



# **Mozambique Independent Review of PAPs' Performance in 2008 and Trends in PAPs' Performance over the Period 2004-2008**

Report prepared for the Joint Review 2009 by a team of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE) consisting of Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco (team leader), Rogério Ossemane, Nelsa Massingue and Rosimina Ali.

Final Report V4  
10<sup>th</sup> of April, 2009

## Table of Contents

<b>1. Introduction, Main Conclusions, Methodology and Indicators</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. Main conclusions of the evaluation	3
1.3. Methodology	4
1.3.1. <i>Work undertaken</i>	4
1.3.2. <i>Adjustments to some evaluation indicators</i>	5
1.4. Structure of the report and acknowledgements	8
<b>2. Group Evaluation</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1. Performance with respect to PAPs' PAF indicators	9
2.2. Qualitative assessment fo PAPs' performance by the GoM and by the PAPs	12
2.2.1. <i>GoM's assessment of the PAPs in 2008</i>	12
2.2.2. <i>PAPs assessment of themselves in 2008</i>	18
<b>3. Individual Evaluation</b>	<b>23</b>
3.1. African Development Bank (ADB)	23
3.2. Austria	24
3.3. Belgium	25
3.4. Canada	26
3.5. Denmark	27
3.6. DFID	29
3.7. European Commission (EC)	30
3.8. Finland	31
3.9. France	32
3.10. Germany	34
3.11. Ireland	35
3.12. Italy	36
3.13. The Netherlands	37
3.14. Norway	38
3.15. Portugal	39
3.16. Spain	40
3.17. Sweden	41
3.18. Switzerland	43
3.19. The World Bank	44
3.20. Overall rank of PAPs by points	45
3.21. Overall evaluation by rank and by scale	45
<b>4. Trends in PAPs' Performance in the Period 2004-2008</b>	<b>48</b>
4.1. Performance with respect to PAPs' PAF indicators	48
4.2. Evolution of the rank and size	55
4.3. Other general issues arising from multi-year analysis	58
<b>5. Final Comment and Conclusions</b>	<b>60</b>
5.1. Comments on indicators that need to be adjusted for the future	60
5.2. Major areas of concern for 2009	65

<b>Annexes</b>	<b>68</b>
Annex 1: Overall summary of performance in 2008	69
Annex 2: Overall summary of PAPs' ODA disbursements to Mozambique	70
Annex 3: Portfolio composition	71
Annex 4: Harmonization and conditionality	72
Annex 5: Utilisation of GoM finance management systems	73
Annex 6: Joint work	74
Annex 7: Project implementation units	75
Annex 8: Technical cooperation	76
Annex 9: PAPs' questionnaire	77
Annex 10: Paris Declaration Indicators	78
Annex 11: Terms of reference	79
Annex 12: 2004-2008 Comparative Performance Data	80

# 1. Introduction, main Conclusions, Methodology and Indicators

## 1.1 Introduction

This is the fifth *independent evaluation of the Programme Aid Partners* (PAPs) performance in Mozambique.<sup>1</sup> These evaluations form part of the mutual accountability exercise in Mozambique, by which the performance of the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and of the group of donors that provide general budget support (GBS), the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) are evaluated against the performance indicators that the GoM and the PAPs jointly adopt. The *performance indicators* for each party, GoM and PAPs, form the *Performance Assessment Framework* (PAF). Thus, *this report assesses the performance of the PAPs against their PAF in 2008*.<sup>2</sup>

The mutual accountability exercise, by which all parties involved in the aid system are evaluated against their PAFs, is a central component of the process that aims to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid in supporting social and economic development for poverty reduction. The Rome and the Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)<sup>3</sup> between the GoM and the PAPs establish the vision, the principles and the rules of engagement between donors and recipient governments, aiming to improve harmonization (between donor's procedures and mechanisms) and alignment (of donors' activities relative to recipient government policies, priorities and procedures).

In this context, the main principle of aid effectiveness is that the recipient government provides the political leadership and the practical tools and mechanisms around which the aid process is harmonized and aligned and the decisions on aid allocation are taken. Another key principle of aid effectiveness is

---

<sup>1</sup> The first evaluation was carried out in 2005 by a team led by Tonny Killick, which evaluated the PAPs' performance in 2004 (*T. Killick, C. Castel-Branco and R. Gester. 2005. Perfect Partners? The Performance fo Programme Aid Partners in Mozambique 2004*). The second evaluation was carried out in 2006 by a Ernst & Young team led by Carlos Castel-Branco, which evaluated the PAPs' performance in 2005 (*Ernst & Young. 2006. Review of PAPs' Performance in 2005 and PAPs' PAF Matrix Targets for 2006*). The third was carried out in 2007 by a team led by Carlos Castel-Branco with research support from Nelsa Massingue and Tonecas Rafael, which evaluated the PAPs' performance in 2006 (*C. Castel-Branco (with research support from Nelsa Massingue and Tonecas Rafael). 2007. Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance Review 2006*). The fourth was undertaken in 2008 by a team from IESE (Carlos Castel-Branco, Carlos Vicente and Nelsa Massingue. 2008. Mozambique Programme Aid Partner Review 2007), and reviewed the PAPs performance in 2007. These reports can be downloaded from the Programme Aid Partners website [www.pap.org.mz](http://www.pap.org.mz). Links to these reports are also available from IESE's website [www.iese.ac.mz](http://www.iese.ac.mz).

<sup>2</sup> The PAPs' PAF for 2008, which includes the ranking mechanism based on points given to the achievement of each indicator, can be downloaded from the PAPs website [www.pap.org.mz](http://www.pap.org.mz).

<sup>3</sup> The Rome and the Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness and the MoU between the GoM and the PAPs can be downloaded from the PAPs' website [www.pap.org.mz](http://www.pap.org.mz). The main indicators of effectiveness of the Paris Declaration are attached to this report.

that both parties, donors and recipient governments, have obligations and responsibilities and that the effectiveness of aid in supporting social and economic development for poverty reduction depends on the performance of both parties in meeting such obligations and responsibilities. These obligations and responsibilities are summarized in each party's annual PAF.

At this stage, two key points about this study and report should be clarified.

First, *this is an independent report* produced by a team of consultants to the best of their ability provided the information and knowledge that are available to them, the terms of reference of the study and the PAPs' PAF matrix and its rating system.<sup>4</sup> This report does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the GoM or of the PAPs, although the report has benefited from interviews with all PAPs and GoM officials from key Ministries, and from critical comments made by both parties on the draft version of the report. Thus, it is up to the GoM and the PAPs to decide how to use the report, what lessons should be learned and what practical actions should be taken to improve the PAPs' performance and the overall effectiveness of aid in Mozambique.

Second, the *PAPs' performance is assessed against a matrix of commitments and a rating (points) system* that was approved by the PAPs and the GoM during the mid-term review, in September 2007. Any such a system is biased towards one or another view of what the major inputs to aid effectiveness are and how they merge together to achieve the desired results. Given that 87% of aid from the PAPs finance public projects, 38% of which is delivered through General Budget Support (GBS), it is only natural that the current matrix gives significantly more weight to portfolio composition of aid (modalities and allocation of aid) and predictability of disbursements. Thus, this evaluation is not geared towards the evaluation of all aspects related to aid partnerships, but is focused on those issues that play the crucial role on effectiveness of aid as part of developmental public finances.

This means that for each PAP there are elements that are not assessed such that the matrix does not necessarily capture the entire dynamics of the aid process. The assessment made in this report refers to performance relative to a matrix with a given structure, weights and biases. Some PAPs, particularly those that rank low in the overall evaluation, are likely to criticize the results and the methodology adopted. However, they should bear in mind that they have approved their own PAF matrix with its targets, for the achievement of which they are fully responsible before each other, the GoM and Mozambique, and against which they are evaluated in this report.

---

<sup>4</sup> Please, see annex 9 for the terms of reference for the current study.

## **1.2. *Main conclusions of the evaluation***

As a group, the performance of the PAPs in 2008 improved significantly relative to 2007. On average, each indicator of the PAPs' PAF was met by 75% of the PAPs (against 66% in 2007). If points were to be given to the PAPs as a group, they would receive 25 (66%), compared with the 15 (39%) they received in 2007. Performance with respect to the hard core public finance management (PFM) indicators [portfolio composition, on budget ODA, use of national systems (budget execution procedures, auditing, financial reporting and procurement)] improved significantly, but these are still the areas in which the PAPs face more deficiencies, and are the areas of greater concern for the GoM.

Comparing with 2007, the following countries or agencies improved their position by upgrading from a lower level of performance to a higher level: Germany, The World Bank and ADB, from "weak" to "medium low"; the European Commission from "medium low" to "medium"; Canada from "medium low" to "medium high"; Denmark and Sweden from "medium" to "medium high"; Finland, Spain and Ireland from "medium high" to "very good". Norway's position fell from "very good" to "medium high". The position of Portugal, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and DFID did not change. For Austria, this is the first evaluation.

The number of "weak" performers reduced from 4 to 1, the number of "very good" performers increased from 5 to 7, the number of "medium high" performers increased from 3 to 5, the number of "medium low" increased from 3 to 4, and the number of "medium" performers declined from 3 to 2. Thus, 12 of the 19 PAPs (63%) are in the top two groups and only 5 (26%) are in the bottom two groups. In 2007, 8 of 18 PAPs (44%) were in the top two groups and 7 (39%) were in the bottom two groups.

In 2008, there was also a significant change in the "size" of the PAPs, defined as the amount of ODA to the GoM, relative to 2007. Sweden upgraded from "large" to "very large"; Norway, Canada, Denmark, ADB and Germany upgraded from "medium" to "large", and France upgraded from "small" to "medium". There are no changes with respect to the other PAPs. As a result, the number of "very large" PAPs increased from 3 to 4, the number of "large" increased from 3 to 7 and the number of "medium" fell from 6 to 2. Hence, 11 PAPs (58%) are now "very large" or "large" (against 6, 33%, in 2007), and only 8 (44%) are "medium" or "small" (against 12, 66%, in 2007). This reflects an increase in the amount of ODA allocated to the GoM relative to 2007 (6%), as well as a 4% increase in total ODA disbursed

relative to 2007. Thus, the share of ODA to the GoM in total ODA disbursed in 2008 relative to 2007 increased by 2%.

There is some relationship between the size of the donor (measured by its ODA disbursed to the GoM) and the level of performance, as 5 of the 7 large PAPs and 4 of 6 small PAPs are “very good” or “medium high”. The others are scattered more or less evenly across degrees of performance.

Multilateral PAPs seem to starting to adjust to the framework, with the EC, the World Bank and ADB upgrading one level in relation to the previous year. So, whereas in 2007 2 out of 3 multilaterals were “weak performers”, in 2008 none is.

The major challenges identified by all parties for 2009 are related to the development and adoption of a proper and solid aid policy and strategy; the consolidation of the gains from harmonization, alignment and the all round improvement in the core PFM indicators, as well as the expansion of such gains to all common funds and to projects; significantly improving medium term predictability; production of a solid, prospective and guiding MTFF; using the fact that most PAPs are designing new strategies to influence and accelerate change, particularly with respect to division of labour and compliance with the core PFM indicators; and the adoption of a work plan, following the Joint Review (JR) to follow up on the main findings and recommendations of the evaluation reports.

### **1.3. Methodology**

#### **1.3.1. Work undertaken**

In order to perform this evaluation, the team:

- Had a meeting with all PAPs (heads of cooperation (HoCs) and economists) to clarify the questionnaires and the evaluation process that was about to follow;
- Administered a questionnaire to all PAPs based on the PAPs’ PAF matrix for 2008, which allowed the systematic collection of data on portfolio composition, predictability, harmonization and alignment and capacity strengthening (questionnaire annexed);
- Collected more qualitative and opinion-like information from the PAPs and GoM officials, based on a interview guide circulated (interview guide annexed);

- Undertook individual interviews with all PAPs and representatives of the Ministries of Planning and Development, Finance and Foreign Affairs and of the Bank of Mozambique (list of interviews annexed);
- Undertook a technical interview with officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Mozambique to check financial data on aid flows;
- Benefitted from a few meetings with the reference group in order to check on the work, clarify issues and take decisions.

After the interviews with the PAPs and after the PAPs submitted the second version of the questionnaires, technical notes were circulated with further questions for clarification (about the data, the new PBAs, and so on).

### *1.3.2. Adjustments to some evaluation indicators*

Some of the PAPs' PAF indicators are not as fair and clear as they should be, do not necessarily address the problem they are intended to, or strongly depend on assumptions about what the other party is going to do. Hence, the consultant adjusted, reclassified or disqualified some PAF indicators in order to ensure fairness and clarity in the evaluation.

- There are three problems with indicators 6 and 7 ("*% of ODA of the PAP registered on the state budget*" and "*ODA disbursed by PAPs as % of its aid recorded in GoM budget*"). First these indicators are not clearly different from each other because of the way they are phrased. Second, the link made in the PAF matrix between indicator 7 and Paris Declaration indicator 7 is not correct, because Paris indicator 7 refers to schedule of disbursement and multi-year frameworks (which is covered by indicator 5 of the PAF's matrix). Third (and this also applies to indicator 6), the indicator is not clear with respect to the definition of "recorded in the budget". Given current practices in Mozambique, it is extremely difficult to identify which projects are recorded in budget when the budget is approved by the Parliament.

After a meeting with the reference group, it was clarified that the objective of indicator 6 is to measure the percentage of ODA to GoM that can be registered in the budget (this is, that follows the procedures defined by the GoM for inclusion in the budget). This does not necessarily mean that all of such funds are actually recorded in the budget. We obtained the results for this indicator by accepting the information provided by the donors on amount of ODA



recorded in the budget (table 2.2.2 of the questionnaire) and dividing this amount by the amount of ODA disbursed (table 1C of the questionnaire).

In the same meeting with the reference group, it was also clarified that the objective of indicator 7 is to measure the proportion of the committed programmatic ODA (GBS and programme based sector aid) that has been disbursed. Obviously, we have obtained this ratio by dividing the amount of programmatic aid disbursed by the amount of programmatic aid committed (table 1A of the questionnaire).

- Indicator 11 (*strict harmonization between bilateral agreements for GBS and the MoU*) creates a problem for individual PAPs whose bilateral agreements have not yet been evaluated for “*strict harmonization with the MoU*” by the relevant reference group. Hence, if this indicator is strictly applied, some PAPs are going to be penalized only because their agreements have not been evaluated. Thus, this indicator (and its 1 point) was eliminated from the evaluation.
- Indicator 15 (*taxes*): there were two problems with this indicator. First, there was some ambiguity related to definition of the target for 2008 (target for 2009 is clear). Second, the baseline survey circulated amongst the PAPs only in the last quarter of 2008, such that no significant changes occurred in 2008 relative to the baseline. In another section of this report some comments are made on the tax issue, but we did not evaluate this indicator for the reasons mentioned above. Hence, the indicator was dropped from this evaluation and its 2 points are deducted from the total available.
- For indicator 16a (% of joint missions), information provided by the PAPs is inconsistent. For example, some PAPs indicate the other agencies that participated with in their joint missions, but many of those other agencies do not mention those missions. Despite several appeals, many PAPs did not confirm whether they were or not part of such missions and whether such missions were undertaken as joint.

For the 2008 evaluation, we decided that every time a PAP mentions a joint mission with other agencies, we record the mission as joint for all the agencies mentioned irrespectively of the mission being mentioned by the other agencies.

The other problem with this indicator is that if it is strictly applied a PAP with 1 individual (not joint) mission receives 0 points, while another with 20 missions (of which 7 are joint missions)

receives 1 point because the joint mission target (35%) is met. However, the missions' indicator is aimed at measuring the burden on GoM, rather than the share of joint missions per se.

Given that the aggregate target (for the entire group) for total number of missions for 2008 is 120 and the target for proportion of joint missions is 35%, we estimated the number of total individual missions (not joint) that each PAP could have for the aggregate target to be achieved. Hence, we decided that the PAPs would obtain the one point attributed to this indicator when: (i) the number of total individual missions (not joint) does not exceed 3 for bilateral PAPs and 7 for multilateral PAPs; or (ii) the number of individual missions (not joint) exceeds 3 (for bilateral) and 7 (for multilaterals) but the share of joint missions in the total number of missions is no less than 35%.

For indicator 16b of the aggregated matrix related to the total number of missions, the consultant had to adjust for double counting of joint missions. The little information available to identify joint missions and agencies involved in those missions was used to adjust the aggregate figure for joint missions by avoiding double counting. For those missions where agencies involved were not properly identified the consultant had no choice but to add the total number of declared joint missions and divide the result by two (to make some level of adjustment in face of an unknown rate of double counting) and the resulting number was added to the total of joint missions. Hence, the figure for joint missions comprises two parts: one that is fully adjusted and another that is partly adjusted for double counting. The figure for total missions includes individual and joint missions.

- Indicator 17 (*analytical work that is coordinated*) is aimed at maximizing synergies between PAPs and minimizing transaction costs for the GoM. However, it produces some weird results. A significant number of donors do not undertake any analytical work at all, and a few have a huge agenda of analytical work. Very few of the studies are done jointly (involving more than one PAP). It is almost impossible to define studies that are not, in a broad sense, aligned with GoM priorities, as such priorities, as defined by the PARPA, are very wide ranging. Now, PAPs that undertake no studies get the points, while PAPs with a large number of studies of which not enough (60%) are jointly done do not get the points. Thus, this indicator rewards free riding as those PAPs that do not undertake analytical work rely, for their decision making, on the PAPs that undertake analytical work. As the indicator stands at the moment, the team decided to eliminate it (and its 1 point) from the 2008 evaluation and its total number of points available.

Despite its shortcomings, the methodology adopted reflects the nature of the evaluation and the commitments that the PAPs made with respect to their performance in 2008. Thus, whereas the reader is warned that the evaluation based on the PAPs' PAF matrix does not always reflect the whole truth and that the subsequent results should be treated with care, the fact is that the PAPs are assessed, in this report, against their own commitments reflected in their PAF and their decisions taken to implement such commitments in 2008.

#### ***1.4. Structure of the report and acknowledgements***

The report is organized in four further sections. Section two provides an overall picture of the performance of the PAPs group as a whole, while section three discusses the assessment of each individual PAP and ranks the PAPs by performance and by size, section four looks at the evolution of common indicators over the five year period from 2004 to 2008, and section five present some final comments and conclusions, including proposals to improve the PAPs' PAF indicators for the future and a summary of the main challenges identified by the study for 2009. Several annexes include all the data collected and utilized for this report (organized and processed), the list of interviews, the terms of reference and the Paris Declaration indicators of progress for comparison with the PAF's indicator.

The authors would like to thank the PAPs Troika and, in particular, the reference group for this study, which included Patrick Empey (Irish Cooperation), Ute Heinbuch (German Cooperation), Wim Ulens (Belgium Technical Cooperation), Anton Johnston (advisor to the Troika) and Hanifa Ibrahimo (MPD). The evaluation team also benefitted from technical support provided by the PAPs Secretary, Benilde Garrine. We would also like to thank all GoM officials that made their time to meet with us and provide valuable information and feedback on key issues, particularly the Directors António Laíce, Domingos Lambo, Augusto Sumburane, Carolina Pessane and Carla Timóteo (Bank of Mozambique). Other officials from MPD and the MdF (Hanifa Ibrahimo, Alberto Manhuse, Fausto Mafambisse, Fernando Ngoca, Custódia Paunde, Ester José, Arginaldo Muandula, Aristótle and others) also contributed in a significant manner to the achievement of the goals of this study. Finally, we would like to thank all PAPs for the interest, efforts and responses to the demands of the study, and for critical suggestions that will help to improve the quality of the assessment and final report.

## 2. Group Evaluation

### 2.1. *Performance with respect to PAPs' PAF indicators*

The table in Annex 1 shows the performance of the PAP group, as a whole, relative to the PAPs' PAF matrix for 2008. Progress has been made in several areas of the PAF indicators:

- While only 4 of the 18 individual indicators considered were met by all of the individual PAPs [commitments for GBS within 4 weeks of the JR (indicator 4), sending the information for the MTFF (indicator 8), adherence to common conditionality (indicator 9), and annex 10 exceptions (as all that ought to meet the target have done so)], *on average* each indicator was met by 75% of the PAPs, which is a significant improvement from the 2007 results, where on average only two thirds of the PAPs met each indicator.
- The shares of GBS (indicator 1) and Program Aid (indicator 2) in total ODA have increased, in 2008, to 38% and 66%, respectively, from 36% and 61% respectively, in 2007 (and from 34% and 55% in 2006). This enabled the PAPs, as a group, to close the gaps relative to the targets (40% for GBS and 75% for Program Aid), thus contributing to strengthen the tools and conditions for government leadership and coordination and for greater aid alignment and effectiveness. Of the 19 PAPs, in 2008 9 met the high target (40%) for GBS (against 7 in 2007), 4 met the medium target (30%), 2 met the low target (20%), and 4 failed to meet any of the targets. With respect to Programme Aid, in 2008 7 PAPs met the high target (75%), against 6 in 2007, and 4 met the low target (66%). Thus, 8 PAPs did not meet any of the targets. The big improvers were the European Commission, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, whereas Denmark adjusted its portfolio to the normal trend after an unusually high GBS disbursement in 2007.<sup>5</sup>
- The number of agencies with GBS financial agreements of less than 3 years (indicator 3) has been reducing from 5 (out of 18 PAPs) in 2006, to 3 (18) in 2007 and 2 (19) in 2008. In 2008, the two PAPs that did not have financial agreements for 3 years or more took steps to introduce multi-year agreements, from 2009, of not less than 3 years. The figures seem to indicate a steady improvement in medium term predictability but this picture is not fully accurate. First, it should be considered that several of the PAPs' agreements with the GoM are

---

<sup>5</sup> See the performance review in 2007 for an explanation of the Danish GBS disbursement in that year.

coming to an end; as they are not rolling agreements, predictability at the end of the program is close to zero. Second, the international financial crisis reduces even further the predictability of new programs and bilateral agreements, as while the PAPs can argue that their current year (2009 and, maybe, 2010) programmatic commitments are going to be met, none can guarantee the levels of total ODA disbursements from 2010-2011 onwards.

This assessment is confirmed with results from indicator 8 (information regarding ODA commitments to the midterm fiscal and expenditure framework, MTFF). While all PAPs declared that they have provided the required financial information for the MTFF on time, GoM officials claim that the information from 2010 onwards is very weak. So, the PAPs can provide good, short term information, but as time moves away from the origin, information gets sharply much more scarce and inconsistent.

- All agencies made their commitments for 2008 and 2009 within four weeks of the Joint Review (JR) (indicator 4). All agencies disbursed confirmed GBS in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, but two agencies failed to disburse within the quarter for which disbursements were scheduled (only one failed to do so in 2007 and 5 failed in 2006) (indicator 5). In 2008, monthly disbursement schedules were introduced in the PAPs' PAF. Of the 19 PAPs, 13 disbursed according to monthly schedules and 4 according to quarterly schedule.

Furthermore, almost two thirds of 2008 GBS were disbursed in the first quarter of 2008. This contrasts with 2004, for example, in which almost two thirds of GBS funds were disbursed in the last quarter of the year. Although "disbursing in the first quarter" is not an indicator, functionality, certainty and flexibility improve when disbursements are made earlier, given that reliability of disbursements is less than perfect.

