Chinese Aid to Education in Mozambique

Jorge Njal

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I. Introduction

China’s humanitarian role in Mozambique parallels with the growing public infrastructures investment. The most recent example is the construction of the world-class National Stadium which was the main venue for the 2011 “African Olympic Games” held in the country’s capital, Maputo. Important commitments have been recently disclosed: in a half a year, the Mozambican government managed to get approximately US$ 1 billion in concessional and at commercial rates loans to build “prestige” infrastructures in the country’s capital and its neighbouring districts: an auto-route linking Maputo with Matola and Marracuene, a bridge connecting the two sides of Maputo Bay and two roads from Catembe to Ponta do Ouro and from Boane to Bela Vista.

Observers of Sino-Mozambican relations should be astonished, not before did China provide as much financial aid to Mozambique in a such very short period of time. Official statistics point out to about US$ 2 billion of loans that Mozambique benefited from China in the last decade, including the amount mentioned above. If anyone wants to have a very broad understanding of the mechanics behind this rapid move of the Chinese finance in Mozambique other factors should be considered than purely “natural resources motives”. Political considerations also determine in great extent economic decisions in Beijing. In short, Mozambique and China ties are predominately political. The main features of these political ties briefly will be mentioned in the following chapter.

The aim of this research is to define the main modalities and impact of the Chinese aid in Mozambique. This research is useful for the understanding of the Chinese-Mozambican relations in particular and it sheds light for future research in the humanitarian engagement of China in Africa in general.

The main argument of this paper is that part of the Mozambican beneficiaries of scholarships and the universities may play a vital role in transforming the one-way aid to benefit both parties. Concretely, we defend that students in China be encouraged to participate in the expansion of Chinese teaching in Mozambique; as well the local universities can play a role in the teaching of Portuguese and diffusion of the Mozambican culture in China.

After the introduction, the second part is a background analysis that highlights political and economic ties as well it indicates the new direction of Sino-Mozambican ties: Fostering culture interaction. Then follows the analysis of the Chinese

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perspectives in foreign aid, after which the main purpose of this paper is explored. The last part is a conclusion which hints on ways to make education cooperation dynamic at the service of both countries.

II. Sino-Mozambican Relations: An Outline

This background chapter pretends to highlight some important aspects of the relationship between Mozambique and China. Importance is given to cooperation in politics, economy and culture.

1. Political Compromise

Due to the support that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) provided to Frelimo in its struggle against the Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique during 1964 and 1974 and the aid China has been rendering since 1975, presently, relations between the two nations are cordial and the Frelimo-CCP ties can somehow be considered fraternal and intimate, in the point of view of the former guerrilla led-government. In fact, the Chinese support in the Frelimo’s war against the Portuguese army (other former Socialist-Communist countries supported provided similarly in different proportions) the support rendered by China is infinitively highlighted by the Mozambican government officials and Frelimo cadres whenever officially meeting their Chinese counterparts.

Frelimo’s gratitude to the Chinese has been always expressed. After the Portuguese army waged a coup d’état against its regime in early 1974 which opened the path to the demise of the Portuguese colonial dominance in Africa, at the beginning of 1975 Samora Machel, Frelimo’s leader and the future first President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique (PRM) (1975-1986), visited China especially to thank the Chinese people and government for the sacrifices consented to liberate Mozambique against colonialism and imperialism. Symbolically, a joint statement mentioned that the two states would establish diplomatic relations on the same day the PRM came into existence: 25 June 1975 (Jornal Notícias 2/3/1975).

During this visit, in a speech, Machel pronounced what was going to be the cornerstone of Mozambique’s firm political support towards the unification of China. At the occasion he condemned “Chiang Kai-shek’s imperialist permanent occupation of Taiwan supported by the United States (US)”, and guaranteed that “Mozambique would never betray the friendship of the Chinese people” (Jornal Notícias 2/3/1975). Indeed, this has ever since been the official position of Mozambique.¹ In the Beijing’s perspective, Maputo’s stance on One China policy represents an important asset, as internally the country has to deal with pro-independence groups in the western

provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Moreover, Mozambique also supports its ally on issues related to human rights (People Daily 11/10/2002). In this regard, the Chinese leaders have continuously thanked and praised their Mozambican counterparts, whom they call as “the true African brothers”.

Another dimension of the political engagement is the inter-party relations between the two ruling parties in Mozambique and China: Frelimo and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Due to ideological reasons, the two political parties only managed to establish formal ties in early 1980s (Li 2008:22-23). The general trends of the recent party-to-party links include the training of Frelimo cadres, material and financial support, two-way high level visits, Frelimo’s assurance to continue to support the unification of China, encouragement for more Chinese investment in the country, expansion of relations to Frelimo’s Youth Organisation-Communist Youth League of China (from early 2012). The CCP also influenced Frelimo to follow an entrepreneurial direction, especially after the current Secretary-General visited China in mid-2008. Some of the party investments in the country are: through its holding company SPI, 29% of assets in the new mobile phone operator, Movitel, (dominated by Vietnamese capital), and a high school and a university, both situated at the Party’s Central School in Matola (Jornal Notícias 23/6/2012; Rádio Moçambique 20/6/2012, TeleGeography 17/5/2012; Jornal Notícias 6/6/2008).

Important to mention is that in the past the two countries experienced some difficult moments due to Maputo’s closer ties to Moscow including supporting the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 and for condemning China in the 1979 China-Vietnam war apart from the role China may have played in the events in Angola in 1975-1976 by apparently siding with the anti-government forces (i.e. UNITA and FNLA) (Jackson 1995; Taylor 2006; Chichava 2008). It can be concluded that the 1975-1979 “misunderstanding” events developed out of the Mozambican internationalism and the opposition between China and the Soviet Union with similar consequences in other African countries (Angola being a paradigmatic case), all shaped by the Cold War environment.

2. Economic Links

Economic cooperation has also been a constant feature of the Sino-Mozambican linkage. While meeting the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, Huang Hua in Maputo in 1980, President Samora Machel highlighted the need to explore relations in the economic and trade areas (Notícias da Beira 24/04/1980). This was welcomed by the Chinese government, which was then at the early stage of the implementation of the new economic policy which allowed the entrance of foreign investment in the country.

