



Brazil's agriculture cooperation in Africa:
new paradigms?

Lídia Cabral e Alex Shankland

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Brazil's agriculture cooperation in Africa: new paradigms?

A scoping study for the Future Agricultures Consortium

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1. Introduction

The subject of ‘emerging donors’ or ‘rising powers’ is becoming increasingly topical in debates on international development. It featured prominently in the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), held in South Korea at the end of 2011, an event that will be remembered as the first time traditional and non-traditional donors¹ sat together, as providers of development cooperation, to agree on best practices for delivering assistance to poor countries. Although the Forum did not produce universal standards on aid effectiveness, but rather differential commitments for traditional and non-traditional donors, it reflected the world’s ‘shifting geopolitical realities’ (Glennie 2011) by recognising the increasingly significant role played by South-South cooperation and the need to move beyond the narrow focus on aid and consider development finance more broadly.

The presence of the rising powers in Africa, particularly China’s, has been subject to much attention and a great deal of damning reporting, although a more nuanced and balanced view is now surfacing, as research on the topic builds up. Most evidence on the rising powers’ development cooperation practices focuses on China (Alden 2007, Rotberg 2008, Bräutigam 2009) and thorough analysis on the experience of countries like Brazil is still in short supply. Some of the work available, especially Bräutigam (2009), considers experiences of cooperation in agriculture, although a systematic analysis of how the rising powers are changing the paradigm of agricultural development in Africa is yet to be produced.

A new Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) research initiative focused on Brazil and China’s agriculture cooperation in Africa aims to contribute to filling this gap by documenting and analysing the experiences of such emerging cooperation programmes and discussing the novelty and value added of the approaches used and implications for African agriculture. The overarching research question guiding the analysis is whether a new paradigm for agricultural development is being forged by the rising powers in Africa?

This paper summarises the findings of a scoping study on Brazilian development cooperation in agriculture in Africa. The study comprised, in a first instance, a review of the relevant literature and interviews with key informants in Brazil, undertaken between October 2011 and March 2012.² This was complemented by an international seminar on the topic held in Brasília on May 2012, which brought together experts and practitioners from Brazil, Africa, China and Europe to discuss Brazilian agricultural cooperation in the context of South-South engagements with Africa.³ The seminar constituted a unique opportunity to gather and contrast experiences and viewpoints on the subject across a wide range of state and non-state actors. Such initial work will be followed by in-depth investigations in a selection of African countries where Brazilian cooperation in agriculture is being put into practice.

The paper is structured into five sections. This brief introduction is followed by an overview of the general features of Brazilian cooperation, including the its drivers, principles, modalities and institutional setting. Section 2 describes cooperation with the African continent, with particular focus on its agriculture component and its growing significance. The fourth section offers some preliminary

¹ The term ‘traditional donor’ is used to refer to the group of donors comprising the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, sometimes also called ‘DAC donors’. This terms contrasts with that of ‘non-traditional’ or ‘non-DAC’ donors, typically referring to countries with emerging economies and more recent histories of development assistance. For a discussion on these concepts see Manning (2006).

² The list of people interviewed is provided in Annex 1.

³ The event, titled “The role of South-South Cooperation in Agricultural Development in Africa - opportunities and challenges”, was hosted on 17 May 2012 by the International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth and was co-organised with the Future Agricultures Consortium and the Department for International Development, with support from UN Women, Articulação Sul and Cirad: <http://www.future-agricultures.org/events/south-south-cooperation>.

observations and sets hypotheses for further investigation. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for the subsequent stage of the research.

2. Overview of Brazil's cooperation for development

2.1 Significance and drivers

Brazilian development cooperation is increasingly in the spotlight. Despite having a small portfolio, compared to other 'rising powers' such as India and China⁴, Brazil is a source of world-leading expertise across a range of areas of great relevance to developing countries' development processes – most notably agriculture research, health (malaria and antiretroviral treatment) and social protection (conditional cash transfers) – and increasingly a reference for many African countries with historical and cultural affinities with this South America giant. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) are internationally renowned research institutions on tropical agriculture and health, respectively. *Bolsa Família* is the world's largest conditional cash transfers programme and has played a central role in moving millions of Brazilians out of extreme poverty (add reference).

Foreign policy has been a major driver of Brazilian cooperation and former-President Lula da Silva was the engine behind the dynamism noticeable during recent years. His policy expanded the focus of cooperation beyond the Latin America region and Lusophone African countries, in what has been interpreted as a strategy of autonomy (via-à-vis the US's hegemony) through diversification of diplomatic and economic relations (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). Africa had a prominent position in Lula's 'presidential diplomacy', not only because of the frequently articulated moral duty, but also because of the continent's commercial potential and geo-political significance as a southern ally (Matos 2011).

Under President Dilma Rousseff, the trend over the first couple of years of administration has been one of apparent continuity and fulfilment of previous commitments. Yet, new nuances are being added to the approach... (Costa Leite 2012).

2.2 Principles and claimed advantages

Brazil's development cooperation is guided by the following principles: (i) joint diplomacy based on solidarity; (ii) demand-driven action, in response to demands from developing countries; (iii) acknowledgement of local experience and adaptation of Brazilian experience; (iv) no imposition of conditions; (v) no association with commercial interests or profit; and (vi) no interference in domestic issues of partner countries (ABC 2011). These principles are claimed to distinguish Brazilian cooperation from traditional forms of cooperation, particularly by reflecting a horizontal relationship between southern countries. Indeed, Brazil rejects being referred to as a 'donor', a label it associates with the vertical (donor-recipient) nature of North-South cooperation. Instead, it prefers to portray its cooperation as a mutually beneficial relationship between partners.

Brazil also claims the advantage of having expertise and technologies that are a good fit to the needs of developing countries, due to greater proximity (vis-à-vis Northern donors) in terms of economic and institutional development, culture and language (in the case of some African countries) and climatic conditions, which are particularly relevant for cooperation in tropical agriculture and health. Brazil also offers its own tested solutions to development problems, rather than ideas of what may work, although, as discussed further ahead, adaptability to different contexts should not be taken for granted.