- The target for the minimum proportion of programmatic ODA disbursed (indicator 7 reformulated), 90%, was met (100%). There was no comparable indicator in 2007 (for 2007, the target had to be defined).
- The share of PAP's ODA disbursed using GoM public financial management procedures improved significantly: 68% utilized budget execution procedures (indicator 12a), against 61% in 2007; 39% utilized GoM auditing systems only (indicator 12b), against 37% in 2007; 63% used GoM financial reporting procedures only (indicator 12c), against 49% in 2007; and 65% used GoM procurement systems (indicator 13), against 51% in 2007. In 2006, only 44% of

ODA utilized budget execution procedures and there was no single GoM procurement system. So, as a whole, GoM finance management systems have been strengthened as a result of increased alignment of aid flows with such systems and GoM efforts to improve its public finance management (PFM) capacities and performance.

- In 2008, 14 PAPs had no annex 10 exceptions in the MoU (indicator 10), against 12 in 2006 and 2007.
- Progress also continued with respect to missions (indicators 16a and 16b). The total number of missions declined to 165 (from 191 in 2007 and 203 in 2006), but the target of maximum number of missions (120) was not met. The share of joint missions increased to 24% (from 18% in 2007 and 10% in 2006), but the target for 2008 (35%) was not met either. Nonetheless, one should also notice that part of the difference between 2008 and 2007 is due to the way missions were counted (explained in an early part of this report).
- There is a slight improvement in coordinated and sector-wide technical cooperation (TC) (indicators 20 and 21), whose shares of total TC increased to 47% and 22%, respectively, from 38% and 21% in 2007 (the target for 2006 was “to reach an agreement about the rules for coordinated TC”). Although the target for coordinated TC in 2008 was not met, the gap between results and target was narrowed.

However, the figures also show that:

- The group targets 1 (GBS) and 2 (Programme Aid) have not been met and almost two thirds of the PAPs are still incapable of meeting the high targets for either indicator. Particularly worrying is that 4 PAPs are still delivering less than 20% of their ODA to GoM through GBS and that the Programme Aid targets are not met by more than 40% of the PAPs. Performance relative to Programme Aid may improve after the proposals for new PBAs are assessed and, eventually, included in the portfolio of programme-based sector aid.
- Of the 18 aggregate matrix indicator targets that can realistically be evaluated, only 11 were met by the PAPs as a group (up from 8 in 2007). This means that the PAPs, as a group, failed to meet 39% of the targets set in the PAPs’ PAF (an improvement, nonetheless, on the 56% failure rate in 2007);

- For the PAPs, the most difficult areas continue to be those related to portfolio composition (% of GBS and Program Aid in total ODA to GoM), use of national auditing systems, number of missions, coordinated technical cooperation (TC) and annex 10 exceptions (although the target of 14 PAPs without annex 10 exceptions was met, there are 5 PAPs which kept their exceptions. The exceptions of three of them will be eliminated in the new MoU). In these indicators, the PAPs failed to meet the group targets (with exception of the indicator “annex 10 exceptions”) and, on *average*, only 52% of the PAPs met each of these targets (compare this with the overall average of 75% of the PAPs meeting each target). If we look at the hardest three indicators (GBS, Programme Aid and auditing systems), *on average*, only 40% of the PAPs met each of those indicators. These areas of hard public finance management issues (portfolio composition, auditing) and typical collective action problems (missions, TC), had been the most difficult ones also in 2007, 2006 and 2005.
- As for the percentage of ODA on budget (indicator 6), the minimum target (85%) was met (95%), but there was no improvement on the 2007 performance (98%). Of the 19 donors, 14 met the target (against 17 in 2007).

If points were to be given to the group as a whole, the PAPs would receive 25 out of a maximum of 38 points, or 66% (“medium” performance). This is a significant improvement on 2007, where the group as whole received 15 points, or 39% (weak). However, one should bear in mind that one sixth of the group points came from a change introduced in the points system in 2008 – the rewarding of progress and grading of targets for portfolio composition. If the 2007 points system was still in place, the group would have received 21 points (55%), which would still have been an important improvement but not as significant as it was with the new points system.

## ***2.2. Qualitative assessment of PAPs’ performance made by the GoM and by the PAPs***

### ***2.2.1. GoM’s assessment of the PAPs in 2008***

As part of the assessment of PAPs’ performance in 2008, Directors and other staff of the Ministries of Planning and Development (MPD), Finance (MdF) and Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINEC), and of the Bank of Mozambique were interviewed (see Annex 7 for the list of interviews).

In these interviews, GoM officials considered the following as the areas of significant improvement in 2008:

- In the mid-term review, donors continued to respect the principle of alignment between the strategic matrix of PARPA and the GoM's PAF, such that no new indicators were introduced. This decision was highly appreciated by the GoM;
- The introduction of indicative commitments for the projects has been considered, by the GoM, a very useful innovation to be consolidated over time;
- The need to respect the planning and budgeting cycle has become clearer for most donors, and this is beginning to show through increasing alignment of information flows, commitments and disbursements, including at sector level, with this cycle;
- The beginning of the introduction and adoption of the principles of the EU code of conduct and division of labour are seen as important steps towards the implementation of the principles of Aid Effectiveness;
- The strengthening of the PAPs secretariat and its close coordination with the GoM staff involved in aid coordination helped to improve the quality and articulation of the joint work.

On the other hand, the following were mentioned as problems that remain and areas in which significantly more joint work needs to be done:

- Political dialogue:
  - Ministers answer PAPs' questions but it is very rare that they ask questions to the PAPs. This is because the GoM is not spending enough time and resources preparing for these debates and also because of lack of power parity such that many in GoM believe that for the sake of keeping aid flowing they should not question PAPs's behaviour and practices;
  - The MoU and the Paris Declaration are good intentions but are not legally binding and do not guarantee a power balance between donors and the GoM. Hence, it is unlikely that the GoM will question donors because at political level the GoM is not prepared to sustain a crisis that may result from such questioning;
  - The terms and the process of dialogue at political level need to be respected by all parties. The letter with the issues for discussion at political level should include all issues and be agreed with the GoM, and no further issues of substance should be



included at the last minute by individual donors or GoM institutions. During reviews there is a need for broader joint discussion at the correct level (i.e. not simply within the drafting team) of key issues prior to them being incorporated in the Aide Memoire. Given that the aid process is supposed to be a *partnership* for development, parties need to work as partners, with the final aide memoire representing either a consensus reached following extensive discussion, or the views of both GoM and PAPs when a consensus is not reached;

- Whereas it can be said that programmatic aid is working well, there is still a lot of work to be done with projects, namely: consolidation of the system of indicative commitments; formalization of all projects with the GoM through approved project documents and registration in the budget; adoption of common denominations; improving predictability and implementation capacity in both common funds and projects (current rate of budget execution even in priority sectors and projects averages 61%); elimination of parallel conditionality in both projects and sector aid (such as the ADB and the World Bank's demand of additional legal and auditing requirements, different procurement systems and different disbursement conditions); elimination of the "no objection" clause when conditions exist for implementation of the GoM's procurement system;

- At the moment, midterm predictability is a serious issue. As donors' strategies come to an end, predictability on the margin approaches zero because these strategies are not rolling. On the other hand, the financial crisis is increasing uncertainty about the future beyond 2010. If this affects GBS and PBAs, it affects the projects even more. Hence, a good midterm MTFF, closely linked with the budget, is impossible, particularly when the domestic resource component of the budget is complementary to external resources, rather than the driving factor.

- As a result, while the MTFF is so closely linked to the budget (which has a short term perspective and needs to be financially accurate), it will be difficult to turn the MTFF into a useful tool to lead and manage aid.
- On the other hand, the MTFF could be designed as a prospective planning exercise, in which the GoM defines policy priorities, costs them and plans their execution over time, and then develops an adequate strategy for resource mobilisation (fiscal and non-fiscal revenue, grants and loans).

- The evaluation process needs to incorporate all aid, for various reasons:
  - Conditionality is being streamlined and rationalized with respect to GBS, but there is evidence that new conditionality has emerged elsewhere;
  - Although overall predictability with respect to GBS has improved, there are systematic violations of agreed disbursements (schedules, amounts) at sector and project level.
- Furthermore, some donors ask for additional proof of efficiency and effectiveness to have their projects on treasury unified account (conta única do tesouro, CUT). Once questioned about these additional demands, these donors say that these are head quarters (HQs) request. From the moment that HQs are involved, the space for harmonization and alignment is severely reduced.
- Pressure to incorporate all ODA on budget is mounting, and so is the pressure to convert projects into common funds. However, some of these projects operate with specific conditionality and within specific institutional conditions that are not consistent with common funds and on-budget ODA. Hence, the key question is how to change such conditionality and other institutional conditions in order to make such projects consistent with programmatic, on-budget ODA and to avoid forcing inappropriate conditionality and other rules into the budget system. The GoM cannot change budget procedures only to accommodate the interest of individual donors;
- There are still many projects (particularly those involving NGOs, small donors and non harmonized/aligned donors) that even the sector groups do not know about. Many of these projects are not implemented through the GoM but are complementary to mainstream projects implemented by or through GoM departments. Some donors are trying to include this type of projects in the budget but they are run with different rules and are very difficult to monitor (hence, it is difficult to collect information on execution);
- Concern that decentralization is having an impact on changing the structure of sector ODA away from programmatic modalities. For example, in the health sector vertical funds have become, by far, the most important means for channelling funds into the sector because of the strategic choice made by two or three donors (most of the other important donors finance one or more of the common funds). Although it could be claimed that the vertical funds are, broadly

speaking, aligned with GoM policies for the sector, they are basically managed by the donors according to their own priorities and vision. The share of programmatic aid in this sector is falling sharply.

- There are concerns about possible increase in transaction costs and complexity of evaluation in the light of the new EU “MDG Contract” approach to GBS.
- The manner in which unspent funds are re-incorporated in the budget contributes to reduce the credibility of the budget. This issue needs to be discussed further at technical level;
- Technical cooperation (TC) is an area where a lot more progress needs to be made and can be made, but many donors insist on maintaining the *modus operandi* of uncoordinated and tied TC. Progress with coordinated TC will help public sector reform and will be helped by public sector reform.
- The question of the rationalization and structure of the working groups needs to be discussed further and agreed between all parties involved, in a coordinated manner. Groups are many, transaction costs are high and capacities are limited, but the issue needs a coordinated and informed discussion;
- The GoM has presented a proposal regarding aid architecture – how the GoM would like it to be – but has so far not received any response from donors.

The GoM officials identified eight main challenges for 2009 and beyond, namely:

- The development of a practical and solid aid policy and strategy that guides, encourages and promotes international development partnerships;
- The adoption of the new MoU for GBS, which gives more guarantees for power parity between the GoM and the PAPs and which is clearer about penalties for the PAPs that do not comply with their commitments;
- The expansion of the utilisation of the GoM national systems for aid disbursements (ODA on budget, on CUT, respecting budget execution procedures, using GoM’s auditing, financial reporting and procurement systems, and payment of taxes). This means the consolidation, development and expansion of progress already achieved in terms of portfolio composition,

predictability, utilization of GoM systems and mutual accountability for GBS and PBAs at sector level, but also its expansion to projects as much as possible;

- Development of sector and common fund MoUs within similar lines of the GBS MoU;
- The inclusion of the important donors that are not PAPs and aid flows that are not GBS or PBAs in the process of evaluation, harmonization and alignment;
- The strengthening of the GoM and the PAPs capacity and focus for analysis of aid dynamics, trends, effectiveness and social and economic impact;
- The improvement of coordination of technical cooperation along the lines of programmatic aid; and
- Making ODAMoz to work as a facilitating tool (data base) to improve macroeconomic policy analysis as well as the assessment of aid effectiveness, trends and dynamics in Mozambique.

With respect to the exercise of evaluating PAPs performance, GoM officials confirmed its advantages reported in 2007, and mentioned that the main weaknesses that remain are:

- Results are not duly discussed and utilized by the PAPs and, mostly, by the GoM. Hence, many findings and recommendations of the reports are not taken forward;
- There are no penalties for PAPs that do not comply with commitments, such that everything depends on voluntary peer pressure;
- Although the evaluation of PAPs performance has been done for five years, PAPs performance is not yet fully understood, in practice, as a key component and determinant of the performance of the whole aid and development process.

GoM officials recommended that during or immediately after the JR a matrix for actions on both sides (GoM and PAPs) to improve performance should be drawn on the basis of the evaluation reports. This requires that the main findings and recommendations of the reports are deeply discussed and a plan of action related to them is jointly produced and approved. Ad hoc joint working groups could be organized to address such issues over the year, and the meetings of the joint steering committee should review progress with respect to these issues.

### *2.2.2. PAPs assessment of themselves in 2008*

As part of the assessment, the PAPs were asked to comment on individual and group issues related to the PAPs' performance in 2008, which significant improvement were achieved and/or which areas are still lagging behind and represent challenges for the future. On the improvements, most of the PAPs mentioned the following issues:

- The approval and signing of the new MoU, which consolidates progress made in several areas of the development partnership since 2004, including the elimination of almost all bilateral exceptions;
- Overall improvement on issues of portfolio composition, short term predictability and use of national systems, and some improvement with respect to coordinated technical cooperation, despite the fact that targets in these areas may not have been fully achieved. The increase of the share of funds on CUT is a significant improvement that needs to be consolidated and expanded. The use of common fund mechanism was expanded and consolidated.
- Beginning of the analysis and rationalization of the structure of the working groups;
- Development of ODAMoz and basis laid for greater GoM use and overhaul of this system of information;
- Notable improvements in PEFA and dissemination of its results;
- More joint initiatives, as shown in the share of joint missions and joint analytical work;
- Improvements with respect to increased division of labour between PAPs.

Three of the PAPs mentioned the action taken by Sweden and Switzerland to signal their reduction in commitments due to unsatisfactory progress on fighting corruption as progress, because it was appropriate and followed the rules of engagement defined by the MoU.

As far as issues that are still lagging behind, the PAPs mentioned the following:

- Coordinated TC (which has not developed very much after the 2005/2006 study), Working Groups structure (which is still too heavy and costly) and the parallel auditing procedures that

still apply in most common funds, are significant problems to address, where progress has been very slow and the need for change is very strong;

- The use of GoM PFM systems is almost restricted to GBS and PBAs and the efforts to improve harmonization and alignment are almost restricted to the PAPs. The challenge is how to extend these processes and mechanism without moving backwards. Thus, there is an increasing need for GoM leadership in making clear what are the pillars and standards around which general harmonization and alignment should develop. In this process, the experience of the PAPs should not be lost.
- Division of labour is still a significant problem: cases of delegated cooperation are few and short lived and many donors are still reluctant to adjust their strategies and priorities to GoM needs and requests. These problems will raise significant challenges for the practical implementation of the EU Code of Conduct and for adjusting for potential effects of the economic crisis on aid flows.
- The aid-development partnership is still too focused on processes and rules, and not enough on the substance (policies and results).
- The process of aid evaluation and mutual accountability is still driven mostly by donors, too focused on processes and rules with little attention given to substance and results. In addition to all the problems that this creates in terms of leadership and ownership, it also affects the quality of the partnership.
- Despite very significant progress, the process of aid evaluation and mutual accountability is still too heavy and costly in terms of coordination, administration, and the implications of these for the magnitude of transaction costs for donors and GoM. The question is how to streamline the process without losing the experience of working group based discussion and joint evaluation.
- The lack of an aid policy and strategy with practical substance with respect to aid architecture, management, priorities in resource allocation, division of labour between donors and between GoM departments, focus around which to harmonize and align and with reference to which evaluation of progress can be made, and the system of evaluation of results. Aid policy cannot simply be a general document on general diplomacy.

- The relationship between the World Bank and other PAPs has been particularly difficult in 2008 in many areas related to harmonization (for example, discussion of the MoU), alignment with GoM procedures (for example, procurement rules) and conceptualization of the aid architecture (for example, how to include the non-PAPs in the process of harmonization and alignment).
- The costs of the process of harmonization and alignment, the lack of effective evaluation of social and economic impact of aid (beyond evaluation of processes) and the economic crisis are contributing to reduce the pressure to implement the principles of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and to consolidate and move forward all the progress already registered in Mozambique.

A couple of PAPs mentioned that there is a real risk of transforming some of the PAPs organizations into a sort of parallel or shadow government, as they tend to become too involved in management, decision making and policy development at micro level. Some donors are still measuring progress (or lack of it) as a function of the GoM implementation of policy priorities developed or suggested by donors, irrespective of their adequacy and of the endogenous policy debate. The perception that large donors or international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, can provide the capacity for policy development, analysis and monitoring and that the recipient government needs little more than managerial and procurement capacities to implement such policies, is still present and strong with some donors, and needs to be challenged.

The biggest challenges identified by the PAPs for the coming years are:

- Production of an aid policy and strategy that leads, gives clear directions, promotes and constrains when necessary, rather than only providing a general framework for general diplomacy. In particular, the aid policy needs to be clear, coherent and concise about architecture of aid, priorities of resource allocation, division of labour between donors and between GoM departments, main pillars for harmonization and alignment and system for evaluation of donors and of results of the aid-development partnership.
- Expansion of the aid harmonization and alignment process and evaluation of donor performance without compromising the significant progress registered over the years around the PAPs group on portfolio composition, predictability, use of national systems and other

areas of alignment and harmonization. This process of expansion should contribute to significantly increase the share of programmatic aid flows (GBS and PBAs), improve predictability (short and medium term), and intensify the use of national systems, rather than undermining these key areas for alignment and harmonization and for effectiveness of aid. In this context, it is also important to look at the PAPs results and see how to make the PAPs that are still too far away from acceptable standards on the key issues (portfolio composition, predictability and use of national systems) to make significant progress in these areas.

- Challenging and changing rigid rules that form part of some of the donors' way of doing things (some PAPs and non-PAPs), as they prevent progress and substantially contribute to increasing costs of harmonization and alignment;
- Production of a coherent and leading midterm fiscal and expenditure framework, that is not only responding defensively to donor declared commitments. The MTFF needs to take the lead indicating what the GoM intends to do, why and how, and where the resources come from. The MTFF should be a key tool to negotiate and decide where resources should go to, the priorities, the policy options and how they may affect revenue and expenditure, the cost of policies and options. The MTFF should not be made dependent only on the information that donors provide; rather, it should guide what donors should do and how to relate to them. In this connection, maybe the MTFF should become more part of the midterm planning process rather than so closely linked with direct budgeting.
- Reduction of cost of alignment and harmonization and changing its main focus from processes to substance and results;
- Making significant progress in coordination of TC, rationalization of the Working Group structure and dynamics, improving of the division of labour between donors and the clarification and strengthening of the harmonization and alignment process at sector level;
- Significantly improving evaluation and analysis of substance in the aid-development partnership, namely the content of the policies, the social and economic results and impacts and the cost-benefit analysis of the aid-development partnerships and development policies. In this context, one particular issue is how the budget can be used to cost policies and options and, in so doing, help to develop cost-benefit analysis of such policies and options.



- The improvement of the quality of ODAMoz and of the effectiveness of linking it on a more solid basis with other GoM information and policy analysis systems. Improvement in information sharing;
- Revision of the PAPs' PAF indicators and targets, in consultation and agreement with the GoM, to consider the accumulated experience in Mozambique and elsewhere, the leadership of the GoM through a clear aid policy, the need to consolidate progress already made and expand it, and the dynamics of expanding harmonization and alignment practices to sectors, projects and non-PAPs.

### 3. Individual Evaluation

#### 3.1. African Development Bank (ADB)

Table 3.1. African Development Bank

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	43	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	43	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Quarterly	1
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	228	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	NO	0
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	43	0
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	43	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	43	0
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	43	0
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	25	0
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	Y	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	24	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	0	0
Total points						21

Table 3.1. illustrates ADB's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. ADB's performance received 21 out of possible 38 points, this is 55% representing a slight improvement in relation to the 2007 performance. The only area of improvement in 2008 relative to the previous year was their adherence to GBS common conditionality. Performance with respect to indicator 5 (schedule of disbursement) deteriorated. In the remaining indicators ADB has maintained the same standard of performance.

### 3.2. Austria

Table 3.2 illustrates Austria's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Austria, a new comer to the PAPs group, received 31 out of possible 38 points, this is 82%. This is a very good and solid performance, better so given the size of the donor and the fact that 2008 was its first year as a PAP.

Austria achieved all predictability targets (except for percentage of ODA registered in the budget) and all harmonization and alignment targets. However, on technical cooperation, it has failed both targets. Despite being a "small PAP" (defined by the size of its ODA to GoM), Austria performed well in terms of the portfolio composition.

Table 3.2 Austria

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	44%	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	72%	2
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	72	0
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	72	2

	systems and reporting	12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	44	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	72	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	72	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	67	1
Capacity Strengthenin g (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	Y	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	40	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	4	0
Total points						31

### 3.3. Belgium

Table 3.3 illustrates Belgium performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Belgium keeps improving on already strong performances in previous years. In 2008 they received 36 out of possible 38 points; this is 95%, improving on the 89% performance level of 2007. Belgium had a very strong all round performance.

Table 3.3 Belgium

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	61	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	82	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	100	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	80	0

		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	82	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	61	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	82	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	82	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	0	1
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	80	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	80	1
Total points						36

### 3.4. Canada

Table 3.4 illustrates Canada's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Canada received 30 out of possible 38 points, this is 79%. This is another good improvement on Canada's performance.

Table 3.4 Canada

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	14	0
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	49	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	86	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	113	2

		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	89	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	14	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	84	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	84	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	41	1
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	80	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	80	1
Total points						30

Canada's weak points are still mostly related to the portfolio structure. However, contrary to 2007, the negative effects of its portfolio composition on the use of national systems were not felt in 2008, which shows that it is possible to make full use of national systems (and align around national systems) even when the aid portfolio is not mostly dominated by programmatic aid. This is the major explanation for the 2008 improvement and was due to the fact that Canada's project in the education sector, which is considered as using all national systems except the national auditing one, increased its share in the overall amount of ODA to GoM.

### 3.5. Denmark

Table 3.5 illustrates Denmark's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Denmark received 30 out of possible 38 points, this is 79%. This is an improvement on the 2007 performance by Denmark and is a result of the reduction of PIUs and of the achievement of the joint mission's target. The remaining structure of its scoring has not changed significantly. Its main weakness is still its portfolio composition where none of the indicators targets is met. Denmark has quite a few new projects that could have been considered as PBAs but, as explanation earlier in this report, they were not included as a result of

a decision taken together with the donor reference group for this study. For the future, these projects should be submitted to the reference group such that they can be included in next year's evaluation as PBAs if the group considers, after close evaluation, that this is the case.

Table 3.5 Denmark

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	19	0
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	55	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	151	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	112	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	55	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	19	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	69	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	81	2
16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	83	1		
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	Y	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	87	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	37	1
Total points						30

### 3.6. DFID

Table 3.6 illustrates DFID's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. DFID received 38 out of possible 38 points, this is 100%, and a repetition of the maximum possible score also achieved in the two previous years.