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2 In the scope of the Sino-Soviet rift, the CCP understood Frelimo’s choice of the Soviet model of development, especially after its 3rd Congress in 1977, as ideologically opposite to Beijing’s. The same reasons were evoked by the Chinese to deny the establishment of relations with some other African political parties. See: Li, Ansh (2008), “China’s New Policy Toward Africa”, In. Robert I. Rotberg (Edit.), China Into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 22-23.
After touring some African countries in 1982 (with the aim to promote South-South Cooperation), the then Prime-Minister, Zhao Ziyang, announced an expansion of the country’s foreign aid, previously launched in 1964\(^3\), by proposing four new principles for the economic and technical cooperation: equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in form and common progress (Brautigam 2008b:203-204). This means that China was from this time on beginning to promote what is today commonly termed by “a win-win cooperation”, i.e., aid aiming to benefit both sides.

Specifically, as of mid-1980s a combination of reasons continued to play a vital role in tying China to Mozambique, economically. First, at the peak of the country’s economic crisis coupled with the growing internal insurgency, Mozambique’s leaders turned to the West by adhering, in 1984, to the Breton Wood financial institutions: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which paved the way to the establishment of economic reforms in 1987; second, constitutional reforms in 1990 and the cessation of the internal conflict in 1992, after 16 years of hostilities that left the country with huge human and economic losses (notably infrastructures, part of which 20 years later is yet to be rehabilitated) and the democratisation process begun with the first general election in 1994, made Mozambique safer for fresh foreign investments; third, the investment “fever” is fuelled by recent discovery of mineral and energy resources and abundant arable land for the growth of cash crops; forth, China’s need for energy and other raw materials to keep up with the expansion of its economy and the need of new markets, the creation in 2000 of FOCAC (Forum on

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\(^3\) On the course of his tour to Africa in 1964, the Chinese Prime-Minister at the time, Zhou Enlai, proclaimed in Accra, Ghana the Eight Principles for the PRC’s Aid to Foreign Countries: “1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual; 2. In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges; 3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible; 4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development; 5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital; 6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese Government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese Government undertakes to replace them; 7. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique; 8. The experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.” See Brautigam, Deborah (2008a), “China’s African Aid: Transatlantic Challenges”, (A Report to the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, April 2008), Washington: GMF, pp. 8-9.
China-Africa Cooperation), which institutionalised Chinese political, economic and technical cooperation between China and the continent and the establishment of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation Between China and the Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Macao Forum) (Fórum para a Cooperação Económica entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Fórum de Macau)), with the aim of strengthening economic and trade cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries (excluding São Tomé and Príncipe, which maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan).

The economic importance of China has been growing at a fast speed, especially from 2007, when the Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Mozambique, the very first time a Chinese President toured the country. By 2010, according to Sérgio Chichava, with US$ 38.6 million approved by the Investment Promotion Centre, China was one of the main foreign investors, the main sectors being industry, infrastructures construction, agriculture and agro-processing and services (Chichava 2011:1). Trade between the two countries in January-November 2011 reached US$ 759 million, with the African nation importing Chinese goods at the cost of US$ 580 million and while exporting to China products worth US$ 179 million (Macauhub 01/12/2011). This has been a general trend but in the future it may change, as there are indications that China is one of the principal destinations of the Mozambican mineral and energy sources.

3. Expanding Ties: Emphasis on Culture

Provision of aid has ever since represented a special dimension in Sino-Mozambican engagement. Since 1975 the PRC has been providing Mozambique with grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans. Part of the grants that China provides to Mozambique include provision of medical care by Chinese doctors in the country, medicine to combat Malaria and other diseases, construction of houses for public servants, supply of public transport means, etc. Below we explore another type of aid to Mozambique in the education sector.

However, new areas of cooperation between the two countries are emerging and culture is now in the spotlight. In fact, recent cultural activities and formal cooperation agreements in the culture sector underline a renewed interest of the Chinese authorities to apply cultural exchanges with African countries to smoothen hearts and minds on the continent.

In April 2011, during the visit of the member of the CCP politburo member, Li Changchun (in charge of the department of culture within the Party), six new agreements were signed between the two countries, including for television, cinema, broadcast of China Radio International in Portuguese in Mozambique and the establishment of the Confucius Institute (Njal 2012:8-9; Macauhub 25/4/2011). Additionally, in mid-2012, China Central Television (CCTV) and Mozambique Television (TVM, in Portuguese abbreviation) signed a cooperation agreement (Xinhuanet 26/6/2012). Under another posterior agreement with Macao’s public radio and television network (Teledifusão de Macau, TDM), besides exchanging television programmes between the two parties, TVM will also display two cultural programmes
produced by CCTV with Portuguese subtitles from TDM, while TDM will translate into Chinese TVM’s programmes about socio-economic, cultural and sport realities before being shown in China by CCTV. (TDM 3/8/2012).

In Maputo the PRC’s Embassy from time to time holds some cultural activities to promote Chinese culture in the country. In 2011, for example, it undertook two exhibitions at two higher education institutions. The aim of the first was, in the scope of the celebration of the Xinhua News Agency’s 80th anniversary, through a set of photographic images, to portray the history of China and Mozambique ties, while the second, envisaged to introduce the Chinese culture and arts to students and teachers (ISTEG n.d.; UEM 8/11/2011). With the recent opening of the Confucius Institute in Maputo such cultural activities will be promoted within this institution.

These new developments should be put into a wider picture. The government of China understands that its presence in Africa sometimes creates some misunderstandings among the locals, in part due to the negative impressions transmitted by the western media, as recently a former Chinese envoy to Africa mentioned when answering a question from the press. Thus, the Chinese authorities have recently been putting in motion some strategies to revert this situation. Defending that the aim is to promote a better understanding of Africa by the Chinese viewers and vice-versa and to strengthen Africa-China relations and present “the true image” of Africa to the world, the national “CCTV English” introduced, in January 2012, CCTV Africa with its headquarters in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, with a wide number of correspondents (all from Africa) around the continent (CCTV News 11/1/2012).

