	13	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	56	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	85	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	117	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	no	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	94	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	13	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	42	0
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	42	0
14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	8 25% joint	0		
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	81	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	81	1
Total points						22

Canada's weak points are still mostly related to the portfolio structure – its composition and the impact of portfolio composition on how resources are channeled through the PFM system. Canada's portfolio

structure is affected by its commitment to a large public project within the Ministry of Education and Culture – Caixa Escolar. This project is a component of FASE but it is the GoM's choice to run it as a project. It is expected that this project will be fully integrated in FASE from 2008, such that Canada's performance may improve very significantly when it comes to portfolio and related indicators.

Otherwise, Canada was a good all round performer and one of the best on the difficult indicators related to capacity strengthening.

3.4. Denmark

Table 3.4. illustrates Denmark's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Denmark received 24 out of possible 36 points, this is 67%. This is a good improvement on the 2006 performance by Denmark.

Table 3.4: Denmark 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	31	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	62	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		All ODA to government	7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	97
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	yes	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	58	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	31	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	45	2
12		% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	45	2	
14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	⁹ 44% joint	0		

		15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	75	
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	3	0
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	75	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	28	1
Total points						24

Denmark's only weak point is related to the composition of portfolio, as they failed to meet the first two targets, for GBS and programme-based aid share of total ODA to the GoM (losing 8 points in the process). However, Denmark's programme aid share of ODA to GoM is over and above the Paris indicator, although it does not meet the PAF indicator. This is one of the cases that needs to be revised prior to the next evaluation.

Otherwise, Denmark was an all round very good performer.

3.5. DFID

Table 3.5. illustrates DFID's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. DFID received 36 out of possible 36 points, this is 100%. This confirms DFID's excellent performance of 2006.

Table 3.5: DFID 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	68	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	99	4
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	99	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	117	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	

	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	85	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	68	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	76	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	78	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	1 0% joint	1
		15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	67	
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	82	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	26	1
Total points						36

3.6. European Union (EU)

Table 3.6. illustrates the EU's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. The EU received 23 out of possible 36 points, this is 64%. This is precisely the same result achieved by the EU in 2006.

Table 3.6: European Union 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	39	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	61	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	no	0
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	80	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	no	0
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	yes	
	Utilization of government	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	57	2

	systems and reporting	11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	40	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	50	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	50	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	8 50% joint	1
		15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	95	
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	55	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	40	1
Total points						23

The EU weak areas are related to the composition of portfolio. They failed to meet the first two indicators (GBS and programme-based aid share of total ODA to the GoM), and lost 8 points in the process, although they improved relative to 2006. Additionally, they also failed to disburse confirmed GBS within the quarter scheduled. Otherwise, the EU was an all round good performer, including in the difficult indicators related to capacity strengthening.

3.7. Finland

Table 3.7. illustrates Finland's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Finland received 27 out of possible 36 points, this is 75%. This is a good performance, which confirms the level achieved in 2006. Finland's major weakness is its share of GBS in total ODA to the GoM, as well as the auditing system (indicator 11b). Otherwise, Finland was an all round very good performer.

Table 3.7: Finland 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	26	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	88	4
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	no	0
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4

		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	99	2
	All ODA to government	7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	101	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	88	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	26	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	67	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	67	2
14a		% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	4 25% joint	0	
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	63	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	63	1
Total points						27

3.8. France

Table 3.8. illustrates France's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. France received 22 out of possible 36 points, this is 61%. This is a good improvement on the 2006 performance by France.

Table 3.8: France 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	15	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	43	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	79	

Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	no	0
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	yes	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	69	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	25	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	53	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	82	2
14a		% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	11 27% joint	0	
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	100			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
		18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	9	0
	Technical Cooperation	19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	6	0
Total points						22

France's major weak points are related to portfolio composition (as they failed to meet targets 1 and 2) and technical cooperation. Otherwise, France has been a very active member of the group and has contributed significantly to the achievement of some common goals, such as, for example, the mapping and rationalization of the working group structure. Additionally, in 2007 France has committed to changing its mechanism of financing GBS when the current agreement with the GoM comes to an end, partly response to the critique and debate that the debt recycling mechanism adopted by France raised in the 2006 evaluation report. In this respect, France is looking for different and innovative forms to finance GBS.

3.9. Germany

Table 3.9. illustrates Germany's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Germany received 19 out of possible 36 points, this is 53%. This is a good improvement on the 2006 performance by Germany. Germany's weakest points are related to portfolio composition, multi-year agreement for GBS and technical cooperation, as they failed to meet the respective targets and lost 14 points in the process. With respect to portfolio composition, they improved significantly if compared to 2006.

Table 3.9: Germany 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	27	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	66	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	no	0
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	92	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	no	0
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	54	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	27	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	54	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	54	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	11 55% joint	0
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	38	0
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	4	0
Total points						19

3.10. Ireland

Table 3.10. illustrates Ireland's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Ireland received 29 out of possible 36 points, this is 81%. This is a very good performance, although it is slightly below the level reached in 2006. Ireland's failure to reach the GBS target (indicator 1) had also an impact on indicators 11b and 11c (auditing and national reporting systems). Otherwise, Ireland was a very good performer.

Table 3.10: Ireland 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	22	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	100	4
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	105	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	83	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	22	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	41	0
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	67	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	3 0% joint	1
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	50			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	58	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	58	1
Total points						29

3.11. Italy

Table 3.11. illustrates Italy's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Italy received 25 out of possible 36 points, this is 69%. This is a very good improvement on the 2006 performance by Italy. Italy's very weak points are related to portfolio composition, where they are away below the targets of indicators 1 and 2. This problem is also reflected in indicators 11b, 14a and 19, which are closely related to portfolio composition. Otherwise, Italy was an all round good performer.

Table 3.11: Italy 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	19	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	19	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		All ODA to government	7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	86
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	yes	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	78	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	19	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	78	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	78	2
14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	10 0% joint	0		
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	5	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	56	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	0	0
Total points						25

3.12. The Netherlands

Table 3.12. illustrates The Netherlands' performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. The Netherlands received 33 out of possible 36 points, this is 92%. This is an excellent performance, although it is slightly below the maximum level achieved by the Netherlands in 2006.

Table 3.12: Netherlands 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	40	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	96	4
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	85	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	95	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	40	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	74	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	81	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	6 0% joint	0
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	33			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	47	0
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	46	1
Total points						33

3.13. Norway

Table 3.13. illustrates Norway's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Norway received 31 out of possible 36 points, this is 86%. This is an excellent all round performance and a very good improvement on the 2006 results.

Table 3.13: Norway 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	40	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	68	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	97	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	74	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	47	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	51	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	51	2
14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	11 36% joint	0		
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	33			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	79	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	71	1
Total points						31

3.14. Portugal

Table 3.14. illustrates Portugal's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Portugal received 15 out of possible 36 points, this is 42%. This is the weakest performance of the 18 PAPs evaluated in 2007, and it is significantly weaker than the performance by Portugal in 2006. Fundamentally, the aid structure of Portugal in Mozambique, particularly the composition of its portfolio and other related indicators of utilization of GoM systems, is not in line with the current PAF structure. Hence, Portugal

failed to meet two thirds of the PAF's indicators. On the other hand, Portugal met most of the targets of indicators related to predictability, where they got 10 out of 12 points, and two thirds of their total number of points.

Table 3.14: Portugal 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	11	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	11	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	25	0
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	402	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	no	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	11	0
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	11	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	11	0
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	11	0
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	8 0% joint	0
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	0	0
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	0	0
Total points						15

3.15. Spain

Table 3.15. illustrates Spain's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Spain received 29 out of possible 36 points, this is 81%. This is a very good all round performance and a truly remarkable improvement on the 2006 results. Spain's only weak point was not being able to achieve the target for

indicator 1 (GBS), which also had an impact on the failure to achieve indicator 11b. Nonetheless, they made excellent progress in all indicators, including indicator 1, relative to 2006.

Table 3.15: Spain 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	37	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	87	4
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	51	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	0	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	87	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	37	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	62	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	62	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	1 0% joint	1
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	2	0
		18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	56	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	56	1
Total points						29

3.16. Sweden

Table 3.16. illustrates Sweden's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Sweden received 25 out of possible 36 points, this is 69%. This is a very good all round performance, which stands at the same level of the 2006 performance. Sweden's weak points are related to programme-based aid and the length of the multi-year arrangement. Otherwise, their performance is very good and solid.