Table 3.6 DFID

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	67	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	100	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	100	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	102	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
		Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)
10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;			yes (1)	YES	1
Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a		% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	100	2
	12b		% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	67	1
	12c		% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	99	2
	13		% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	99	2
	16a		% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	86	1
Capacity Strengthenin g (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	88	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	74	1
Total points						38



### 3.7. European Commission (EC)

Table 3.7 illustrates the EC's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. The EU received 26 out of possible 38 points, this is 68%, a 4 percentage point improvement in relation to 2007.

The EC improvement is mostly related to its portfolio composition achieving 5 out of 7 points and to the impact of the bigger share of GBS on the use of national auditing systems. Another improvement was the EC disbursement of its GBS within the scheduled quarter. However these improvements were partially obfuscated by the EC performance deterioration in relation to the joint missions and to the coordinated technical cooperation indicators.

Table 3.7 European Commission

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	48	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	69	2
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Quarterly	1
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	69%	0
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	92	2
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	NO	0
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	NO	0
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	69	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	48	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	69	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	69	2
Capacity Strengthening (13% of total points)	Project Implementation Units	16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	22	0
		18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2

Total points)	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	20	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	20	1
Total points						26

### 3.8. Finland

Table 3.8 illustrates Finland's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Finland received 35 out of possible 38 points, this is 92%. This is an excellent performance, improving on the already good level achieved in 2007. Finland's overall improvement resulted from the increase in the share of GBS and from the adoption of a three year (2008-2010) agreement with GoM. Despite its improvement on portfolio composition, it still failed to achieve the indicator on the use of national auditing systems. It has also not managed to achieve the joint missions' target.

Table 3.8 Finland

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	31	2
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	93	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	98	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	93	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	31	0

		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	93	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	93	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	10	0
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	66	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	66	1
Total points						35

### 3.9. France

Table 3.9. illustrates France's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. France received 24 out of possible 38 points, this is 63%. This represents a slight improvement on the 2007 performance by France.

France's major weak points are still related to portfolio composition (as they failed to meet targets 1 and 2) and technical cooperation. In relation to 2007, France has lost two points from the use of national financial reporting systems indicator and won one from the joint missions' indicator.

Otherwise, France has been a very active member of the group and has contributed significantly to the achievement of some common goals, such as, for example, the mapping and rationalization of the working group structure and the development of a system for easy estimation of the portfolio and use of national systems by all donors.

Table 3.9 France

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	14	0
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	34	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3

	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	109	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	NO	0
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	75	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	35	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	45	0
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	80	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	36	1
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	29	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	10	0
Total points						24

With respect to the 2007 discussion on France mode of financing GBS (by recycling Mozambique's debt service), they had a year of debate on this issue but no changes were introduced in 2008. Hence, the point remains that strictly speaking, it might be questionable that debt recycling, one form of debt relief, can be accounted as GBS, particularly when debt relief is not even included in ODA accounting. Pushing this debate to its extreme conclusions, one may even argue that France's GBS is financed by other PAPs, which finance GBS and thus enable the GoM to service its debt to France, which France then recycles into GBS. It would be advisable that the PAPs and the GoM have a good and well informed discussion about this point, and that a thorough evaluation of other possibilities is made, including highly concessional loans with flexibility to adjust to macroeconomic shocks, in order to find adequate replacements for debt recycling as a way of financing GBS.

### 3.10. Germany

Table 3.10 illustrates Germany's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Germany received 21 out of possible 38 points, this is 55%. This is an improvement of Germany's performance relative to 2007 and 2006. Germany has improved on joint missions and on coordinated TC, and has the potential to improve on portfolio composition once its new PBAs are approved by the joint reference group. In spite of its improvement, Germany failed to make their GBS disbursement within the quarter it was scheduled for, to disburse the committed amount, to eliminate annex 10 exceptions, does not have an agreement with GoM of at least three years and did not follow the national auditing systems and the sector wide TC indicators.

Table 3.10 Germany

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	29	1
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	62	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	NO	0
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	NO	0
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	100	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	77	0
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	NO	0
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	62	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	29	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	60	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	60	2
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	77	2

		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	6	0
Total points						21

### 3.11. Ireland

Table 3.11 illustrates Ireland's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Ireland received 35 out of possible 38 points, this is 92%. This is a remarkable 11p.p. improvement from the 2007 performance and it's a reflection of the improvements registered in the use of national financial reporting systems and also to the fact that the graduated system of scoring introduced for this year evaluation for the GBS indicator allowed Ireland to gain one point. It is worth mentioning that this big improvement from Ireland is also a result of the non-deterioration in any of the indicators score achieved in the previous year. *The case of Ireland also confirms that even with a not so large share of GBS it is quite possible to make adequate use of national systems.*

Table 3.11 Ireland

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	24	1
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	88	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	88	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	88	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	24	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	85	2

Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	85	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	75	1
	Technical Cooperation	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
		19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	100	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	100	1
Total points						35

### 3.12. Italy

Table 3.12 illustrates Italy's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Italy received 26 out of possible 38 points, this is 68%. This performance is roughly at the same level as the 2007s. Italy's weak points are still related to portfolio composition, use of national auditing systems and failing to make the GBS disbursement within the scheduled month and to achieve the sector wide TC indicator. However, it is worth mentioning Italy's increase on its share of GBS and of programmatic aid from 19% in 2007 to 34% in 2008 which resulted in a 2 points gain from the GBS indicator.

Table 3.12 Italy

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	34	2
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	34	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Quarterly	1
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	153	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	100	2

	systems and reporting	12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	34	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	100	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	100	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	0	0
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	0	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	0	0
Total points						26

### 3.13. The Netherlands

Table 3.13 illustrates The Netherlands' performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. The Netherlands received 36 out of possible 38 points, this is 95%. This is an excellent performance, and slightly above the level achieved in 2007. The two points that Netherlands did not receive were one from the GBS indicator and another from the use of national auditing procedures indicator (both are closely related).

Table 3.13 The Netherlands

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	32	2
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	77	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	100%	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100%	2
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1



total points)	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	77	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	32	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	67	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	77	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	71	1
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	63	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	63	1
Total points						36

### 3.14. Norway

Table 3.14 illustrates Norway's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Norway received 31 out of possible 38 points, this is 82%. This is a good all round performance showing however a 4p.p. deterioration from the 2007 results. Two indicators have deteriorated, the one related to ODA disbursed that was registered in the budget and the one on coordinated TC. As also mentioned in the 2007 evaluation, Norway is penalized because of its support to the large and critical project of electrification. The discussion on how to classify and differentiate GoM led projects from donor led projects, and to help to expand harmonization and alignment to projects, is carried on in the section five of this report, where practical proposals are made about this.

Table 3.14 Norway

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	45	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	70	2
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3

	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	76	0
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	70	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	51	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	66	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	70	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	20	0
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	41	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	41	1
Total points						31

### 3.15. Portugal

Table 3.15 illustrates Portugal's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Portugal received 15 out of possible 38 points, this is 39%. This is once again the weakest performance of the 19 PAPs evaluated in 2008, and again weaker than the previous year performance. Fundamentally, the aid structure of Portugal in Mozambique, particularly the composition of its portfolio and other related indicators of utilization of GoM systems, is not in line with the current PAF structure. Hence, Portugal failed to meet two thirds of the PAF's indicators. Additionally, although still remaining its strongest area (representing almost two-thirds of its total points), predictability indicators have worsened in 2008 reducing from the 83% level of achievement in 2007 to 66% in 2008. This was due to the 8 months delay in GBS disbursement.

Table 3.15 Portugal

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	12	0
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	14	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	NO	0
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	14	0
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	14	0
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	12	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	14	0
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	14	0
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	13	0
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	0	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	0	0
Total points						15

### 3.16. Spain

Table 3.16 illustrates Spain's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Spain received 35 out of possible 38 points, this is 92%. This is a very good all round performance and a truly remarkable improvement on the 2007 results. Spain's weak points were not being able to achieve the target for

indicator 18 (number of PIUs) and for the indicator on the use of national auditing procedures (12b). However, in relation of the latter Spain was only 1p.p. shorter of the target.

Table 3.16 Spain

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	41	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	82	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	95	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	82	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	41	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	82	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	82	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	100	1
Capacity Strengthenin g (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	No	0
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	55	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	55	1
Total points						35

### 3.17. Sweden

Table 3.17 illustrates Sweden's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Sweden received 31 out of possible 38 points, this is 82%. Sweden is another country showing an outstanding improvement of

13p.p. with a very good all round performance. Sweden's weak points are related to programme-based aid, the length of the multi-year arrangement and coordinated technical cooperation. Otherwise, their performance is very good and solid.

Table 3.17 Sweden

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	52	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	73	2
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	NO	0
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	91	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	109	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	73	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	54	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	66	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	66	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	56	1
Capacity Strengthenin g (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	49	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	49	1
Total points						31

### 3.18. Switzerland

Table 3.18 illustrates Switzerland's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. Switzerland received 36 out of possible 38 points, this is 95%. Only the failure to disburse the GBS within the scheduled month prevented Switzerland from repeating the previous year maximum possible score.

#### 3.18 Switzerland

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	53	3
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	80	4
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Quarterly	1
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	92	2
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	100	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	YES	1
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	80	2
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	53	1
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	80	2
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	80	2
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	25	1
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	93	2
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	27	1
Total points						36

### 3.19. The World Bank

Table 3.19 illustrates The World Bank's performance vis-à-vis the PAPs' PAF matrix. The World Bank received 20 out of possible 38 points, this is 53% representing a 6 percentage point improvement in relation to 2007. The World Bank's major weaknesses are still related to portfolio composition, utilization of GoM systems and reporting, and coordinated TC. On these indicators, the Bank lost 13 points. The World Bank is another PAP who is always going to be penalized because of its focus on large infra-structure investment that is run as projects, and because of its failure to improve the use of national systems.

Table 3.19 The World Bank

Objectives	Activities	No.	Indicators	Target	Executed	Points
Portfolio Composition (18% of total points)	GBS	1	PAP provides at least 40% GBS (as % of ODA to Government)	Yes if >20% (1) > 30% (2) >40% (3)	32%	2
	Program Aid	2	% program- based aid of total ODA disbursed by PAP	>66% (2) >75% (4)	49%	0
Predictability (39% of total points)	Commitment of funds	3	PAP has multi-year agreements of not less than 3 years.	Yes (3)	YES	3
		4	Commitments of GBS for year n+1 within 4 weeks of the JR in year n	Yes (3)	YES	3
	Disbursement	5	Disbursement of confirmed GBS commitment in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, according to monthly disbursement schedule as agreed with GoM	Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly	Monthly	3
		6	% of ODA disbursed registered in the budget	85% (2)	66%	0
		7	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	85% (2)	96%	2
		8	Commitments to MTFF	Yes (2)	YES	2
Harmonization and Alignment (29% of total points)	Consolidation and harmonization of conditionality	9	PAP adheres to GBS common conditionality.	Yes (2)	YES	2
		10	PAP has NO GBS MoU Annex 10 exceptions;	yes (1)	NO	0
	Utilization of government systems and reporting	12a	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national budget execution procedures	55% (2)	44	0
		12b	% PAP's ODA disbursed audited using national auditing procedures only	42% (1)	29	0
		12c	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national financial reporting procedures	55% (2)	29	0
		13	% PAP's ODA disbursed using national procurement systems	55% (2)	29	0
		16a	% of missions by PAP that are joint	35% (1)	43	1
Capacity Strengthening (13% of Total points)	Project Implementation Units	18	Number of parallel PIUs (based on list agreed for OECD/DAC questionnaire)	Zero or Number reduced (2)	0	2
	Technical Cooperation	19	% PAP's TC provided through coordinated programmes	55% (2)	34	0
		20	% sector-wide TC of PAP as percentage of total TC by PAP	16% (1)	6	0
Total points						20

As Norway and a few other PAPs, the World Bank is always penalised because of its focus on large infra-structure projects that are GoM driven.

### 3.20. Overall rank of PAPs by points

Table 3.20: Overall Ranking 2008

Rank	PAPs	Points
1	DFID	38
2	Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland	36
5	Finland, Ireland and Spain	35
8	Norway, Sweden and Austria	31
11	Canada and Denmark	30
13	European Commission and Italy	26
15	France	24
16	Germany and African Development Bank (ADB)	21
18	World Bank	20
19	Portugal	15

### 3.21. Overall evaluation by rank and by scale

If the PAPs performance in 2008 is classified into:

- Very good: 34 points or more out of 38;
- Medium high: 30 to 33 points
- Medium: 25 to 29 points
- Medium low: 20 to 24 points
- Weak: less than 20 points

...then,

- 7 PAPs are very good
- 5 are medium high



- 2 are medium
- 4 are medium low, and
- 1 is weak

The performance of the PAPs as a group is medium (25 points).

If the PAPs are classified into groups by size (amount of ODA to the GoM), there will be:

- 4 very large PAPs (more than US\$ 90 million in 2008) namely, the World Bank, EC, DFID, and Sweden.
- 7 large PAPs (more than US\$ 50 million in 2008) namely, the Netherlands, AfDB, Germany, Norway, Ireland, Denmark and Canada.
- 2 medium PAPs (more than US\$ 20 million in 2008) namely, Finland and France, and
- 6 small PAPs (less than US\$ 20 million in 2008) namely, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium and Austria.

Table 3.21, below, shows how the PAPs rank by size and performance.

Table 3.21: Size and rank related

	<i>Very Good</i>	<i>Medium High</i>	<i>Medium (Rank)</i>	<i>Medium Low</i>	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Very large</i>	DFID	Sweden	European Commission	The World Bank		4
<i>Large</i>	Netherlands, Ireland	Norway, Canada, Denmark		Germany, ADB		7
<i>Medium (size)</i>	Finland			France		2
<i>Small</i>	Belgium, Spain, Switzerland,	Austria	Italy		Portugal	6
<i>Total</i>	7	5	2	4	1	19

Comparing with 2007, the following countries or agencies improved their position by upgrading from a lower level of performance to a higher level: Germany, The World Bank and ADB, from “weak” to “medium low”; the European Commission from “medium low” to “medium”; Canada from “medium low” to “medium high”; Denmark and Sweden from “medium” to “medium high”; Finland, Spain and Ireland from “medium high” to “very good”. Norway’s position fell from “very good” to “medium high”. The

position of Portugal, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and DFID did not change. For Austria (medium high), this is the first evaluation.

The number of “weak” performers reduced from 4 to 1, the number of “very good” performers increased from 5 to 7, the number of “medium high” performers increased from 3 to 5, the number of “medium low” increased from 3 to 4, and the number of “medium” performers declined from 3 to 2. Thus, 12 of the 19 PAPs (63%) are in the top two groups and only 5 (26%) are in the bottom two groups. In 2007, 8 of 18 PAPs (44%) were in the top two groups and 7 (39%) were in the bottom two groups.

In 2008, there was also a significant change in the “size” of the PAPs (amount of ODA to the GoM) relative to 2007. Sweden upgraded from “large” to “very large”; Norway, Canada, Denmark, ADB and Germany upgraded from “medium” to “large”, and France upgraded from “small” to “medium”. There are no changes with respect to the other PAPs. As a result, the number of “very large” PAPs increased from 3 to 4, the number of “large” increased from 3 to 7 and the number of “medium” fell from 6 to 2. Hence, 11 PAPs (58%) are now “very large” or “large” (against 6, 33%, in 2007), and only 8 (44%) are “medium” or “small” (against 12, 66%, in 2007). This reflects an increase in the amount allocated to the GoM relative to 2007 (6%), as well as a 4% increase in total ODA disbursed relative to 2007. Thus, the share of ODA to the GoM in total ODA disbursed in 2008 relative to 2007 increased by 2%.

There is some relationship between the size of the donor (measured by its ODA disbursed to the GoM) and the level of performance, as 5 of the 7 large PAPs are “very good” or “medium high”; and 4 of 6 the small PAPs are “very good” or “medium high”. The others are scattered more or less evenly across degrees of performance.

Multilateral PAPs seem to starting to adjust to the framework, with the EC, the World Bank and ADB upgrading one level in relation to the previous year. So, whereas in 2007 2 out of 3 multilaterals were “weak performers”, in 2008 none is.


Could this table be useful for the GoM and the PAPs to evaluate donor mobility across categories defined by size and performance, and to develop differentiated strategies for different types of donors? Could this table be a useful source of information for revising some of the PAPs’ PAF indicators, particularly for those PAPs that are focused in financing large public investment in infra-structure that is run as projects? If a similar exercise is done for the 2005 and 2006 evaluations, it might be possible to start to identify some interesting patterns of behaviour and change.

## 4. Trends in PAPs' Performance in the Period 2004-2008

### 4.1. Performance with respect to PAPs' PAF indicators

Table 4.1 (below) shows trends in performance of the group of PAPs for indicators that are comparable over a period of at least 3 years. Of the current 20 indicators, 7 are comparable over a five year period, and other 7 are comparable over a three year period. In all indicators, the group achieved significant progress over the period.

Graph 4.1 (below) shows that over the period 2004-2008, PAPs' ODA flows to Mozambique increased from about US\$ 850 million in 2004 to about US\$ 1.36 billion in 2008. PAPs' ODA to the GoM increased in line with the general increase in total ODA (Graph 4.2). Over the whole period, Program-based ODA increased faster than total and GoM ODA, as the share of both GBS (indicator 1) and total Program-based ODA (indicator 2) increased from 31% and 63%, respectively, in 2004, to 38% and 66%, respectively, in 2008 (table 4.1 and various graphs, below).<sup>6</sup>




<sup>6</sup> Program-based ODA comprises two components: GBS and Program-based sector ODA.



Table 4.1: Mozambique: Summary of PAPs group performance over the period 2004-2008

		Indicators of Group Performance														Total Points	% of the Maximum Points Available
		Portfolio composition			Predictability				Harmonization and alignment				Capacity Strengthening				
		GBS	Program-based Aid		GBS Commitments		Disbursements		Conditionality		Utilization of GoM Systems		Missions		Technical Cooperation		
		1a	1b	2	3	4	5	6	9	10	12a	13	16a	16b	20		
		PAPs contribute 40% to GBS	% GBS	% Program-based Aid	MYA > 3 Years	Commitment in Yn for Yn+1	Disbursement in Fiscal Year and Schedule	% of ODA disbursed that is registered in the budget	Adherence to GBS conditionality	NO Annex 10 exceptions	% ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget execution procedures	% ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement	% of joint missions	Total number of missions	% Coordinated Technical Cooperation		
2004	Group Target	Y			70%		60%		87%	53%							
	Group Achievement	N	31%	63%	81%		80%		87%	50%							
	Group points	0															
	Nr of PAPs achieving																
2005	Group Target	Y	Tbm		80%		80%		90%	55%							
	Group Achievement	N	32%	51%	100%		100%		100%	47%							
	Group points	0															
	Nr of PAPs achieving																
2006	Group Target	Y	40%	70%	100%	100%	100%	80	95%	13 NO exception, 2 reducing	45%	45%	20%	GBS < 7; Non-GBS < 160	Agree guidelines and adhere to it	36	69%
	Group Achievement	N	34%	55%	72% (5 failed)	94% (1 failed)	FY=88%; Schedule=78%	67%	94% (1 failed)	12 No exceptions, 2 eliminating	44%	52%	10%	Non-GBS = 203	No agreement		



	Group points	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			0	1	0	0	0	25	
	Nr of PAPs achieving		6/18 = 33%	8/18 = 44%	13/18 = 72%	17/18 = 94%	14/18 = 78%	9/18 = 50%	17/18 = 94%		10/18 = 56%	13/18 = 72%	12/18 = 66%				
2007	Group Target	Y	40%	72%	100%	100%	100%	82	100%	14 with NO exception	45%	45%	30%	< 140	50%	36	39%
	Group Achievement	N	36%	61%	89% (2 failed)	100%	FY 100%. Schedule 94% (1 failed)	98%	94% (1 failed)	12	61%	52%	18%	191	38%		
	Group points	0	0	0	0	3	0	2		0	2	2	0	0	0	15	
	Nr of PAPs achieving		7/18 = 39%	6/18 = 33%	16/18 = 89%	18/18 = 100%	17/18 = 94%	17/18 = 94%	17/18 = 94%		15/18 = 83%	14/18 = 78%	9/18 = 50%				
2008	Group Target	Y	40%	75%	100%	100%	100%	85% (2)	100%	14 PAPs with NO exceptions	55%	55%	35%	< 120	55%	38	66%
	Group Achievement	N	38%	66%	89% (2 failed)	100%	FY=100%, Schedule=89% (2 failed)	95%	100%	14	68%	65%	24%	165	47%		
	Group points	0	2	2	0	3	0	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	25	
	Nr of PAPs achieving		8/19 = 42%	7/19 = 37%	17/19 = 89%	19/19 = 100%	17/19 = 89%	14/19 = 74%	19/19 = 100%	14	16/19 = 84%	16/19 = 84%	13/19 = 68%	9/19 = 47%			



Graphs 4.3 and 4.4, below, show that, over the period, GBS become the single most important component of ODA to the GoM, followed by Project-based and Program-based sector ODA. Interestingly, Program-based sector ODA is, of the three components of ODA to the GoM, the one which, over the whole period, recorded the slowest increase. In 2005 and 2006, several PAPs were adjusting their portfolio to the new modalities and it seems that there was a trade-off between GBS and Program-based sector ODA. Hence, whereas the share of GBS increased sharply, the share of Program-based sector ODA fell during this period. This explains the reason why the total share of Program ODA increased by only 5%, whereas the share of GBS increased by 23% over the whole period. From 2007, when almost all PAPs adopted new country strategies and there was more confidence in the public finance management system and in the new ODA modalities, the composition of the portfolio started to change: not only GBS became the single most important component of ODA to the GoM (overtaking Project-base sector ODA in 2008), but the share of Program-based sector ODA started to increase and to close the gap relative to Project-sector ODA.



Finally, graph 4.5 and 4.6, below, clearly illustrate the dynamics of change and the trade-off between GBS and Program-based sector ODA in the portfolio composition of PAPs' ODA to the GoM.





In addition to changes in portfolio composition, the PAPs also achieved considerable improvement in mid-term and short-term predictability. All PAPs have multi-year programs and in only two cases these programs are less than three years. These two PAPs have taken steps to adopt multi-year programs of three or more years from 2009.

Whereas in 2005 3 of the 17 PAPs (18%) did not even have an agreed schedule, with the GoM, for disbursement of GBS, in 2008 all had (monthly or quarterly), 13 (68%) met the monthly schedule, 4 (21%) met the quarterly schedule and only 2 (11%) missed the schedule all together.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, whereas in 2004 more than two thirds of GBS were disbursed in the last quarter of the year, in 2008 almost two thirds of GBS were disbursed in the first quarter. Although “disbursing in the first quarter” is not an indicator, functionality, certainty and flexibility improve considerably when disbursements are made earlier, given that reliability of disbursements is still less than perfect.