Although media cooperation has been a constant feature of Sino-African engagement, Beijing is decidedly aiming to stimulate its soft-power in Africa. In his speech at the opening of the 5th FOCAC Summit, in June 2012, the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, mentioned that

China proposes to set up a “China-Africa Press Exchange Center” in China to encourage exchanges and visits between Chinese and African media, and China supports exchange of correspondents by media organizations of the two sides. (Hu 2012).

We can summarise that Sino-Mozambican relations are evolving. Though there may be some differences, the nature of Beijing’s aims in getting closer to Maputo is the same as in any of the other fifty African countries with diplomatic relations with China.

III. Chinese Perspectives on Aid

From an analysis of Xu Jiajun (2012) and Deborah Brautigam (2010), it is clearly observable that the PRC’s aid practices differ from those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD). These two authors highlight that China’s reluctance in joining Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) definition on Official Development Assistance (ODA) is justified by a set of reasons: it perceives that the aid from the west does not reduce poverty (Brautigam 2010:39, 43-44), it does not agree to make available 0.7% of its national gross income, because
its abilities and national conditions don’t allow it to do so; internally, mainly in rural areas of central and western regions of the country, where it was estimated that about 100 million people (2001 World Bank figure) remained poor and over 30 million children of school age did not go to school (1999 World Bank figure) (Schiere 2010:6) it would seem indecent if it portrayed itself to be siding with the rich North, it also would be unwelcomed by the African countries that enjoy China’s financing than the Western aid model (Xu 2012: 14-15). Additionally, China defends that tied aid projects lessen unnecessary bureaucracy costs (i.e., international bidding) and it also understands that tied aid projects pave the way for the private investment (of Chinese companies) (Xu 2012:16-17). On the other hand China contests the DAC calculation on debt relief: it does not catalogue it as a grant. However, the PRC is open to cooperate with the DAC members and it is gradually applying international standards to formulate its aid policy (Xu 2012:14-15).

Some scholars from China defend the distinctiveness of the Chinese aid policy towards Africa. For example, Hu Mei claims that the Chinese assistance policy focuses on development and livelihood improvement of African people. In other words, it seeks to promote economic development of Africa, while benefiting China as well, whereas the Western aid policy (which she terms by “democracy aid to Africa policy”) envisages to expand Western ideology across Africa (Hu 2009:349). Another Chinese researcher defends Hu’s assertion that in the past the West’s aid model was not successful in Africa. Zhu Ming adds that the PRC’s aid attained positive outcome in Africa, it is praised by the African political elites for being less bureaucratic (Zhu 2009: 372-374).

Other Chinese scholars defend that Beijing should regard provision of aid to Africa as a national strategic expenditure. That is why they call for the augment of aid volume which should be accompanied by an increased supervision and management of aid to prevent misuse and embezzlement, and to guarantee the quality of the aid projects (Zhang 2009:77; He 2008:162-163).

It can be concluded that China’s aid to Africa, in the context of the global African policy, should not be desegregated from the general Chinese domestic and foreign policies. As correctly Brautigam suggests, the PRC’s African policy should be seen as its core objectives seek to deal with three political and economic questions. a) Africa’s abundant natural resources would partly match the country’s need of energy, especially after 1993, when China became an importer of oil as also would compensate the annual loss of 500,000 hectares of forest. b) Deter Taiwan from gaining diplomatic recognition across Africa. c) China has always perceived Africa in purely economic terms, as both a vital market and ground for the expansion of Chinese companies (Brautigam 2009:78).

Thus, in providing aid China seeks to achieve political, strategic and economic goals by building business, cementing political ties and enhancing its internal and international position. (Brautigam 2008b:201-202).
IV. Contemporary Mozambican Education challenges and Chinese Education Aid

The 2011 UN Human Development Index listed Mozambique as the 184th out of 187 countries, definitely cataloguing the country as one of the least developed nations in the world. Actually, this has been the trend since independence in 1975. The reasons can be pointed out to a combination of factors – occurrence of the internal war between 1976 and 1992, ineffective socio-economic policies and almost cyclical natural disasters. Thus, since the end of the armed conflict, the country has continuously been one of the principal recipients of the foreign assistance. The support to the education sector particularly aims to eradicate huge rates of illiteracy and to accomplish the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target number two – net enrolment rate in primary education of children between 6 and 12 years old by 2015. The importance of the role of the donors can be measured by the lowering illiteracy rates, from 53.6% in 2003 to 48% in 2008 (Eduardo 2012:1). In his study, Fernando Bilale, mentions that external sources (aid programs, donors and international financial institutions) sustain the education global budget, mainly for infrastructures and equipment. He also shows that the share of donors in the expenses of education in 2005 and 2006 was respectively 66% and 82% (Bilale 2007:66-67).

Although the education sector gets the biggest pie of the annual state budget (around 20%), provision of education services in Mozambique continues to face obstacles. Current public concerns are related to the quality of education in all levels (from primary to higher education). In the wake of the recent discovery of energetic and mineral resources national-wide, the lack of qualified labour is especially striking. It is under this context that the education aid provided by China to Mozambique should be evaluated.

Beijing’s education aid policy is governed by five approaches, namely, it is demand-driven (not supply-driven, as the MDG’s); stresses on cooperation, mutual benefits and common development; it is limited; emphasises on practical action; it is Africa-based (Niu 2009:257-258).

In general, Chinese education cooperation is divided in five sub-areas: human resources development (short- and long-term training of African professionals and students in China); student exchange and dispatching teachers; sending young volunteers to Africa; exchange and cooperation between higher education institutions; and Chinese language teaching (Niu 2009:258-261).

As it was pointed out above, Chinese model of providing education aid is different from the Western one. According to Yuan Tingting, the OECD donors deliver aid “through bureaucratised and professionalised consultants and specialist agencies and organisation, often competitive between NGOs, and between countries, and prone to corruption” (Yuan 2011:8). China instead focuses on building schools, encouraging one-to-one university cooperation, providing teachers (youth volunteers) to teach the Chinese language, supplying scholarships or donating school material. Cash in small amounts seldom is provided (Yuan 2011:7-11).