⁴ Although the most recent comparison is somehow dated (ECOSOC 2008).

2.3 Cooperation modalities and volume of resources invested in cooperation activities

Technical cooperation is the most visible modality of the country's development cooperation portfolio. It consists of the transfer and adaptation of expertise, skills and technology for development mainly through training courses, workshops, consultancies, exchange programmes, and, occasionally, the donation of equipment. But Brazil also uses other cooperation modalities and in reality, technical cooperation represents a relatively small proportion of the country's international cooperation budget. It provides scholarships for foreigners to study in Brazil. It assists countries facing emergencies (Haiti is the largest beneficiary of Brazilian humanitarian assistance). It makes contributions to international and regional multilateral institutions working in development, such as several UN agencies or the Inter-American Development Bank. It grants debt relief to highly indebted poor countries and it is increasingly offering export credits on concessional terms to countries in Latin America and Africa.⁵

At the end of 2010, the governmental Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA) published the first survey on Brazilian development cooperation, where the amount of resources channelled to the various modalities was calculated for the 2005-2009 period (IPEA et al. 2010). According to the survey, Brazil's development cooperation programme amounted, in 2009, to US\$ 362 million, approximately 0.02% of GNI. The bulk of this amount (68%) corresponded to Brazil's contributions to multilateral organisations, whereas technical cooperation represented just 13% of the total. The weight of technical cooperation is lower if the full period surveyed is considered – Figure 1.

Figure 1. Brazilian development cooperation by modality, 2005-9




Source: IPEA et al. (2010).

The IPEA survey excluded debt relief, export credits and food financing initiatives from the definition and calculation of Brazilian cooperation. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) has subsequently attempted to fill this gap by estimating the amount of resources channelled through these modalities – Figure 2. According to such estimates, export credits become the largest modality of cooperation, representing 42% of the overall portfolio during 2005-2009. The weight of technical cooperation drops to a mere 3%.

Figure 2. Brazilian development cooperation by modality (including debt relief and export credits), 2005-9


⁵ For details on these modalities of cooperation and a discussion on the of scope of Brazilian cooperation see Cabral (2011).



Source: ABC (2011a).

Despite its relatively small weight, technical cooperation, a key instrument of Brazilian diplomacy, has been expanding rapidly over recent years, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Brazilian technical cooperation, annual budget and new projects, 2003-9



Sources: IPEA et al. (2010) and correspondence with ABC.

Linked to the expansion of technical cooperation, another trend worthy of notice is the rise of trilateral (or triangular) cooperation arrangements, whereby cooperation is provided by Brazil alongside another donor (typically a traditional donor) to a beneficiary country. Japan, Germany, the United States and several UN agencies are amongst the main partners (on the provider side) of Brazil in trilateral cooperation. Trilateral cooperation is claimed to make the most of the complementarities between cooperation providers to the advantage of the beneficiary country. For Brazil, it allows its cooperation activities in third countries to be scaled up, complementing its technical cooperation inputs with financial resources granted by the partner donor. At the same time, triangular cooperation also offers a route for maintaining strategic links with traditional donors at a time when Brazil is making the transition from aid recipient to provider.⁶

⁶ For a detailed analysis of the concept see Fordelone (2009). For a discussion of Brazil’s engagement with this modality see Cabral and Winestock (2010).

2.4 Overview of institutional setting and coordination challenges

The institutional framework governing Brazilian development cooperation is characterised first and foremost by significant segmentation. This is in part due to the nature of Brazilian cooperation, particularly its technical assistance dimension, which entails first-hand transfer of Brazil's own experiences and the expertise of its institutions across an array of thematic fields, from agriculture, to education, health, security, energy, social protection, among many other. There is therefore a great number of institutions – governmental and non-governmental – directly involved in the implementation of technical cooperation projects, raising considerable coordination challenges.

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) is the government institution with the mandate to coordinate technical cooperation. Its capacity has been greatly boosted over recent years – its budget increased threefold between 2008 and 2010⁷ – and it has benefited from dynamic leadership that has visibly revamped its image. Yet, ABC's coordination role is constrained by several factors. One is its relatively low-grade position in the government hierarchy. As a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (commonly known as *Itamaraty*), it is a 'virtual' agency, with no financial autonomy or significant political clout. It has therefore limited space to set the cooperation agenda, plan ahead or be strategic in deploying its financial and human resources. The direction of cooperation (such as selection of beneficiary countries and thematic focus) is largely determined by *Itamaraty* and specialised institutions, such as Embrapa for cooperation in agriculture. ABC's coordination role takes shape at the implementation level, organising the protocol and logistics for missions of Brazilian experts to the field.

Another factor constraining ABC's coordination function is the obsolete legal framework for Brazilian cooperation, which still portrays Brazil as a recipient country. This limits the ability to operate abroad. Embrapa and Fiocruz are probably the only Brazilian cooperation actors, with the exception of the foreign office, with legitimacy to establish a presence overseas. ABC has not been granted such right yet although it has started placing contractors in strategic countries to support operations or coordinate specific projects. Its capacity to represent Brazil at the development partners' table is however limited, as its field officers do not have such mandate or profile.

Finally, ABC's mandate is restricted to technical cooperation, which represents only a fraction of Brazil's development cooperation activities abroad. Responsibilities for other modalities of cooperation, such as debt relief, concessional lending and emergency relief, spread across several institutions including *Itamaraty*, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce, the Commerce Chamber (CAMEX) and the External Credit Assessment Committee (COMACE).⁸

⁷ From 17 to 52 million Brazilian Reais (Cabral and Winestock 2010).

⁸ For details on these institutions' roles see Cabral (2011).

3. Brazil's agriculture cooperation in Africa: features and trends


3.1 Africa focus

Africa featured prominently in Lula's 'presidential diplomacy'. The former president often spoke passionately about Brazil's affinities with the continent and his country's moral and fraternal duty to support Africa's renaissance. During Lula's administration (2003-2010), presidential visits to the continent reached record levels and the number of Brazilian embassies across Africa more than doubled (MRE 2011). Economic relations also intensified, with a considerable rise in trade and private investment in the mining, construction and oil sectors (Costa and Veiga 2011; Iglesias e Costa 2011).