The figures seem to indicate a steady improvement in medium term predictability but this picture is not fully accurate. First, it should be considered that most of the PAPs’ country strategy agreements with the GoM are still not rolling, such that as they approach the end of the program predictability falls close to zero. If, in addition, one considers that because of program cycles most of the PAPs’ country strategies tend to come to an end in the same year, then it is clear that overall medium term predictability is still quite problematic. Second, the current international economic crisis reduces even further the predictability of new programs and bilateral agreements, as while the PAPs can argue that their current year (2009 and, maybe, 2010) programmatic commitments are going to be met, none can guarantee the levels of total ODA disbursements from 2010-2011 onwards.

This assessment is confirmed by the tendency of the quality and accuracy of the data released by the PAPs to fall sharply for periods beyond 2 years in the future.

Table 4.2, below, shows the PAPs’ performance with respect to key and comparable (over the period) indicators of harmonization and alignment. The performance of the group has improved in terms of the targets achieved and percentage of the individual PAPs achieving the targets.

---

<sup>7</sup> Given that the date of disbursement is defined as the date when the financial resources are reported as been paid to a certain account of the Bank of Mozambique; and that a considerable part of delays are related to inter-bank transfer and not to the PAPs, we considered that any disbursement within 15 days of the agreed schedule is considered as on schedule.

Table 4.2: Performance of key and comparable indicators related to harmonization and alignment

	2006	2008
<b>ODA to the GoM that is registered in the budget (a)</b>		
% of total ODA to the GoM	67%	95%
% of PAPs meeting the target	50%	74%
<b>ODA to GoM using budget execution procedures</b>		
% of total ODA to the GoM	44%	68%
% of PAPs meeting the target	56%	84%
<b>ODA to GoM using GoM's procurement systems</b>		
% of total ODA to the GoM	52%	65%
% of PAPs meeting the target	72%	84%
<b>PAPs adherence to common GBS conditionality</b>		
Group target "met" or "not met"	Met (b)	Met
% of PAPs meeting the target	87% (b)	100%
<b>No annex 10 exceptions</b>		
Group target "met" or "not met"	Not met (b)	Met
% of PAPs meeting the target	7 (b)	14
<b>Missions</b>		
Number of missions	203	165
% of joint missions	10%	24%
Target "met" or "not met"	Not met	Not met
% of PAPs meeting the target	66%	68%

*Notes: (a) Follows the "on budget rules and procedures" such that it can be on budget; if it is not, it is due to either an error, some delay on information by the PAPs, some decision by the GoM or some difference with respect to classification and codification of projects. (b) Refers to 2004.*

With respect to coordinated technical cooperation, whereas the 2006 target was "agree guidelines and adhere to it", and this target was not met, in 2008 there was a quantitative target (55% of technical cooperation coordinated), which was still not met but 47% of technical cooperation was coordinated. However, coordinated technical cooperation is limited to Program-based sector ODA and a few large projects that are essentially technical cooperation involving more than one PAP. Outside PBAs, there is no clear framework for coordinated technical cooperation to thrive.

#### 4.2. Evolution of the rank and size

Table 4.3 a, b, c, below, compare the size and performance ranking of the PAPs for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. The number of very good performers increased from 4 (22% of the PAPs) in 2006 to 7 (37%) in 2008, and the number of weak performers fell from 4 (22%) in 2006 to 1 (5%) in 2008. The number of PAPs in the top two categories of performers (very good and medium high)

increased from 8 (44%) in 2006 to 12 (63%) in 2008. The number of PAPs in the bottom two categories (medium low and weak) fell from 10 (56%) in 2006 to 5 (26%) in 2008.

Table 4.3: Size and performance ranking related

(a) 2006

	<i>Very Good</i>	<i>Medium High</i>	<i>Medium (Rank)</i>	<i>Medium Low</i>	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Very large</i>				African Development Bank, European Commission, World Bank		3
<i>Large</i>	DFID, Netherlands	Norway, Sweden		Denmark		5
<i>Medium (size)</i>	Ireland, Switzerland	Finland		Italy, Portugal	Canada, Germany, Spain	8
<i>Small</i>		Belgium			France	2
<i>Total</i>	4	4	0	6	4	18

(b) 2007

	<i>Very Good</i>	<i>Medium High</i>	<i>Medium (Rank)</i>	<i>Medium Low</i>	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Very large</i>	DFID			European Commission	World Bank	3
<i>Large</i>	Netherlands	Ireland	Sweden			3
<i>Medium (size)</i>	Norway	Finland	Denmark	Canada	Germany, African Development Bank	6
<i>Small</i>	Switzerland, Belgium	Spain	Italy	France	Portugal	6
<i>Total</i>	5	3	3	3	4	18

(c) 2008

	<i>Very Good</i>	<i>Medium High</i>	<i>Medium (Rank)</i>	<i>Medium Low</i>	<i>Weak</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Very large</i>	DFID	Sweden	European Commission	The World Bank		4
<i>Large</i>	Netherlands, Ireland	Norway, Canada, Denmark		Germany, African Development Bank		7
<i>Medium (size)</i>	Finland			France		2
<i>Small</i>	Belgium, Spain, Switzerland,	Austria	Italy		Portugal	6
<i>Total</i>	7	5	2	4	1	19

At individual level, as it should be expected from the aggregate results, most PAPs upgraded one or more levels in performance. The most notable cases are Spain, which improved from “weak” in 2006 to “very good” in 2008, and Canada, which upgraded from “weak” in 2006 to “medium high” in 2008. DFID, the Netherlands and Switzerland are the only three PAPs that have been “very good” performers for the whole period. Denmark has steadily improved one level at a time, from “medium low” in 2006 to “medium high” in 2008.

Portugal's rank has fallen from "medium low" to "weak", and this PAP has been the worst in the rank for the last two years (2007 and 2008). The case of Portugal is worth mentioning, also, for another reason that explains a significant part of its performance. Portugal's portfolio is mostly dominated by individual projects, such that it consistently fails to meet any of the indicators related to portfolio composition and utilisation of GoM systems. However, in 2006 Portugal's project portfolio performed badly due to absorption and execution problems. Hence, Portugal's portfolio composition in that particular year was much more in line with the PAF's targets – as its project disbursements fell dramatically, its share of GBS and Program ODA increased sharply. In the last two years, having improved considerably in project execution, Portugal's portfolio and overall performance relative to a matrix of indicators focused on programmatic ODA worsened considerably.

Norway has been on the margin between "very good" and "medium high", despite very considerable efforts to align and harmonise. The fall in their rank from "very good" in 2007 to "medium high" is the "cost of electrification". A considerable share of Norway ODA is financing the electrification program, which is run as a project. No one can question the vital importance of this program for Mozambique's development and yet Norway is penalised because of financing it.

Thus, these two cases call attention to the need to expand the evaluation of portfolio performance beyond programme ODA, to include the remaining 35% of ODA to GoM, the projects. The recommendation of this report to classify projects on and off system (see section 5.1, indicators 1 and 2, in the next chapter) may become a useful instrument to evaluate projects and to provide an incentive and a tool for improvement in the quality of the overall package of ODA to the GoM. Moreover, the PAPs that are focused on infra-structure development "on system" should no longer be penalised in their individual evaluations.

Another interesting issue is that some PAPs, such as Ireland and France, have met all the targets related to utilisation of GoM system despite the fact that they do not perform well with respect to the share of GBS in their total ODA package to the GoM. This is a strong reminder that any PAP, or any other donor, willing can maximise utilisation of GoM systems of public finance management. Although the composition of portfolio and utilisation of GoM systems are linked, a donor does not necessarily have to provide GBS to align and harmonise with GoM PFM cycles and systems.

With respect to size, there are also some interesting changes. On the whole, the average size of the PAPs, measured by their ODA to the GoM, increased: whereas in 2006 only 8 PAPs (44%) were “large” and “very large”, as many as 11 (58%) were “large” and “very large”. This is because the nominal value of ODA to the GoM also increased significantly. On the other hand, the nominal contribution of some PAPs also changed. For example, while the share of Program-based ODA from Spain increased, the nominal contribution of Spain to the GoM declined because Project-based ODA fell considerably. Hence, over a three year period, the performance of Spain upgraded, remarkably, from “weak” to “very good”, while the size of its overall contribution to the GoM fell. Thus, once again attention is called to the need of expanding the evaluation to the overall ODA package performance, including projects.

This type of evaluation of PAPs, by performance, size and specialization, may be a useful starting point to help the GoM and the PAPs to develop more appropriate and more specific ODA strategies.

#### *4.3. Other general issues arising from multi-year analysis*

There are a couple of issues worth mentioning related to the performance of the PAPs, besides the quantitative results associated to indicators. First, the mutual accountability exercise has been consolidated. Although the PAPs and the GoM have pointed to weaknesses of the system (not covering the entire ODA spectrum disbursed to the GoM, being based, on the PAPs side, entirely on peer pressure, and being highly underutilised), no one questions the importance and significance of submitting the PAPs and the GoM to mutual accountability. Second, although there are differences between PAPs with respect to approaches to and possibilities of changing in the context of alignment and harmonization, most PAPs have at least committed to try to improve their performances in line with the Paris and the PAF’s indicators. Of course, some are more committed or can change quicker than others. It might be argued that the fact that the number and variety of PAPs has increased over the period is proof of this commitment to improve aid effectiveness, although some may argue that the quality of the partnership may have deteriorated (and may deteriorate further in the future) as the numbers and variety of PAPs increase.

Third, despite all that achieved over the years, the alignment and harmonization process is still too costly with significant quantities of time and resources spent on coordination alone, is still driven mostly by the PAPs, and is still more influenced than it ought to be by personalities on the field (what may help

to overcome obstacles or may help to make progress more slowly and uncertain). Moreover, this process is still too focused on processes, with very little attention paid to evaluation of substance, results and socio-economic impact of the processes.

Finally, it should be clearly noted that the PAPs performance is one component of a partnership with the GoM. Hence, good and bad performance of the PAPs cannot be seen independently of the quality of the partnership, of the dialogue and of the performance of the GoM.

## 5. Final Comments and Conclusions

### 5.1. *Comments on indicators that need to be adjusted for the future*

The comments on this section are aimed at improving fairness and credibility in the evaluation, as well as providing a further incentive for aid effectiveness and efficiency. It should be mentioned, however, that these comments should not be used as a means to downgrade the relevance of the results of the current evaluation, or to justify any practices and intentions that are against the letter and spirit of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Experience always shows that real life is not “black” or “white”, and that fine tuning the “grey” is necessary for the achievement of the main goals. However, one should not use this argument to say that “any colour” is possible and that there are no differences between them. Openness to the need for fine tuning allows us to improve our goals and the process to achieve them. This is not the same as abandoning the goals and violating the principles for the sake of bureaucratic or any other vested interests of individual agencies.

Having clarified these points, we now look at a few indicators that need to be re-written, qualified or adjusted in the future:

- ***Indicators 1 and 2 (Portfolio composition)***: there are donors whose portfolio is dominated by projects rather than more programmatic modalities. In some of these cases, donors are in projects at the request of the GoM – for example, the “Caixa Escolar” project in education – or because they are involved in large scale public investments in infra-structure, which are run as projects by choice of the GoM and because of the nature of the project. Yet, the PAF matrix has no mechanisms to differentiate between donor driven project aid that is not programmatic because of donor individual interests, and project aid that is recipient government led (run as projects by decision of the GoM). Thus, all PAPs with large project aid based portfolios are penalized in the same way, which is less than fair. This problem should be corrected for future evaluations.

Perhaps, the best way to rectifying this situation is by a collective decision taken by the GoM and PAPs regarding the re-classification of such projects in two categories: “*On-system GoM Projects*” and “*Off-system Donor Projects*”.<sup>8</sup> For example, if a particular PAP is asked, by the

---

<sup>8</sup> We would like to thank Anton Johnston for suggesting the names for the two categories.

GoM, to be concentrated in large scale infra-structure projects that form part of the government expenditure priorities; if such projects are run as projects for efficiency and effectiveness agreed with or decided by the GoM, rather than because of individual interests pursued by donor agencies; if the projects strictly follow national public finance management procedures (on budget, on budget execution report, on CUT, aligned with GoM rules regarding auditing, financial reports, procurement) rather than individual donors' procedures; and if there is no additional conditionality of any sort attached to the projects, then such projects could be reclassified as *"On-system GoM Projects"* (a special form of programmatic aid).

- **Definition of PBAs:** In the last few evaluations of the PAPs performance, the issue of definitions has always been difficult and dealt with at an inappropriate time (when the evaluation starts, rather than when the PAP's PAF matrix is approved). Generally speaking, definitions should be clearly agreed, in detail, when the PAPs' PAF matrix is approved during the midterm review. The most important issue is that the GoM and the PAPs are clear, from the beginning, about what they have agreed with and committed to and what they need to do during the year, rather than only about what they need to answer during the evaluation when a questionnaire and an interview come about.

One particular problem with definitions is that of the programme based sector aid (PBAs/sectors). During the 2008 evaluation, quite a few PAPs came up with new PBAs to be counted in their programme based aid (the same problem happened in the 2007 evaluation). This practice should be stopped. Instead, when the PAPs' PAF matrix is agreed, donor portfolios should be checked for new PBAs (in addition to the already formally existent and approved). This assessment should be made by the joint reference group (GoM and PAPs) and a collective decision should be taken on the basis of the detailed criteria adopted for every other single PBA. Thus, all PAPs should know, from the start of the year, what PBAs are in practice. If a new PBA is started after this assessment is made, then the new one should be submitted immediately to the reference group. Therefore, when the PAPs' evaluation starts, the evaluation team is informed of the detailed situation of all PBAs and how they perform with respect to each one of the individual criteria and no PAP should try to come up with new PBAs of any sort during the PAPs' evaluation. If a project is not on the map produced for the midterm review (and reviewed during the year as deemed necessary), then it is not an approved PBA and should not be considered as such.



This is not a bureaucratic issue, but a practical one. First, the fundamental issue at stake is not how many points a PAP can squeeze out of the system and add to its rating but how programmatic and effective aid is in Mozambique. Hence, being clear about the commitments and practices of each PAP with respect to programmatic aid is important for aid effectiveness and efficiency before it becomes a question in a questionnaire that is translated into points in a rating system.

Second, given the pressure under which the evaluation of the PAPs is done, the chances that a particular PAP may cheat the system and get away with it by coming up with new PBAs at the last minute is high. This should be avoided at any costs. We are not saying or suggesting that any PAP has cheated, but we are only emphasizing the point that minimizing the opportunities to cheat increases the credibility of the study.

Third, there is a joint system in place to assess what is and what is not a PBA. This system may not be perfect but exists and works. So, PAPs should use it, and contribute to it, rather than seeking an agreement with the evaluation team.

Fourth, the GoM, the PAPs and the whole system of aid harmonization and alignment would benefit strongly from developing the capacity and routine to regularly review the aid portfolio composition and its implications for effectiveness, efficiency, the public finance management systems, etc. Obviously, this can only be achieved if the GoM takes ownership of the idea and leads the way.

Thus, this is a point of substance and not one only related to bureaucratic rules.

- **Indicator 6** (*% of on budget ODA*): this indicator, a measure of predictability, needs clarification by defining whether it refers to ODA that can be on budget (this is, ODA that follows all the GoM established rules for being recorded in the budget) or ODA that is actually recorded in the budget (which, given the limitations of the current system, can only be accurately reported either by the Ministry of Finance or on the budget execution reports, which measure “usage” rather than “disbursements”);
- **Indicator 7** (*% of on budget ODA that was disbursed*): re-phrase the indicator in order to make it clearer as a measure of reliability.

- **Indicator 11** (*strict harmonization between bilateral agreements and the MoU*): the problem with this indicator (no information available to evaluate it) had already been raised in the 2007 evaluation report. There is no need to keep in the PAF matrix an indicator that cannot be evaluated because the required information is never available. Hence, either this indicator is dropped from future evaluations, or the PAPs and the GoM create the necessary conditions for it to be evaluated by assessing the bilateral agreements for strict harmonization with the MoU.

From 2009, a new MoU has been adopted and for many PAPs new strategies will be developed, which may affect the terms of their bilateral agreements for GBS. Hence, it is advisable that the PAPs and the GoM create a special group to evaluate the entire spectrum of strategies and bilateral agreements related to GBS. This could also become an opportunity to evaluate the MoUs for sector PBAs and common funds and the respective agreements for consistency with the GBS MoU.

- **Indicator 15** (*% of ODA that pays taxes*): data collected for 2008 shows no significant differences relative to the base line report on ODA related taxes. Additionally, no PAP has indicated that their status quo relative to paying taxes would be changed (although many have informally relaxed the requirement to apply for tax draw backs due to the huge bureaucratic burden involved). If the issue of ODA related taxes is so important for the GoM and the PAPs, it would be advisable to introduce a new tax indicator (in addition to the current indicator 15 of the PAF matrix), which would be 15b and would evaluate the PAPs willingness to remove barriers to paying taxes across their overall ODA portfolio.
- **Indicator 16a for individual PAPs** (*joint missions*): the PAPs need to review what joint missions are (OECD/DAC definitions) and whether the definition is cumulative (for example, jointly financed plus joint ToRs, plus jointly executed or, instead, only one of the above mentioned characteristics), such that all have the same definition of mission and of joint mission. The PAPs also need to record the missions (according to OECD/DAC definition of a mission) throughout the year, such that they have reliable data for the evaluation. Otherwise, this indicator becomes meaningless because the data on which it is assessed is unreliable.

In order to tackle the issue of fairness and to provide an incentive to reduce the number of missions at the same time that the share of joint missions increases, it is advisable that this indicator is re-written in two stages (two sub-indicators) as something like "(16a) maximum

number of individual missions to be...(target for the year, differentiated between multilaterals and bilateral); and (16b) share of joint missions to be... (target for the year, equal for all PAPs)."

We would also like to call attention to the fact that in 2009 most of PAPs will be designing their new country strategies. This tends to increase the number of missions (evaluations, appraisals, programming, negotiating with the GoM, etc.). While the goal of reducing the number of missions (as defined by the OECD/DAC) should be maintained and pursued, the PAPs and the GoM should be careful about not defining unrealistic targets for the number of missions in 2009.

- **Indicator 17 (joint analytical work):** if the initiative to undertake analytical works comes only or mostly from the PAPs, it is not realistic to believe that most of the analytical work can be done jointly, because agencies have different areas of expertise, interests and focuses and different capacities to perform studies. Thus, while it is desirable that different agencies do not undertake the same study separately, it is to be expected that most studies are not necessarily going to be jointly undertaken.

Of course, this indicator is aimed at providing incentives for harmonization and alignment of analytical work, which is a valid aim in itself. However, it might be possible that such an aim is better achieved through more direct approaches.

For example, the GoM and the PAPs may draw a medium term plan of analytical work to be carried out in order to improve different areas of economic and financial governance, and sector policy and planning, according to the priorities of the GoM's medium term development framework. These studies could be thought as a means to providing information and the knowledge basis for policy and strategy development, analysis and monitoring and evaluation. DNEAP, in the Ministry of Planning and Development, could become the focal point to develop and coordinate this agenda of articulated analytical work for policy purposes. A common or pooled fund of some sort could even be created to finance such a common programme of analytical work, which would also help to untie the finance of the studies from the procurement of capacity to perform the studies. Of course, standards and other quality control mechanisms should be put in place.

If such a plan is ever drawn and implemented, then a framework would exist to prevent the PAPs that have a tendency and vested interest in performing their studies on their own from continuing to do so and, at the same time, to avoid free riding.

## 5.2. *Major areas of concern for 2009*

In addition to the need to address the problems with the indicators mentioned above, the following issues were identified by the GoM and the PAPs as major concerns to be addressed in 2009:

- Expansion of the system of the rules of programmatic aid and of the harmonization, alignment and evaluation to all aid. The first step in this process is to improve, significantly, short and medium run predictability, reliability and functionality with respect to sector PBAs and common funds and projects undertaken by the PAPs and continue to increase the share of ODA on budget and using all national systems of public finance management (budget execution, auditing, financial reporting and procurement).

However, this effort should not imply the relaxation of the PFM and budget rules, but should rather involve the upgrading of the quality of the projects and project data.

- Improving the general predictability, reliability and functionality of aid flows, in the short and medium run.

At the moment, midterm predictability is a serious issue. As donors' strategies come to an end, predictability on the margin approaches zero because these strategies are not rolling. On the other hand, the financial crisis is increasing uncertainty about the future beyond 2010. If this affects GBS and PBAs, it affects the projects even more. Hence, a good midterm MTFF, closely linked with the budget, is impossible, particularly when the domestic resource component of the budget is complementary to external resources, rather than the driving factor.

- Improvement in coordination of TC across programme based ODA and projects.
- Rationalization of the structure of the working groups.
- The development and adoption of a solid aid policy and strategy, with practical substance with respect to aid architecture, management, priorities in resource allocation, division of labour between donors and between GoM departments, focus around which to harmonize and align and with reference to which evaluation of progress can be made, and the system of evaluation of results. Aid policy cannot simply be a general document on general diplomacy.

- Development the ODAMoz data base a practical tool for the GoM and the PAPs to improve macroeconomic policy analysis as well as the assessment of aid effectiveness, trends and dynamics.
- Improve significantly the issue of division of labour between donors and between GoM departments. In particular, it is possible to take advantage of the fact that most PAPs are designing new strategies to take significant steps forward in this issue.
- Challenging and changing rigid rules that form part of some of the donors way of doing things (some PAPs and non-PAPs), as they prevent progress and substantially contribute to increasing costs of harmonization and alignment;
- Production of a coherent and leading midterm fiscal and expenditure framework, that is not only responding defensively to donor declared commitments. The MTFF needs to take the lead indicating what the GoM intends to do, why and how, and where the resources will come from. The MTFF should be a key tool to negotiate and decide where resources should go to, the priorities, the policy options and how they may affect revenue and expenditure, the cost of policies and options. The MTFF should not be made dependent only on the information that donors provide; rather, it should guide what donors should do and how to relate to them. In this connection, maybe the MTFF should become more part of the midterm planning process rather than so closely linked with direct budgeting.
- Initiating the development of a medium term plan of analytical work to be carried out in order to improve different areas of economic and financial governance, and sector policy and planning, according to the priorities of the GoM's medium term development framework.

In 2009, many PAPs are going to design new strategies. This is a great opportunity to address many of the issues raised above, if the GoM and the PAPs organize themselves to influence the process, substance and direction of such strategies from the early stages. Of course, a solid and useful aid policy and strategy would be a crucial instrument to provide clear guidelines and directions for new PAPs strategies.

During or immediately after the JR a matrix for actions on both sides (GoM and PAPs) to improve performance should be drawn on the basis of the evaluation reports. This requires that the main findings and recommendations of the reports are deeply discussed and a plan of action related to them is jointly produced and approved. Ad hoc joint working groups could be organized to address such issues over the year, and the meetings of the joint steering committee should review progress with respect to these issues.

