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Summary

What does a participatory budget look like in the context of a competitive-authoritarian regime? How and why would such an instrument of participatory democracy be implemented in such an unpropitious setting? What difference could it make in terms of empowerment and democratisation? This monograph explores these questions through the use of a single 'typical' case study: the participatory budget of Maputo, Mozambique. The methodology is a historical-institutional process tracing through personal interviews, participant-observation and the collection of relevant archival data.

1. Introduction

Participatory budgeting has gone from being an exotic Brazilian experiment in local-level participatory democracy to becoming a mainstream policy proposal of the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, and regional development banks around the world.[1] Its appeal, both practical and theoretical, has been the claim that a well-designed participatory budget allows ordinary citizens to participate in decisions about public spending in their own neighbourhoods and cities and, in so doing, encourages them to become part of the 'public sphere' – both at the local level and beyond – rather than to remain mired in the civic disengagement and apolitical cynicism that seems to have plagued so many political systems in recent years. Such citizen engagement is seen to bring additional benefits of increasing citizen oversight of public spending, thereby helping to reduce corruption and cronyism, empowering a more diverse range of political activists, reducing elitism and clientelism and, in the end, providing citizens with greater access to basic services and improved living conditions.[2] Whether as a result of such arguments or

1 '... Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke (2005) [...] define PB in the following way: 'participatory budgeting allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances'. Additionally they propose five criteria: (1) the financial dimension has to be discussed; (2) the city level has to be involved; (3) the process has to be repeated; (4) there has to be some form of public deliberation; (5) some accountability is required. Within this broad definition, PB can of course take on different forms and the models of PB can vary significantly.' [...] Though the PB initiatives can also address the overall financial health of municipalities, the focus is on discretionary spending' [Wampler (2007) cited in Krenjova & Raudla (2012:3 & 12)].

Goldfrank (2012:3) cites the following cases of participatory budgeting at least partially financed by the World Bank: 'Bank-supported PB projects in: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gambia, Honduras, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Uganda, and Uruguay.' Of these cases, the following are now, or have recently been, 'competitive-authoritarian regimes': Albania, Dominican Republic, Madagascar, Peru (under Alberto Fujimori, as the PB emerged from the post-Fujimori 'no-party regime' [McNulty, 2011]), and Uganda.

For more on PB assistance from the World Bank, in addition to Goldfrank (2012), see Shah (2007). For the UNDP, see UN (2008); also UNDP (2013: 5).

For the general worldwide spread of PBs, see Ganuza & Baiocchi (2012); also Wampler & Hartz (2012); also Pateman (2012); also Sintomer et al. (2010).

As one would expect, academics have been writing about participatory budgeting since it emerged from the first Workers' Party administration of the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in 1989. For Porto Alegre's experience, see Abers (2000); Fedozzi (1997); Baiocchi (2005). For several reviews of the by-now expansive academic literature, see Nylen (2011); Fung (2011); and Serageldin et al. (2003).

2 'Public works have long been a key source of patronage between governments and community leaders. By placing public works at the center of participatory budgeting, it is hoped that the cycle of patronage politics can be broken. Breaking the cycle of patronage entails public discussions of public works, access to technical information, and the eventual implementation of projects. By removing public works from the clientelistic exchange, governments and community leaders hope to generate a new type of politics.' [Wampler, 2007: 37; also see Sintomer et al. 2001:30]

'Participation is particularly important because it fosters good governance, promotes transparency, increases social justice by involving the poor and excluded, and helps individuals become better citizens.' (Moynihan, 2007: 58).

not, participatory budgeting has now spread throughout the globe, reaching even into the boroughs of New York City and the suburbs of Northern California.[3]

One of the most curious aspects of this phenomenon has been the adoption of participatory budgeting in settings where one would not expect to see public officials touting the benefits of citizen participation and empowerment and transparency of the budget-making process. While originally part of a post-Cold War leftist agenda of 'democratising democracy' in reaction to conservative political coalitions implementing neoliberal economic reforms that targeted popular social programmes, participatory budgeting now emerges from both the left and right of the ideological spectrum (though it is still primarily the left that values expanded 'popular' participation and oversight and, especially, 'pro-poor' outcomes) (Moynihan, 2007: 80; Bräutigam, 2004). Even in China, 'there have been experiments with participatory budgeting with varying degrees of participation as well as consultation' (He & Warren, 2010:21; He, 2011; Fishkin, He & Siu, 2008; Wu, 2011). Participatory budgeting has similarly appeared in a number of 'competitive-authoritarian regimes' (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 2012): 'civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis opponents. In other words, competition is real but unfair.'[4] In such regimes, autonomous civil society organisation and activism – a key component in most Brazilian cases – are either missing or are actively repressed.[5]