Bilateral cooperation, FOCAC and Macao Forum are the main platforms that enable Mozambique to benefit from the Chinese aid in the area of education.
1. Mechanisms Governing PRC’s Education Assistance to Mozambique

Bilateral economic and technical cooperation agreements greatly boost Chinese education aid to individual African countries like Mozambique. Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1975 the two countries have celebrated agreements and memoranda of understanding that enable Mozambique to take advantage in a wide range of sectors that include health, agriculture, trade and mutual protection of investment, tourism, defence and security, education and science and technology, infrastructures, environment protection, etc.

Recent official agreements in the field of education include: i) a 2002’s agreement on human resource development, agriculture and environmental protection; ii) an economic and technical cooperation agreement for agriculture, health, education and mining in 2004; iii) an economic and technical cooperation agreements between the two governments celebrated in 2005; iv) a 2007 Joint Communiqué; agreement to step up cooperation in science and technology in 2008; v) a 2010 economic and technical cooperation (January); vi) economic and technological cooperation agreement in 2010 (June); vii) a cooperation agreement to establish Confucius Institute in Mozambique in 2011 (MFA-PRC 22/8/2011; MFA-PRC 17/6/2010; Janson & Jiala 2009:2-3; AIM 30/1/2008; MFA-PRC 9/2/2007).

The first FOCAC Ministerial Conference, held in Beijing, in the scope of the revival of China-Africa cooperation in the 21st century, highlighted the need of promoting cooperation on education and. Specifically, China, besides assuring to set up an African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF) for the training of African professionals of different sectors, to grant more scholarships, to send teachers to Africa to support higher education institutions and to encourage forms of exchange between universities for the study of Chinese and African civilisations, (FOCAC 2000a; FOCAC 2000b).

In the following FOCAC II (held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2003), FOCAC III (Beijing in 2006), FOCAC IV (Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in 2009) and FOCAC V (in Beijing in 2012), China continued to increase the number of its pledges in the area of education and human resources development. For instance, the number of professional personnel to be trained by China was to triple, from 10,000 in 2004 to 30,000 by 2015, the number of Chinese government scholarships annually will be 6,000 between 2013-2015 against 2,000 between 2004-2006 (FOCAC 2003; Hu 2012).

Similar education and human resources development promises are made under the framework of the Macao Forum. When it was created in 2003, China and the Portuguese-speaking countries agreed that cooperation in the education sector would promote economic and trade exchange as well it would increase mutual understanding and friendship (Fórum China-PLP 2003). Thus, for the 2007-2009 triennial China had vowed to allocate a number of scholarships, train 900 staff and technicians, build rural schools, send teams of young volunteers to teach, provide medical care and promote culture (Fórum China-PLP 2006). In the course of the third Ministerial Conference in 2009, China raised the amount of personnel to be trained to 1,500 (especially in the
sectors of agriculture, education, health, science and technology and customs administration), the figure of scholarships was also to be increased as additionally the Chinese government committed to build in Macao (the Forum’s headquarters) a Training Centre for the members of the Forum (Fórum China-PLP 2009).

Usually, it is during bilateral discussions that the African countries individually negotiate with the Chinese government to access the aid that China promises at every FOCAC and Macao Forum Ministerial Conferences. For example, during President Armando Guebuza’s state visit to China in 2011, on the scope of FOCAC IV - Action Plan 2010-2013, Mozambique requested concessional loans to finance communication systems, long distance learning and data centre and infrastructure of electronic government sharing projects (Jornal Notícias 11/08/2011).

2. Modalities of Chinese Education and Human Resources Development Support to Mozambique

Why the current linkage of China in Mozambique’s education should not be labelled as a cooperation model? The answer lies in the following facts. The movement of students is one-way, Mozambique universities do not host any student from China, for example, under any form of official agreement. The Chinese volunteers presently teaching at the Confucius Institute had previously gone to Macao to learn Portuguese. Thus, the various cooperation agreements between four higher education institutions in China with their two Mozambican partners, envisage “a transmission” of the Chinese experience.

We believe that these Mozambican universities could invest more in “exporting” the Mozambican culture and Portuguese language to China, in collaboration with the local culture practitioners, cultural authorities and private sectors.

2.1. Provision of Scholarships

The number of students from Mozambique in China has been growing since 2007, when 35 students headed for China after Hu Jintao’s visit to Mozambique (CCS 2010:89). The same happened in 2012’s 32 vacancies attributed to Mozambique after the visit to Maputo in the previous year of Li Changchun, one of the nine Chinese Communist Party Politburo members.

Table 1: Number of Chinese government scholarships attributed to Mozambican Students, 1992-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of scholarships</th>
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<tr>
<td>1992-2005</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
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</table>
As the table above, on the evolution of the number of vacancies provided by the government of China between 1992 and 2012, shows, the 2007 and 2012 figures are the highest. For the years prior to 2006 the number of scholarship per year was less than five students.

Before 2011 the government of China was the sole provider of scholarships to Mozambican students. But in the context of Corporate Social Responsibility, a new private Chinese company now plays an important role in enabling more Mozambicans to study in China free of charge. Concretely, China Kingho Group, a new company investing in the mineral sector in the country created in 2010 an educational fund to support 100 students to study courses related to mining engineering and including Chinese language to work as translators and interpreters at the sponsoring company. This group of students, proportionally selected across the country by IBE (the Portuguese abbreviation for Institute for Scholarships) went to China in 2011 and headed to three different cities: Wuhan (in Hubei Province), Nanjing (Jiangsu Province) and Changchun (Jilin Province) (CSC 30/08/2011).

As a common practice, in 2011, about twenty others students, under the Chinese government scholarships, also went to China for their university studies in different areas of specialisation (Jornal Notícias 08/08/2011). According to information provided at IBE, thirty-one more students followed in the present year. Currently, there are about 200 students from Mozambique in different Chinese universities, eight times more than the Mozambican community (among students and embassy staff) in the neighbouring Japan (VOA 12/08/2011). This figure places China as the main destination for Mozambican students, Algeria comes second, according to a personal communication at IBE. Some of the other countries with a considerable number of students from Mozambique are Portugal, Russia and India (IBE 2011:14).