# **ANNEXES**

# **ANNEX 1**

## **OVERALL SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE IN 2008**



Table summary of group and individual results per indicator and total

	Indicators of Group Performance																				Total Points	% of the Maximum Points Available
	Portfolio composition			Predictability						Harmonization and alignment						Capacity Strengthening						
	GBS		Program-based Aid	GBS Commitments		Disbursements				Conditionality		Utilization of GoM Systems				Missions		PIUs	Technical Cooperation			
	1a	1b	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12a	12b	12c	13	16a	16b	19	20	21		
	Individual PAPs contribute with 40% to GBS	% GBS	% Program-based Aid	MYA > 3 Years	Commitment in Yn for Yn+1	Disbursement in Fiscal Year and Schedule	% of ODA disbursed that is registered in the budget	% of ODA committed that is disbursed	Commitments to MTFF	Adherence to GBS conditionality	NO Annex 10 exceptions	% ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget	% ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems	% ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedure	% ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement	% of joint missions	Total number of missions	Project Implementation Units	% Coordinated Technical Cooperation	% of Sector-wide TC		
Group Traget	Yes	40%	75%	100%	100%	100%	85% (2)	85% (2)	100%	100%	14 PAPs with NO exceptions	55%	42%	55%	55%	35%	< 120	22	55%	16%		
Group Achivement	No	38%	66%	89% Two PAPs failed	100%	68% 6 PAPs failed	95%	98%	100%	100%	14	68%	39%	63%	65%	24%	165	14	47%	22%	38	
Group points	0	2	2	0	3	0	2	2	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	0	0	2	0	1	25	66%

	Indicators of Individual Performance																														Total Points	% of the Maximum Points Available						
	Portfolio composition				Predictability												Harmonization and alignment												Capacity Strengthening									
	GBS		Program-based Aid		GBS Commitments				Disbursements								Conditionality				Utilization of GoM Systems								Missions				PIUs		Technical Cooperation			
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		12a		12b		12c		13		16a				18		19		20	
	% GBS		% Program-based Aid		MYA > 3 Years		Commitment in Yn for Yn+1		Disbursement in Fiscal Year and Schedule		% of ODA disbursed that is registered in the budget		% of ODA committed that is disbursed		Commitments to MTFF		Adherence to GBS conditionality		NO Annex 10 exceptions		% ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget		% ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems		% ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedures		% ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement		% of joint missions				Project Implementation Units		% Coordinated Technical Cooperation		% of Sector-wide TC	
Individual Target (points)	Yes if >20% (1) >30% (2) >40% (3)		>66% (2) >75% (4)		Yes (3)		Yes (3)		Yes (1) for quarterly (3) for monthly		85% (2)		85% (2)		Yes (2)		Yes (2)		Yes (1)		55% (2)		42% (1)		55% (2)		55% (2)		35% (1)		Zero or number reduced (2)		55% (2)		16% (1)		38	
	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points	achieved (%)	points				
African Development Bank	43	3	43	0	YES	3	YES	3	Quarterly	1	228	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	NO	0	43	0	43	1	43	0	43	0	25	0	Y	2	24	0	0	0	21	55%
Austria	44	3	72	2	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	72	0	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	72	2	44	1	72	2	72	2	67	1	Y	2	40	0	4	0	31	82%
Belgium	61	3	82	4	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	100	2	80	0	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	82	2	61	1	82	2	82	2	0	1	0	2	80	2	80	1	36	95%
Canada	14	0	49	0	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	86	2	113	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	89	2	14	0	84	2	84	2	41	1	0	2	80	2	80	1	30	79%
Denmark	19	0	55	0	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	151	2	112	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	72	2	24	0	90	2	106	2	83	1	Y	2	87	2	37	1	30	79%
DFID	67	3	100	4	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	100	2	102	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	100	2	67	1	99	2	99	2	86	1	0	2	88	2	74	1	38	100%
European Comission	48	3	69	2	YES	3	YES	3	Quarterly	1	69	0	92	2	YES	2	YES	2	NO	0	69	2	48	1	69	2	69	2	22	0	0	2	20	0	20	1	28	74%
Finland	31	2	93	4	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	98	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	93	2	31	0	93	2	93	2	10	0	0	2	66	2	66	1	35	92%
France	14	0	34	0	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	109	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	NO	0	84	2	40	0	51	0	90	2	36	1	0	2	29	0	10	0	24	63%
Germany	29	1	62	0	NO	0	YES	3	NO	0	100	2	74	0	YES	2	YES	2	NO	0	62	2	29	0	60	2	60	2	64	1	0	2	77	2	6	0	21	55%
Ireland	24	1	88	4	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	88	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	88	2	24	0	85	2	85	2	75	1	0	2	100	2	100	1	35	92%
Italy	34	2	34	0	YES	3	YES	3	Quarterly	1	153	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	100	2	34	0	100	2	100	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	26	68%
Netherlands	32	2	77	4	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	100	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	77	2	32	0	67	2	77	2	71	1	0	2	63	2	63	1	36	95%
Norway	45	3	70	2	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	76	0	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	70	2	51	1	66	2	70	2	20	0	0	2	41	0	41	1	31	82%
Portugal	12	0	14	0	YES	3	YES	3	NO	0	14	0	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	14	0	12	0	14	0	14	0	13	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	15	39%
Spain	41	3	82	4	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	95	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	82	2	41	0	82	2	82	2	100	1	No	0	55	2	55	1	35	92%
Sweden	52	3	73	2	NO	0	YES	3	Monthly	3	91	2	109	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	73	2	54	1	66	2	66	2	56	1	0	2	49	0	49	1	31	82%
Switzerland	53	3	80	4	YES	3	YES	3	Quarterly	1	92	2	100	2	YES	2	YES	2	YES	1	80	2	53	1	80	2	80	2	25	1	0	2	93	2	27	1	36	95%
World Bank	32	2	49	0	YES	3	YES	3	Monthly	3	66	0	96	2	YES	2	YES	2	NO	0	42	0	28	0	28	0	28	0	43	1	0	2	34	0	6	0	20	53%

Maximum points per indicator	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	38	100%
Average points per donor	1.9	1.9	2.7	3.0	2.3	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.0	0.7	1.7	0.4	1.6	1.7	0.7	2.0	1.1	0.7	559.0	77%
No. of Donors that achived indicator	15	11	17	19	17	14	17	19	19	14	16	8	15	16	13	18	9	12	269.0	79%

75% Considerando as metas mais altas

## **ANNEX 2**

### **OVERALL SUMMARY OF PAPs' ODA DISBURSEMENTS TO MOZAMBIQUE**

**Table 1: Total ODA to Mozambique (GoM and non-GoM ODA) (in US\$)**

	2008	
	Committed	Disbursed
<b>Program ODA (1)</b>	<b>796,559,751</b>	<b>781,793,098</b>
General Budget Support	456,375,968	458,185,992
Program-based sector	340,183,783	323,607,106
<b>Project ODA (2)</b>		405,727,876
<b>Support to Provincial Budget (3)</b>		7,754,959
<b>Total ODA to the GoM (4)=(1)+(3)</b>	<b>796,559,751</b>	<b>1,195,275,933</b>
<b>Non-GoM ODA</b>		
Private Sector Support (5)		30,305,288
NGOs (6)		112,495,796
Others (7)		25,363,462
<b>Total Non-GoM ODA (8) = (5)+(6)+(7)</b>		<b>168,164,545</b>
<b>Total ODA to Mozambique (9) = (4)+(8)</b>	<b>796,559,751</b>	<b>1,363,440,478</b>

## **ANNEX 3**

### **PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION**

# 1. Structure of the Global Aid Portfolio 2008 (in US\$)

Donor Agencies	ODA to GoM (Table 1A)						Non-GoM ODA (table 1B)				Total ODA to Mozambique (11) = 6+10
	Program ODA			Project ODA (4)	Support to Provincial Government (5)	Total ODA to GoM (6) = 3+4+5	Private sector Support (7)	NGOs (8)	Others (9)	Total Non-GoM Aid (10) = 7+8+9	
	GBS (1)	Program-based sector (2)	Total Program ODA (3) = 1+2								
AfDB	31,716,000.0	0.0	31,716,000.0	41,311,318.7	0.0	73,027,318.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	73,027,318.7
Austria	2,352,941.2	1,470,588.2	3,823,529.4	1,504,350.4	0.0	5,327,879.8	0.0	2,407,959.1	0.0	2,407,959.1	7,735,838.9
Belgium	4,411,765.0	1,470,588.0	5,882,353.0	1,326,674.0	0.0	7,209,027.0	0	4,958,703	658,434	5,617,137.0	12,826,164.0
Canada	7,009,346.0	17,757,009.0	24,766,355.0	26,004,562.0	0.0	50,770,917.0	0.0	6,162,599.0	270,539.0	6,433,138.0	57,204,055.0
Denmark	9,823,183.0	19,318,147.0	29,141,330.0	23,700,187.0	0.0	52,841,517.0	4,764,936.0	7,350,000.0	10,308,405.0	22,423,341.0	75,264,858.0
DFID	75,925,926.0	36,944,444.4	112,870,370.4	0.0	0.0	112,870,370.4	0.0	4,464,206.0	596,975.0	5,061,181.0	117,931,551.4
European Comission	68,933,823.0	30,392,404.0	99,326,227.0	45,398,321.0	0.0	144,724,548.0	0.0	18,028,210.0	0.0	18,028,210.0	162,752,758.0
Finland	10,294,118.0	20,588,235.0	30,882,353.0	2,454,628.0	0.0	33,336,981.0	0.0	3,743,178.0	0.0	3,743,178.0	37,080,159.0
France	2,941,200.0	4,411,800.0	7,353,000.0	14,050,680.0	0.0	21,403,680.0	36,765.0	1,066,762.0	0.0	1,103,527.0	22,507,207.0
Germany	18,382,353.0	21,311,278.0	39,693,631.0	24,541,767.0	0.0	64,235,398.0	0.0	4,200,000.0	0.0	4,200,000.0	68,435,398.0
Ireland	14,705,882.4	39,147,058.8	53,852,941.2	1,113,695.6	6,174,076.5	61,140,713.2	868,988.2	3,522,554.4	466,938.2	4,858,480.9	65,999,194.1
Italy	5,588,235.0	0.0	5,588,235.0	11,028,920.6	0.0	16,617,155.6	8,218,332	4,971,266.1	8,218,331.8	21,407,929.8	38,025,085.3
Netherlands	26,470,588.2	37,760,453.5	64,231,041.7	19,322,137.9	0.0	83,553,179.6	3,014,618.9	6,616,928.0	833,708.5	10,465,255.4	94,018,435.0
Norway	28,368,794.0	15,576,453.0	43,945,247.0	19,129,703.0	0.0	63,074,950.0	3,892,251.0	11,236,400.0	0.0	15,128,651.0	78,203,601.0
Portugal	1,500,000.0	250,000.0	1,750,000.0	10,851,935.0	0.0	12,601,935.0	0.0	715,050.0	0.0	715,050.0	13,316,985.0
Spain	7,352,941.2	7,352,941.2	14,705,882.4	1,632,352.9	1,580,882.4	17,919,117.6	0.0	19,251,434.1	0.0	19,251,434.1	37,170,551.8
Sweden	53,191,489.0	21,592,065.0	74,783,554.0	28,148,166.0	0.0	102,931,720.0	1,346,434.0	7,772,327.0	478,723.0	9,597,484.0	112,529,204.0
Switzerland	7,407,407.0	3,703,704.0	11,111,111.0	2,793,183.0	0.0	13,904,294.0	862,963.0	5,994,219.0	3,477,407.0	10,334,589.0	24,238,883.0
World Bank	81,810,000.0	44,559,937.0	126,369,937.0	131,415,294.0	0.0	257,785,231.0	7,300,000.0	34,000.0	54,000.0	7,388,000.0	265,173,231.0
TOTAL	458,185,991.9	323,607,106.1	781,793,098.1	405,727,876.1	7,754,958.8	1,195,275,933.0	30,305,287.9	112,495,795.8	25,363,461.5	168,164,545.2	1,363,440,478.3

# 2. Share of different ODA modalities in "Total ODA to the GoM" (in %)

Donor Agencies	Program ODA				
	GBS (1)	Program-based sector (2)	Total Program ODA (3)	Project ODA to the GoM (4)	Provincial Budget Support (5)
AfDB	43.4	0.0	43.4	56.6	0.0
Austria	44.2	27.6	71.8	28.2	0.0
Belgium	61.2	20.4	81.6	18.4	0.0
Canada	13.8	35.0	48.8	51.2	0.0
Denmark	18.6	36.6	55.1	44.9	0.0
DFID	67.3	32.7	100.0	0.0	0.0
European Comission	47.6	21.0	68.6	31.4	0.0
Finland	30.9	61.8	92.6	7.4	0.0
France	13.7	20.6	34.4	65.6	0.0
Germany	28.6	33.2	61.8	38.2	0.0
Ireland	24.1	64.0	88.1	1.8	10.1
Italy	33.6	0.0	33.6	66.4	0.0
Netherlands	31.7	45.2	76.9	23.1	0.0
Norway	45.0	24.7	69.7	30.3	0.0
Portugal	11.9	2.0	13.9	86.1	0.0
Spain	41.0	41.0	82.1	9.1	8.8
Sweden	51.7	21.0	72.7	27.3	0.0
Switzerland	53.3	26.6	79.9	20.1	0.0
World Bank	31.7	17.3	49.0	51.0	0.0
TOTAL	38.3%	27.1%	65.5%	33.9%	0.6%

### 3. Share of different ODA modalities in "Total ODA to Mozambique" (in %)

Donor Agencies	GBS	(1)	Program-based sector (2)	Total Program ODA (4) = 1+2+3	Project ODA to the GoM	Support to Provincial Budget (5)	Total ODA to the GoM	Total non-Government ODA (4) = 1+2+4
AfDB		43.4	0.0	43.4	56.6	0.0	100.0	0.0
Austria		30.4	19.0	49.4	19.4	0.0	68.9	31.1
Belgium		34.4	11.5	45.9	10.3	0.0	56.2	43.8
Canada		12.3	31.0	43.3	45.5	0.0	88.8	11.2
Denmark		13.1	25.7	38.7	31.5	0.0	70.2	29.8
DFID		64.4	31.3	95.7	0.0	0.0	95.7	4.3
European Comission		42.4	18.7	61.0	27.9	0.0	88.9	11.1
Finland		27.8	55.5	83.3	6.6	0.0	89.9	10.1
France		13.1	19.6	32.7	62.4	0.0	95.1	4.9
Germany		26.9	31.1	58.0	35.9	0.0	93.9	6.1
Ireland		22.3	59.3	81.6	1.7	9.4	92.6	7.4
Italy		14.7	0.0	14.7	29.0	0.0	43.7	56.3
Netherlands		28.2	40.2	68.3	20.6	0.0	88.9	11.1
Norway		36.3	19.9	56.2	24.5	0.0	80.7	19.3
Portugal		11.3	1.9	13.1	81.5	0.0	94.6	5.4
Spain		19.8	19.8	39.6	4.4	4.3	48.2	51.8
Sweden		47.3	19.2	66.5	25.0	0.0	91.5	8.5
Switzerland		30.6	15.3	45.8	11.5	0.0	57.4	42.6
World Bank		30.9	16.8	47.7	49.6	0.0	97.2	2.8
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>33.6</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>57.3</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>87.7</b>	<b>12.3</b>

### 4. Structural composition of "Program ODA" in Mozambique (in %)

Donor Agencies	GBS	(1)	Program-based sector (2)	Total = 1+2 (3)
AfDB		100.0	0.0	100.0
Austria		61.5	38.5	100.0
Belgium		75.0	25.0	100.0
Canada		28.3	71.7	100.0
Denmark		33.7	66.3	100.0
DFID		67.3	32.7	100.0
European Comission		69.4	30.6	100.0
Finland		33.3	66.7	100.0
France		40.0	60.0	100.0
Germany		46.3	53.7	100.0
Ireland		27.3	72.7	100.0
Italy		100.0	0.0	100.0
Netherlands		41.2	58.8	100.0
Norway		64.6	35.4	100.0
Portugal		85.7	14.3	100.0
Spain		50.0	50.0	100.0
Sweden		71.1	28.9	100.0
Switzerland		66.7	33.3	100.0
World Bank		64.7	35.3	100.0
<b>Total</b>		<b>58.6</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>

1. FUNDS DISBURSED IN PROGRAMME BASED AID PER AGENCY AND PER SECTOR IN USD

	Public finance Manangement	Public Sector reform	National Statistic	Agriculture	Health	Education	Tax	Tribunal administrativo	HIV/SIDA	Support to Niassa	Water and sanitation	Roads	Acção Social	Sector Aid II										Total	
	UTRAFE	UTRESP	INE	PROAGRI	PROSAUDE II	FASE	ATA	TAA	CNCS	Provincial Budget support	ASAS	PRISE	INAS	Aids	Eduaction	Environment	Fisheries	Health	Limpopo	Roads	Statistics	Maputo Water	PPFD		FSTAP
AfDB																								0.0	
Austria				1,470,588.2																				1,470,588.2	
Belgium	1,470,588.0																							1,470,588.0	
Canada				4,672,897.0	5,607,477.0	4,672,897.0			2,803,738.0															17,757,009.0	
Denmark	2,393,569.0	2,220,963.0	1,571,709.0	3,264,398.0	4,441,575.0	4,715,128.0			710,805.0					467,835.0	3,991,413.0	2,984,154.0		1,469,193.0		3,098,065.0	533,896.0			19,318,147.0	
DFID	3,240,740.7	925,925.9			12,407,407.4	8,333,333.3			925,925.9			8,333,333.3	2,777,777.8											36,944,444.4	
European Comission				23,120,588.0	7,271,816.0																			30,392,404.0	
Finland				5,882,353.0	7,352,941.0	6,617,647.0		735,294.0																20,588,235.0	
France					4,411,800.0														1,176,480.0			1,277,480.0		4,411,800.0	
Germany						19,853,954.0			1,457,324.0													6,784,592.0	1,132,176.0	21,311,278.0	
Ireland		441,176.5		2,941,176.5	24,264,705.9	9,558,823.5			1,941,176.5															39,147,058.8	
Italy																								0.0	
Netherlands					4,819,277.0	22,058,823.5		882,352.9			8,088,235.3		1,911,764.7											37,760,453.5	
Norway	1,768,651.0		2,304,965.0		7,659,574.0												3,843,262.0							15,576,452.0	
Portugal						250,000.0																		250,000.0	
Spain					4,411,764.7	2,941,176.5																		7,352,941.2	
Sweden	1,519,757.0	1,142,107.0		6,838,906.0				1,748,542.0	911,854.0	2,472,121.0		6,958,778.0												21,592,065.0	
Switzerland					3,703,704.0																			3,703,704.0	
World Bank						28,000,000.0			6,160,000.0			10,399,937.0												44,559,937.0	
Total	10,393,305.7	4,730,172.4	3,876,674.0	48,190,906.7	86,352,042.0	107,001,782.9	0.0	3,366,188.9	14,910,823.4	2,472,121.0	8,088,235.3	25,692,048.3	4,689,542.5	467,835.0	3,991,413.0	2,984,154.0	3,843,262.0	1,469,193.0	1,176,480.0	3,098,065.0	533,896.0	1,277,480.0	6,784,592.0	1,132,176.0	323,607,105.1

2. FUNDS DISBURSED IN PROJECT BASED AID PER PAP IN USD

	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Birth Registration</i>	<i>Cultural Heritage</i>	<i>Demining</i>	<i>Decentralization</i>	<i>Disaster Risk Manangement</i>	Economic development	<i>Education</i>	Emergency	<i>Energy</i>	<i>Enviroment</i>	<i>Financial Sector</i>	<i>Governance</i>	<i>Government and Civil Society</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>HIV/SIDA</i>	Infrastruture	<i>Justice</i>	<i>Limpopo Project</i>	<i>Mining</i>	<i>Microfinance</i>
AfDB	10,188,765.0							5,196,666.6	500,000.0	1,742,794.2		1,243,267.2			1,707,906.6					505,870.2	
Austria																					
Belgium				735,294.0											191,176.0						
Canada	3,123,983.0							20,439,250.0					642,364.0		679,034.0	458,307.0					
Denmark	1,024,025.0							3,991,413.0		6,581,454.0	4,691,657.0				1,469,193.0	468,948.0		1,217,578.0			
DFID																					
European Comission																					
Finland								268,825.0			17,279.0				14,341.0						
France								2,091,522.0			1,597,866.0		639,493.0		5,630,650.0				1,176,480.0		1,114,444.0
Germany					7,883,962.0	1,281,178.0		1,456,819.0		1,569,434.0		1,363,084.0									
Ireland	294,117.6				655,611.8											458,083.8					
Italy	201,548.7						18,980.4	1,042,697.5	1,629,040.5		700,550.0		1,855,111.0		4,453,732.9		10,430,769.1				
Netherlands					322,970.6			124,820.6													
Norway										18,426,760.0											
Portugal	392,627.9							5,072,902.9		11,342.6				1,660,111.8	68,783.8	73,529.4					
Spain	907,058.8							7,281,525.3						4,927,941.2	5,458,957.4						
Sweden								13,805,660.0		6,146,243.0											
Switzerland																					
World Bank	3,353,722.0				10,030,000.0			18,715,580.0		7,987,586.0	4,654,302.0	1,040,000.0			1,780,000.0						
Total	19,485,848.1	0.0	0.0	735,294.0	18,892,544.4	1,281,178.0	18,980.4	79,487,681.9	2,129,040.5	42,465,613.8	11,661,654.0	3,646,351.2	3,136,968.0	6,588,052.9	21,453,774.6	1,458,868.2	10,430,769.1	1,217,578.0		505,870.2	1,114,444.0

2. FUNDS DISBURSED IN PROJECT BASED AID PER PAP IN USD (Continued)

	<i>Multisector</i>	<i>Municipal</i>	<i>PFM</i>	<i>Principal Waste Manangement</i>	<i>Private Sector</i>	<i>Public Sector</i>	<i>Research</i>	<i>Roads</i>	<i>Rural Development</i>	<i>Science and Technology</i>	<i>Social Sector</i>	<i>Statistics</i>	<i>Study Funds</i>	<i>Tax</i>	<i>Technical Assistance</i>	<i>Telecommunicat ion</i>	<i>Transport</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Water</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
AfDB								4,781,187.0			91,976.4								15,352,885.5		21,085,269.8
Austria		1,470,588.2																			0.0
Belgium			1,470,588.0																		926,470.0
Canada	394,623.0																		267,001.0		25,342,938.0
Denmark							623,957.0	3,098,065.0				533,896.0									19,444,268.0
DFID																					0.0
European Comission																					0.0
Finland									1,786,536.0	367,647.0											300,445.0
France							312,172.0						210,572.0						1,277,480.0		12,250,455.0
Germany		1,268,054.0			1,904,279.0												6,140,939.0			541,842.0	13,554,477.0
Ireland																					1,407,813.2
Italy					80,110.1				1,701,698.9		2,205,195.4										20,332,430.0
Netherlands																			18,874,346.8		447,791.2
Norway								702,943.0													18,426,760.0
Portugal																				3,572,636.8	7,279,298.5
Spain																					1,632,353.0
Sweden								4,142,206.0		4,032,602.0											19,951,903.0
Switzerland		2,066,667.0												58,880.0	394,025.0				273,611.0		0.0
World Bank						14,340,000.0										2,140,000.0	41,260,000.0	7,970,000.0	17,992,552.9		47,561,190.0
Total	394,623.0	4,805,309.2	1,470,588.0	0.0	1,984,389.1	14,340,000.0	936,129.0	12,724,401.0	3,488,234.9	4,400,249.0	2,297,171.8		210,572.0	58,880.0	394,025.0	2,140,000.0	47,400,939.0	7,970,000.0	54,037,877.2	4,114,478.8	209,943,861.8