Table 3.16: Sweden 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	55	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	69	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	no	0
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	99	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	no	0
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	yes	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	68	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	55	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	66	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	66	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	17 6% joint	0
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	100			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	45	0
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	26	1
Total points						25

3.17. Switzerland

Table 3.17. illustrates Switzerland's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Switzerland received 36 out of possible 36 points, this is 100%. This is an excellent all round performance and a slight improvement on the excellent 2006 results.

Table 3.17: Switzerland 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	48	4
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	84	4
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	100	2
	All ODA to government	7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	102	
	Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes
9			PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	yes	1
10			Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	yes	
Utilization of government systems and reporting		11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	80	2
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	48	1
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	48	2
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	51	2
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	6 50% joint	1
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	0			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	90	2
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	34	1
Total points						36

3.18. The World Bank

Table 3.18. illustrates The World Bank's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. The World Bank received 17 out of possible 36 points, this is 47%. The World Bank's poor results (significantly worse than the 2006 results), are related to portfolio composition and utilization of GoM system and reporting. On these indicators, the Bank lost 16 points. The World Bank is another PAP who is always going to be

penalized because of its focus on large infra-structure investment that is run as projects. A revision of this situation is necessary, or the evaluation runs the risk to becoming a rigid formality.

Table 3.18: World Bank 2007

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (22% of total points)	GBS	1a	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes (4)	26	0
	Program Aid	2	% Program-based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	72% (4)	35	0
Predictability (33% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	yes	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	yes	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	yes (4)	yes	4
		6	% of PAP's ODA that is recorded in the government budget	82% (2)	99	2
		7	ODA disbursed by PAP as percentage of its aid recorded in government budget	To be defined (2)	100	
Harmonization and Alignment (31% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	8	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	yes	2
		9	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions:	yes (1)	no	0
		10	Strict harmonization between PAP bilateral agreement for GBS and MoU	Yes (1)	no	
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	11a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	45% (2)	35	0
		11b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	40% (1)	26	0
		11c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	45% (2)	26	0
		12	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	45% (2)	26	0
		14a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	30% (1)	86 14% joint	0
15	% of analytical work by PAP that is coordinated	55% (1)	67			
Capacity Strengthening (14% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	17	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	18	% PAP's TC provided through co-ordinated programmes	50% (2)	14	0
		19	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	13% (1)	14	1
Total points						17

3.19. Overall rank of PAPs by points

Table 3.19: Overall Ranking 2007

PAPs	Points
DFID	36
Switzerland	36
Netherlands	33
Belgium	32
Norway	31
Ireland	29
Spain	29
Finland	27
Sweden	25
Italy	25
Denmark	24
European Commission	23
Canada	22
France	22
Germany	19
African Development Bank	19
World Bank	17
Portugal	15

3.20. Overall evaluation by rank and by scale

If the PAPs performance in 2007 is classified into:

- Very good: 30 points or more out of 36
- Medium high: 27 to 29 points
- Medium: 24 to 26 points
- Medium low: 20 to 23 points
- Weak: less than 20 points

...then,

- 5 PAPs are very good

- 3 are medium high
- 3 are medium
- 3 are medium low, and
- 4 are weak

The performance of the PAPs as a group is weak.

If the PAPs are classified into groups by size (amount of ODA to the GoM), there will be:

- 3 very large PAPs (more than US\$ 90 million in 2007)
- 3 large PAPs (more than US\$ 50 million in 2007)
- 6 medium PAPs (more than US\$ 20 million in 2007), and
- 6 small PAPs (less than US\$ 20 million in 2007)

Table 3.20, below, shows how the PAPs rank by size and performance.

Table 3.20: Size and rank related

	<i>Very Good</i>	<i>Medium High</i>	<i>Medium (Rank)</i>	<i>Medium Low</i>	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Very large</i>	DFID			European Union	The World Bank	3
<i>Large</i>	Netherlands	Ireland	Sweden			3
<i>Medium (size)</i>	Norway	Finland	Denmark	Canada	Germany, ADB	6
<i>Small</i>	Switzerland, Belgium	Spain	Italy	France	Portugal	6
<i>Total</i>	5	3	3	3	4	18

There is some, but not very strong, relationship between the size of the donor (measured by its ODA disbursed to the GoM) and the level of performance. The medium and small donors are equally distributed through all performance groups. However, 2 of the 3 very large PAPs (both are multilateral donors) are at the bottom half of the table with respect to performance, and all the 3 large donors are at the top of the table with respect to performance.

It seems that there is some clear relationship between being a significant multilateral donor and performance, as all the multilateral donors are at the bottom of the table with respect to performance – the EU has a medium low rank, whereas the World Bank and the ADB have weak ranks. Could this table be useful for the GoM and the PAPs to evaluate donor mobility across categories defined by size and performance, and to develop differentiated strategies for different types of donors? Could this table be a useful source of information for revising some of the PAPs' PAF indicators, particularly for those PAPs that are focused in financing large public investment in infra-structure that is run as projects? If a similar exercise is done for the 2005 and 2006 evaluations, it might be possible to start to identify some interesting patterns of behavior and change.

4. General Comments and Conclusions

4.1. *Comments on the 2007 evaluation*

The 2007 evaluation was a very intense exercise performed over a short period of time. There were more PAPs to interview and two more meetings with GoM officials than in previous evaluations, but the working days allocated to the study were fewer than in previous years. This creates some difficulties for the quality of the evaluation, as it tends to make the evaluation more mechanical.

It is not very clear why the timing of the study was not planned in such a way as to produce a report for the beginning of the Joint Review. This was done in 2007 (for the 2006 evaluation in the 2007 JR) and it worked.

Additionally, the concurrence of the PAPs evaluation and the OECD/DAC study at the same time created more problems than solved:

- The launching of the two evaluations together did not allow enough time to discuss the PAPs questionnaire with donors. One of the side effects of this was the large number of errors and information deficiencies that made the processing of the data slow. In practice, more than half of the donors had to be extensively consulted about their answers to the questionnaire even after the individual interviews.
- Coordination was very weak between the two studies; and

- Generally, the PAPs had much more difficulties in meeting deadlines than in previous exercises. This, obviously, affected the ability of the team of consultants to meet its own deadlines.

Many agencies continue to have huge difficulties to gather the information for the evaluation. Although all claim bureaucratic reasons – centralization, delays related to flows of information from the headquarters, etc. – it is important to also acknowledge that most agencies pay little attention to the indicators in the PAF until they receive the questionnaire for evaluation, and that in some of these agencies the PAPs evaluation exercise is a task that belongs only to the person/sector in charge of GBS. As a result, information gathering only starts when the questionnaire is distributed.

All the agencies that work with the PAPs' PAF throughout the year are capable of answering the questionnaire quicker and more reliably because they pay attention to register, during the year, the information they know will necessary to evaluate their performance vis-à-vis the PAF. Additionally, these agencies involve all their sectors in the gathering of the required information.

In addition to this, it is important to make sure that the ODAMoz works and produces the right type of information and reports on time to analyze portfolio composition, predictability and the remaining indicators. If this goal can be achieved, the information part of the exercise will be significantly improved, simplified and accelerated.

The other important issue is that the PAPs should avoid coming to the period of evaluation without clear definitions for key indicators. The main issue is not about having the definitions ready by the time the evaluation starts. The evaluation is the last part of the cycle of activity. The key question is that ***the definitions need to be clarified prior to the approval of the PAF's indicators, so that the PAPs and the GoM know exactly what they are agreeing to and how this agreement can be monitored and evaluated.***

Thus, the PAPs and the GoM should try to have the definitions clarified during the JR, when the PAF matrix for the following year is approved.

Building on the positive experience of 2007, it would be important to maintain the good practice of PAPs and GoM discussing the evaluation together and formulating a plan of action to deal with the issues raised by the study. This would be another area in which a solid PAPs secretariat would be very useful, particularly in working with its counterpart at GoM level. The PAP's Troika and the GoM effort in 2007 to deal with the issues raised by the 2006 evaluation was one of the reasons why progress was possible on many indicators.

This year, GoM officials have suggested that the report is presented to the relevant Ministers and Vice-Ministers by the consultant, and that such a presentation includes an overview of the past reports that enables the Ministers and Vice-Ministers to develop a better understanding of the evolution and potential of the mutual accountability exercise. This is an experience that could be repeated in the years to come.