The trend is likely to be maintained by Lula's successor. During the first two years of her mandate, president Dilma Rousseff paid her first visit to the continent (touring 3 countries) and created *Grupo África*, an inter-ministerial group, with private sector representatives, to focus on Brazil's relations with Africa. Dilma's rhetoric seems, on the surface, less emotional and more pragmatic than Lula's, with an explicit emphasis on commercial and investment opportunities for Brazilian enterprises, although also urging them to leave a 'legacy' to Africans through the transfer of technology, training and social programmes.⁹

Reflecting the country's diplomatic and economic motivations, Brazilian cooperation has been spreading steadily across the continent. According to the latest official information, there are technical cooperation projects in either design or implementation stage in 38 countries (ABC 2011). In 2010, Africa accounted for the largest regional increase in budget execution, having absorbed 57% of Brazil's overall technical cooperation budget (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Brazilian technical cooperation by world regions, 2010




Source: ABC (2011).

The five Portuguese-speaking African countries¹⁰ remain Brazil's main technical cooperation partners, with Mozambique as the single largest beneficiary (Figure 5). In 2010, these countries accounted for 74% of resources spent in technical cooperation in Africa (Cabral and Winestock 2010). But as noted before, the portfolio of partners is being diversified, mirroring the spreading of the diplomatic network and deepening of economic relations across the continent.

Figure 5. Top ten beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa, 2011

⁹ 'Dilma revê estratégia para a África', *Valor Econômico*, 08/11/2011 edition.

¹⁰ These are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tomé and Príncipe.




Source: ABC (2011).

Alongside technical cooperation, other modalities are being increasingly drawn on for South-South cooperation with Africa. Debt relief has been granted to several African countries, clearing the way for additional lending to be made available by the Brazilian banking system. Some of these loans are concessional and focused on development objectives, such as a new credit facility to support African farmers in buying agricultural machinery for productivity gains and food security (more on this in the sections that follow). Others are primarily motivated by commercial objectives, such as most lending provided by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to countries like Angola, Nigeria and South Africa.

3.2 Agriculture as a bulging field of cooperation in Africa


Agriculture tops the list of priority fields of Brazilian technical cooperation. Between 2003 and 2010, it accounted for 22 percent of the country's technical cooperation portfolio worldwide. In Africa, the proportion of agriculture-related projects was even greater (at 26 percent, over the same period) – Figures 6a and 6b.

Figure 6a. Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported worldwide, 2003-10



Source: ABC (2011).

Figure 6b. Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported in Africa, 2003-10



Source: ABC (2011).

Despite the prominence of Lusophone countries in the agriculture cooperation portfolio, technical cooperation in agriculture has been expanding considerably across the continent. An event hosted by President Lula back in 2010 – *Diálogo Brasil-África*¹¹ – played an important part in propelling Brazil as a source of cutting-edge expertise on tropical agriculture (ABC 2010a). The event brought together high-profile actors¹² to discuss opportunities for cooperation in the domains of agricultural development and food security leading to a surge in demand for Brazilian technical cooperation projects. It showcased consolidated areas of cooperation, such as Embrapa’s renowned agricultural research, as well as Brazil’s domestic agricultural policies, their accomplishments and potential for replication in Africa. Related to the latter, the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and the National Rural Learning Service (SENAR) were brought forward as complementary sources of expertise, opening new fronts for technical cooperation in agriculture.

At the time of the event, at least 26 African countries¹³ hosted Brazilian technical cooperation projects, in either design or implementation stage (ABC 2010b). These projects covered a range of agricultural issues, such as support to production, training of extension agents, development of value chains, strengthening of public sector institutions, support to rural associations and cooperatives, sanitary and phytosanitary regulation, amongst other (*ibid*). Since then, additional projects have been initiated, opening new areas of work with existing partners as well as in other countries. Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal and Kenya (Kenya as a new partner for technical cooperation in agriculture) are confirmed beneficiaries of a new programme for boosting African agriculture productivity, *Programa Mais Alimentos África*, which entails the establishment of a credit line to buy Brazilian agriculture machinery. Latest additions to the list of partner countries include Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger, which, alongside Mozambique and Senegal, will benefit from a food purchase programme, *Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos*, to be set up by Brazil

¹¹ The ‘Diálogo Brasil-África em Segurança Alimentar, Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural’ was held in May 2010 in Brazil’s capital, Brasília.

¹² Including ministers of agriculture from several African countries, representatives of the African Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, as well as the private sector and non-governmental organisations, alongside Brazilian relevant institutions.

¹³ These countries are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, S. Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

with support from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) of the United Nations.¹⁴

3.3 Institutional players and arrangements for technical cooperation in agriculture

Embrapa as the face of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture

Embrapa is to a large extent the face of Brazilian cooperation in this sector. It dominates the portfolio of projects as the source of expertise for agriculture-related issues, particularly in areas such as strengthening developing countries' research capacity and adapting Brazilian technology to these countries' agro-ecological conditions (ABC 2010b). For example, under Cotton 4, a flagship project in the agriculture portfolio initiated in 2006, Embrapa is working with research institutes of four West Africa countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) to adapt Brazilian cotton's genetic material and improve productivity and quality of cotton production in those countries, as well as strengthen local research capacity (ABC undated).

Embrapa has its own international cooperation division, the International Relations Secretariat, responsible for managing and coordinating technical cooperation initiatives. This unit has about 50 staff distributed across three sub-divisions: technical cooperation, 'structured projects' (more on this below) and scientific cooperation. The latter does not concern cooperation for international development, but rather scientific exchanges with the aim of strengthening Brazilian scientific research.