### 3. SHARE OF PROGRAMMATIC ODA PER AGENCY AND PER SECTOR (IN %)

	Public finance Management	Public Sector reform	National Statistic	Agriculture	Health	Education	Tax	Tribunal administrativo	HIV/SIDA	Support to Niassa	Water and sanitation	Roads	Ação Social	Sector Aid II												Total
	UTRAFE	UTRESP	INE	PROAGRI	PROSAUDE	FASE	ATA	TAA	CNCS	Provincial Budget support	ASAS	PRISE	INAS	Aids	Eduaction	Environment	Fisheries	Health	Limpopo	Roads	Statistics	Maputo Water	PPFD	FSTAP		
AfDB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Austria	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Belgium	14.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Canada	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.7	6.5	4.4	0.0	0.0	18.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Denmark	23.0	47.0	40.5	6.8	5.1	4.4	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
DFID	31.2	19.6	0.0	0.0	14.4	7.8	0.0	0.0	6.2	0.0	0.0	32.4	59.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
European Comission	0.0	0.0	0.0	48.0	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Finland	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.2	8.5	6.2	0.0	21.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
France	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0		
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.6	0.0	0.0	9.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0		
Ireland	0.0	9.3	0.0	6.1	28.1	8.9	0.0	0.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Italy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6	20.6	0.0	26.2	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	40.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Norway	17.0	0.0	59.5	0.0	8.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Sweden	14.6	24.1	0.0	14.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	51.9	6.1	100.0	0.0	27.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Switzerland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
World Bank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.2	0.0	0.0	41.3	0.0	0.0	40.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		

## **ANNEX 4**

### **HARMONIZATION AND CONDITIONALITY**

PAPs	NO Annex 10 bilateral exceptions	Adherence to common Conditionality of GBS	GBS commitment made within 4 weeks of the JR	Multi-year agreement not less than 3 years	Has your organization disbursed all the committed funds for 2008 according to the disbursement scheduled agreed?	GBS commitments disbursed in the fiscal year (2008)	Commitments to MTFF
African Development Bank	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Austria	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Belgium	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Canada	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Denmark	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
DFID	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
European Comission	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Finland	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
France	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Germany	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Ireland	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Italy	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Netherlands	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Norway	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Spain	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sweden	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Switzerland	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
World Bank	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Total (Yes)	14	18	19	17	13	19	19

## **ANNEX 5**

### **UTILISATION OF GOM FINANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS**

# 1. GOVERNMENT FINANCE MANAGMENT SYSTEMS (data in units of US\$)

PAP's	ODA to GoM recorded in the budget	ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems	ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget execution procedures	ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedures	ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement	ODA disbursed to GoM	ODA committed to GoM	Programme Aid (disbursed)
AfDB	166,547,059.2	31,716,000.0	31,716,000.0	31,716,000.0	31,716,000.0	73,027,318.7	31,716,000	31,716,000
Austria	3,823,529.4	2,352,941.2	3,823,529.4	3,823,529.4	3,823,529.4	5,327,879.8	3,823,529	3,823,529
Belgium	7,241,260.0	4,411,765.0	5,882,353.0	5,882,353.0	5,882,353.0	7,209,027.0	7,352,941	5,882,353
Canada	43,689,417.0	7,009,346.0	45,205,605.0	42,401,867.0	42,401,867.0	50,770,917.0	21,962,617	24,766,355
Denmark	60,739,896.0	9,823,183.0	29,141,330.0	36,419,219.0	42,682,585.0	40,296,960.0	26,129,666	29,141,330
DFID	112,870,370.4	75,925,926.0	112,870,370.4	111,944,444.5	111,944,444.5	112,870,370.4	110,648,148	112,870,370
European Comission	99,326,227.0	68,933,823.0	99,326,227.0	99,326,227.0	99,326,227.0	144,724,548.0	107,433,823	99,326,227
Finland	32,668,889.0	10,294,118.0	30,882,353.0	30,882,353.0	31,102,941.0	33,336,981.0	30,882,353	30,882,353
France	20,675,901.0	7,546,710.0	15,948,342.0	9,584,509.0	17,061,150.0	18,949,719.0	7,352,941	7,353,000
Germany	64,235,398.0	18,382,353.0	39,693,631.0	38,236,307.0	38,236,307.0	64,235,398.0	53,715,832	39,693,631
Ireland	53,573,529.4	14,705,882.4	53,852,941.2	51,911,764.7	51,911,764.7	61,140,713.2	54,029,412	53,852,941
Italy	25,450,605.3	5,588,235.0	16,617,155.6	16,617,155.6	16,617,155.6	16,617,155.6	5,588,235	5,588,235
Netherlands	83,553,179.6	26,470,588.2	64,231,042.0	56,142,806.0	64,231,042.0	83,553,179.6	64,231,041	64,231,042
Norway	48,205,447.0	32,212,056.0	43,945,247.0	41,640,283.0	43,945,247.0	63,074,950.0	43,945,247	43,945,247
Portugal	1,750,000.0	1,500,000.0	1,750,000.0	1,750,000.0	1,750,000.0	12,601,935.0	1,750,000	1,750,000
Spain	17,095,588.2	7,352,941.2	14,705,882.4	14,705,882.4	14,705,882.4	17,919,117.6	14,705,882	14,705,882
Sweden	93,667,865.2	55,663,610.0	74,783,554.0	67,824,776.0	67,824,776.0	102,931,720.0	68,920,973	74,783,554
Switzerland	12,748,655.0	7,407,407.0	11,111,111.0	11,111,111.0	11,111,111.0	13,904,294.0	11,111,111	11,111,111
World Bank	170,462,500.0	71,810,000.0	109,279,000.0	71,810,000.0	71,810,000.0	257,785,231.0	131,260,000	126,369,937
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,118,325,316.8</b>	<b>459,106,884.9</b>	<b>804,765,674.0</b>	<b>743,730,587.6</b>	<b>768,084,382.6</b>	<b>1,180,277,415.0</b>	<b>796,559,751.4</b>	<b>781,793,098.1</b>

## 2. GOVERNMENT FINANCE MANAGMENT SYSTEMS (data in %)

PAP's	ODA to GoM recorded in the budget	ODA to GoM using GoM auditing systems	ODA to GoM disbursed using GoM budget procedures	ODA to GoM using GoM reporting procedures	ODA to GoM using GoM Procurement	ODA disbursed as % of ODA recorded	% of ODA Committed that is disbursed
AfDB	228	43	43	43	43	44	100
Austria	72	44	72	72	72	139	100
Belgium	100	61	82	82	82	100	80
Canada	86	14	89	84	84	116	113
Denmark	151	24	72	90	106	66	112
DFID	100	67	100	99	99	100	102
European Comission	69	48	69	69	69	0	92
Finland	98	31	93	93	93	102	100
France	109	40	84	51	90	92	100
Germany	100	29	62	60	60	100	74
Ireland	88	24	88	85	85	114	100
Italy	153	34	100	100	100	65	100
Netherlands	100	32	77	67	77	100	100
Norway	76	51	70	66	70	131	100
Portugal	14	12	14	14	14	720	100
Spain	95	41	82	82	82	105	100
Sweden	91	54	73	66	66	110	109
Switzerland	92	53	80	80	80	109	100
World Bank	66	28	42	28	28	151	96
<b>Total</b>	<b>94.8%</b>	<b>38.9%</b>	<b>68.2%</b>	<b>63.0%</b>	<b>65.1%</b>	<b>105.5%</b>	<b>98.1%</b>

## **ANNEX 6**

### **JOINT WORK**

## Joint Work. PAF Indicators 16a, 16b e 17.

### JOINT WORK (in units)

PAP's	Total missions	Joint Missions	Individual Missions	Analytical Work	Coordinated Analytical Work	Non-Coordinated Analytical Work
African Development Bank	16	4	12	1	1	0
Austria	3	2	1	1	1	0
Belgium	2	0	2	0	0	0
Canada	17	7	10	0	0	0
Denmark	6	5	1	2	0	2
DFID	7	6	1	13	11	2
European Comission	18	4	14		6	-6
Finland	10	1	9	0	0	0
France	11	4	7	3	2	1
Germany	14	9	5	21	21	0
Ireland	8	6	2	1	0	1
Italy	0	0	0	1	1	0
Netherlands	7	5	2	1	0	1
Norway	10	2	8	2	0	2
Portugal	8	1	7	0	0	0
Spain	2	2	0	0	0	0
Sweden	16	9	7	1	0	1
Switzerland	4	1	3	0	0	0
<b>World Bank</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>4</b>

### JOINT MISSIONS AND COORDINATED ANALYTICAL WORK (in %)

PAP's	% Joint Missions	% Coordinated Analytical Work
African Development Bank	25	100
Austria	67	100
Belgium	0	-
Canada	41	-
Denmark	83	0
DFID	86	85
European Comission	22	-
Finland	10	-
France	36	67
Germany	64	100
Ireland	75	0
Italy	0	100
Netherlands	71	0
Norway	20	0
Portugal	13	-
Spain	100	-
Sweden	56	0
Switzerland	25	-
<b>World Bank</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>93%</b>



# **ANNEX 7**

## **PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNITS**

## Project Implementation Units. PAF indicator 19

PAP's	Number	Other agencies involved	Reduced from 2007?	PIUS 2007
AfDB	8		Y	11
Austria	2		n/a	0
Belgium	0		n/a	0
Canada	0		n/a	0
Denmark	2		Y	3
DFID	0		n/a	0
European Comission	0		n/a	0
Finland	0		n/a	0
France	0		n/a	0
Germany	0		n/a	0
Ireland	0		n/a	0
Italy	0		Y	5
Netherlands	0		n/a	0
Norway	0		n/a	0
Portugal	0		n/a	0
Spain	2		no	2
Sweden	0		n/a	0
Switzerland	0		n/a	0
<b>World Bank</b>	0		n/a	0

<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>			<b>21</b>
--------------	-----------	--	--	-----------

## **ANNEX 8**

### **TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

## 1. TECHNICAL COOPERATION (in units of US\$)

PAP's	Total TC	Non-Coordinated	Coordinated TC	Sector-wide TC
AfDB	6,509,978	4,944,788	1,565,190	0
Austria	4,081,427	2,441,721	1,639,706	169,118
Belgium	1,106,085	223,732	882,353	882,353
Canada	2,065,421	420,560	1,644,861	1,644,860
Denmark	8,185,703	1,031,877	7,153,826	3,033,747
DFID	5,031,234	596,975	4,434,259	3,712,037
European Comission	15,677,361	12,582,184	3,095,177	3,095,177
Finland	2,695,894	912,806	1,783,088	1,783,088
France	2,534,972	1,795,066	739,906	264,708
Germany	19,710,969	4,453,511	15,257,458	1,184,893
Ireland	2,700,735	0	2,700,735	2,700,735
Italy	2,455,447	2,455,447	0	
Netherlands	3,669,006	1,350,437	2,318,568	2,318,568
Norway	5,446,035	3,195,150	2,250,885	2,250,886
Portugal	4,592,434	4,581,184	11,250	11,250
Spain	724,865	327,806	397,059	397,059
Sweden	6,313,996	3,206,998	3,106,998	3,106,998
Switzerland	825,961	58,880	767,081	222,222
<b>World Bank</b>	<b>38,936,726</b>	<b>25,752,726</b>	<b>13,184,000</b>	<b>2,492,000</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>133,264,249.5</b>	<b>70,331,848.9</b>	<b>62,932,400.6</b>	<b>29,269,698.9</b>

## 2. COORDINATED AND SECTOR-WIDE TC AS % OF TOTAL TC

PAP's	% Coordinated programmes TC	% Sector-wide TC
AfDB	24	0
Austria	40	4
Belgium	80	80
Canada	80	80
Denmark	87	37
DFID	88	74
European Comission	20	20
Finland	66	66
France	29	10
Germany	77	6
Ireland	100	100
Italy	0	0
Netherlands	63	63
Norway	41	41
Portugal	0	0
Spain	55	55
Sweden	49	49
Switzerland	93	27
<b>World Bank</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>47.2%</b>	<b>22.0%</b>

3. Support tables to calculate % of technical assistance in PBAs

	Public finance Manangement	Public Sector reform	National Statistic	Agriculture	Health	Education	Tax	Tribunal administrativo	HIV/SIDA	Support to Niassa	Water and sanitation	Roads	Acção Social	Sector Aid II										Total	
	UTRAFE	UTRESP	INE	PROAGRI	PROSAUDE II	FASE	ATA	TAA	CNCS	Provincial Budget support	ASAS	PRISE	INAS	Aids	Eduaction	Environment	Fisheries	Health	Limpopo	Roads	Statistics	Maputo Water	PPFD		FSTAP
AfDB																								0.0	
Austria				1,470,588.2																				1,470,588.2	
Belgium	1,470,588.0																							1,470,588.0	
Canada				4,672,897.0	5,607,477.0	4,672,897.0			2,803,738.0															17,757,009.0	
Denmark	2,393,569.0	2,220,963.0	1,571,709.0	3,264,398.0	4,441,575.0	4,715,128.0			710,805.0					467,835.0	3,991,413.0	2,984,154.0		1,469,193.0		3,098,065.0	533,896.0			31,862,703.0	
DFID	3,240,740.7	925,925.9			12,407,407.4	8,333,333.3			925,925.9			8,333,333.3	2,777,777.8											36,944,444.4	
European Comission				23,120,588.0	7,271,816.0																			30,392,404.0	
Finland				5,882,353.0	7,352,941.0	6,617,647.0		735,294.0																20,588,235.0	
France					4,411,800.0														1,176,480.0			1,277,480.0		6,865,760.0	
Germany						19,853,954.0			1,457,324.0														6,784,592.0	1,132,176.0	29,228,046.0
Ireland		441,176.5		2,941,176.5	24,264,705.9	9,558,823.5			1,941,176.5															39,147,058.8	
Italy																								0.0	
Netherlands					4,819,277.0	22,058,823.5		882,352.9			8,088,235.3		1,911,764.7											37,760,453.5	
Norway	1,768,651.0		2,304,965.0		7,659,574.0												3,843,262.0							15,576,452.0	
Portugal						250,000.0																		250,000.0	
Spain					4,411,764.7	2,941,176.5																		7,352,941.2	
Sweden	1,519,757.0	1,142,107.0		6,838,906.0				1,748,542.0	911,854.0	2,472,121.0		6,958,778.0												21,592,065.0	
Switzerland					3,703,704.0																			3,703,704.0	
World Bank						28,000,000.0			6,160,000.0			10,399,937.0												44,559,937.0	
Total	10,393,305.7	4,730,172.4	3,876,674.0	48,190,906.7	86,352,042.0	79,001,782.9	0.0	3,366,188.9	8,750,823.4	2,472,121.0	8,088,235.3	15,292,111.3	4,689,542.5	467,835.0	3,991,413.0	2,984,154.0	3,843,262.0	1,469,193.0	1,176,480.0	3,098,065.0	533,896.0	1,277,480.0	6,784,592.0	1,132,176.0	346,522,389.1

	Public finance Manangement	Public Sector reform	National Statistic	Agriculture	Health	Education	Tax	Tribunal administrativo	HIV/SIDA	Support to Niassa	Water and sanitation	Roads	Acção Social	Sector Aid II												TOTAL
	UTRAFE	UTRESP	INE	PROAGRI	PROSAUDE II	FASE	ATA	TAA	CNCS	Provincial Budget support	ASAS	PRISE	INAS	Aids	Eduaction	Environment	Fisheries	Health	Limpopo	Roads	Statistics	Maputo Water	PPFD	FSTAP		
AfDB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Austria	0.0	0.0	0.0	169,117.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Belgium	882,352.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Canada	0.0	0.0	0.0	537,383.2	336,448.6	210,280.4	0.0	0.0	560,747.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Denmark	1,436,141.4	444,192.6	157,170.9	375,405.8	266,494.5	212,180.8	0.0	0.0	142,161.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
DFID	1,944,444.4	185,185.2	0.0	0.0	744,444.4	375,000.0	0.0	0.0	185,185.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	277,777.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
European Comission	0.0	0.0	0.0	2,658,867.6	436,309.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Finland	0.0	0.0	0.0	676,470.6	441,176.5	297,794.1	0.0	367,647.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
France	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	264,708.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	893,427.9	0.0	0.0	291,464.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Ireland	0.0	88,235.3	0.0	338,235.3	1,455,882.4	430,147.1	0.0	0.0	388,235.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Italy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	289,156.6	992,647.1	0.0	441,176.5	0.0	0.0	404,411.8	0.0	191,176.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Norway	1,061,190.6	0.0	230,496.5	0.0	459,574.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	499,624.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Portugal	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11,250.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	264,705.9	132,352.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Sweden	911,854.2	228,421.4	0.0	786,474.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	874,271.0	182,370.8	123,606.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Switzerland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	222,222.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
World Bank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,260,000.0	0.0	0.0	1,232,000.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Total	6,235,983.4	946,034.5	387,667.4	5,541,954.3	5,181,122.5	4,815,080.2	0.0	1,683,094.5	2,982,164.7	123,606.1	404,411.8	0.0	468,954.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	499,624.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	29,269,697.6		

## **ANNEX 9**

### **PAPs' QUESTIONNAIRE**

## Questionnaire for the Study:

### “Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance: Review – 2008”

#### Important Information

This questionnaire is an integral part of the study “Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance: Review – 2008”, which forms part of the mutual accountability exercise agreed between the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) and the Government of Mozambique (GoM). The aim of the questionnaire is to gather information related to the performance of each PAP in 2008 with respect to the agreed PAPs’ Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators.

The final report of this study needs to be submitted by the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 2009 in order to be included in the Joint Review (JR). A draft report needs to be submitted by the 13<sup>th</sup> of March. Hence, this questionnaire, fully answered, should be sent back to the consultant not later than the 19<sup>th</sup> of February 2009. Late arrival of questionnaires, or incomplete questionnaires, will affect the schedule of the interviews and the remaining schedule of the study. The answered questionnaires should be sent to the following email addresses:

[carlos.castelbranco@gmail.com](mailto:carlos.castelbranco@gmail.com) and [carlos.castel-branco@iese.ac.mz](mailto:carlos.castel-branco@iese.ac.mz)

Interviews with all PAPs will take place between the 23<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> of February. In these interviews, the answers to the questionnaires will be revised and other issues will be discussed. The PAPs will have the opportunity to redo the questionnaires.

The schedule for this study is very tight and only five working days have been allocated for the interviews with 19 PAPs and relevant GoM departments. This means that we will need to have 5 interviews per day, and that we need to set up the final interview schedule as early as possible (Form for interview is attached to the questionnaire). For this, we need the full understanding and cooperation of all parties involved.

The consultant can also be contacted by phone: +258 82 3150310.

Attached to this questionnaire are: (i) identification of funds that are defined as programme-based sector aid; (ii) table with percentages of coordinated TC per programme; (iii) note with technical information including exchange rates; and (iv) form for the schedule of interviews to be filled by PAPs and GoM.

Thank you for your collaboration.



**Identification of the Organization**

Date (dd-mm-yy):

Country:

Agency:

Address:

Phone number:

Fax number:

Mobile phone:

Person who filled the form (name/post):

Phone number:

Email:

Supervisor/Person in Charge (name/post):

Phone number:

Email:

## 1 Portfolio Composition

Aggregated portfolio composition: Commitments and Disbursements of ODA in 2008 (Tables 1A, 1B and 1C provide background information to calculate answers for PAF indicators 1a) 1b) and 2)

Table 1A: ODA to the GoM committed and disbursed (in units of USD) for 2008

OECD/DAC equivalent	Aid Modality		Committed	Disbursed
I.9 Q.14	1	Program Aid	0	0
	1.1	General Budget Support		
	1.2	Programme-based Sector Aid		
	2	Project Aid		
	3	Support to Provincial Government (non - PBS)		
I.3 Q.3		Sub-Total ODA to GoM		0

**Notes:** Programme-based sector aid includes only the sector common funds identified in the attached tables. If the PAP believes that other sector aid programmes qualify as programme-based sector aid given the OECD/DAC criteria, please create another row for the new data in the above table (call it "sector aid 2") and present the justification deemed necessary based on the OECD/DAC criteria; **Please do not fill cells in orange, as they contain automatic formulae.**

Please, explain the reasons for the difference between "Committed" and "Disbursed" in Table 1A (Program Aid only). Is the difference:

(a) Related to the Government of Mozambique (GoM)

i. Breaching of underlying principles (Y/N):

Please, specify:

ii. Others:

(b) Related to the donor (Y/N):

Please, specify:

(c) Related to both GoM and donors (Y/N):

Please, specify:

(d) Other reasons:

Were the causes, mentioned above, for the differences between commitments and disbursements:

(a) Discussed with the GoM ? (Y/N):

(b) Agreed with the GoM ? (Y/N):

(c) Discussed with other PAPs? (Y/N):

(d) Agreed with other PAPs? (Y/N):

Table 1B: Non-GoM ODA disbursed (in units USD) for 2008

Private Sector Support	
NGOs	
Others (specify)	
Sub-Total non-GoM ODA	0

Notes: (1) Items in this table refer to primary beneficiaries. (2) Write the specification for "others" in the allocated cell, and insert as many rows as necessary. **Please do not fill cells in orange, as they contain automatic formulae.**

**Table 1C: Total ODA disbursed to Mozambique (Please, do not fill this table)**

OECD DAC equivalent	Summary of ODA	in units of USD
I.3 Q3	Sub-Total ODA to GoM (1)	0
= I.3 (Q.1-Q3)	Sub-Total non-GoM ODA (2)	0
I.3 Q.1	Total ODA disbursed (1+2)	0

## 2 Predictability

### 2.1 Multi-Year Indicative Commitments for GBS (PAF indicator 3.)

Do you have a multi-year agreement with the GoM for GBS?	Which years are covered?	Does it include firm financial pledges and/or commitments?

Please, add any details deemed relevant to clarify the answers given above:

## 2.2. Disbursements and the State Budget

### 2.2.1 Schedule of commitments and disbursements of GBS in 2008 (in units of USD) (PAF indicators 4 and 5.)

	Yes	No	Explain
Were your financial commitments for GBS in 2008 made within 4 weeks after the JR in 2007?			
Has your organization disbursed all the committed funds for 2008 according to the disbursement scheduled agreed?			

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

### 2.2.2 ODA recorded in the budget in 2008 (in US\$) (PAF indicators 6 and 7.)

How much ODA was recorded in the budget?	
Is it possible to identify specific categories of items NOT recorded in the State Budget that should have been recorded? Please, indicate the items.	

## 2.3 Commitment for the CFMP (PAF indicator 8.)

Where the commitment for the CFMP sent to the GoM in 15 of February? \_\_\_\_ (Y/N) If the answer is "No", please explain Why:

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

## 2.4 Sectors

Of the key sectors with sector-aid programs in which you participate, please indicate,

### 2.4.1 Programme-based sector aid for 2008 (This table provides background information to answer PAF indicators 1a) 1b) 2) 12) 13) and 14).