The history of the Mozambican trainees in the People’s Republic of China can be traced well back to pre-independence period. According to José Moiane’s4 accounts, from May to October 1964 eleven Mozambican got military training in guerrilla struggle strategy and tactic (Moiane 2009:53-58). More guerrillas from Mozambique (both from Frelimo and other smaller anti-Frelimo groups) were to follow the footsteps of this group and between 1965 and 1974 many others were trained by

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4 A General during the colonial war and governor of two provinces in post-independent Mozambique, was one of the first 11 Frelimo guerrillas to receive military training in China. All through the liberation war, this group was nicknamed “The Group of 11”. Actually, the Chinese military instructors of Nanjing Military Academy had helped them, not only to understand that the main enemy was the colonial regime not all Portuguese people, but to know that in a guerrilla war the main factor are the people, therefore ideological work is important to get support from the people, because they are the reason of the struggle. See: Matusse, Renato (2004), Guebuza – A Paixão pela Terra, Maputo: Macmillan, p. 78.
military instructors from China in Nachingwea (located in Tanzania, the main Frelimo military headquarters) (Vieira, 2010:616). In the post-independent Mozambique military training in China continued. For example, while visiting China in 1984, Samora Machel had a meeting with Mozambican military officials studying there (Jornal Notícias 20/07/1984).

From 1992 Mozambicans began receiving scholarships to China. By 2003 twenty-two nationals from Mozambique had studied in China. Statistics from the Mozambican Institute for Scholarships show that between 2003 and 2005 only four students went to China for their higher education training (CCS 2010:89). However, as it was signalled above, the combination of factors changed this trend from 2006: especially the Chinese government vows to increase the number of scholarships to African students in both FOCAC and Macao Forum and the visit to Mozambique of Hu Jintao in 2007. Thus, we see the sudden rise of number of scholarships to Mozambican students to China, from 12 in 2006 to 35 in the following year and around 20 per year in the subsequent four years (Jornal Notícias 08/08/2011; CCS 2010:89). As part of the agreements of the 2011 high level visits of the of the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo member to Maputo and of the Mozambique’s President to China, the number of the students in China from 2012 is to rise. In regard to provision of scholarships to the nationals of Mozambique, President Guebuza’s visit secured important commitments, both from the government of China and a Chinese telecom company, Huawei. It is in this context that the figure of beneficiaries of the Chinese government scholarships rose from 2011’s 20 to 325 in 2012. The award of Huawei’s scholarships may begin in 2013, according to a source within IBE.

How is the number of scholarships determined? Yuan helps us by highlighting the role of the Chinese diplomats in host countries, as they play a very important role in the overall foreign aid policy of China. In regard to the definition of the number of scholarships, the embassy staff discusses with the local government about this and other issues (Yuan 2011:8). It can also be assumed that the negotiations include the host country’s priority areas for training. In 2011 and 2012, for instance, IBE only accepted candidates to apply to study in China in the field of engineering, medicine, natural sciences. The same requirements are applied in regard to some other countries aiding Mozambique in the area of higher education.

Usually, the availability of scholarships to China is published by the Institute for Scholarships in the local newspapers and also it makes announcements on its website (www.ibe.gov.mz), also it requests the provincial education departments to expand the information further. The process begins in February/March with the submission of applications and culminates in late August with a farewell ceremony at the Embassy.

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5 According to Institute for Scholarships’ staff accounts, in general, annually one or two of the selected students for different reasons give up to head to China. For instance, in 2012 one selected student did not go to China with the other thirty-one fellow Mozambicans. In 2009, two students also gave up pursuing their higher education in China. A close analysis of this practice may determine the reasons, the extent of the consequences for Mozambique and measures to avoid such a waste, especially if considering the country’s increasing need of qualified human resources.
of China where the selected students, in the presence of the education authorities, officially receive their admission notices and their free air ticket and two or three days later leave for China. Upon their arrival in Beijing, similarly as other foreign students awarded the Chinese government scholarships, they get help from the efficient China Scholarship Council’s staff that provides them with free accommodation before sending them by train to their final universities nationwide.

Important to say that before leaving Beijing each of these students receives from the government of China 1,500 Renminbi (RMB) (a little more than US$ 235\(^6\)), which is basically used for medical examination\(^7\) and to pay for the resident permit.

Considering factors like higher competition to enrol in a public university (relatively cheaper than the private ones) in Mozambique and the decrease of education quality, especially after the polemic university curricula reforms during 2008-2011, earning a degree abroad may represent an added advantage for many young Mozambicans. In China, during the duration of their studies, through contact with other foreign students, the Mozambicans will indirectly improve their speaking skills in English and/or French.

In general, study conditions in China are better than in some other countries where fellow compatriots pursue their studies. As it was widely reported in the local press, Mozambican students in a North-African nation went on strike and occupied the diplomatic mission of their country for about a week. The strikers were demanding for an increase of the monthly allowance. Almost at the same time, another group studying in an Eastern European country threatened to follow the same route so that IBE increases the value of money they receive per month. But the most serious case happened in another country in Africa where some lost their scholarships for complaining about living conditions there.

Besides a free return ticket, tuition, housing and medical insurance, the Chinese government monthly gives every foreign student with full scholarship respectively in the undergraduate, masters and doctoral degrees RMB 1,400 (US$ 222), RMB 1,700 (US$ 270), RMB 2,000 (US$ 317). Additionally, the government of Mozambique, through IBE, provides each national student with US$ 1,200 per year. This is a common practice for all beneficiaries of scholarships under the Ministry of Education, though the amount varies from country to country.

The length of Chinese scholarships depends on the degree and the language of instruction. Bachelors students have 5/6 years (for example, medicine and architecture need 5 years plus one year of Chinese language and Culture while the majority of specialities are 4 years long plus one year of Chinese language and Culture) to conclude their studies. Post-graduate students get 2/4 years (masters and doctoral

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\(^6\) Considering the following exchange rate: US$ 1.0 = RMB 6.3.

\(^7\) One of the requirements for application for these scholarships in the country of origin is a set of medical examination, however, the university authority requires that all the students repeat the same exams, before begging with their classes. It was in such context that at least two students from Mozambique that went to China in 2011 were diagnosed with some disease that determined that they had to leave China, in other words, they lost their scholarships.
degree candidates instructed in English will usually graduate in 2 and 3 years, respectively; if the studies are in Chinese both will take 4 years to finish, including one year of Chinese language and Culture. In general, a great deal of the scholarships is in Chinese.