3 See Chapin (2013).

4 Levitsky & Way (2012: 881, fn.10). For a list of such regimes and their developmental trajectories – democratisation, unstable authoritarianism, and stable authoritarianism -- between 1990 and 2005, see Levitsky & Way (2006: 86, table 1.2).

Competitive-authoritarianism is even less democratic than Guillermo O'Donnell's well-known concept of 'delegative democracy,' described by Friedman and Hochstetler (2002: 23) as 'a democracy in which state actors are selected democratically but run roughshod over other political institutions. Of particular concern is executives' ability largely to ignore representative organisations, from interest groups to parties to the legislative branch itself.' The key difference is the greater capacity of competitive-authoritarian (C-A) regimes to control and influence the actual electoral process itself. This is related to the greater institutional capacity of the C-A regime relative to delegative democracy's (DD's) more personalist nature.

The following are cases of competitive-authoritarianism, illustrative of where either participatory budgeting or some form of participatory planning have been attempted in the recent past:
Albania: Dallyn (2008), cited in Goldfrank (2012: 9, 12–13).
Armenia: Fölscher (2007); OSCE (2013).
Botswana: Bar-On (2001).
Cambodia: One World Action (2008).
Cameroon: Partnership for Transparency Fund (2012); Charlier & N'Cho-Oguie (2009); Sintomer et al. (2010: 45–46);
Mozambique: Nguenha (2009, 2011); Reaud (2012); Shall (2007) based on Dondo and Manhica cases.
Russia: Vinogradova (2002); Krylova (2007a); Fölscher (2007).
Ukraine: Krylova (2007b); Fölscher (2007).
Zimbabwe: UN-Habitat (2008); Mika (2003a, 2003b); Shall (2007, especially pp. 195, 197, 204–5, 209–212, 215–216); Sintomer et al. (2010: 50).

5 'Probably the strongest impediment to the adoption of PB practices in the new democracies in the CEE [Central and Eastern European] region is the prevailing political culture and the weakness of civil

So why would non-democratic regimes implement participatory budgeting? Are these purely for show, as one might hypothesise, or do they reflect some other, perhaps more hopeful, political dynamic – a 'first opening in closed structures' (Sintomer et al, 2010: 7)[6] for example? Beyond the questions of motivation, what have been the systematic impacts of such policies, born as they were in efforts to democratize hitherto opaque, top-down, and exclusionary political structures and practices, yet 'imported' into regimes with few of the recognised 'preconditions and enabling factors for citizen engagement with public decisions'?[7]

In order to begin to answer these two questions, I explore the 'historical puzzle' (Levi, 2010) that is the participatory budget (*Orçamento Participativo*) in Mozambique's capital city, Maputo.[8] As established in Levitsky and Way (2012: 876), Mozambique is a 'typical case' (Gerring, 2008) of a universe of cases described as 'party based authoritarian regimes that emerged out of violent, ideologically-driven conflict' that includes the African cases of Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. This is a regional subset of the larger universe of competitive-authoritarian regimes discussed in detail in Levitsky and Way's *Competitive-authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (2010). And, as stated above, a surprising number of such regimes have experimented with participatory budgeting. In the case of former Soviet states in Eastern Europe, for example,

society (see Regulska, 2009). On the side of the 'general public', there is popular distrust of political institutions and formal procedures and unwillingness of citizens to become actively involved in public matters (Illner, 1998)' (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 26).

6 These questions are rooted in a surface-level 'irrationality' of such choices, as reflected in the following: 'Political actors might feel threatened by the citizens' direct participation in local governance as they essentially lose – at least some – decision-making space (Cabannes, 2004; Wampler, 2007)' (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 12).

7 'The capacity of citizens to engage the state on the allocation and use of public resources—and the likelihood of their actually doing so—depend on several factors. These include the openness and democratic depth of political and governance systems; the existence of enabling legal frameworks, including guarantees of basic freedoms; the capacity for participation both inside and outside of government; the existence of functional and free media institutions; and the willingness and capacity of the state to make budget information available' (Fölscher, 2007: 247).