Embrapa draws on several of its specialised research and service provision units for development cooperation in particular topics.¹⁵ Units whose presence seems most recurrent in technical cooperation projects include: Embrapa Horticultures, Embrapa Cerrados, Embrapa Tropical Agro-industry, Embrapa Meat Livestock and Embrapa Dairy Livestock.¹⁶ But the range is increasing. In a new project in Mozambique alone – *Pro-Savana* (discussed in detail below) – there are as many as 16 Embrapa units involved.¹⁷

Training courses for researchers and practitioners from partner countries are also an important component of Embrapa's contribution to development cooperation.¹⁸ Sporadic courses are giving way to a more structured and strategic training programme coordinated by the recently established Centre for Training in Tropical Agriculture (CECAT). **This includes training not only on technical tropical agriculture subjects – such as... - but also on agricultural policy and institutions.**

Embrapa's footprint in Africa has expanded over recent years, with a vigorous push from President Lula himself, an enthusiast about the research corporation's potential contribution to Africa's development. In 2006, Embrapa opened an office in Accra¹⁹, Ghana, with the aim of facilitating engagement with African

¹⁴ 'Africa: Brazil to Fund Food Purchasing in Five Countries', posted on 22 February 2012 by The African Press Organization. Accessible at: <http://africabusiness.com/2012/02/22/brazil-to-fund-food-purchasing-in-five-african-countries-agreement-signed-with-fao-and-wfp/>.

¹⁵ Embrapa is structured as a network of about 47 specialised research and service provision units, located across Brazil: http://www.embrapa.br/english/embrapa/unidades_de_pesquisa.

¹⁶ Interview with Embrapa, 13/10/2011.

¹⁷ Interview with JICA office in Brasília, 10/10/2011.

¹⁸ These courses usually comprise an overview of Brazilian agriculture and agricultural research as well as a selection of specialised applied techniques, such as livestock and fodder management, seed production and preservation, soya cultivation and water conservation (ABC 2010a).

¹⁹ The selection of Accra resulted from a field recognition mission undertaken by *Itamaraty*, ABC and Embrapa to Africa in 2005 with the aim of identifying an adequate location for Embrapa's Africa office. This mission identified four possible locations: Accra, Dakar, Nairobi and Pretoria. Nairobi was presented as the strongest contender, but ended up being rejected due to concerns over political stability and security. Pretoria was also rejected on the grounds that South Africa was not representative of the rest of the continent. Accra ended up being selected because of the attractive housing conditions promptly offered by the Government of Ghana. Source: interview with Embrapa, Ghana office, 26/03/2012.

institutions on technical cooperation matters and provide support to headquarters regarding coordination and monitoring of the portfolio of projects in operation across the continent. Yet, in 2011 this office's remit was scaled down and it is currently responsible for the coordination of projects located in Ghana only.²⁰ But Embrapa's presence is being strengthened elsewhere – Mozambique currently hosts a team of Embrapa professionals that could become a hub for cooperation in Southern Africa.

An expanding range of players

Besides Embrapa, there are at least 22 other Brazilian institutions²¹ involved in technical cooperation in agriculture in Africa, covering a wide range of issues. As capacity to respond to swelling demand from developing countries is being stretched to the limit, Embrapa is partnering with or giving way to other agricultural research institutions, such as, for example, the Federal University of Viçosa (ABC 2010b).

Also, as the topics in the agriculture cooperation portfolio with Africa diversify, so do the range of Brazilian players involved. MDA's presence in the portfolio is expanding, carrying with it the focus on 'family farming'²² and food security. Other governmental institutions with a strong presence are the Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Enterprises (EMATER), providers of rural extension services at the state level²³, and the National Rural Learning Service (SENAR), a parastatal specialised in rural professional training. Some of these institutions have their own international cooperation units.

Besides governmental institutions, some community-based organisations are being brought into the Brazilian cooperation framework. The General Secretariat of the Presidency (*Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República*) has played an active role in engaging non-governmental players and Brazil's social movements. A project aiming to recover and preserve native seeds in Mozambique and South Africa, *Implantação de Bancos Comunitários de Sementes Crioulas em Áreas de Agricultura Familiar*, draws on the experience of two Brazilian community-based organisations in the field, the Women Farmers' Movement and the Popular Peasant Movement, alongside the Brazilian Institute for Economic and Social Analysis. It aims to connect Brazilian rural civil society and farmers' organisations in those in African countries.

Institutional arrangements for project selection, coordination and country engagement

The identification of cooperation opportunities typically emerges from diplomatic exchanges between Brazil and its partner countries, mediated by *Itamaraty* and country-level diplomatic representations. Country visits by the President of Brazil or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or reciprocal visits by partner countries to Brazil, often mark the beginning of such exchanges. These are followed by technical prospection missions organised by ABC and usually comprised of the relevant specialised institutions from Brazil. The missions may have a specific thematic focus (e.g. prospection mission to Mali in 2009/10, undertaken by EMATER-DF, MDA and ABC, for projects related to smallholder horticulture) or may have a broader focus, depending on how detailed discussions on the diplomatic front had been (ABC 2010b). Although cooperation is claimed to be demand-driven, the specific focus of cooperation and selection of individual projects depends largely on the institutions taking part in the mission and the menu of options they carry with them. Interaction with the partner country for project identification is done exclusively at a government-to-government (and central administration) level. Special occurrences, such as the above-

²⁰ Interview with Embrapa, Ghana office, 26/03/2012.

²¹ The full list included in ABC's 2010 catalogue of technical cooperation in Africa is provided in annex.

²² The concept of 'family farming' is specific to Brazil. A 2006 law establishes criteria for defining this type of agriculture production system. These include: farming plots with an average surface of 15 hectares (although this may vary significantly, depending on the size of the municipality), maximum of 2 wage-labourers per year (most labour must be sourced within the household), net annual income of up to 130.000 Reais, and family-based management of the land.

²³ The most active EMATER in the cooperation portfolio is the one located in the Federal District of Brasília: EMATER-DF (<http://www.emater.df.gov.br/>).

mentioned *Diálogo Brasil-África* event and international fora, represent other channels for identifying cooperation opportunities.

ABC is responsible for overall coordination across Brazilian institutions, although this concerns essentially procedural matters (e.g. producing the cooperation agreement document – *Ajuste Complementar* – that operationalises the high-level cooperation agreement – *Acordo Básico* – and serves as the basis for developing the detailed project document) and administration (financing travel expenses and organising the logistics around the field mission). It is unclear whether there is any coordination on the substance of interventions, particularly in countries where different Brazilian institutions carry out development cooperation under the same thematic umbrella. This is happening in Mozambique where currently Embrapa and MDA are simultaneously implementing cooperation projects.