Aiming to allow Mozambique to get the most out of its relationship with the PRC and to solidify the long-lasting ties between the two nations, besides pushing for important projects financing like the Maputo-Catembe bridge and Catembe-Ponta do Ouro and Boane-Bela Vista roads and the mentioned loan for long distance programmes, Guebuza managed to convince the Chinese authorities to set up a new number of scholarships for Mozambican students. According to a local media publication, China made available 215 scholarships, 200 for students in Mozambique and the remaining 15 for students already in China. It was agreed that the 200 scholarships will be in areas related to engineering (Canalmoz 31/8/2011). However, the time covered by these scholarships was not disclosed.

Considering the lack of the personnel with a post-graduate degree and also because the largest portion of the scholarships is for the undergraduate students (in courses such as Sociology, Public Administration, i.e., which students can study in Mozambique), it would be wiser for the Mozambican government if it requested its Chinese counterparts to make available scholarships for the post-graduate level, namely, in the master’s and doctorate degrees in areas of knowledge crucial to the country.

In providing scholarships and increasing the number every three years, not purely humanitarian reasons justify this move from the point of view of the Chinese government and the private sector. Economic and political motives are at stake. In the long run former students in China may be of help for the government of China as also for the businesses with interest in Africa. In the perspective of Beijing, if part of this group is placed in high-ranking positions within the government (including diplomats in China) it will be beneficial for the Chinese side. Also working with people that understand the Chinese language and culture could make interaction between the two parties easier. This approach is also taken by some African governments that dispatch to Beijing diplomats well versed in Chinese language and culture, i.e., former students in China. Until recently Mozambique had at its embassy in Beijing two former students in China. They worked there for more than five years. Yet in Mozambique, there is another example of an employee, who also studied in China, working with the Investment Promotion Centre (CPI, a Portuguese acronym for Centro de Promoção de Investimentos). For such an institution as CPI whose aim is to attract foreign investment to have an employee that masters Chinese well could not be perfect, if we consider that the Chinese are the main investors in Mozambique. China, as well as India, Brazil and South Africa, will soon host a representation of CPI. Particularly, former Mozambican students in China could play a role in such places or in ministries or provincial governments with agreements with similar Chinese partners.

2.2. Professional Personnel Training

Too much bureaucracy in Mozambique is a direct result of the lack of specific
training of the staff in many government and private institutions. It is under this background that the Chinese role in training government professional in a wide range of sectors should be assessed. In fact, the Chinese authorities understand that only with qualified personnel in developing countries can China and its nationals benefit from a very flexible and efficient environment: practical, less corrupt, security, etc.

In 2010, the then Chinese ambassador to Mozambique, Tian Guangfeng, highlighted the rising tendency of China supplying support in the education sector. With regard to human resources development, the diplomat mentioned that every year about 100 professionals of Mozambique benefit of some short-term training conducted by the Chinese authorities in a very wide range of areas. Being a member state of two fora, both coordinated by the People’s Republic of China, makes Mozambique one the constant beneficiaries of the promises that China makes at the Ministerial Conferences of FOCAC and Macao Forum, regarding improving the work capacity of the African personnel. For example, at the second conference of FOCAC China vowed to train 15,000 Africans from 2007 to 2009, by the end of 2008 438 nationals from Mozambique had received different kind of training (CCS 2010:87).

However, the country is not benefitting in some crucial areas. At FOCAC IV in 2009, China extended its education support to include training African teachers and headmasters of the primary, secondary and vocational levels. In this regard, it made available 1,500 as the total figure of beneficiaries to be trained by 2012 in education related themes. Chosen, by the Ministry of Education of China, Zhejiang Normal University regularly receive African education staff organised according to two languages: English and French.

May the language be the reason why Mozambique has not so far sent a delegation to attend such training seminars? The present weak state of education in Mozambique in all levels demand the education authorities to seek to learn from countries such as China with sound education policies. The present status that China boasts as the “factor of the world” is intrinsically connected with the education in general and vocational training in particular.

2.3. Cooperation Between Universities in Mozambique and China

The Action Plan approved at the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in 2009 in the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh, with the objective of boosting China-Africa in university-to-university links, the government of China proposed to implement 20+20 Cooperation Plan for both countries universities to establish a new cooperation model between twenty Chinese universities and twenty African universities (FOCAC 2009). However, relations between two Mozambican universities and four Chinese universities in Guangdong, Hubei, Sichuan and Zhejiang were established under a different scope. For example, Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM, the Portuguese abbreviation) established ties with Zhejiang Normal University in 2011 for the establishment of the Confucius Institute in Mozambique; while Foshan University (FSU), of Guangdong Province, since 2011 has a cooperation accord with the private St. Thomas University of Mozambique (STUM) in the area of agriculture. It was in the context of such an
agreement that teachers from Foshan University conducted a training course in Modern Agricultural Technology in Maputo in 2011 (FSU 24/08/2011; BIUSTM, Janeiro – Marco/2011).

Earlier, in 2004, FSU had established cooperation with UEM. A delegation from UEM visited this university in 2008 and showed an interest in applying the experience of the Chinese university in the reform process that UEM was then undergoing (FSU 17/01/2008).

In 2006 UEM signed another cooperation agreement with Wuhan’s China University of Geosciences (CUG). The agreement envisaged cooperation in scientific research, academic research and exchange visits (CUG 15/10/2006). It was in the spirit of this relationship that the Vice-Chancellor of the CUG, Zhang Jingao, at the official opening of the UEM’s 2007 academic year, lectured about history of his university and mentioned that cooperation in modern science and technology break linguistic barriers, therefore, he said that it was the right time for UEM and CUG to establish the foundations of practical scientific cooperation (Jornal Notícias 10/03/2007).

In the same year, Eduardo Mondlane University signed an accord with Sichuan Agricultural University for the establishment of an agricultural UEM’s college in Vilanculos, Inhambane Province, which was inaugurated in 2008. This agreement also included support to the faculties of Agronomy, Veterinary Sciences and Engineering (Macauhub 12/07/2007).