A final question is related to the PAPs secretariat. This needs to be strengthened, its activities and responsibilities broaden and resources need to be allocated to get the PAPs secretariat capable of providing far more substantial support than what is happening at the moment. This issue was raised in interviews with GoM officials and PAPs, and needs to be taken far more seriously than it is at the moment. With no more than 0.1 per cent of the aid package delivered annually by the PAPs, enough investment can be made to develop a solid and highly competent secretariat that will perform a supporting role in key areas of substance, from the collection and organization of information to analysis and organizational and analytical initiative.

4.2. *General Comment on the Evaluation of the PAPs*

The question of the method of evaluation of the PAPs has been raised in all of the previous three reports. First, there is the question of the model and timing of the evaluation: should the evaluation be developed on a permanent and continuous basis during the whole year, or should the current model of evaluating 19 PAPs in 15 working days, under pressure and with no time for any deep analysis be continued? Should the evaluation continue to be undertaken by an independent consultant or should it be undertaken by a team that comprises national and foreign independent experts, supported by two strong secretariats (at GoM and PAPs level)? Who should be responsible to guarantee that the

evaluation is done within the necessary timing to produce quality results? How should the terms of reference be defined and the consultant selected?

Second, what is and has been the relevance of this study for the GoM and the PAPs? Are we focusing on the right issues for the right reasons? Are the PAP's PAF indicators the most relevant for the GoM? Are the weights given to the different categories truly representative of clear priorities agreed between the GoM and the PAPs? Are the targets realistic and feasible? Do the PAPs utilize the PAF to organize their work and analysis during the year or, instead, do they only rush to get the information under pressure for the evaluation?

Third, how are these studies and reports conveyed, discussed and interpreted at political level of the GoM and of the PAPs? What happens after the report is conveyed?

To help the thinking about this issue, and to confirm the need to do the thinking and take the necessary decisions, the PAPs and GoM officials interviewed were asked to say what they think about the value and relevance of the evaluations and how to make the process better. The main ideas presented are summarized in table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Ideas from GoM officials and PAPs regarding the PAPs evaluation system in Mozambique

	<i>GoM</i>	<i>PAPs</i>
<i>Usefulness of the evaluation</i>	The last report was more useful than the others on practical issues. Work plan following the evaluation of 2006 was useful. But the evaluation is not yet utilized by the GoM.	Indicators, weights, scoring and ranking influence analysis and decision-making, particularly with respect to the ability of country offices to use the results to influence head-quarters.
	The process puts pressure on donors and forces them to make changes. Usefulness of the evaluation still depends too much on the willingness of the donors to make the necessary changes.	Without the evaluations and the matrix of indicators and targets, it is unlikely that all the progress achieved so far (for example, with regard to portfolio composition, utilization of government PFM systems, etc) would have been made.
	Important to make wider audience within GoM aware of the tools available to make aid more effective and more focused strategically.	In 2005, one of the HoCs said, during an interview, that his organization did not agree with the PAPs' evaluation as they were in the country to evaluate the GoM and not the other way round. In 2008, no serious and responsible PAP would question the need for the evaluation.
<i>Problems with the evaluation</i>	Donor driven, and in 2007 GoM was not consulted regarding ToRs or hiring of consultant, contrary to previous practice. GoM involvement is minimal. GoM is not yet organized to guide and to take full advantage of the evaluations. Many within GoM skeptical of how much influence the process has on donor actions.	The role of internal policies and politics of the different organizations, as well as other factors, are to be considered as factors in policy making. Thus, the PAPs' evaluation, per se, is not enough to force greater change quicker. Lack of progress with coordinated TC shows that the existence of the process, per se, is not enough to ensure progress in contentious issues.
	Time consuming and occurs under pressure when everybody is under pressure because of the beginning of the fiscal year and the JR. Nobody has the time to dedicate to the evaluation and to read the reports carefully.	Donor driven, with little input from GoM. How useful is this for the GoM? This hampers progress because GoM have taken no steps to make sure that PAPs deliver on key issues and priorities for national governance.
<i>Ways forward: how to improve the evaluation?</i>	Continuous evaluation (by a team of national and foreign and experts supported by stronger secretariats and PAPs and GoM levels; or by GoM officials if capacity is put in place. Continuous evaluation improve quality and reduces pressure.	Continuous evaluation with a permanent independent team: civil society and experts/analysts of this area of study.
	Wider dissemination, including at the political level, to discuss results and ways forward and to develop the perception of the importance of this tool for strategic and practical aid management.	Need for radical improvement of the ODAMoz to facilitate collection of the data and a continuous and permanent evaluation.
	Stronger involvement of the GoM in the choice of the key donor indicators and weights. Need of detailed, technical aid policy and strategy to provide a systematic framework for the choice of indicators and targets.	Need of aid policy and strategy, with pragmatic content and with enough substance and detail to provide the framework for choice of indicators, setting of targets and putting pressure for change on internal politics and policies of aid agencies.
	Action plan after the evaluation to tackle the main issues raised, on a systematic manner.	The choice of indicators, weights and point structure should be improved, and the system should be able to take progress into consideration.

4.3. *New MoU*

The new MoU for GBS needs to be ready by the end of the 2008. This is a great opportunity to utilize the accumulated experience to improve the partnership between the GoM and the PAFs, to institutionalize some of the best practices and make them better and more streamlined, to reduce administrative burden and transaction costs, to eliminate exceptions and simplify the process in order to make this more focused, effective and efficient, to influence effective and efficient harmonization and alignment at sector level, to improve how ODA to the GoM (programmatic and project based) is run, and so on and so forth.

However, care should be taken not to introduce too many conditionalities and constraints and not to try to address too many issues through one single instrument, or the risk is that the entire process becomes unbearable and collapses.

Also, care should be taken to make sure that both GoM and PAFs work together with time to build the capacity, the quality, the knowledge and information that is required and the partnership for the MoU to be a source of inspiration and guidance for further success, rather than a source of tension and lack of trust.

This is a delicate exercise, but also one that benefits from significant experience, both from Mozambique and other countries.

4.4. *Relationship between the PAFs' PAF and the Paris Declaration*

Many PAFs mentioned the need to improve the relationship between the PAFs' PAF and the Paris Declaration and OECD/DAC indicators. There are many reasons why this should be so:

- Definitions should be identical although applied to the concrete situation in Mozambique;
- Paris indicators and targets should be considered in the definition of the PAF indicators and targets, and in the evaluation and rewarding of points to PAFs;
- The demand and requirements for the performance of the PAFs needs to be defined and assessed taking into consideration how the recipient country performs (and the Paris targets

and indicators are related to the degree of performance of the recipient country systems of governance).

However, care should be taken with one important point. The fact that the PAF goes beyond Paris (in targets and also in some indicators, such as the GBS) reflects the national experience and, therefore, is likely to be part of ensuring national ownership of the process of mutual evaluation. Thus, while it is desirable that the mutual evaluation exercise is consistent with Paris in what it needs to be consistent, it is also important to acknowledge that Paris is a general (global) program and that it is necessary to guarantee that this exercise is consistent with the national reality and ownership. Besides, if national reality and ownership are not guaranteed, the spirit of Paris is not achieved. The fundamental issue is to keep the right balance and avoid fundamentalisms on one side or the other.