Besides project identification and design, interaction with partner country institutions is mostly done within the framework of individual projects. In-country structures for managing policy dialogue at the technical level are only starting to surface and engagement with country processes has been mainly done via diplomatic channels. ABC has no formal representation outside Brazil, although it has placed about ten workers, on short-term contracts, within Brazilian country embassies in a selection of strategic countries. These ‘focal points’ perform mainly a facilitator’s role, aiding Brasília and the local embassies on operational matters concerning cooperation-related field visits of Brazilian government officials and experts (Cabral and Winestock, 2010).²⁴ Recently, a contractor with a technical profile (Fundação Gertúlio Vargas Projetos) has been hired to coordinate a component of *ProSavana*, a large cooperation programme aiming to replicate the Brazilian *cerrado* development experience and transform the Mozambican savannah into highly productive agriculture land (see Box 1 below), **setting a precedent of middle-management that could be emulated in countries with large cooperation programmes (expand?)**. Embrapa is the only specialised institution in the agricultural domain with in-country representations. Besides the Accra office, it now has a general coordinator for Embrapa activities in Mozambique. It also has a few specialised researchers posted in partner countries with large research projects (e.g. Mozambique, Mali and Senegal).

3.4 The policy of ‘no-policy’

There is no explicitly formulated policy for Brazilian cooperation in agriculture or indeed in any other sector. Beyond the general guiding principles of Brazilian cooperation and the menu of Brazilian agricultural policy and research experiences partner countries may want to choose from, there is no official line on what the policy objectives and approach for cooperation in agriculture, or indeed any other sector or theme, are. The common justification for such gap is the ‘demand-driven’ and ‘no-interference’ attributes of cooperation, which are claimed to require entering cooperation agreements without pre-set agendas. The ‘no-policy’ policy could be interpreted, however, as the result of institutional segmentation of cooperation in general and, for the agriculture sector in particular, the fragmentary nature of Brazil’s agricultural governance.

The segmentation of the institutional map reflects to some extent the nature of Brazilian technical cooperation, which entails the direct participation of the range of institutions specialised in the particular subject of cooperation. As noted, there are more than 20 of such institutions actively involved in agriculture cooperation, making coordination of interventions particularly challenging. With virtually no institutional direction or coordination on the content of interventions – ABC’s role is essentially confined to operational coordination, and *Itamaraty* is concerned with higher level diplomatic issues – what

²⁴ In 2010, countries with ABC staff working within the local embassy were: Cape Verde, Angola, Mali, Kenya, East Timor, Mozambique, S. Tome and Principe and Guinea-Bissau.

emerges is a cooperation framework without a unified or coherent policy direction but shaped by the agendas, experiences and imaginaries of the various institutions and individuals delivering technical cooperation on the ground.

Until recently, the agriculture cooperation framework was dominated by Embrapa and its emphasis on tropical agriculture research focused, particularly, on agribusiness. But, the impetus given, since 2010, to family farming and food security is adding new conceptual (ideological even) and practical dimensions to the framework. The duality that, in grossly simplified terms, characterises domestic agricultural governance (Alex, what about a textbox here on MAPA vs MDA? Can you add?) is permeating development cooperation abroad. The absence of a clearly defined policy direction for cooperation in agriculture is, under such conditions, not surprising.

3.5 Changes in the nature of cooperation in agriculture

Changes in the nature of Brazilian cooperation have been taking place, reflecting the increasing size of operations as well as accumulation of expertise. On the one hand, one-off small-scale technical cooperation projects are progressively giving way to larger projects, with a longer time horizon, focused on strengthening capacities of local institutions and with more explicit concern for impact and sustainability. Such projects are referred to as 'structured projects' (*projetos estruturantes*). Cotton 4 was the first of this kind.

The nature of technical cooperation is also expanding beyond simpler forms of assistance (such as training, study visits and workshops) by gradually focusing on the adaptation of successful Brazilian policies to the African context. This was already happening in other sectors, an example being *Bolsa Família*, a conditional cash transfers programme. As for agriculture, the 2010 *Diálogo Brasil-África* event marks this shift and introduces the adaptation of Brazilian agricultural policies into the technical cooperation portfolio. Examples of this include the *Programa Mais Alimentos África* and the *Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos* (PAA), which are already operational in several countries – Box 1.

Furthermore, new modalities of cooperation are also being associated with technical cooperation, as illustrated by the *Mais Alimentos África* programme, which combines conventional technical assistance in agriculture with a credit facility directed to African farmers for the acquisition of Brazilian agriculture machinery and equipment. A total of 900 have already been approved for this programme.

Finally, triangular cooperation is adding scale and visibility to Brazilian technical cooperation projects. *ProSavana*, currently one of the largest projects in the agriculture portfolio, is the product of a trilateral cooperation agreement between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. PAA is also a trilateral cooperation partnership of Brazil, FAO and WFP in five African countries. The United States are also a key partner in trilateral cooperation with Africa in the agricultural domain.²⁵

Box 1. *Mais Alimentos África, Aquisição de Alimentos* and *Pro-Savana*: rising stars in Brazil-Africa agriculture cooperation

Programa Mais Alimentos África aims to increase agricultural productivity and food security in Africa by improving access to technology. The programme led by MDA adapts a similar programme implemented in Brazil, since 2008, as part of the National Programme for Strengthening Family Agriculture (Pronaf). It consists of a credit facility to support the acquisition of farming machinery and equipment supplied by the Brazilian industry, directed at 'family farming' or the African equivalent, complemented by specialised technical assistance. The loan is provided on concessional terms, offering a 15 to 17 years repayment period, a 3 to 5 years grace period and an interest rate of 2% (or the Libor if this is lower). A total of

²⁵ For example, there are currently two trilateral cooperation arrangements between Brazil, the US and Mozambique – one aiming to strengthen institutional capacity of Mozambique's public agricultural research institute, the other aiming to improve food security through a pilot research project on horticultures in Maputo's green belt.