8 Reference is to Levi (2010: 3–5):

> [...] *Analytic Narratives* explore institutional change in a wide range of places and times. All focus on a specific historic puzzle, sometimes taking place only in one country. The primary aim is to understand a particular set of institutions, but the combination of approach and findings do have implications for a wider set of issues. [...] Analytics, in this approach, refers to the building of models derived from rational choice, particularly the theory of extensive form games. This means, first, extracting from the narratives the key actors, their goals, and their preferences and the effective rules that influence actors' behaviors. Second, it means elaborating the strategic interactions that produce an equilibrium that constrains some actions and facilitates others. The emphasis is on identifying the reasons for the shift from an institutional equilibrium at one point in time to a different institutional equilibrium at a different point in time. [...] The narrative of analytic narratives establishes the actual and principal players, their goals, and their preferences while also illuminating the effective rules of the game, constraints, and incentives. Narrative is the story being told but as a detailed and textured account of context and process, with concern for both sequence and temporality.

> [t]he negative institutional and political context of local government – together with the absence of countervailing forces of citizen interest and capability to act and the lack of vibrant organisations able to mobilise and support citizen action – should have hindered the development of participatory budgeting practices in the region. Yet [...], citizens are participating in resource decisions of local governments across the region. (Fölscher, 2007: 134)

In the spirit of comparative political analysis, what we learn about Maputo's participatory budget (PB) may be able to provide insights into similar experiences in comparable cases elsewhere, and vice versa.[9]

Maputo's PB has been in place since 2008, thereby establishing a six-year 'track record' – as of the time of this research – that can be fruitfully analysed through a process tracing methodology (Faletti, 2006).[10] Moreover, Maputo's PB exists within an historical context of decentralising and democratising reforms in Mozambique (Weimer, 2012; Ames et al., 2010), the analysis of which may provide further insight into the 'why?,' the 'how?' and the 'so what?'.[11] Before we delve into the details of the case study, however, a brief presentation of the historical context of Maputo's PB is appropriate, followed by a review of the appropriate theoretical literature.

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9 'A range of countries and case studies allows preliminary conclusions to be drawn about how differences in the environment may affect the impact and sustainability of participatory budgeting' (Fölscher, 2007: 128).

I prefer the label 'competitive-authoritarian regime' over, for example, Reaud's 'post-conflict, new democracies' (2012) precisely because the word 'democracy' presupposes certain regime traits that simply have not existed in the Mozambican case prior to 2013 (when this manuscript was researched).

10 In 'theory-guided process tracing', a research method within the larger theoretical framework of historical-institutionalism – for example (Faletti, 2006) – the researcher starts with one or more theoretical-causal propositions that would seem to fit an observed real-world situation or 'outcome,' explicitly mapping out each one's suggested causal chain or 'trajectory' as well as the actors involved in the process (a process of deduction). These deduced 'chains' and actors (or models) are then compared with observed real-world chains/trajectories and actors in one or more case studies. These latter thereby operate as tests of the theoretical models.

Looking at Maputo's PB, we can describe as 'highly unlikely' both the 'bottom-up' and 'mutually constructed' 'against the machine' models based on Brazilian experiences in which the main protagonists are either CSOs ('bottom-up') or party-based government officials and CSOs – and/or previously active civil society and political society activists – acting in tandem ('mutually constructed') to design participatory institutional innovations around well-known ideas about participatory governance. These models are the foundation of most of the early literature on PBs, based as they were on the Brazilian and Latin American experiences. Such models are highly unlikely in Mozambique precisely because of the relative weaknesses of civil society and ideologically motivated political society in Mozambique alongside the relative ubiquity of a neo-patrimonial party-state essentially uninterested in fostering autonomous citizenship and collective action.

11 Tan (2009: 97), for example, sees Maputo's PB as an example of a broader process of development policy innovation beginning in Mozambique in the 1990s advocating for 'greater vertical accountability and broadening the institutions and processes of political representation'. In the words of a more recent policy analysis document, 'Mozambique has adopted an agenda of urban reform which can provide valuable lessons to consider in the development of an enabling environment for strategic planning' (United Cities & Local Government, 2009: 2).