Annex 1: Overall Summary 2007

Table A.1.1: Total ODA to Mozambique (GoM and non-GoM ODA) (in US\$)

	2007	
	Committed	Disbursed
Program ODA (1)		686,501,453
General Budget Support	395,372,406	403,513,586
Program-based sector		263,147,084
Pooled TA		19,840,783
Project ODA (2)		433,692,078
Total ODA to the GoM (3)=(1)+(2)		1,120,193,531
Non-GoM ODA		
Private Sector Support (4)		51,784,474
NGOs (5)		113,292,774
Others (6)		27,164,989
Total Non-GoM ODA (7) = (4)+(5)+(6)		192,242,237
Total ODA to Mozambique (8) = (3)+(7)		1,312,435,768

Table A 1.2: summary of group and individual results per indicator and total

Objectives in the PAF →	Indicators of Group and Individual Performance																			Total Points per Agency [1]	% per PAP of the Maximum Points Available (36) ([2] = [1]/36*100)																		
	Portfolio composition		Predictability					Harmonization and alignment								Capacity Strengthening																							
	GBS	Program-based Aid	Commitments		Disbursements		All ODA to Government	Conditionality			Utilization of GoM Systems					Project Implementation Units		Technical Cooperation																					
	1a & 1b	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11a	11b	11c	12	14a & 14b	15	17	18	19																				
Indicator number in the PAF →	% GBS	% Program-based Aid	MYA > 3 Years	Commitment in Yn for Yn+1	Disbursement in Fiscal Year and Schedule	% ODA to GoM recorded in the Budget	ODA disbursed as % of ODA recorded in the budget	Adherence to GBS conditionality	NO Annex 10 exceptions	Strict harmonization with MoU	% ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget procedures	% ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems only	% ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedures	% ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement	Missions	Analytical Work	Number of Project Implementation Units	% Coordinated Technical Cooperation	% of Sector-wide TC																				
<i>Group Target</i>	40%	72%	100%	100%	100%	82%	To be defined	100%	14 PAPs with NO exceptions	100%	45%	40%	45%	45%	Total < 140; 30% joint	55% coordinated	27	50%	13%	-	-																		
<i>Group Achievement</i>	36%	61%	83% (3 PAPs failed)	100%	Fiscal Year = 100% ; Schedule = 94% (One PAP failed).	98%	94%	94% (One PAP failed)	12 have NO exceptions; 4 PAPs eliminated some exceptions in 2007; One did nothing; One is in consultations with HQ	67% (3 PAPs failed)	61%	37%	49%	51%	Total = 191 Joint = 18%	71%	21	38%	21%	-	-																		
<i>Group points</i>	0	0	0	3	0	2		0	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	0	1	15	39%																		
<i>Individual Target (points)</i>	Yes if at least 40% (4)		72% (4)		Yes (3)		Yes (3)		Yes (4)		82% (2)		To be defined		Yes (2)		Yes (1)		Yes (1)		45% (2)		40% (1)		45% (2)		45% (2)		30% (1)		55% (1)		Zero or number reduced (2)		50% (2)		13% (1)		
	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points			
African Development Bank	40	4	43	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	70	no	0	no	0			40	0	40	1	40	0	40	0	18	22%	0	25	11	2	8	0	0	0	19	53%
Belgium	49	4	65	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	88	2	113	yes	2	yes	1			65	2	49	1	65	2	65	2	1	100%	0	2	77	2	46	1	32	89%		
Canada	13	0	56	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	85	2	117	yes	2	yes	1	no		94	2	13	0	42	0	42	0	8	25%	0	0	0	2	81	2	81	1	22	61%
Denmark	31	0	62	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	97	yes	2	yes	1	yes		58	2	31	0	45	2	45	2	9	44%	0	75	3	0	75	2	28	1	24	67%
DFID	68	4	99	4	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	99	2	117	yes	2	yes	1			85	2	68	1	76	2	78	2	1	100%	0	2	82	2	26	1	36	100%		
European Commission	39	0	61	0	yes	3	yes	3	no	0	100	2	80	yes	2	no	0	yes		57	2	40	1	50	2	50	2	8	50%	1	95	0	2	55	2	40	1	23	64%
Finland	26	0	88	4	no	0	yes	3	yes	4	99	2	101	yes	2	yes	1			88	2	26	0	67	2	67	2	4	25%	0	0	0	2	63	2	63	1	27	75%
France	15	0	43	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	79	yes	2	no	0	yes		69	2	25	0	53	2	82	2	11	27%	0	100	0	2	9	0	6	0	22	61%
Germany	27	0	66	0	no	0	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	92	yes	2	no	0			54	2	27	0	54	2	54	2	11	55%	0	0	0	2	38	0	4	0	19	53%
Ireland	22	0	100	4	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	105	yes	2	yes	1			83	2	22	0	41	0	67	2	3	100%	0	2	58	2	58	1	29	81%		
Italy	19	0	19	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	86	yes	2	yes	1	yes		78	2	19	0	78	2	78	2	10	0%	0	0	5	2	56	2	0	0	25	69%
Netherlands	40	4	96	4	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	85	yes	2	yes	1			95	2	40	1	74	2	81	2	6	0%	0	33	0	2	47	0	46	1	33	92%
Norway	40	4	68	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	97	yes	2	yes	1			74	2	47	1	51	2	51	2	11	36%	0	33	0	2	79	2	71	1	31	86%
Portugal	11	0	11	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	25	0	402	yes	2	yes	1	no		11	0	11	0	11	0	11	0	8	0%	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	15	42%
Spain	37	0	87	4	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	51	yes	2	yes	1			87	2	37	0	62	2	62	2	1	0%	1	0	2	0	56	2	56	1	29	81%
Sweden	55	4	69	0	no	0	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	99	yes	2	no	0	yes		68	2	55	1	66	2	66	2	17	6%	0	100	0	2	45	0	26	1	25	69%
Switzerland	48	4	84	4	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	100	2	102	yes	2	yes	1	yes		80	2	48	1	48	2	51	2	6	50%	1	0	0	2	90	2	34	1	36	100%
World Bank	26	0	35	0	yes	3	yes	3	yes	4	99	2	100	yes	2	no	0	no		35	0	26	0	26	0	26	0	86	14%	0	67	0	2	14	0	14	1	17	47%
<i>Maximum points per indicator</i>	4	4	3	3	4	2		2	1		2	1	2	2	1					2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1			2	2	1			36				
<i>Average points per donor</i>	1.6	1.3	2.5	3.0	3.8	1.9		1.9	0.7		1.7	0.4	1.4	1.6	0.3					1.7	0.4	1.4	1.6	0.3	0.3				1.8	1.2	0.7								
<i>No. of Donors that achieved indicator</i>	7	6	15	18	17	17		17	12		15	8	13	14	9					15	8	13	14	9	9				16	11	13								

Annex 2: Portfolio Composition 2007

Structure of the Global Aid Portfolio 2007 (data in US\$)

Donor Agencies	ODA to GoM (Table 1A)						Non-GoM ODA (table 1C)				Total ODA to Mozambique (11) = 6+10
	Program ODA				Project ODA (5)	Total ODA to GoM (6) = 6+7	Private sector Support (7)	NGOs (8)	Others (9)	Total Non-GoM Aid (10) = 7+8+9	
	GBS (1)	Program-based sector (2)	Pooled TA (3)	Total Program ODA (4) = 1+2+3							
African Development Bank	30,069,000	1,376,000	749,000	32,194,000	42,501,000	74,695,000	7,889,000	0	0	7,889,000	82,584,000
Belgium	4,106,776	0	1,368,925	5,475,701	2,988,025	8,463,726	0	2,217,326	616,016	2,833,342	11,297,068
Canada	4,654,410	15,367,466	0	20,021,876	15,979,462	36,001,338	0	6,194,330	0	6,194,330	42,195,668
Denmark	19,400,000	17,900,000	2,000,000	39,300,000	24,200,000	63,500,000	2,700,000	20,200,000	1,000,000	23,900,000	87,400,000
DFID	72,037,214	24,759,959	8,007,254	104,804,427	1,000,517	105,804,944	1,094,411	6,469,790	501,161	8,065,363	113,870,307
European Comission	59,036,277	30,250,327	2,737,851	92,024,454	58,122,016	150,146,471	0	16,313,413	0	16,313,413	166,459,884
Finland	6,844,627	16,427,105	0	23,271,732	3,256,111	26,527,843	0	2,199,695	0	2,199,695	28,727,538
France	2,737,851	4,995,147	0	7,732,998	10,301,072	18,034,070	0	645,495	17,111,567	17,757,062	35,791,132
Germany	13,689,254	19,330,099	0	33,019,353	17,109,956	50,129,309	0	3,173,542	0	3,173,542	53,302,851
Ireland	12,320,328	41,293,500	1,786,500	55,400,328	0	55,400,328	467,000	2,958,000	0	3,425,000	58,825,328
Italy	5,201,916	0	0	5,201,916	22,660,971	27,862,887	342,231	6,243,941	0	6,586,172	34,449,059
Netherlands	24,640,657	34,184,697	0	58,825,354	2,520,814	61,346,168	1,304,913	7,856,211	290,522	9,451,646	70,797,814
Norway	23,897,310	13,655,605	2,389,731	39,942,646	19,214,630	59,157,276	1,024,170	7,982,107	604,524	9,610,801	68,768,077
Portugal	1,500,000	0	0	1,500,000	11,680,037	13,180,037	0	1,168,452	0	1,168,452	14,348,489
Spain	4,106,776	5,475,702	0	9,582,478	1,439,014	11,021,492	0	16,511,532	3,239,789	19,751,321	30,772,813
Sweden	42,857,143	10,939,655	350,680	54,147,478	24,449,932	78,597,410	2,169,705	8,494,191	1,652,055	12,315,951	90,913,361
Switzerland	6,667,361	4,500,469	450,842	11,618,672	2,264,859	13,883,531	261,191	4,629,749	2,149,355	7,040,295	20,923,826
World Bank	69,746,686	22,691,354	0	92,438,040	174,003,661	266,441,701	34,531,852	35,000	0	34,566,852	301,008,553
TOTAL	403,513,586	263,147,084	19,840,783	686,501,453	433,692,078	1,120,193,531	51,784,474	113,292,774	27,164,989	192,242,237	1,312,435,768