\$640 million have been approved by the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX) for implementation of this programme in Africa in 2011-12. Credit lines have already been negotiated with Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal and Kenya.

Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (PAA) aims to address food insecurity and strengthen local food markets by procuring food stuffs produced by small farmers, donating them to families facing food insecurity, supplying school feeding programmes and building up food stocks. The programme draws on a similar programme implemented in Brazil by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS). The Brazilian government has committed \$2.4 million to support the programme's implementation in five African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal. FAO and WFP will assist implementation of this trilateral cooperation programme.

ProSavana is the outcome of a triangular partnership between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. The partnership was initially set between Japan and Brazil at the L'Aquila G8 meeting in 2009, as part of the Global L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. Mozambique was subsequently identified as third party and beneficiary of the arrangement. The programme, led by Embrapa on the Brazil side, aims to transform parts of the savannah spreading across the *Nacala* corridor, in northern Mozambique, into highly productive agricultural land and address food security concerns. *ProSavana* will try to emulate the Brazilian *cerrado* transformation which received support from Japan in the 1980s and 1990s through a programme called PRODECER and turned Brazil into a world leading soya producer. *ProSavana* has three main components: (i) agricultural research, (ii) rural extension and (iii) local area development planning. The programme is claimed to focus on both commercial large-scale production systems and subsistence smallholder agriculture. Implementation started in 2011 and about \$13 million have been committed, by Brazil, Japan and the Mozambican government, for a period of about 5 years. An additional amount of resources will be provided by Japan to Mozambique (through a combination of grants and concessional loans) to support developing complementary infrastructures across the *Nacala* corridor. The expected overall timeframe for the programme is of at least 20 years.

Sources: Key informants' interviews and [press \(several\)](#).

4. Emerging traits of the Brazil-Africa encounter

4.1 Brazil's drivers: the confluence of altruistic and self-interested motivations

It is widely established that development cooperation in Brazil is, first and foremost, an instrument of foreign policy (Ayllón Pino 2010; Cabral and Winestock 2010) and this is by definition the expression of geopolitical strategies that are bound to include a range of self-interested objectives (Lima and Hirst 2006). This is hardly different to any other country with an international development programme, although the degree to which countries are forthright about the link between charity and self-interest is somewhat variable. Brazil claims, however, that its cooperation approach is guided by the principle of 'solidary diplomacy', which brings together elements of altruism (supporting those in need) and reciprocity (forging mutually beneficial partnerships) in a horizontal relationship between southern peers. Our proposed hypothesis is that ***the combination of altruistic and self-interested drives in Brazilian cooperation mirrors competing perspectives within Brazil with regards to international relations.***

The narrative of solidarity fits well with the roots and mandate of the lead party of the ruling coalition – the Workers Party (PT) – and, in the case of Africa, it follows Lula's legacy of approximation to the continent. It also fits with other less virtuous, even if equally legitimate, objectives concerning geopolitics and the quest of political support, particularly from non-OECD countries, for greater clout in global politics and in the governance of international bodies in particular. The pragmatic impulse responds to the need of a growing economy like Brazil to access raw materials, markets and secure profitable deals for its bulging businesses. Africa, with its generous resource endowments and relative political and macroeconomic stability, represents an increasingly attractive destination for Brazilian traders and investors.

Such dualistic drive is perceptible in agriculture cooperation where, on the one hand, there is an agenda for assisting countries reaching, for example, food sovereignty and strengthening their smallholder agriculture and, on the other hand, there are commercial interests shaping the nature of assistance. *Mais Alimentos África* is an example of noticeable confluence of both types of motivations. The programme is aimed to address productivity and food insecurity constraints, including in newly resettled agricultural land of Zimbabwe marginalised by traditional donors (Mukwereza 2012). Besides these development objectives, pursued within the partner country, the programme is also serving the interests of Brazilian industry. In fact, the programme has been described as an 'industrial policy' that ensures a 'steadily increasing demand' for the Brazilian industrial sector (Patriota and Pierri, 2012: 28). *ProSavana* is another example of such confluence of interests in that alongside the technical cooperation component, focused on strengthening research and extension, the programme is also helping to steer private investment from Brazil (and Japan) – the recently launched *Fundo Nacala* is expected to attract Brazilian (and Japanese) investors into the *Nacala* corridor in what is expected to become a mutually beneficial arrangement.²⁶

4.2 Narratives of agricultural development: dichotomy or pluralism?

As noted before, there is no explicit strategy for Brazilian agricultural cooperation, either in Africa or elsewhere. Brazil's cooperation policy for the sector is what emerges from the sum of the various programmes and projects being carried out by a range of institutions guided by a common general code of conduct (demand-driven, no interference, etc.). Under such piecemeal approach, **contrasting narratives on agriculture development are starting to surface, reflecting the competing visions of development held by the various Brazilian actors involved in agricultural cooperation.** The contrast is, in

²⁶ 'Mozambique: Agreement On Nacala Fund', *AllAfrica*, 6th July 2012: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207061132.html>.

simplified terms, between a model of agricultural development founded on smallholder production systems and a model driven essentially by high-value and large-scale commercial farming. The cooperation programme spearheaded by the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development is tightly associated with the former model, whereas much (though not all) of Embrapa's development cooperation activities tend to be associated with the latter.

These competing visions reflect (or are the cause of) the segmented nature of Brazil's domestic institutional framework for governing the sector. Whether segmentation is a positive or a negative attribute of Brazil's agricultural governance is a disputed matter. Some would claim Brazil has a pluralistic model, where institutional segmentation results from a pragmatic division of labour²⁷. Other would point to the dichotomy and inconsistencies between two conceptually and ideologically opposing models of development.