2. Historical background: Mozambique

Mozambique's history as a Portuguese colony began in 1498 with the arrival of the first Portuguese explorers. For centuries, the Portuguese occupation mostly remained confined to a handful of coastal trading enclaves (gold, ivory and, increasingly, human slaves) with periodic military incursions into the interior. The twentieth century unfolded with growing levels of colonial occupation and control. The southernmost major city, Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo), became the colonial capital in 1902.[12] Colonial Mozambique increasingly modelled itself on the neighbouring white minority-ruled regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), but firmly within the vision of an overseas empire centred in Portugal. The governor's mansion (today's City Hall of Maputo), completed in 1945, had an inscription on its facade proclaiming '*Aqui é Portugal*' (This is Portugal). Following the Second World War, Portuguese settlers flocked to the colony.

Mozambique began its post-colonial path in 1974 following ten years of armed struggle on the part of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) against Portuguese military and secret police forces. When the Portuguese military mutinied against its own government that year, the reins of independent Mozambique were handed over to the Marxist, Soviet-aligned and fiercely nationalistic Frelimo leadership. The new government proceeded to implement a plan of socialist nation-building, based on centralised one-party rule, state ownership and management of the economy, and a 'high modernist' ideology (Scott, 1999) that interpreted all 'traditional' beliefs and practices to be retrograde and, therefore, unfit for the new nation. A severe lack of administrative capabilities (the Portuguese had seen fit to keep the vast majority of Mozambicans illiterate), Soviet-style economic policies (e.g. rural collectivisation and nationalisation of industries), and a growing discontent in some parts of the country with the government's attitudes to religion and 'tradition' fuelled the flames of an armed insurgency initiated in 1976 by the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), largely supplied and financed by Rhodesia and South Africa (Emerson, 2014). The resulting 16-year civil war devastated Mozambique's economy, wiped out much of its transportation and communications infrastructure, and displaced, impoverished or killed millions of Mozambicans.

Maputo's public administration at this time is described by one analyst (Grest, 1995) as top-down 'crisis management' taking place within a 'context of rapidly contracting resources and disastrous economic decline.'[13] Frelimo's 'democratic centralism' was a contradictory mix. On the one hand, 'popular participation' was a frequent watchword: 'Strong emphasis was placed on the organised participation of citizens as a way of overcoming problems

12 For a brief account of colonial public administration in Mozambique, and a more detailed account of developments in Maputo in the post-independence period of the 1970s and 1980s, see Grest (1995).

13 Subsequent quotes in this paragraph are also from Grest (1995).

in the towns. Citizens were to be organised at a number of levels. At the local level the *grupos dinamizadores* [neighbourhood-level activist cells] were to be the link between the Party and the state.' On the other hand, party authority was unquestioned: 'the head of the local administration remained a political appointment and the degree of control by the central government over local administration introduced by Frelimo consolidated and took to its logical conclusion the colonial system.' By the late 1970s, however, 'The *grupos dinamizadores* in neighbourhoods and workplaces, which had been fundamental in mobilising support for national liberation, were in a process of decay' (Fauvet & Mosse, 2004: 83 [my translation]). Hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into the cities fueled a process of uncoordinated urban sprawl.

With the end of white rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the winding down of the Cold War and the end of Soviet assistance, the Frelimo leadership ultimately abandoned socialism in favour of open markets and private investment (Pitcher, 2002). 'Simultaneous to the adoption of market-opening reforms, donors used the opportunity to promote political liberalization' and decentralisation (Reaud, 2012: 24), ultimately establishing the legal framework for a transition to a multiparty electoral system (1990 Constitution).[14] In 1992, an internationally brokered peace treaty was signed with Renamo. Since then, elections have been held for the presidency and the legislature (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014), for a growing number of 'autonomous' municipalities (1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013), and more recently for provincial assembly legislators (2009 and 2014).[15] Frelimo has dominated in all these elections, consistently winning the presidency and the national legislative majority as well as an overwhelming majority of municipal executive posts and provincial and municipal legislative majorities.[16] But electoral fraud, Frelimo's 'partisanisation' of the state (i.e. its virtual monopoly over Mozambique's state institutions, including the electoral machinery), electoral boycotts by Renamo in 1998 and in 2013, and periodic bouts of political violence – from both Renamo and Frelimo – have stained this otherwise promising story of Mozambique's political and economic transformation (Lalá & Osteheimer, 2003). 'Partisanisation' has also been active within Maputo's local-level administrative structures: in place of the old *grupos mobilizadores* are formally non-

14 Decentralisation of the 1990s was a 'key component' of the World Bank-managed economic restructuring plan that began in 1987, according to Reaud (2012: 24), citing the following: World Bank, Mozambique-Municipal Development Project, Project no. MZPE1806, Report no. PID8361, Appraisal date 19 February 2001.