Share of different ODA modalities in "Total ODA to the GoM" (data in %)

Donor Agencies	GBS (1)	Program-based sector (2)	Pooled TA (3)	Total Program ODA	Project ODA to the GoM
African Development Ba	40	2	1	43	57
Belgium	49	0	16	65	35
Canada	13	43	0	56	44
Denmark	31	28	3	62	38
DFID	68	23	8	99	1
European Comission	39	20	2	61	39
Finland	26	62	0	88	12
France	15	28	0	43	57
Germany	27	39	0	66	34
Ireland	22	75	3	100	0
Italy	19	0	0	19	81
Netherlands	40	56	0	96	4
Norway	40	23	4	68	32
Portugal	11	0	0	11	89
Spain	37	50	0	87	13
Sweden	55	14	0	69	31
Switzerland	48	32	3	84	16
World Bank	26	9	0	35	65
TOTAL	36	23	2	61	39

Share of different ODA modalities in "Total ODA to Mozambique" (data in %)

Donor Agencies	GBS (1)	Program-based sector (2)	Pooled TA (3)	Total Program ODA (4) = 1+2+3	Project ODA to the GoM	Total ODA to the GoM	Total non-Government ODA (4) = 1+2+4
African Development Ba	36	2	1	39	51	90	10
Belgium	36	0	12	48	26	75	25
Canada	11	36	0	47	38	85	15
Denmark	22	20	2	45	28	73	27
DFID	63	22	7	92	1	93	7
European Comission	35	18	2	55	35	90	10
Finland	24	57	0	81	11	92	8
France	8	14	0	22	29	50	50
Germany	26	36	0	62	32	94	6
Ireland	21	70	3	94	0	94	6
Italy	15	0	0	15	66	81	19
Netherlands	35	48	0	83	4	87	13
Norway	35	20	3	58	28	86	14
Portugal	10	0	0	10	81	92	8
Spain	13	18	0	31	5	36	64
Sweden	47	12	0	60	27	86	14
Switzerland	32	22	2	56	11	66	34
World Bank	23	8	0	31	58	89	11
TOTAL	31	20	2	52	33	85	15

Structural composition of "Program ODA" in Mozambique (data in %)

Donor Agencies	GBS (1)	Program-based sector (2)	Pooled TA (3)	Total = 1+2+3 (4)
African Development Bank	93	4	2	100
Belgium	75	0	25	100
Canada	23	77	0	100
Denmark	49	46	5	100
DFID	69	24	8	100
European Comission	64	33	3	100
Finland	29	71	0	100
France	35	65	0	100
Germany	41	59	0	100
Ireland	22	75	3	100
Italy	100	0	0	100
Netherlands	42	58	0	100
Norway	60	34	6	100
Portugal	100	0	0	100
Spain	43	57	0	100
Sweden	79	20	1	100
Switzerland	57	39	4	100
World Bank	75	25	0	100
Total	59	38	3	100

Annex 3: Predictability

2007						
PAPs	Multi-year agreement not less than 3 years	GBS commitment made within 4 weeks of the JR	GBS disbursement according to quarterly disbursement schedule	GBS commitments disbursed in the fiscal year (2007)	% ODA to GoM recorded in the budget	ODA disbursed as % of ODA recorded
African Development Bank	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	70
Belgium	yes	yes	yes	yes	88	113
Canada	yes	yes	yes	yes	85	117
Denmark	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	97
DFID	yes	yes	yes	yes	99	117
European Commission	yes	yes	no	yes	100	80
Finland	no	yes	yes	yes	99	101
France	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	79
Germany	no	yes	yes	yes	100	92
Ireland	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	105
Italy	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	86
Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	85
Norway	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	97
Portugal	yes	yes	yes	yes	25	402
Spain	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	51
Sweden	no	yes	yes	yes	100	99
Switzerland	yes	yes	yes	yes	100	102
World Bank	yes	yes	yes	yes	99	100
Total (Yes)	16	18	17	18	98	94

Percentage of PAPs with multi-year agreements (not<3 years) 83%

Commitments of GBS for year n+1 made within 4 weeks of the JR in year n 100%

Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to quarterly disbursement schedule agreed with GoM 94%

Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled (2007) 100%

Annex 4: Sector ODA (PBAs and Projects)

Sector ODA 2007 Mozambique

FUNDS DISBURSED IN PROGRAMME BASED AID PER AGENCY AND PER SECTOR IN USD

	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Water</i>	<i>Roads</i>	<i>HIV/AIDS</i>	<i>UTRESP</i>	<i>Energy</i>	<i>Fisheries</i>	<i>PBS</i>	<i>SISTAFE- UTRAFE</i>	<i>Tribunal Administrativo</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
African Development Bank	0	0	0	0	1,376,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,376,000
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,368,925	0	0	1,368,925
Canada	4,654,410	3,444,263	5,652,515	0	0	1,683,500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,434,688
Denmark	3,000,000	6,600,000	2,200,000	0	1,900,000	2,100,000	1,200,000	400,000	0	0	2,100,000	0	400,000	19,900,000
DFID	0	6,959,595	8,599,442	74,276	2,915,590	1,600,827	786,725	0	0	0	0	1,600,827	2,222,676	24,759,959
European Comission	13,997,248	9,233,402	0	0	7,019,677	0	0	0	0	0	2,737,851	0	0	32,988,178
Finland	5,475,702	5,475,702	5,475,702	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,427,106
France	0	3,652,032	0	322,672	1,020,444	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,995,148
Germany	0	0	13,496,351	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13,496,351
Ireland	2,396,000	20,533,000	7,871,000	1,193,000	774,000	2,053,000	342,000	0	0	9,600,000	342,200	0	0	45,104,200
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	7,216,867	20,533,880	5,612,594	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	821,355	0	34,184,696
Norway	0	13,655,605	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,717,828	0	2,389,731	0	0	19,763,164
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	2,737,851	2,737,851	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,475,702
Sweden	5,624,655	0	0	0	27,114	1,000,000	926,419	0	0	1,932,896	1,428,571	0	0	10,939,655
Switzerland	0	4,500,469	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	450,842	4,951,311
World Bank	0	0	0	0	0	7,549,357	15,141,997	0	0	0	0	0	0	22,691,354
Total	35,148,016	84,008,786	66,566,741	7,202,542	15,032,825	15,986,684	18,397,141	400,000	3,717,828	11,532,896	10,367,278	2,422,182	3,073,518	273,856,437