Apart from the recent agreement for the establishment of the Confucius Institute at UEM, all-in-all we can describe inter-university cooperation between the two countries as not dynamic. To make this partnership active the Mozambican partners should seek to reciprocate the Chinese gestures by promoting, from example, Mozambican history and culture and the Portuguese language within the partner universities. In fact, though “the export of Chinese knowledge” is a common trend of the linkage between Chinese and African institutions of higher education, there are cases of joint research projects between China and a certain African country. In Mozambique there are some research institutions with reputation around the world, namely the Centre for African Studies within Eduardo Mondlane University and the Institute of Economic and Social Studies (IESE, in Portuguese abbreviation), can perfectly work with similar institutions in China.

On the other hand, as the study of Africa’s Portuguese-speaking countries in China is almost nonexistent due to language difficulties, the current position of Mozambique can be useful for interested Chinese scholars. Existing higher education cooperation agreements can be extended to include Mozambique’s support in any future research centre in China on studies of Portuguese-speaking Africa, including the research on China in these countries.

2.4. Chinese Language Teaching

Although in 2005, the government of Mozambique considered introducing the teaching of Chinese language in secondary schools, the process that led to the opening of the Confucius Institute in Mozambique in 2012 began in September 2009, when
UEM’s Vice-Chancellor signed two memoranda of understanding on the establishment of Confucius Institute at UEM with Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban) in Beijing and with Zhejiang Normal University on exchange and cooperation programmes in Jinhua, Zhejiang Province (UEM-FLCS 23/09/2009).

However, it was only after the official signature between the two governments in April 2011 that it became possible that in April 2012 the first group of about 210 Mozambican students began attending short duration classes of the Chinese language at the Confucius Institute attached to Eduardo Mondlane University’s Faculty of Social Sciences and Arts (Njal 2012:9).

The second three-month course will be held from September to November. Differently from the first course, this time it was widely announced in the local press. It is expected to attract a wide range of people outside the university community. The fees are fixed between MT 500 (about US$ 18) and MT 1,000 (US$ 36), respectively for UEM’s students and staff (including lecturers) and the public in general (UEM-FLCS-IC 2012).

The official inauguration of the Confucius Institute in Mozambique is expected to happen in October. It is worth to mention that the establishment of this 29th Confucius Institute in Africa will particularly boost and publicise Chinese culture across Mozambique.

As elsewhere in Africa, leaning Chinese will surely be beneficial: many Chinese people doing business across the country, including the big construction companies that often hire Chinese interpreters and translators, will welcome local people who are able to master Mandarin. On the other hand, possessing some skills in this language may be an advantage for those who wish to apply for scholarships to study in China. It is worth mentioning that all the previous scholarship students from Mozambique only began studying Chinese in China.

Before the opening of Confucius Institute, Chinese language course was intermittently conducted at the Institute of Languages of Maputo. It occurred in two phases. The first was between 2008 and 2009 and the second in the first term of 2011, according to its Director of Studies, Hélder Gany. Presently, the teaching of Chinese is interrupted due to a number of factors. Gany mentioned especially the lack of teachers and the opening of the Confucius Institute at UEM in 2012 and less number of students willing to study Chinese (Interview with Hélder Gany 24/9/2012).

In the near future, in the event of a major increase of candidates pretending to learn Chinese, senior or graduated students in China can play a role in making the language popular in Mozambique. For such a plan to take place it needs a coordinated action which would involve the Chinese Embassy in Maputo, IBE, the Confucius Institute in Mozambique, the Confucius Institute Headquarters in China and the Mozambican students association in China.

2.5. Construction of Education Infrastructures

Mozambique also gets a different kind of support from China: construction of primary and secondary schools. These education infrastructures are provided in the context of FOCAC, Macao Forum, bilateral cooperation and Corporate Social
Responsibility of the Chinese companies in Mozambique.

According to different sources (including the press), the number of schools built by the Chinese government has been increasing, especially after 2006. Under the pledges made by the Chinese government to build 200 rural primary schools, Mozambique was attributed two of them (CCS, 2010:90). Another four secondary (in Niassa and Gaza Provinces) and technical schools (in Nampula Province and Maputo City), promised in this period were handed over five years later, at the cost of US$ 700,000 each plus a primary school in Niassa (Jornal Notícias 8/8/2011). In 2010 the government of Mozambique received three more schools (FOCAC 13/07/2010).

The latest Chinese commitments in this area are: a Chinese company in Nampula will rehabilitate a local school while China-Mozambique Friendship Primary School will be built in the northern Cabo Delgado Province, in the context of FOCAC IV Action Plan (Faisca 13/07/2012; Macauhub 10/05/2012).

All the entire list of elementary and secondary schools represents a huge contribution by the Chinese government and companies operating in the country. Schools built in the rural areas where local children sometimes need to walk long distances to get to school. It is important to stress that these infrastructures represent grants, i.e., all are gifts for Mozambique.

However, in 2011, as it was mentioned in this article, the Mozambican government requested from China a concessional loan valued at US$ 15 million for a plan of long distance learning (Jornal Notícias 11/08/2011). Previously, it had secured from the Chinese finance an amount of US$ 100 million to build seven vocational colleges in similar number of provinces (Macauhub 29/06/2011).

3. Mozambican Diaspora in China: An example from Wuhan, Hubei

As the table below demonstrates by 2011 62 Mozambican students had been to Wuhan, capital of Hubei Province in Central China, one of the main cities with foreign students in the country. Basically, the table shows that the great majority of the students is in the BA degree and another salient trend is that female students represent 27% of the group and none is pursuing master’s degree course. It was said above, in 2011 part of the students (40) financed by China Kingho Group headed to Wuhan, while the other six were “regular students”, i.e., under China Scholarship Council (CSC).

The first Mozambican students in Wuhan arrived in 2007. The group was composed by seven members; one in the master’s degree programme and six in the BA degree. In 2008 six more students (all for the undergraduate majors) joined them, similarly another two (bachelors and masters) and two (BA and MA) in 2009 and

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8 In general, people should be cautious when confronted with figures related to the statistics of foreign students in China or elsewhere. In this case, due to health problems or difficulties in adapting in China, by June 2012, three students (of the China Kingho Group) were advised to return home from CSC and the Mozambican Embassy in Beijing, in other words, they lost their scholarships.

9 Actually, 4 of these transferred from Shanghai where they spent the first year in China learning Chinese there (they are part of the 2010 students).
2010 respectively followed.