4.3 Knowledge transmission: first-hand experience and the limits of the technocratic approach

One distinctive attribute of Brazilian technical cooperation is the direct deployment of expertise without intermediaries. Brazilian institutions (governmental or not) typically make use of their own staff to transfer into partner countries the knowledge and policies they have been experimenting with within Brazil. Brazilian 'development workers' have first-hand experience with the issues they work with on development cooperation projects. For example, in an on-going food security research project in Mozambique, called Proalimentar, Embrapa researchers are working directly in the field (literally) with researchers from the Mozambican Agrarian Research Institute testing suitable horticulture varieties for the Maputo greenbelt. Likewise, staff from the MDA is working directly with their counterparts in several African countries to adapt Brazil's *Mais Alimentos* programme to local conditions. Consultants are occasionally contracted, but a great part of the work is typically carried out directly by Brazilian technocrats. The advantages of such approach are obvious and in fact its pragmatism is an aspect that recipients frequently praise about Brazilian cooperation.²⁸ But there are some caveats that are worth bringing up for discussion.

While Brazilian 'development workers' are experts in their own trade, they are not, on the other hand, typically (though there are exceptions) well acquainted with Africa and the challenges of development in that context. Embrapa researchers may be world-class authorities on African agroecological systems, but establishing successful and sustainable research programmes will require not only good crop science but also a good grasp about the functioning of local institutions and the political dynamics of development. The idea that development can be achieved through technical fixes is obsolete, no matter how virtuous those fixes are. To date, Brazilian cooperation reveals signs of a **technocratic approach to development** that assumes African countries can emulate Brazil's successes through a combination of technical solutions that Brazilian world-class researchers and civil servants can readily deploy. This approach is not only ill equipped to handle the politics of development but it also strips Brazil's domestic experiences of their own political baggage (for example the state-society dynamics discussed in 4.5 below).

Brazil's presence in partner countries – which, with few exceptions, is almost exclusively confined to diplomatic representation – remains insufficient to generate an in-depth understanding of the local context. Agencies like ABC and Embrapa are only now starting to create posts at country level for a more continuous tracking of interventions, but it remains to be seen whether those occupying such posts will have the profile or autonomy required to build a solid understanding of local culture, institutions and processes.

²⁷ Key informants' interviews.

²⁸ See for example Russo et al. (2011) about Brazilian cooperation in health.

4.4 Affinities as discourse

Historical and cultural affinities are often argued to make cooperation between Brazil and African countries particularly fluid. The affinities discourse was particularly strong in Lula's public addresses and the former-President once described the continent as Brazil's eastern neighbour (add reference). But despite historical bonds and agroecological and epidemiological similarities that make the exchange with some African countries easier, **the much-claimed affinities between Brazil and Africa are largely rhetorical.**

On the one hand, differences between Brazil and most African countries either in economic, political or sociological terms are not trivial. Give examples?

On the other hand, gaps in knowledge about the other side of the partnership remain deep across the Atlantic. On the African side, the myth of Brazil's successful agricultural transformation is pervasive and a particular model of agricultural development fills the dominant imaginary of prosperity, with insufficient understanding of the social and environmental costs associated with that model (reference? FAC blog?). Expand...

On the Brazil side, understandings of Africa are constrained by several factors. One is how recent and contained the representation of Brazilian cooperation in African soil still is. The nearly absence of politics and development policy analysts within country representations of Brazilian cooperation institutions (where such representations exist), or indeed field missions from Brazil, limit the comprehension of local institutions and processes.

Furthermore, back home in Brazil, academic research and teaching on contemporary African politics and society is still limited. Cross-disciplinary and less stereotyped and romanticised research about Africa is starting to emerge but remains severely underdeveloped (Zamparoni 2007). Expand...

Another factor to consider is the limited influence of Brazilian afro-descendants, the social group with, arguably, the closest cultural kinship with the continent (or at least parts of it), in formal Brazilian institutions. The potential role of afro-descendants (for example, Quilombola communities) as brokers in the Brazil-Africa knowledge encounter remains poorly explored.²⁹ There have been some attempts to increase the share of afro-descendants entering higher education, including the Affirmative Action Programme of Rio Branco Institute, the prestigious school training Brazilian diplomats (World Bank and IPEA 2011). Yet, it will take time for such measures to permeate Brazilian politics and cooperation policy. And there is of course no guarantee that they will make Brazilian institutions better equipped to relate to a highly diverse and dynamic continent.

4.5 The role of civil society and the challenge of reproducing particular state-society dynamics

Brazilian cooperation is largely about transferring homemade research and public policies to developing countries through cooperation projects managed through government-to-government arrangements. It has been argued, however, that Brazilian cooperation disregards the influence of state-society dynamics in the trajectory of Brazil's public policies. Civil society and social movements played a major part, it is claimed, in pushing for policies to address the constraints facing family farming and this cannot be disregarded in the transfer of such policies into Africa (Campolina 2011; 2012). This argument questions a development cooperation model confined to government-to-government relations and calls for greater participation of Brazilian civil society.

²⁹ Although it should be noted that Brazilian afro-descendants have a particular identity of their own... (Oliva...)

Signs of growing awareness of the role of non-state actors can play in development cooperation are starting to show. The *Secretaria Geral da Presidência da República* has been actively engaging Brazilian social movements in government-led development cooperation. There are specific projects being implemented with the active involvement of community-based organisations, such as the already mentioned native seeds recovery initiative in Mozambique and South Africa. There have also been efforts to institutionalise a civil society forum for the community of Lusophone countries, the CPLP, to promote civil society dialogue across member countries.³⁰ Furthermore, Brazilian civil society is itself becoming more informed, organised and vocal around the subject of international development. Networks of development policy wonks and practitioners are taking shape to foster public debate on development cooperation and strengthen analysis and lesson learning on the topic.³¹

It remains to be seen how significant the engagement of Brazilian civil society with development cooperation processes will become in the coming years and whether it will influence the course of cooperation policies and practices. Within Brazil, there is much scope for civil society to create a demand for accountability and results. It is less clear how effective Brazilian civil society would be in engaging directly in South-South cooperation – the question is whether the state-society dynamics experienced in Brazil are transferable and replicable through formal cooperation processes or whether, to be effective and sustainable, they have to emerge spontaneously and play by the rules of local culture and politics.

³⁰ The CPLP comprises the five portuguese-speaking African countries, Brazil, East Timor and Portugal.