FUNDS DISBURSED IN PROJECT BASED AID PER AGENCY AND PER DONOR IN USD

	Agriculture	Health	Education	Water	Roads	HIVAIDS	Energy	Fisheries	Railways and Ports	Decentralization	Municipal Development	Communications	Maputo Municipal Development	Trade policy	Rural Development	Demining and INAS	Commodity aid	Governance	Others	TOTAL
African Development Bank	17,636,000	1,587,000	4,290,000	14,194,000	0	0	2,107,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,686,000	42,500,000
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	184,805	184,805
Belgium	0	2,917,174	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,917,174
Canada	0	486,520	13,963,457	1,529,485	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15,979,462
Denmark	100,000	0	0	0	0	0	13,200,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10,900,000	24,200,000
DFID	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500,000	500,000
European Commission	0	2,075,803	0	19,481,109	27,174,743	0	827,286	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,801,529	57,360,470
Finland	1,012,382	1,043,081	674,453	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	526,194	3,256,110
France	1,340,998	4,631,651	2,297,032	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,031,391	10,301,072
Germany	0	0	1,817,656	302,612	5,449,143	1,356,195	1,504,578	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,513,370	22,943,554
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	1,059,663	4,865,700	0	9,126,168	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,879,493	643,943	60,917	2,093,087	1,931,999	22,660,971
Netherlands	0	0	2,383,924	85,934	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	136,890	2,606,748
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	12,972,195	3,717,828	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,524,606	19,214,629
Portugal	10,073	62,382	6,124,947	616,553	0	34,223	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,614,312	11,462,490
Spain		8,857,599	5,295,201	0	0	578,378	0	0	0	994,752	0	0	0	0	3,725,871	0	0	0	2,395,619	21,847,420
Sweden	0	0	4,885,546	0	10,011,923	0	4,348,526	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,203,937	24,449,932
Switzerland	0	0	0	1,487,961	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75,008	0	0	0	0	992,292	2,555,261
World Bank	2,021,333	0	15,942,922	21,181,160	30,329,516	3,280,353	3,710,489	0	50,190,322	12,039,668	6,423,212	3,791,941	3,786,463	0	0	0	0	0	21,306,282	174,003,661
Total	22,120,786	22,720,873	62,540,838	58,878,813	82,091,493	5,249,149	38,670,074	3,717,828	50,190,322	13,034,420	6,423,212	3,791,941	3,786,463	75,008	6,605,365	643,943	60,917	2,093,087	76,249,226	458,943,758

Annex 5: Harmonization and Utilization of Public Finance Management Systems

2007			
PAPs	Adherence to common Conditionality of GBS	NO Annex 10 bilateral exceptions	New GBS bilateral agreements strictly harmonized with MoU
African Development Bank	no	no	N/A
Belgium	yes	yes	N/A
Canada	yes	yes	no
Denmark	yes	yes	yes
DFID	yes	yes	N/A
European Comission	yes	no	yes
Finland	yes	yes	N/A
France	yes	no	yes
Germany	yes	no	N/A
Ireland	yes	yes	N/A
Italy	yes	yes	yes
Netherlands	yes	yes	N/A
Norway	yes	yes	N/A
Portugal	yes	yes	no
Spain	yes	yes	N/A
Sweden	yes	no	yes
Switzerland	yes	yes	yes
World Bank	yes	no	no
Total (Yes)	17	12	6

PAPs adhere to GBS common conditionality	94%
Number of PAPs with No Annex 10 exceptions	12
Strict harmonization between new bilateral agreements for GBS and MoU	67%

GOVERNMENT FINANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (data in US\$)

2007				
PAP's	ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget procedures	ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems only	ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedures	ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement
African Development Bank	30,069,000.0	30,069,000.0	30,069,000.0	30,069,000.0
Belgium	5,475,701.0	4,106,776.0	5,475,701.0	5,475,701.0
Canada	33,985,333.0	4,654,410.1	14,961,334.9	14,961,334.9
Denmark	36,600,000.0	19,400,000.0	28,700,000.0	28,700,000.0
DFID	90,058,079.8	72,037,214.4	80,636,656.4	82,237,483.4
European Commission	85,004,777.5	60,678,987.0	75,771,375.8	75,771,375.8
Finland	23,271,733.0	6,844,627.0	17,796,031.0	17,796,031.0
France	12,492,615.0	4,511,018.0	9,506,166.0	14,799,720.0
Germany	27,185,605.0	13,689,254.0	27,185,605.0	27,185,605.0
Ireland	45,857,528.0	12,320,328.0	22,929,528.0	37,000,000.0
Italy	21,773,131.8	5,201,916.0	21,773,131.8	21,773,131.8
Netherlands	58,003,998.0	24,640,657.0	45,174,537.0	49,713,720.0
Norway	43,660,474.0	27,615,138.0	30,004,869.0	30,004,869.0
Portugal	1,500,000.0	1,500,000.0	1,500,000.0	1,500,000.0
Spain	9,582,477.8	4,106,776.2	6,844,627.0	6,844,627.0
Sweden	53,769,684.0	42,857,143.0	51,843,265.0	51,843,265.0
Switzerland	11,167,830.0	6,667,361.0	6,667,361.0	7,118,203.0
World Bank	92,438,040.1	69,746,686.0	69,746,686.0	69,746,686.0
Total	681,896,008.0	410,647,291.7	546,585,874.9	572,540,752.9

GOVERNMENT FINANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (data in %)

2007						
PAP's	% ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget procedures	% ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems only	% ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedures	% ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement	% Joint Missions	% Coordinated Analytical Work
African Development Bank	40	40	40	40	22	25
Belgium	65	49	65	65	0	100
Canada	94	13	42	42	25	
Denmark	58	31	45	45	44	75
DFID	85	68	76	78	0	67
European Commission	57	40	50	50	50	95
Finland	88	26	67	67	25	
France	69	25	53	82	27	100
Germany	54	27	54	54	55	
Ireland	83	22	41	67	0	50
Italy	78	19	78	78	0	
Netherlands	95	40	74	81	0	33
Norway	74	47	51	51	36	33
Portugal	11	11	11	11	0	
Spain	87	37	62	62	0	
Sweden	68	55	66	66	6	100
Switzerland	80	48	48	51	50	
World Bank	35	26	26	26	14	67
Total	60.9	36.3	48.8	51.8	18	71

PROJECT ODA RECORDED IN THE GoM BUDGET

PAPs	Values in (000) Mtn	Values in USD
African Development Bank	1,952,896	76,379,590
Belgium	50,883	1,990,075
Canada	273,450	10,694,880
Denmark	959,723	37,535,669
DFID	9,398	367,556
European Union	2,639,084	103,217,015
Finland	77,340	3,024,853
France	419,745	16,416,614
Germany	695,872	27,216,185
Ireland	181,984	7,117,562
Italy	693,434	27,120,843
Netherlands	357,143	13,968,183
Norway	538,160	21,047,920
Portugal	45,416	1,776,257
Spain	303,019	11,851,341
Sweden	645,835	25,259,190
Switzerland	62,499	2,444,391
World Bank	4,411,988	172,556,941
Total	14,317,866	559,985,065

Source: Budget execution report 2007, 4th quarter, version 4.

Annex 6: Technical Cooperation

TECHNICAL COOPERATION (data in US\$)

2007			
PAP's	Total TC	Coordinated programmes TC	Sector-wide TC
African Development Bank	6,484,000	498,000	0
Belgium	1,779,603	1,368,925	821,355
Canada	1,653,253	1,332,976	1,332,976
Denmark	9,900,000	7,400,000	2,760,000
DFID	8,007,254	6,591,848	2,086,188
European Comission	9,512,116	5,235,455	3,806,398
Finland	1,899,294	1,204,654	1,204,654
France	3,639,312	322,672	219,122
Germany	16,922,679	6,441,084	607,336
Ireland	4,356,035	2,546,035	2,546,035
Italy	1,931,999	1,077,287	0
Netherlands	4,456,085	2,078,844	2,048,344
Norway	3,872,511	3,072,511	2,736,493
Portugal	10,730,932	0	0
Spain	513,347	287,474	287,474
Sweden	7,752,655	3,491,811	1,985,907
Switzerland	798,877	720,870	270,028
World Bank	33,536,371	4,538,271	4,538,271
Total	127,746,323	48,208,718	27,250,581

COORDINATED AND SECTOR-WIDE TC AS % OF TOTAL TC (data in %)

2007		
PAP's	% Coordinated programmes TC	% Sector-wide TC
African Development Bank	8	0
Belgium	77	46
Canada	81	81
Denmark	75	28
DFID	82	26
European Comission	55	40
Finland	63	63
France	9	6
Germany	38	4
Ireland	58	58
Italy	56	0
Netherlands	47	46
Norway	79	71
Portugal	0	0
Spain	56	56
Sweden	45	26
Switzerland	90	34
World Bank	14	14
Total	38	21

Annex 7: List of interviews

African Development Bank
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
DFID
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
World Bank
Adriano Ubisse
Amélia Muthemba
António Laíce
Aristotle Domingos Peho
Arginaldo Andrice Muandula
Caroline Ennis
Cristina Matusse
Domingos Lambo
Gamiliel Munguambe
Hanifa Ibrahim

Annex 8: Questionnaire for the PAPs

Questionnaire for the Study:

“Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance: Review – 2007”

Important Information

This questionnaire is an integral part of the study “Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance: Review – 2007”, which forms part of the mutual accountability exercise agreed between the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) and the Government of Mozambique (GoM). The aim of the questionnaire is to gather information related to the performance of each PAP in 2007 with respect to the agreed PAPs’ Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators.