OECD/DAC Equivalent	SECTORS	How do you participate (A)	Funds disbursed (B)	Have you delegated cooperation to another donor? (Y/N, specify donor)	Has another donor delegated cooperation on your organization? (Y/N, specify donor)
= 13 O.3-GBS	Public Finance Management	UTRAFE			
	Public Sector Reform	UTRESP			
	National Statistic	INE			
	Agriculture	PROAGRI			
	Health	PROSAUDE			
		MEDICAMENTOS			
		SAUPROV			
	Education	FASE			
	Tax	ATA			
	Tribunal Administrativo	TAA			
	HIV/SIDA	CNCS			
	Support to Niassa	Provincial Budget Support			
	Water and Sanitation	ASAS			
	Roads	PRISE			
	Ação Social	INVAS			
	TOTAL		0		

Notes: (A) Donor, Coordinating Donor or Observer. (B) In USD. Please add as many rows as necessary to specify others. Also put data only for programme-based aid, example, agriculture - PROAGRI, health - ProSaude, education - FASE.

Please, add any details deemed relevant to clarify the answers given above (for example, to explain mobility between sectors over the years):

2.4.2 Project-based sector aid for 2008 (This table provides background information to answer PAF indicators 1a) 1b) 2) 12) 13) and 14).

OECD/DAC equivalent	SECTORS (fill in the names of the sectors where your agency operates with projects)	How do you participate (A)	Funds disbursed (B)	Have you delegated cooperation to another donor? (Y/N, specify donor)	Has another donor delegated cooperation on your organization? (Y/N, specify donor)
= I.3 Q.3-GBS					
	TOTAL		0		

**Notes:** (A) Donor, Coordinating Donor or Observer. (B) In USD; Please put data only for project-based, example in agriculture - which is not PROAGRI, in Health - which is not ProSaude. Please fill in the sectors in which you are involved financing projects.

2.4.3 Payment of taxes ( The question above 3.1.3 is a background information to answer PAF indicator 15.)

Of the Project and common Funds mentioned above in the table 2.4.2 which ones pay taxes?

Please, add any details deemed relevant to clarify the answers given above (for example, to explain mobility between sectors over the years):

### 3 Harmonization and Alignment

#### 3.1. Harmonization of conditionality

##### 3.1.1 Common conditionality in 2008 (PAF indicator 9)

	Yes	No	Explain		
Has your organization adhered to the common conditionalities of GBS as defined by the PAF and basic principles?					
Has any particular event (or set of events) triggered a decision from your organization that in any way changed the amounts committed and disbursed and/or the schedule of disbursements?					
Can you justify your decision to change amounts/schedule on the basis of the common conditionalities?					
Would you, instead, justify your decision on the basis of the bilateral agreement?					
Have the other PAPs agreed with your analysis of the problem?					
Have they supported your decision?					
If they did not support your position, did you reconsider and change your decision?					
How did the GoM react to your decision?					

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

##### 3.1.2 Annex 10 bilateral exceptions in the MoU in 2008 (PAF indicator 10.)

	Yes	No	Explain
Does/did your organization have annex 10 exceptions in the MoU?			
Have you eliminated your annex 10 exceptions?			
Have you taken steps, or are taking steps, to eliminate annex 10 exceptions?			
Which exceptions have been, or are going to be, eliminated and why?			
Which exceptions remain and why?			

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

##### 3.1.3 Harmonization of bilateral agreements ( The question above 3.1.3 is background information to answer PAF indicator 11)

Is your bilateral agreement strictly harmonized with the MoU? \_\_\_\_ (Y/N) If the answer is "No", please explain which aspects are not harmonized and what you intend to do about it:

**3.2 Utilisation of government systems and reporting in 2008 (PAF indicators 12 and 13.)**

OECD/DAC equivalent		Amount (in units of USD)	Explain
I.5a Q.7	ODA that is disbursed according to national procedures of budget execution.		
I.5a Q.9	ODA that is audited using ONLY national auditing systems.		
I.5a Q.8	ODA that requires ONLY national financial reporting systems.		
I.5b Q.11	ODA that utilises ONLY national procurement systems.		

Please, add details deemed necessary to clarify the answers given above:

**3.3 PAPs' joint work in 2008 (This table provides background information to answer PAF indicators 16a) 16b) 17.)**

OECD/DAC equivalent		Number	Other agencies involved	Description
I.10a Q.1	Total joint missions (a)			
I.10a Q.1	Total missions			
I.10b Q.1	Analytical work that is coordinated (b)			
I.10b Q.1	Analytical work undertaken			

**Note:** (a) please, make sure that you list the joint missions and indicate the other agencies involved, such that we can avoid double counting. (b) please, make sure that you list the analytical work done and the other agencies involved, such that we can avoid double counting.

Please, add any details deemed necessary to clarify the answers above:

## 4 Capacity Strengthening

**4.1 Number of parallel Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in 2008 (PAF indicator 19)**

OECD/DAC equivalent		Number	Sector	Other agencies involved
I.6 Q.12	Number of parallel PIUs in place			
	What do you intend to do with existing PIUs?			

Please, add any details deemed necessary to clarify the answers above:

*4.2 Technical Cooperation in 2008 (PAF indicators 20 and 21.)*

OECD/DAC equivalent	Indicator	Amount (in Units of USD)
	4 Q.5 Total value of TC provided	
	4 Q.6 Total non- coordinated TC provided	
	Total sector-wide TC provided	
	Other agencies involved in your sector-wide TC	

Please, add any details deemed necessary to clarify the answers above:



Evaluation of Progress in Development Partnership involving the PAPs/GoM MoU signatories (please, present your analysis and give concrete examples)

What is your opinion regarding the following issues involving the PAPs/GoM MoU signatories	In 2008 relative to 2007	Over the period 2004/2008
Areas of development partnership that have recorded significant improvement...		
Of the areas with significant progress mentioned above, please identify and list the 2-3 you think were the most important		
Areas that are lagging behind and need significant improvement...		
Of the areas lagging behind mentioned above, please identify and list the 2-3 you think were the most important		
What could have or still can be done to value progress and address the areas lagging behind (lessons for the future)		

Challenges ahead for the PAPs regarding the development partnership in Mozambique

What is your opinion about challenges with respect to....	General identification/analysis of the challenge and concrete examples	How to deal with the challenge
...aid volumes and portfolio composition		
...predictability and use of national systems		
...technical cooperation		
...policy dialogue		
...coordination amongst donors (PAPs, DPG, working groups, code of conduct, etc.)		
...changing bilateral rules of the PAPs (for example, annex 10 exceptions) to adjust to common and best trends and practices		
...aid policy and strategy in Mozambique		
...the impact of the "international crisis"		
...any other challenges you may identify related to your agency or to the PAPs as a whole.		

Evaluation of the PAPs Performance Review 2004/2008

With respect to the PAPs performance review, what is your opinion about...	General evaluation	Concrete examples for each of your comments
Major positive impacts and usefulness made of the study		
Major problems with the study		
Suggestions about what should this evaluation aim at in the future		
Suggestions about PAF indicators and procedures that should be reviewed/changed for the future		
Suggestions about what can be done to improve/change the entire exercise of performance review in the future (more globally)		

# **ANNEX 10**

## **PARIS DECLARATION INDICATORS**

# **PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS**

## **Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability**

### **I. Statement of Resolve**

1. We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five-year review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year. As in Monterrey, we recognise that while the volumes of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid effectiveness must increase significantly as well to support partner country efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance. This will be all the more important if existing and new bilateral and multilateral initiatives lead to significant further increases in aid.

2. At this High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, we followed up on the Declaration adopted at the High-Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003) and the core principles put forward at the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Development Results (February 2004) because we believe they will increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of the MDGs.

#### **Scale up for more effective aid**

3. We reaffirm the commitments made at Rome to harmonise and align aid delivery. We are encouraged that many donors and partner countries are making aid effectiveness a high priority, and we reaffirm our commitment to accelerate progress in implementation, especially in the following areas:

- i. Strengthening partner countries' national development strategies and associated operational frameworks (e.g., planning, budget, and performance assessment frameworks).
- ii. Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries' priorities, systems and procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities.
- iii. Enhancing donors' and partner countries' respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies, strategies and performance.
- iv. Eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to make them as cost-effective as possible.
- v. Reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures to encourage collaborative behaviour and progressive alignment with partner countries' priorities, systems and procedures.
- vi. Defining measures and standards of performance and accountability of partner country systems in public financial management, procurement, fiduciary safeguards and environmental assessments, in line with broadly accepted good practices and their quick and widespread application.

4. We commit ourselves to taking concrete and effective action to address the remaining challenges, including:

- i. Weaknesses in partner countries' institutional capacities to develop and implement results-driven national development strategies.

- ii. Failure to provide more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows to committed partner countries.
  - iii. Insufficient delegation of authority to donors' field staff, and inadequate attention to incentives for effective development partnerships between donors and partner countries.
  - iv. Insufficient integration of global programmes and initiatives into partner countries' broader development agendas, including in critical areas such as HIV/AIDS.
  - v. Corruption and lack of transparency, which erode public support, impede effective resource mobilisation and allocation and divert resources away from activities that are vital for poverty reduction and sustainable economic development. Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems.
5. We acknowledge that enhancing the effectiveness of aid is feasible and necessary across all aid modalities. In determining the most effective modalities of aid delivery, we will be guided by development strategies and priorities established by partner countries. Individually and collectively, we will choose and design appropriate and complementary modalities so as to maximise their combined effectiveness.
6. In following up the Declaration, we will intensify our efforts to provide and use development assistance, including the increased flows as promised at Monterrey, in ways that rationalise the often excessive fragmentation of donor activities at the country and sector levels.

### **Adapt and apply to differing country situations**

7. Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations, such as the tsunami disaster that struck countries of the Indian Ocean rim on 26 December 2004. In such situations, worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of partner countries. In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonisation, alignment and managing for results are adapted to environments of weak governance and capacity. Overall, we will give increased attention to such complex situations as we work toward greater aid effectiveness.

### **Specify indicators, timetable and targets**

8. We accept that the reforms suggested in this Declaration will require continued high-level political support, peer pressure and coordinated actions at the global, regional and country levels. We commit to accelerate the pace of change by implementing, in a spirit of mutual accountability, the Partnership Commitments presented in Section II and to measure progress against 12 specific indicators that we have agreed today and that are set out in Section III of this Declaration.

9. As a further spur to progress, we will set targets for the year 2010. These targets, which will involve action by both donors and partner countries, are designed to track and encourage progress at the global level among the countries and agencies that have agreed to this Declaration. They are not intended to prejudge or substitute for any targets that individual partner countries may wish to set. We have agreed today to set five preliminary targets against indicators as shown in Section III. We agree to review these preliminary targets and to adopt targets against the remaining indicators as shown in Section III before the UNGA Summit in September 2005; and we ask the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC to prepare for this urgently<sup>1</sup>. Meanwhile, we welcome initiatives by partner countries and donors to establish their own targets for

---

<sup>1</sup> In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of public financial management reform programmes (relating to target 5a.ii). Further discussions are underway to address these issues. The targets, including the reservation, have been notified to the Chairs of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in a letter of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

improved aid effectiveness within the framework of the agreed Partnership Commitments and Indicators of Progress. For example, a number of partner countries have presented action plans, and a large number of donors have announced important new commitments. We invite all participants who wish to provide information on such initiatives to submit it by 4 April 2005 for subsequent publication.

### **Monitor and evaluate implementation**

10. Because demonstrating real progress at country level is critical, under the leadership of the partner country we will periodically assess, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, our mutual progress at country level in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. In doing so, we will make use of appropriate country level mechanisms.

11. At the international level, we call on the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC to broaden partner country participation and, by the end of 2005, to propose arrangements for the medium term monitoring of the commitments in this Declaration. In the meantime, we ask the partnership to co-ordinate the international monitoring of the Indicators of Progress included in Section III; to refine targets as necessary; to provide appropriate guidance to establish baselines; and to enable consistent aggregation of information across a range of countries to be summed up in a periodic report. We will also use existing peer review mechanisms and regional reviews to support progress in this agenda. We will, in addition, explore independent cross-country monitoring and evaluation processes – which should be applied without imposing additional burdens on partners – to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how increased aid effectiveness contributes to meeting development objectives.

12. Consistent with the focus on implementation, we plan to meet again in 2008 in a developing country and conduct two rounds of monitoring before then to review progress in implementing this Declaration.

## **II. Partnership Commitments**

13. Developed in a spirit of mutual accountability, these Partnership Commitments are based on the lessons of experience. We recognise that commitments need to be interpreted in the light of the specific situation of each partner country.

### **OWNERSHIP**

#### **Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions**

14. **Partner countries** commit to:

- Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies<sup>2</sup> through broad consultative processes.
- Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets (**Indicator 1**).
- Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector.

15. **Donors** commit to:

- Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.

---

<sup>2</sup> The term 'national development strategies' includes poverty reduction and similar overarching strategies as well as sector and thematic strategies.

## ALIGNMENT

**Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures**

### Donors align with partners' strategies

16. **Donors** commit to:

- Base their overall support — country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes — on partners' national development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies<sup>3</sup> (**Indicator 3**).
- Draw conditions, whenever possible, from a partner's national development strategy or its annual review of progress in implementing this strategy. Other conditions would be included only when a sound justification exists and would be undertaken transparently and in close consultation with other donors and stakeholders.
- Link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from the national development strategy. This does not mean that all donors have identical conditions, but that each donor's conditions should be derived from a common streamlined framework aimed at achieving lasting results.

### Donors use strengthened country systems

17. Using a country's own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness by strengthening the partner country's sustainable capacity to develop, implement and account for its policies to its citizens and parliament. Country systems and procedures typically include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring.

18. Diagnostic reviews are an important — and growing — source of information to governments and donors on the state of country systems in partner countries. Partner countries and donors have a shared interest in being able to monitor progress over time in improving country systems. They are assisted by performance assessment frameworks, and an associated set of reform measures, that build on the information set out in diagnostic reviews and related analytical work.

19. **Partner countries** and **donors** jointly commit to:

- Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country systems (**Indicator 2**).
- Integrate diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks within country-led strategies for capacity development.

20. **Partner countries** commit to:

- Carry out diagnostic reviews that provide reliable assessments of country systems and procedures.
- On the basis of such diagnostic reviews, undertake reforms that may be necessary to ensure that national systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, accountable and transparent.
- Undertake reforms, such as public management reform, that may be necessary to launch and fuel sustainable capacity development processes.

21. **Donors** commit to:

- Use country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible. Where use of country systems is not feasible, establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and procedures (**Indicator 5**).

---

<sup>3</sup> This includes for example the Annual Progress Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategies (APR).

- Avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes (**Indicator 6**).
- Adopt harmonised performance assessment frameworks for country systems so as to avoid presenting partner countries with an excessive number of potentially conflicting targets.

## **Partner countries strengthen development capacity with support from donors**

22. The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programmes, is critical for achieving development objectives — from analysis and dialogue through implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Capacity development is the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human resources.

23. **Partner countries** commit to:

- Integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national development strategies and pursue their implementation through country-led capacity development strategies where needed.

24. **Donors** commit to:

- Align their analytic and financial support with partners' capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly (**Indicator 4**).

## **Strengthen public financial management capacity**

25. **Partner countries** commit to:

- Intensify efforts to mobilise domestic resources, strengthen fiscal sustainability, and create an enabling environment for public and private investments.
- Publish timely, transparent and reliable reporting on budget execution.
- Take leadership of the public financial management reform process.

26. **Donors** commit to:

- Provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules (**Indicator 7**).
- Rely to the maximum extent possible on transparent partner government budget and accounting mechanisms (**Indicator 5**).

27. **Partner countries** and **donors** jointly commit to:

- Implement harmonised diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks in public financial management.

## **Strengthen national procurement systems**

28. **Partner countries** and **donors** jointly commit to:

- Use mutually agreed standards and processes<sup>4</sup> to carry out diagnostics, develop sustainable reforms and monitor implementation.
- Commit sufficient resources to support and sustain medium and long-term procurement reforms and capacity development.
- Share feedback at the country level on recommended approaches so they can be improved over time.

---

<sup>4</sup> Such as the processes developed by the joint OECD-DAC – World Bank Round Table on Strengthening Procurement Capacities in Developing Countries.

29. **Partner countries** commit to take leadership and implement the procurement reform process.
30. **Donors** commit to:
- Progressively rely on partner country systems for procurement when the country has implemented mutually agreed standards and processes (**Indicator 5**).
  - Adopt harmonised approaches when national systems do not meet mutually agreed levels of performance or donors do not use them.

### Untie aid: getting better value for money

31. Untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner countries and improving country ownership and alignment. **DAC Donors** will continue to make progress on untying as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries (**Indicator 8**).

## HARMONISATION

**Donors' actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective**

### Donors implement common arrangements and simplify procedures

32. **Donors** commit to:
- Implement the donor action plans that they have developed as part of the follow-up to the Rome High-Level Forum.
  - Implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (e.g. joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows. Increased use of programme-based aid modalities can contribute to this effort (**Indicator 9**).
  - Work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative, missions to the field and diagnostic reviews (**Indicator 10**); and promote joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of practice.

### Complementarity: more effective division of labour

33. Excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness. A pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden sharing increases complementarity and can reduce transaction costs.

34. **Partner countries** commit to:
- Provide clear views on donors' comparative advantage and on how to achieve donor complementarity at country or sector level.
35. **Donors** commit to:
- Make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead donors for the execution of programmes, activities and tasks.
  - Work together to harmonise separate procedures.

### Incentives for collaborative behaviour

36. **Donors** and **partner countries** jointly commit to:
- Reform procedures and strengthen incentives—including for recruitment, appraisal and training—for management and staff to work towards harmonisation, alignment and results.



## Delivering effective aid in fragile states<sup>5</sup>

37. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to build legitimate, effective and resilient state and other country institutions. While the guiding principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile states, they need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery.

38. **Partner countries** commit to:

- Make progress towards building institutions and establishing governance structures that deliver effective governance, public safety, security, and equitable access to basic social services for their citizens.
- Engage in dialogue with donors on developing simple planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, where national development strategies are not yet in place.
- Encourage broad participation of a range of national actors in setting development priorities.

39. **Donors** commit to:

- Harmonise their activities. Harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of strong government leadership. It should focus on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of political engagement; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices.
- Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies or, if that is not possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, sector or non-government systems.
- Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as bypassing national budget processes or setting high salaries for local staff.
- Use an appropriate mix of aid instruments, including support for recurrent financing, particularly for countries in promising but high-risk transitions.

## Promoting a harmonised approach to environmental assessments

40. Donors have achieved considerable progress in harmonisation around environmental impact assessment (EIA) including relevant health and social issues at the project level. This progress needs to be deepened, including on addressing implications of global environmental issues such as climate change, desertification and loss of biodiversity.

41. **Donors** and **partner countries** jointly commit to:

- Strengthen the application of EIAs and deepen common procedures for projects, including consultations with stakeholders; and develop and apply common approaches for “strategic environmental assessment” at the sector and national levels.
- Continue to develop the specialised technical and policy capacity necessary for environmental analysis and for enforcement of legislation.

42. Similar harmonisation efforts are also needed on other cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality and other thematic issues including those financed by dedicated funds.

## MANAGING FOR RESULTS

### Managing resources and improving decision-making for results

43. Managing for results means managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making.

---

<sup>5</sup> The following section draws on the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, which emerged from the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States (London, January 2005).

44. **Partner countries** commit to:
- Strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and annual and multi-annual budget processes.
  - Endeavour to establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions of the national and sector development strategies; and that these frameworks should track a manageable number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available (**Indicator 11**).
45. **Donors** commit to:
- Link country programming and resources to results and align them with effective partner country performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with partners' national development strategies.
  - Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries' results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks.
  - Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can rely more extensively on partner countries' statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems, with partner countries to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting.
46. **Partner countries** and **donors** jointly commit to:
- Work together in a participatory approach to strengthen country capacities and demand for results based management.

## **MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY**

### **Donors and partners are accountable for development results**

47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability and transparency in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance.
48. **Partner countries** commit to:
- Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets.
  - Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies.
49. **Donors** commit to:
- Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens.
50. **Partner countries** and **donors** commit to:
- Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments. (**Indicator 12**).

# III. Indicators of Progress

To be measured nationally and monitored internationally

OWNERSHIP		TARGET FOR 2010
1	<i>Partners have operational development strategies</i> — Number of countries with national development strategies (including PRSs) that have clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets.	<b>At least 75% of partner countries</b> have operational development strategies.
ALIGNMENT		TARGETS FOR 2010
2	<i>Reliable country systems</i> — Number of partner countries that have procurement and public financial management systems that either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.	<p><b>(a) Public financial management – Half of partner countries</b> move up at least one measure (i.e., 0.5 points) on the PFM/ CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) scale of performance.</p> <p><b>(b) Procurement – One-third of partner countries</b> move up at least one measure (i.e., from D to C, C to B or B to A) on the four-point scale used to assess performance for this indicator.</p>
3	<i>Aid flows are aligned on national priorities</i> — Percent of aid flows to the government sector that is reported on partners' national budgets.	<b>Halve the gap</b> — halve the proportion of aid flows to government sector not reported on government's budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget).
4	<i>Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support</i> — Percent of donor capacity-development support provided through co-ordinated programmes consistent with partners' national development strategies.	<b>50% of technical co-operation flows</b> are implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national development strategies.
5a	<i>Use of country public financial management systems</i> — Percent of donors and of aid flows that use public financial management systems in partner countries, which either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.	<b>PERCENT OF DONORS</b>
		Score* Target
		5+ <b>All donors</b> use partner countries' PFM systems.
		3.5 to 4.5 <b>90% of donors</b> use partner countries' PFM systems.
		<b>PERCENT OF AID FLOWS</b>
		Score* Target
5b	<i>Use of country procurement systems</i> — Percent of donors and of aid flows that use partner country procurement systems which either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.	Score* Target
		A <b>All donors</b> use partner countries' procurement systems.
		B <b>90% of donors</b> use partner countries' procurement systems.
		<b>PERCENT OF AID FLOWS</b>
		Score* Target
		A <b>A two-thirds reduction</b> in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries' procurement systems.
6	<i>Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel implementation structures</i> — Number of parallel project implementation units (PIUs) per country.	<b>Reduce by two-thirds</b> the stock of parallel project implementation units (PIUs).
7	<i>Aid is more predictable</i> — Percent of aid disbursements released according to agreed schedules in annual or multi-year frameworks.	<b>Halve the gap</b> — halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled.
8	<i>Aid is untied</i> — Percent of bilateral aid that is untied.	<b>Continued progress over time.</b>

HARMONISATION		TARGETS FOR 2010
9	<i>Use of common arrangements or procedures</i> — Percent of aid provided as programme-based approaches.	<b>66% of aid flows</b> are provided in the context of programme-based approaches.
10	<i>Encourage shared analysis</i> — Percent of (a) field missions and/or (b) country analytic work, including diagnostic reviews that are joint.	<b>(a) 40% of donor missions</b> to the field are joint.
		<b>(b) 66% of country analytic work is joint.</b>
MANAGING FOR RESULTS		TARGET FOR 2010
11	<i>Results-oriented frameworks</i> — Number of countries with transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against (a) the national development strategies and (b) sector programmes.	<b>Reduce the gap by one-third</b> — Reduce the proportion of countries without transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks by one-third.
MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY		TARGET FOR 2010
12	<i>Mutual accountability</i> — Number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness including those in this Declaration.	<b>All partner countries</b> have mutual assessment reviews in place.