³¹ *Articulação SUL* is one example of this trend: <http://www.cebrap.org.br/v2/areas/view/35>.

5. Conclusion: new paradigms?

The central questions under investigation are whether Brazilian cooperation in agriculture represents a different approach of supporting the development of African agriculture, relative to other sources (old and new) of development assistance (a new cooperation paradigm), and provides an alternative and enhanced model on how this sector should be developed in the African context (a new agricultural development paradigm). It would be premature, at this initial stage of the research project, to provide conclusive answers to these overarching questions, as in-depth fieldwork in countries benefiting from Brazilian cooperation is required before well-grounded conclusions can be reached. Notwithstanding, drawing on the initial research undertaken, some preliminary remarks are worth making to help stimulating the debate and taking the research agenda forward.

Middlemen free cooperation?

One distinctive feature noted is the direct deployment by Brazilian cooperation of professionals holding first-hand experience with the technical solutions cooperation projects are set to communicate. In agriculture, these are potentially very relevant solutions, given that Brazil hosts world-leading expertise on tropical agriculture (and this is not exclusive to Embrapa). For these solutions to be effective and sustainable, however, the adaptation element needs to be built in. This is not only about adjusting Brazilian successful varieties to local soils, climate and pests. It is also about understanding local governance and decision-making processes more broadly. For example, having a good grasp of how agricultural research is managed and how it is absorbed by producers, and ultimately consumers. Will rural communities in Mozambique actually incorporate orange-fleshed sweet potato or yellow maize into their food habits, even if instructed about the superior nutritional value of such varieties? The capacity to fully adapt to local context and needs will be the test of the added value of Brazil's lean (brokers-free) mode of cooperation.

But this feature of direct cooperation may start to change as larger cooperation programmes ('*projetos estruturantes*') get off the ground and create needs for middle-management solutions. Fundação Gertúlio Vargas *Projetos*, the consultancy arm of a Brazilian think tank, has just been contracted to manage a component of ProSavana in Mozambique.

Is 'mutual advantage' good news for African agriculture?

The horizontality character of Brazilian cooperation is pervasive in official discourse and claimed to distinguish Brazil's approach to the vertical nature of traditional development assistance. But in reality, Brazil's economic, institutional, scientific or diplomatic stature constitutes a hard match to most African countries. The obvious discrepancies compromise the claimed balance of the South-South partnership. Notwithstanding, the mutual benefit element in the South-South philosophy can potentially alter the code of conduct for development cooperation more broadly. Brazil has until recently been cautious about this. Lula da Silva insisted that cooperation with Africa was driven by altruistic motivations and a sense of responsibility towards the continent. But President Rousseff is revealing a more pragmatic attitude. The use of cooperation as a vehicle for business transactions may be welcome by African agriculture, where the private sector has failed to emerge to fill the gap left by the dismantling of public services by the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s. It is worth noting however that Brazil is not alone in seeking economic advantage through cooperation – donors as diverse as the United States and China are quite blunt about the intermingling of solidarity and self-interest – although the package it is offering is particularly attractive

A holistic approach to agricultural development?

There is also a potentially distinctive element of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture. It draws on Brazil's particular model of agricultural governance, which, as discussed before, can be interpreted either as dichotomous or as pluralistic. The question that emerges then is how African agriculture can best benefit from this (these) model(s)? And this leads in turn to a set of subsidiary questions. Will the policy void and contrasting visions of development give rise to inconsistencies in country practices that can compromise the outcomes of Brazilian development interventions? Or does the variety on offer make Brazilian cooperation more amenable to recipient countries' appropriation and adaptation to local context? More specifically, will the coexistence of 'family farming' and agribusiness models in Brazilian cooperation help addressing the long-lasting debates on small-versus-large production systems in Africa in a holistic way or will it accentuate existing tensions and competition for natural resources and public services?

The many questions raised in this paper confirm the need for further investigation. The next stage of the research will look into country experiences in detail to test the hypotheses raised by this first exploratory exercise. (...)

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Annex 1: List of people interviewed

Marco Farani, Director, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação

Márcio Corrêa, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação

Francesco Pierri, Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário

(...)

Leovegildo Matos, Regional Resident Representative, Embrapa, Ghana office

Annex 2: Brazilian institutions involved in technical cooperation with Africa in agriculture

	Institutions	Projects/issues covered	Number of projects	Countries
1	Embrapa / MAPA			Various
2	Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MDA)			Various
3	Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural (SENAR)			Various
4	Associação Brasileira de das Entidades Estaduais de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (ASBRAER)			
5	Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA)	Capacity building on phytosanitary inspection		Angola
6	Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (EMATER) - DF			Various
7	Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (EMATER) – Minas Gerais			Botswana
8	Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (EMATER) – Rondônia			Equatorial Guinea
9	Instituto Brasileiro do Algodão			Cotton 4...
10	Comissão Executiva do Plano da Lavoura Cacaueira (CEPLAC)		1	Cameroon
11	Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco	Desertification, citrus value chain	1	Argelia
12	Companhia de Desenvolvimento do Vale de São Francisco	Desertification, citrus value chain	1	Argelia
13	Universidade Federal de Viçosa		1	Argelia
14	UNESP – Departamento de Aquicultura em Jaboticabal, S.P.		1	Cameroon
15	Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)	Biofuels	1	Zambia
16	Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP)	Biofuels	1	Zambia
17	Empresa Baiana de Desenvolvimento Agrícola (EBDA)		1	Gabon
18	Secretaria de Estado de Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento – DF	Rice	1	Senegal
19	Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem do Corporativismo		1	Botswana
20	Ministério da Educação – Secretaria de Educação Profissional e Tecnológica	Strengthening of caju promotion centre	1	Guiné-Bissau
21	Movimento Camponês Popular	Community/traditional seed banks	1	South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique
22	Movimento das Mulheres Camponesas	Community/traditional seed banks	1	South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique
23	Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas	Community/traditional seed banks	1	South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique

Source: ABC (2010b).



Av. Patrice Lumumba, 178 - Maputo
MOÇAMBIQUE

Tel. + 258 21 328894
Fax + 258 21 328895
www.iese.ac.mz