The final report of this study needs to be submitted by the 25th of March 2008 in order to be included in the Joint Review (JR). A draft report needs to be submitted by the 5th of March. Hence, this questionnaire, fully answered, should be sent back to the consultant not later than the 15th of February 2008. Late arrival of questionnaires, or incomplete questionnaires, will affect the schedule of the interviews and the remaining schedule of the study. The answered questionnaires should be sent to the following email addresses:

carlos.castelbranco@gmail.com and carlos.castel-branco@iese.ac.mz

Interviews with all PAPs will take place between the 18th and 22nd of February. In these interviews, the answers to the questionnaires will be revised and other issues will be discussed. The PAPs will have the opportunity to redo the questionnaires.

A form will be circulated by email to organize the interviews’ schedule. The schedule for this study is very tight and only five working days have been allocated for the interviews with 19 PAPs and relevant GoM departments. This means that we will need to have 5 interviews per day, and that we need to set up the final interview schedule as early as possible. For this, we need the full understanding and cooperation of all parties involved.

The consultant can also be contacted by phone: +258 82 3150310.

Attached to this questionnaire are OECD/DAC based definitions and lists that should be used by the PAPs to identify the programs that qualify for the different categories (ex., programme-based sector aid, pooled TA, etc.).

In some of the tables there is a column with the equivalent OECD/DAC indicator and question. This column aims to establish a relationship between the questions asked in the PAP and in the OECD/DAC questionnaire to facilitate the work of the respondent. Please do not fill this column. In some of the tables there are rows in orange; please do not fill these rows as they contain formulae.

Thank you for your collaboration.

Identification of the Organization

Date (dd-mm-yy):

Country:

Agency:

Address:

Phone number:

Fax number:

Mobile phone:

Person who filled the form (name/post):

Phone number:

Email:

Supervisor/Person in Charge (name/post):

Phone number:

Email:

1 Portfolio Composition

1.1 Aggregated portfolio composition: Commitments and Disbursements of ODA (in USD)

Table 1A: ODA to the GoM committed and disbursed (in USD)

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		2007	
		Committed	Disbursed
	Program Aid		
I.9 Q.14	<i>General Budget Support</i>		
	<i>Programme-based Sector Aid</i>	do not fill	
	<i>Pooled TA</i>		
	<i>Provincial Budget Support</i>		
	Project Aid		
I.3 Q.3	Sub-Total ODA to GoM		

Notes: (1) Please, make sure that you fill in the data in units of USD; (2) Programme-based sector aid includes only the ten sector common funds registered on budget. If the PAP believes that other sector aid programmes qualify as programme-based aid given the OECD/DAC criteria, please create another row for the new data in the above table (call it "sector aid 2") and present the justification deemed necessary based on the OECD/DAC criteria; (3) Tables with the OECD/DAC criteria and list of funds that qualify for programme-based sector aid are attached. Please do not try to fill cells in orange, as they contain automatic formulae.

Please, explain the reasons for the difference between "Committed" and "Disbursed" in table 1A, for 2007 only:

(a) Related to the Government of Mozambique (GoM)

i. Breaching of underlying principles (Y/N):

Please, specify:

ii. Others:

(b) Related to the donor (Y/N):

Please, specify:

(c) Related to both GoM and donors (Y/N):
Please, specify:

(d) Other reasons:

Were the causes for the differences between commitments and disbursements:

(a) Discussed with the GoM ? (Y/N):

(b) Agreed with the GoM ? (Y/N):

(c) Discussed with other PAPs? (Y/N):

(d) Agreed with other PAPs? (Y/N):

Table 1B: Non-GoM ODA disbursed (in USD)

	2007
Private Sector Support	
NGOs	
Others (specify)	
Sub-Total non-GoM ODA	

Notes: (1) Please, make sure that you fill in the data in USD; (2) Items in this table refer to primary beneficiaries. (3) Write the specification for "others" in the allocated cell, and insert as many rows as necessary. **Please do not fill cells in orange, as they contain automatic formulae.**

Table 1C: Total ODA disbursed to Mozambique (in USD) (Please, do not fill this table)

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		2007
I.3 Q.3	Sub-Total ODA to GoM (1)	
= I.3 (Q.1-Q3)	Sub-Total non-GoM ODA (2)	
I.3 Q.1	Total ODA disbursed (1+2)	

Note: Please do not fill cells in orange, as they contain automatic formulae.

2 Predictability

2.1. Multi-Year Indicative Commitments for GBS

	Do you have a multi-year agreement with the GoM for GBS?	How many Years are covered?	Which years are covered?	Does it include firm financial pledges and/or commitments?
2007				

Please, add any details deemed relevant to clarify the answers given above:

2.2. Disbursements and the State Budget

2.2.1. Schedule of commitments and disbursements of GBS in 2007

	Yes	No	Explain
Were your financial commitments for GBS in 2007 made within 4 weeks after the JR in 2006?			
Have your organization disbursed all the committed funds in 2007 as scheduled?			
Have your organization disbursed all the committed funds according to the quarterly disbursement schedule agreed?			

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

2.2.2. ODA recorded in the budget in 2007

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		2007
I.7 Q.13	How much total ODA for the GoM did you scheduled for disbursement? (in USD)	
I.3 Q.3	How much ODA for the GoM was disbursed? (in USD)	
	How much ODA was recorded in the budget? (in Meticais)	
	Is it possible to identify specific categories of items NOT recorded in the State Budget that should have been recorded? Please, indicate the items.	

Note: The third question is equivalent to the OECD/DAC indicator 3 Question 1 of government questionnaire.

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

2.3. Sectors

Of the key sectors with sector-aid programs in which you participate, please indicate,

Programme-based sector aid for 2007

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		How do you participate (A)	Funds disbursed (B)	Have you delegated cooperation to another donor? (Y/N, specify donor)	Has another donor delegated cooperation on your organization? (Y/N, specify donor)
= I.3 Q.3-GBS	<i>Agriculture</i>				
	<i>Health</i>				
	<i>Education</i>				
	<i>Water</i>				
	<i>Roads</i>				
	<i>HIV/AIDS</i>				
	<i>UTRESP</i>				
	<i>Energy</i>				
	<i>Fisheries</i>				
	<i>PBS</i>				
	<i>SISTAFE-UTRAFE</i>				
	<i>Tribunal Administrativo</i>				
	<i>Others (specify):_____</i>				
	<i>TOTAL</i>				

Notes: (A) Donor, Coordinating Donor or Observer. (B) In USD;

Please, add any details deemed relevant to clarify the answers given above (for example, to explain mobility between sectors over the years):

Project-based sector aid for 2007

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		How do you participate (A)	Funds disbursed (B)	Have you delegated cooperation to another donor? (Y/N, specify donor)	Has another donor delegated cooperation on your organization? (Y/N, specify donor)
= I.3 Q.3-GBS	<i>Agriculture</i>				
	<i>Health</i>				
	<i>Education</i>				
	<i>Water</i>				
	<i>Roads</i>				
	<i>HIV/AIDS</i>				
	<i>Energy</i>				
	<i>Fisheries</i>				
	<i>Others (specify): _____</i>				
	<i>TOTAL</i>				

Notes: (A) Donor, Coordinating Donor or Observer. (B) In USD;

Please, add any details deemed relevant to clarify the answers given above (for example, to explain mobility between sectors over the years):

3 Harmonization and Alignment

3.1. Harmonization of conditionality

3.1.1. Common conditionality in 2007

	Yes	No	Explain
Have your organization adhered to the common conditionalities of GBS as defined by the PAF and basic principles?			
Has any particular event (or set of events) triggered a decision from your organization that in any way changed the amounts committed and disbursed and/or the schedule of disbursements?			
Can you justify your decision to change amounts/schedule on the basis of the common conditionalities?			
Would you, instead, justify your decision on the basis of the bilateral agreement?			
Have the other PAPs agreed with your analysis of the problem?			
Have they supported your decision?			
If they did not support your position, did you reconsider and change your decision?			
How did the GoM react to your decision?			