But by the end of 2010 two graduate students had left: one had finished his studies in 2009, while the other had to change to another university in a different province, due to absence of a specialist to tutor him in his dissertation (about African History). In July 2012 another group of students finished their studies in Wuhan: one of MA degree and five (the group of 2007) earned BA degree. New students are expected to arrive in September 2012.

Table 2: Evolution of Number of Mozambican Students in Wuhan (Hubei), 2007-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations

Between December 2011 and February 2012 the present author administered a survey, in order to assess the social insertion among Mozambican students in Wuhan. Thirty-seven students (27 male and 10 female) answered the semi-structured interviews. In terms of representativeness (i.e., place of birth and present residence in Mozambique) the thirty-seven respondents embrace the whole country, the majority from Maputo City and Maputo Province and Cabo Delgado Province and the least Gaza and Zambezia Provinces.

Generally, the Mozambicans spend time together and frequently they celebrate their country’s national festivities. Their hobbies include: surf on the internet; go out alone or with fellow country-mates; play football; stay indoors and take a rest. Going to the disco seems to be quite popular among students from Mozambique and from other countries too. At least once per month they go out at night. Solidarity is also a constant feature of the Mozambican community in China. The ones that came earlier will always help the newcomers.

10 The topics that they often discuss about include: student life in China, socio-economic and political of Mozambique and China. Although there are times that they wished they lived with fewer country-mates because they would probably study better or speak Chinese better.

11 In all the dormitories the students have a broadband connection, normally, after a couple of months in China, the students will purchase a personal computer. Accessing Internet enables all students to keep in touch with other Mozambican students in China as well with the family and friends back home.

12 In a short period of time, the Mozambican football team became famous across different universities of Wuhan. The team has won some local tournaments. This brings “prestige” to the whole community.

13 Considering the time that the survey was taken, preference in staying indoors is understandable: in winter Wuhan is a very cold place, even among local people!
According to the majority of the students Chinese economy is more developed than the Mozambican one. They also mention that the cost of living in China is cheaper than in their country but they consider health services very expensive.¹⁴

Being in China and experiencing Chinese culture gives them a reference with which to situate their perceptions about development of Mozambique. Thus, identifying “possible forms to boost economic development” of their country. Specifically, all of them stress that more investment in technical and vocational training is needed, they also defend that the Mozambican people in general should take work seriously, should be promoted foreign investment in order to generate employment, as well there is a need to combat practices of corruption and the country should provide better social services for all. When asked whether they would fix their residence in China after graduation, all of them claimed that they pretend to go back home to “help Mozambique develop”.

These “developmental views” are a common feature of all the Mozambicans in China. It can also be assumed that similar thoughts may be a constant debate among other Mozambican Diaspora in other countries: either students, diplomats, migrant workers or many other professionals.

V. Conclusion

There is a growing tendency of the general scholarship to dedicate a lot of efforts in researching such areas linked with China’s search of Africa’s natural resources or economic and investment cooperation between the two parts. We believe that this may be a result of the influence that the media and the civil society organisations play in the West in general and in Africa in particular. An analysis on China’s support in the education or health sector is as important as a study of mapping of Chinese businesses or public infrastructures the Chinese finance or build in Mozambique. Political motives of China in Africa should similarly be understood by scholars and the general public. Such studies may help us to expand our perceptions about the current presence of China in Africa. Thus, suspicion and myths may diminish.

We are aware that the diversity of China’s engagement in the education sector in Mozambique cannot be completely understood in only one simple research. For instance, a study of China role in each of the mentioned modalities could produce nuanced perspectives, as a general study like this one may lack. The analysis of the data collected allows us to affirm that China plays an important role in aiding Mozambique in education. This paper also shows that private companies also play a role in providing aid in education, but not purely on humanitarian grounds, for example, Kingho is investing for its own business in Mozambique by allowing that certain number of local people be trained in areas related to its business.

However, another comparative study may illustrate the proportion of the aid in education China makes available to Mozambique in comparison with other donor’s.

¹⁴ The issue of the cost of health services in China is very hot among Mozambican student in Wuhan, especially after their sick country-mate lost his scholarship because he had cost “his school a lot of money” in his treatment but unfortunately had not shown signs of improving, according to his doctor.
Indeed, it would be interesting to compare the tendency of the budget that countries such as Portugal presently affected by economic and financial crisis allocate to Mozambique’s education or to other developing nations. For many years Portugal has been the main partner of Mozambique in many social areas, education in special. However, economic crisis dictated that for the 2012/2013 academic year the Portuguese government would not award scholarships to Mozambicans study in Portugal or locally (IBE, 2012). According to the public notice it was stipulated that it would be available in alternate years. This is really interesting, because as we have seen, Chinese commitments to education in Africa envisage the rise of financing, in contrast to the traditional donors.

Although the cooperation is “one-way”, we suggest that Mozambican universities and the students trained in China may play a vital role in reversing this situation. For example, Mozambique’s institutions can promote the learning of Portuguese in China. In Zhejiang Province there is an international trade city, Yiwu, having Brazil one of its biggest commercial partners. In this context, the Mozambican Eduardo Mondlane University can play a role in providing material and staff support to its partner, Zhejiang Normal University. The introduction of the study of Portuguese language within the university’s College of Foreign Languages could be beneficial not only to both institutions communities but also to the businesspeople in the neighbouring city of Yiwu and others from different parts of Zhejiang or China. Especially, it would enable that future Chinese teachers in Mozambique and in other Portuguese-speaking countries be trained locally. In Zhejiang’s capital Hangzhou there are some private schools training local people to be Portuguese interpreters and translators in Angola and Mozambique. The running of short-term Portuguese courses (2 months long) in Yiwu’s Foreign Languages Schools has proven that there’s a great demand for learning Portuguese as economic ties between China and the Portuguese-speaking world continue to expand.

Because of the lack of trained teachers to teach Chinese in Mozambique, former students in China can play an important role in the popularisation of learning Chinese language, both within the Confucius Institute and in other foreign languages schools across the country. Considering that there is a lack of teachers, with a minimal cost, a selected number of students that previously earned a degree in China can be encouraged to return to China to pursue a masters degree in teaching Chinese as a second language, which lasts for two years, including teaching practice for a semester in the country of origin.
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