**Important Note:** In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of public financial management reform programmes (relating to target 5a.ii). Further discussions are underway to address these issues. The targets, including the reservation, have been notified to the Chairs of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in a letter of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

**\*Note on Indicator 5:** Scores for Indicator 5 are determined by the methodology used to measure quality of procurement and public financial management systems under Indicator 2 above.

## Appendix A :

### Methodological Notes on the Indicators of Progress

The Indicators of Progress provides a framework in which to make operational the responsibilities and accountabilities that are framed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This framework draws selectively from the Partnership Commitments presented in Section II of this Declaration.

**Purpose** — The Indicators of Progress provide a framework in which to make operational the responsibilities and accountabilities that are framed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They measure principally **collective behaviour at the country level**.

**Country level vs. global level** — The indicators are to be **measured at the country level** in close collaboration between partner countries and donors. Values of country level indicators can then be statistically aggregated at the **regional or global level**. This global aggregation would be done both for the country panel mentioned below, for purposes of statistical comparability, and more broadly for all partner countries for which relevant data are available.

**Donor / Partner country performance** — The indicators of progress also provide a **benchmark against which individual donor agencies or partner countries can measure their performance** at the country, regional, or global level. In measuring individual donor performance, the indicators should be applied with flexibility in the recognition that donors have different institutional mandates.

**Targets** — The targets are set at the global level. Progress against these targets is to be measured by aggregating data measured at the country level. In addition to global targets, partner countries and donors in a given country might agree on country-level targets.

**Baseline** — A baseline will be established for 2005 in a panel of self-selected countries. The partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) is asked to establish this panel.

**Definitions and criteria** — The partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) is asked to provide specific guidance on definitions, scope of application, criteria and methodologies to assure that results can be aggregated across countries and across time.

**Note on Indicator 9** — Programme based approaches are defined in Volume 2 of Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery (OECD, 2005) in Box 3.1 as a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation. Programme based approaches share the following features: (a) leadership by the host country or organisation; (b) a single comprehensive programme and budget framework; (c) a formalised process for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement; (d) Efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. For the purpose of indicator 9 performance will be measured separately across the aid modalities that contribute to programme-based approaches.

## APPENDIX B:

### List of Participating Countries and Organisations

#### Participating Countries

Albania	Australia	Austria
Bangladesh	Belgium	Benin
Bolivia	Botswana	[Brazil]*
Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cambodia
Cameroon	Canada	China
Congo D.R.	Czech Republic	Denmark
Dominican Republic	Egypt	Ethiopia
European Commission	Fiji	Finland
France	Gambia, The	Germany
Ghana	Greece	Guatemala
Guinea	Honduras	Iceland
Indonesia	Ireland	Italy
Jamaica	Japan	Jordan
Kenya	Korea	Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic	Lao PDR	Luxembourg
Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia
Mali	Mauritania	Mexico
Mongolia	Morocco	Mozambique
Nepal	Netherlands	New Zealand
Nicaragua	Niger	Norway
Pakistan	Papua New Guinea	Philippines
Poland	Portugal	Romania
Russian Federation	Rwanda	Saudi Arabia
Senegal	Serbia and Montenegro	Slovak Republic
Solomon Islands	South Africa	Spain
Sri Lanka	Sweden	Switzerland
Tajikistan	Tanzania	Thailand
Timor-Leste	Tunisia	Turkey
Uganda	United Kingdom	United States of America
Vanuatu	Vietnam	Yemen
Zambia		

\* To be confirmed.

More countries than listed here have endorsed the Paris Declaration. For a full and up to date list please consult [www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration/members](http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration/members).

#### Participating Organisations

African Development Bank	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
Asian Development Bank	Commonwealth Secretariat
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)	Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)	Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	European Investment Bank (EIB)
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria	G24
Inter-American Development Bank	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	International Organisation of the Francophonie
Islamic Development Bank	Millennium Campaign
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)	Nordic Development Fund
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
OPEC Fund for International Development	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
United Nations Development Group (UNDG)	World Bank

#### Civil Society Organisations

Africa Humanitarian Action	AFRODAD
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations	Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)
Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (CCFD)	Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE)
Comisión Económica (Nicaragua)	ENDA Tiers Monde
EURODAD	International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)	Reality of Aid Network
Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET)	UK Aid Network

# **ANNEX 11**

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE**



## **Termos de Referência**

### **Avaliação do Desempenho dos Parceiros de Apoio Programático ao Programa de Moçambique - 2008**

#### **1. Antecedentes**

Um grupo de 19 Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs) providencia apoio ao Orçamento Geral do Estado a Moçambique. Em 2004 um Memorando de Entendimento (MdE) para o apoio programático foi assinado entre o Governo de Moçambique (GdM) e os Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs), o qual obriga ao Governo de Moçambique (GdM) e os Parceiros de Apoio Programático (PAPs) aos princípios de mútua prestação de contas, de forma a permitir o sentido de pertença, a previsibilidade dos fluxos de ajuda, o alinhamento com os processos do Governo, e harmonização na monitoria e avaliação dos processos.

Um dos requisitos no MdE é a avaliação conjunta uma vez por ano do desempenho dos PAPs em relação aos seus compromissos, feita com base num relatório independente do progresso em relação aos indicadores da matriz do Quadro de Avaliação de Desempenho (QAD) dos PAPs, e discutida na Revisão Conjunta anual. O QAD dos PAPs, que estabelece os indicadores e metas para 2009, acordadas durante a Revisão Semestral (RS) em Setembro de 2008 (algumas das metas finalizadas na RC 2008), providencia a base para a avaliação do desempenho dos PAPs em 2008. A base para este exercício é criar incentivos para os PAPs melhorarem a eficácia da ajuda externa. A matriz do QAD dos PAPs está inserida no anexo 1.

A avaliação do desempenho será feita de forma agregada para todos os 19 PAPs, e para cada parceiro individualmente, usando um mecanismo acordado durante a Revisão Semestral de 2008, e finalizada durante a Revisão Conjunta de 2009 (vide anexo destes TdR).

#### **2. Objectivos**

O objectivo principal desta consulta é proporcionar uma revisão independente do desempenho dos parceiros em 2008 contra os seus compromissos avaliados através dos indicadores e metas na matriz do QAD dos PAPs, comparada ao desempenho em 2007 e 2006.

O consultor deve fazer a avaliação do desempenho dos doadores em termos agregados (para o grupo como um todo) e individual para cada doador.

O exercício acima referido requer que o consultor(es) prepare um questionário a ser preenchido individualmente por cada doador dos PAPs, G19. O questionário deve ser elaborado em torno da matriz do QAD dos PAPs. O consultor deve organizar uma sessão de esclarecimento de dúvidas ou definições e da metodologia usada com representantes de todos os doadores para evitar que o questionário seja interpretado de forma diferente pelos diferentes parceiros.

O consultor deverá entrevistar o GdM e todos os PAPs pelo menos uma vez conforme a tabela abaixo indicada.

#### **3. Requisitos de Competência e Experiência**

É necessária uma equipa com 2 consultores no máximo. Os consultores devem estar familiarizados com as práticas dos doadores em Moçambique, com o trabalho na harmonização e alinhamento do OECD DAC e SPA, e com a literatura sobre a eficácia de ajuda externa.

#### **4. Cronograma e resultados esperados**

***O número total de dias de trabalho será até 15 dias para o chefe da equipa e 14 dias para o outro membro.*** Os resultados deverão ser apresentados ao GdM e aos PAPs em forma de sumários e relatórios.



## **Calendário:**

Finais de Janeiro '09: Leituras preparatórias e preparação de questionários (incluindo consulta com o Grupo de Referência sobre o conteúdo do questionário)

Princípio de Fevereiro: Envio dos Questionários finais a todos os doadores.

Primeira semana de Fevereiro: Apresentação sumária a todos os PAPs do questionário para esclarecimento de dúvidas/definições etc.

13 de Fevereiro: Prazo para devolução dos questionários ao consultor.

16 – 20 Fevereiro: Reuniões do consultor com o GdM e os PAPs individuais

5 Março: Primeiro esboço do relatório enviado ao GdM e aos PAPs em Português e Inglês.

9 Março: Apresentação dos resultados ao GdM e aos PAPs

12 Março: Envio de comentários/correcções pelo Grupo de Referência ao consultor

19 Março: Envio do relatório final ao GdM (em Português) e doadores (Inglês).

## **5. Relatórios**

O consultor submeterá relatórios ao GdM e PAPs. O grupo de referência para o consultor consistirá de representantes do GdM (Adriano Ubisse, Hanifa Ibrahim e Arginaldo Muandula) e PAPs (Patrick Empey, Ute Heinbuch, Wim Ulens).

Os resultados devem ser distribuídos em Português e Inglês. O relatório consistirá em: um sumário narrativo, orientação geral sobre o desempenho dos PAPs, uma matriz completa do QAD dos PAPs (PAPs PAF matriz) comparando metas aos resultados actuais para 2008, e matrizes completas e resultados do posicionamento de cada PAP.

## **6. Principais Referências Bibliográficas**

- Review of the PAPs' Performance in 2007 and PAPs' PAF matrix targets for 2008 – Ernst & Young – April 2008
- "Perfect Partners? The performance of Programme Aid Partners in Mozambique, 2004: A report to the Programme Aid Partners and Government of Mozambique." Prepared by Tony Killick (team leader), Carlos N. Castel-Branco, and Richard Gerster, May 2005
- Baseline Study on PAP Performance in 2003 – September 2004 – Report to the G15 Programme Aid Partners and Government of Mozambique by Richard Gerster and Alan Harding.
- 2004 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Mozambique and the Programme Aid Partners for the provision of Direct Budget and Balance of Payment Support.
- Study on Alignment of Sectoral Aid with Government Planning and Budgeting Cycle – Ernst & Young – October 2006
- SPA BSWG – 2008 Survey of the Alignment of Budget Support and Balance of Payments Support with National PRS Processes
- Responses to 2007 and 2008 DAC/SPA questionnaires
- OECD/DAC GBS evaluation – Mozambique case study (preliminary report)
- OECD/DAC survey on progress in harmonisation and alignment – Mozambique report
- The PAP website [www.pap.org.mz](http://www.pap.org.mz)
- Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and targets
- Accra Action Agenda



## Anexo 1 – Matriz dos PAPs PAF e metas para 2008

Objectivos	Actividades	No	MATRIZ AGREGADA EM TODOS OS PAPS (RS 2008) (aprovada no PAF CdG, em 12.09.08) Indicadores	Meta 2008	Antiga Meta 2009	Prop. Nova Meta 2009	Meta de Paris 2010
Composição do Portfolio	AGO (Apoio Geral ao Orçamento)	1a	PAPs individuais contribuem com pelo menos 40% para o AGO (como % do ODA para o Governo).	Sim	Sim	Sim	
		1b	% AGO no ODA <sup>1</sup> total dos PAPs.	40%	40%	40%	
	Ajuda Programática	2	% de Ajuda Programática no total de ODA desembolsado pelos PAPs (Indicador 9 de Paris).	75%	80%	75%	(66%)
Previsibilidade	Compromisso de AGO	3	% de PAPs com acordos multi-anuais não inferiores a 3 anos.	100%	100%	100%	
		4	Compromissos de AGO para o ano n+1 feito dentro das 4 semanas após a Revisão Conjunta (RC) no ano n.	100%	100%	100%	
	Desembolso do AGO	5	Desembolso do compromisso confirmado de AGO no ano fiscal para o qual foi calendarizado, de acordo com a programação mensal de desembolsos acordada com o GdM.	100%	100%	100%	
		6	% do ODA dos PAPs registada no orçamento do Estado (Indicador 3 de Paris).	85%	90%	95%	(>85%)
	Todo ODA para o governo	7	ODA desembolsada pelos PAPs como percentagem da ajuda registada no orçamento do Estado (Indicador 7 de Paris).	85%	90%	95%	(reduzir em 50% a diferença)
		8	Compromissos para o CFMP enviados ao GdM em 15 de Fevereiro.	100%	100%	100%	
Harmonização e Alinhamento	Harmonização dos condicionalismos	9	Aderência dos PAPs ao condicionalismo comum do AGO.	100%	100%	100%	
		10	Número de PAPs sem excepções no Anexo10.	14	15	15	
		11	Harmonização estrita entre os acordos bilaterais para o AGO e o MdE.	100%	100%	100%	
	Utilização dos sistemas de prestação de	12	% do ODA dos PAPs que utiliza os Sistemas de Gestão das Finanças				

<sup>1</sup> O ODA dos PAPs nesta matriz apenas inclui o ODA para o Governo



contas do governo		Públicas do País (Indicador 5a de Paris).					
	12a	% do ODA desembolsada pelos PAPs que usa os procedimentos nacionais de execução orçamental (Indicador 5a de Paris).	55%	60%	65%		
	12b	% do ODA desembolsada pelos PAPs auditada usando os procedimentos nacionais de auditoria (Indicador 5a de Paris).	42%	45%	45%		
	12c	% do ODA desembolsada pelos PAPs que usa os procedimentos nacionais de prestação de relatórios financeiros (Indicador 5a de Paris).	55%	60%	60%		
	13	% do ODA desembolsada pelos PAPs que usa os sistemas nacionais de procurement (Indicador 5b de Paris).	55%	60%	55%	(redução em 2/3 na não utilização)	
	14	% dos programas sectoriais que cumpriram com os indicadores 12a, 12c e 13.	70%	85%	85%		
	15	% de fundos de projectos e de fundos comuns de ajuda ao GdM para os quais são feitos pagamentos de impostos.		Dado de base + 10%	A ser definida		
	16a	% do total das missões que são conjuntas (Indicador 10a de Paris).	35%	40%	40%	(40% conjuntas)	
	16b	Número total de missões.	120	100	100		
	17	% de trabalho analítico que é coordenado (Indicador 10b de Paris).	60%	60%	66%	(66% conjunto)	
18	Doadores e o GdM acordam sobre o "período calmo" e sua implementação.	Sim	Sim	Sim			
Reforço da Capacidade	Unidades de Implementação de Projectos	19	Número de Unidades de Implementação de Projectos (PIUs) paralelas (Indicador 6 de Paris).	22	17	17	(Redução de 2/3)
	Cooperação técnica (CT)	20	% da CT dos PAPs dada através de programas coordenados (Indicador 4 de Paris)	55%	60%	55%	(50%)
		21	% da CT sectorial (alargada) como percentagem do total da CT dos PAPs.	16%	20%	25%	



Objectivos	Actividades	No.	Pontos	MATRIZ INDIVIDUAL (PAPs' PAF) (RS 2008) (aprovada no PAF CdG de 12.09.08) Indicadores	Meta 2008	Antiga Meta 2009	Prop. nova Meta 2009	Meta de Paris 2010
Composição do Portfolio	AGO	1	>20%=1p >30%=2p >40%=3p	PAP contribui com pelo menos 40% do AGO (como % do ODA para o Governo).	Sim	Sim	Sim	
							n/a	
	Ajuda Programática	2	>66%=2p >75%=4p	% da ajuda programática no total do ODA desembolsado pelo PAP ( <i>Indicador 9 de Paris</i> ).	75%	80%	75%	(66%)
Previsibilidade	Compromisso de AGO	3	3p	PAP tem acordos plurianuais não inferiores a 3 anos.	Sim	Sim	Sim	
		4	3p	Compromisso de AGO para o ano n+1 feito dentro de 4 semanas após a Revisão Conjunta (RC) no ano n.	Sim	Sim	Sim	
	Desembolso do AGO	5	1p dentro trimestre, 3p adic dentro mês	Desembolso do compromisso confirmado de AGO no ano fiscal para o qual foi calendarizado, de acordo com a programação mensal de desembolsos acordada com o GdM.	Sim	Sim	Sim	
		6	2p	% do ODA do PAP registada no orçamento do Estado ( <i>Indicador 3 de Paris</i> ).	85%	90%	95%	(>85%)
	Todo ODA para o governo	7	2p	ODA desembolsado pelo PAP como percentagem da sua ajuda registada no orçamento do estado ( <i>Indicador 7 de Paris</i> ).	85%	90%	95%	(reduzir em 50% a diferenç)
		8	2p	Compromissos para o MTFF enviados ao	Sim	Sim	Sim	



				GdM em 15 de Fevereiro.				
Harmonização e Alinhamento	Harmonização dos condicionalismos	9	2p	Aderência do PAP ao condicionalismo comum do AGO.	Sim	Sim	Sim	
		10	1p	PAP NÃO tem excepções no Anexo 10 do MdE	Sim	Sim	Sim	
		11	1p	Harmonização estrita entre o acordo bilateral do PAP para AGO e o MdE.	Sim	Sim	Sim	
	Utilização dos sistemas e da prestação de contas do governo	12		% do ODA desembolsado pelo PAP que usa os Sistemas de Gestão das Finanças Públicas do País ( <i>Indicador 5a de Paris</i> ).				
		12a	2p	% do ODA desembolsado pelo PAP que usa os procedimentos nacionais de execução orçamental ( <i>Indicador 5a de Paris</i> ).	55%	60%	65%	
		12b	1p	% do ODA desembolsado pelo PAP que foi auditada usando apenas os procedimentos nacionais de auditoria ( <i>Indicador 5a de Paris</i> ).	42%	45%	45%	
		12c	2p	% do ODA desembolsado pelo PAP que usa os procedimentos nacionais de prestação de relatórios financeiros ( <i>Indicador 5a de Paris</i> ).	55%	60%	60%	
		13	2p	% do ODA desembolsado pelo PAP que usa os sistemas nacionais de <i>procurement</i> ( <i>Indicador 5a de Paris</i> ).	55%	60%	55%	(2/3 redução na não utilização)
		15	2p	% de fundos de projectos e de fundos comuns do PAP para ajuda ao governo para os quais são feitos pagamentos de impostos.		Dado de base + 10%	A ser definida	
		16a	1p	% do total de missões do PAP que são feitas em conjunto ( <i>Indicador 10a de Paris</i> ).	35%	40%	40%	(40% conjuntas)
				% de trabalho analítico feito pelo PAP que é	60%	60%	66%	



		17	1p	coordenado ( <i>Indicador 10b de Paris</i> ).				(66% conjunto)
Reforço da Capacidade	Unidades de Implementação de Projectos (PIU)	18	2p	Número de PIUs paralelos (com base na lista acordada para o questionário da OECD/DAC) ( <i>Indicador 6 de Paris</i> ).	Zero ou número reduzido	Zero ou número reduzido	Zero ou número reduzido	(2/3 redução)
	Cooperação técnica (CT)	19	2p	% da CT dos PAPs dada através de programas coordenados ( <i>Indicador 4 de Paris</i> ).	55%	60%	55%	(50%)
		20	1p	% de CT sectorial (alargada) do PAP como percentagem do total da CT do PAP.	16%	20%	25%	



## **ANNEX 12**

### **2004 – 2008 COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE DATA**



	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
<b>Program ODA (1)</b>	<b>497,598,071</b>	<b>532,930,551</b>	<b>580,535,693</b>	<b>686,501,453</b>	<b>781,793,098</b>
<i>General Budget Support</i>	243,393,834	329,906,147	359,094,372	403,513,586	458,185,992
Program-based sector	254,204,238	203,024,403	221,441,321	282,987,867	323,607,106
<b>Project ODA (2)</b>	<b>287,590,656</b>	<b>504,344,199</b>	<b>488,015,664</b>	<b>433,692,078</b>	<b>405,727,876</b>
<b>Support to Provincial Budget (3)</b>		9,956,189	8,306,053		7,754,959
<b>Total ODA to the GoM (4)=(1)+(3)</b>	<b>785,188,727</b>	<b>1,047,230,939</b>	<b>1,076,857,410</b>	<b>1,120,193,531</b>	<b>1,195,275,933</b>
<b>Non-GoM ODA</b>					
<i>Private Sector Support (5)</i>	25,710,822	19,712,870	28,431,012	51,784,474	30,305,288
<i>NGOs (6)</i>	57,902,273	72,586,831	70,874,686	113,292,774	112,495,796
<i>Others (7)</i>	26,873,256	8,316,317	11,642,544	27,164,989	25,363,462
<b>Total Non-GoM ODA (8) = (5)+(6)+(7)</b>	<b>110,486,351</b>	<b>100,616,018</b>	<b>110,948,242</b>	<b>192,242,237</b>	<b>168,164,546</b>
<b>Total ODA to Mozambique (9) = (4)+(8)</b>	<b>895,675,078</b>	<b>1,147,846,957</b>	<b>1,187,805,652</b>	<b>1,312,435,768</b>	<b>1,363,440,479</b>

<b>Percentages of Total ODA to Moz</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b>Program ODA as % of total ODA to Moz</b>	<b>56%</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>57%</b>
<i>General Budget Support as % of total ODA to Moz</i>	27%	29%	30%	31%	34%
Program-based sector as % of total ODA to Moz	28%	18%	19%	22%	24%
<b>Project ODA as % of total ODA to Moz</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>30%</b>
<b>Support to Provincial Budget as % of total ODA to Moz</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>Total ODA to the GoM as % of total ODA to Moz</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>91%</b>	<b>91%</b>	<b>85%</b>	<b>88%</b>
<b>Non-GoM ODA</b>					
<i>Private Sector Support as % of total ODA to Moz</i>	3%	2%	2%	4%	2%
<i>NGOs as % of total ODA to Moz</i>	6%	6%	6%	9%	8%
<i>Others as % of total ODA to Moz</i>	3%	1%	1%	2%	2%
<b>Total Non-GoM ODA as % of total ODA to Moz</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Total ODA to Mozambique</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

<b>Percentages of Total ODA to GoM</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b><i>Program ODA as % of total ODA to GoM</i></b>	63%	51%	54%	61%	65%
<i>General Budget Support as % of total ODA to GoM</i>	31%	32%	33%	36%	38%
<i>Program-based sector as % of total ODA to GoM</i>	32%	19%	21%	25%	27%
<b><i>Project ODA as % of total ODA to GoM</i></b>	37%	48%	45%	39%	34%
<b><i>Support to Provincial Budget as % of total ODA to GoM</i></b>	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%
<b><i>Total ODA to the GoM as % of total ODA to GoM</i></b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Percentages of Total ODA to Non-GoM</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b>Non-GoM ODA</b>					
<i>Private Sector Support as % of total Non-GoM ODA</i>	23%	20%	26%	27%	18%
<i>NGOs as % of total Non-GoM ODA</i>	52%	72%	64%	59%	67%
<i>Others as % of total Non-GoM ODA</i>	24%	8%	10%	14%	15%
<b>Total Non-GoM ODA as % of total ODA to Moz</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%