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

3.1.2. Annex 10 bilateral exceptions in the MoU in 2007

	Yes	No	Explain
Does/did your organization have annex 10 exceptions in the MoU?			
Have you eliminated your annex 10 exceptions?			
Have you taken steps, or are taking steps, to eliminate annex 10 exceptions?			
Which exceptions have been, or are going to be, eliminated and why?			
Which exceptions remain and why?			

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

3.1.3. Harmonization of bilateral agreements

Is your new bilateral agreement strickly harmonized with the MoU? ____ (Y/N) If the answer is "No", please explain which aspects are not harmonized and what you intend to do about it:

3.2. Utilisation of government systems and reporting in 2007

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		Amount (in USD)	Explain
I.5a Q.7	ODA that is disbursed according to national procedures of budget execution.		
I.5a Q.9	ODA that is audited using ONLY national auditing systems.		

I.5a Q.8	ODA that requires ONLY national financial reporting systems.		
I.5b Q.11	ODA that utilises ONLY national procurement systems.		

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

3.3. *PAPs' joint work in 2007*

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		Number	Other agencies involved	Description
I.10a Q.17	Total joint missions (a)			
I.10a Q.16	Total missions			
I.10b Q.19	Analytical work that is coordinated (b)			
I.10b Q.18	Analytical work undertaken			

Note: (a) please, make sure that you list the joint missions and indicate the other agencies involved, so that we can avoid double counting. (b) please, make sure that you list the analytical work done and the other agencies involved, such that we can avoid double counting.

Please, add any details deemed necessary to clarify the answers above:

4 Capacity Strengthening

4.1. Number of parallel Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in 2007

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		Number	Sector	Other agencies involved
I.6 Q.12	Number of parallel PIUs in place			
	What do you intend to do with existing PIUs?			

Note: Please refer to OECD/DAC list/criteria attached.

Please, add any details deemed necessary to clarify the answers above:

4.2. Technical Cooperation in 2007

OECD/DAC equivalent Indicator (I) and Question (Q)		
	Areas/sectors in which you provide TC	
	Number of years you have been providing TC in these areas/sectors	
I.4 Q.5	Total value of TC provided (in USD)	
I.4 Q.6	Total TC provided through coordinated programmes (in USD)	
	Total sector-wide TC provided (in USD)	
	Other agencies involved with your coordinated and sector-wide TC	

Note: Please refer to OECD/DAC list/criteria attached.

Please, add any details deemed necessary to clarify the answers above:

Termos de Referência

Avaliação do Desempenho dos Parceiros de Apoio Programático ao Programa de Moçambique - 2007

1. Antecedentes

Um grupo de 19 Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs) providencia apoio ao Orçamento Geral do Estado à Moçambique. Em 2004 um Memorando de Entendimento (MdE) para o apoio programático foi assinado entre o Governo de Moçambique (GdM) e os Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs) o qual obriga ao Governo de Moçambique (GdM) e os Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs) aos princípios de mútua prestação de contas, de forma a permitir o sentido de posse, a previsibilidade dos fluxos de ajuda, o alinhamento com os processos do Governo, e harmonização na monitoria e avaliação dos processos.

Um requisito no MdE é a avaliação conjunta uma vez por ano, do desempenho dos PAPs em relação aos seus compromissos, feita com base num relatório independente do progresso em relação aos indicadores da matriz do Quadro de Avaliação de Desempenho (QAD) dos PAPs, e discutida na Revisão Conjunta anual. O QAD dos PAPs, que estabelece os indicadores e metas para 2007, acordadas durante a Revisão Semestral (RS) em Setembro de 2006, providencia a base para a avaliação do desempenho dos PAPs em 2007. A base para este exercício é criar incentivos para os PAPs melhorarem a efectividade da ajuda. A matriz do QAD dos PAPs para 2007 está inserida no Anexo 1.

A avaliação do desempenho será feita de forma agregada para todos os 19 PAPs, e para cada parceiro individualmente, usando um mecanismo acordado durante a Revisão Semestral de 2005 e finalizada durante a Revisão Conjunta de 2006.

2. Objectivos

O objectivo principal desta consulta é proporcionar uma revisão independente do desempenho dos parceiros em 2007 contra os seus compromissos avaliados através dos indicadores e metas na matriz do QAD dos PAPs, comparada ao desempenho em 2006 e 2005.

Espera-se que o consultor faça a avaliação do desempenho dos doadores em termos agregados (para o grupo como um todo) e individual para cada doador.

O exercício acima requerer que o consultor prepare um questionário a ser preenchido individualmente por cada doador dos PAPS, G19. O questionário deve ser elaborado em torno da matriz do QAD dos PAPS. O consultor deve organizar uma sessão de esclarecimento de dúvidas ou definições e da metodologia usada com representantes de todos os doadores para evitar que o questionário seja interpretado de forma diferente pelos diferentes parceiros.

O consultor deverá entrevistar o GdM e todos os PAPS pelo menos uma vez conforme a tabela abaixo indicada.

3. Requisitos de Competência e Experiência

É necessária uma equipa com 2 consultores no máximo. Os consultores devem estar familiarizados com as práticas dos doadores em Moçambique, com o trabalho na harmonização e alinhamento do OECD DAC e SPA, e com a literatura sobre a efectividade da ajuda.

A língua de trabalho é Inglês e todos os suplementos e relatórios deverão ser apresentados em Inglês. Devem nos ser apresentados os curriculums vitae dos consultores disponíveis e uma estimativa em termos reais de tempo útil necessária para a realização do trabalho.

4. Cronograma e resultados esperados

O número total de dias de trabalho será até 15 dias para o chefe da equipa e 14 dias para o outro membro? Os resultados deverão ser apresentados ao GdM e aos PAPS em forma de sumários e relatórios.

Calendário:

Meados até fins de Janeiro '08: Leituras preparatórias e preparação de questionários (incluindo consultoria com o Grupo de Referência no conteúdo do questionário)

Final de Janeiro: Envio dos Questionários finais a todos os doadores.

Segunda semana de Fevereiro: Apresentação sumária a todos os PAPS do questionário para esclarecimento de dúvidas/definições etc.

15 de Fevereiro: Prazo para devolução dos questionários ao consultor.

18 – 22 Fevereiro: Reuniões do consultor com o GdM e os doadores individuais

5 Março: Primeiro esboço do relatório enviado ao Grupo da Referência em Português e Inglês.

12 Março: Envio de comentários/correções pelo GdM e PAPS ao consultor

19 Março: Envio do relatório final ao GdM e PAPS.

5. Relatórios

O consultor submeterá relatórios em versão electrónica e manuscrita em Inglês ao GdM e PAPs. A tradução destes documentos é da responsabilidade dos PAPs.

O Grupo de Referência para o Consultor consistirá por Jolke Oppenwahl, Per Mogstad e um representante do MPD.

Os resultados devem ser distribuídos em Português e Inglês. O relatório consistirá de um sumário narrativo, orientação geral no desempenho dos PAPs, uma matriz completa do QAD dos PAPs (PAPs PAF matriz) comparando metas aos resultados actuais para 2007, e matrizes completas e resultados do posicionamento de cada PAP.

6. Principais Referências Bibliográficas

- Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Review 2006 – Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, Final Report 28.02.2007
- "Perfect Partners? The performance of Programme Aid Partners in Mozambique, 2004: A report to the Programme Aid Partners and Government of Mozambique." Prepared by Tony Killick (team leader), Carlos N. Castel-Branco, and Richard Gerster, May 2005
- Baseline Study on PAP Performance in 2003 – September 2004 – Report to the G15 Programme Aid Partners and Government of Mozambique by Richard Gerster and Alan Harding.
- 2004 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Mozambique and the Programme Aid Partners for the provision of Direct Budget and Balance of Payment Support.
- Study on Alignment of Sectoral Aid with Government Planning and Budgeting Cycle – Ernst & Young – October 2006
- SPA BSWG – 2004 Survey of the Alignment of Budget Support and Balance of Payments Support with National PRS Processes
- Responses to 2005 and 2006 DAC/SPA questionnaires
- OECD/DAC GBS evaluation – Mozambique case study (preliminary report)
- OECD/DAC survey on progress in harmonization and alignment – Mozambique draft report
- The PAP website www.pap.org.mz
- Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and targets.