15 'After FRELIMO had won the Parliament [in the 1994 general elections] with only a 17-seat margin, the party's leadership had second thoughts about extending democratic decentralisation to the rural areas, where RENAMO had its strongholds. This political calculation further solidified the bifurcated nature of Mozambican government: urban areas, which became decentralized and rural areas that experienced limited deconcentration. Law no. 10/97 designated 33 municipalities [where local leadership was decided via elections], with an additional 10 added by Law no. 3/2008' (Reaud, 2012: 25; Weimer, 2012). Three more '*autarcias*' were created in 2013.

16 Elections results here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Mozambique [last accessed: 2/9/2014]; also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Mozambique [last accessed: 2/9/2014].

partisan administrative structures – Neighbourhood Secretaries and Block Chiefs – almost all of whom also serve as local-level party leaders; at the same time, there was a resurgence of Frelimo party organisation, especially in the city's poorer *bairros,* beginning in the mid-2000s (Bowen & Helling, 2011: 4–8).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the promise and the uncertainty of Mozambique's political development combined with discoveries of vast stores of mineral wealth (primarily coal and natural gas) to provide fertile ground for an unprecedented influx of Western investments as well as development assistance, both public and private. Western interest was further bolstered following the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Eastern Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), the incidents of 9/11, and the growing lawlessness in and around Somalia and Yemen, all of which made the busy sea lanes along Mozambique's coast and the stability of the regime in Maputo, all the more worthy of concern. By 2007, the 'donor community' in Mozambique financed 54% of the country's budget (Scholz & Plagemann, (s.d.): 1);[17] in 2012, that figure stood at 40% (Mozambique Economy Profile, 2013; Reaud, 2012: 33-4). But these and other development funds came with strings attached, one of which committed the government to implement a series of 'good governance' reforms. And while the ambiguity of this term is undeniable, the basic premise was that Mozambique's Frelimo-dominated state needed to embrace greater degrees of decentralisation, transparency, accountability, and pluralistic participation (Canhanga, 2009: 96). In response, reformist elements within the party-state joined growing ranks of college graduates in numerous donor-funded projects throughout the country, including a concerted effort to prepare localities for municipal-level autonomy and elected leadership by 1998 (See Weimer, 2012; Canhanga, 2009). At the same time, donor-funded civil society organisation (CSOs) sprung up throughout the country, with some dedicated to supporting the 'good governance' reforms, and others more focused on addressing specific social issues (e.g. HIV/AIDS, women's health, land rights, etc.). Most if not all of these projects and efforts were marked by attempts to translate the general commitment to public participation and deliberation into specific 'participatory' processes of local-level policy-making and implementation. It was precisely in this context that Maputo's participatory budget was conceptualised and born, as will be more fully explored below.

Before jumping into that story, however, it behoves us to review the appropriate theoretical literature that touches on the two questions of this paper:

1. Why PB in a competitive-authoritarian regime?

2. What are the benefits – if any – of such a PB in such a context (i.e. so what)?

17 According to Sumich (2008: 116), 'foreign aid supplied around 60 per cent of the government budget between 2002 and 2004.'

3. Literature review

Almost all of the literature on PBs and other participatory innovations (PIs) follows a similar analytical layout. First, there are the normative arguments or justifications for why PBs and PIs *should* be implemented. This is what I have elsewhere called the 'participatory promise.'[18] We might also think of this as the 'So what?' discussion of why PBs and PIs actually matter, both to proponents in the field and to the authors of the literature. Second, there are empirical descriptions of the particular methodologies and institutional designs developed or borrowed and used in these cases. Finally, there comes the analysis of success/failure based on the ability of the case studies to live up to the relevant underlying participatory promise and/or, at the very least, on their ability simply to survive. Here, there is an emphasis on exploring the reasons and conditions behind that success/failure and then drawing lessons from that exploration which can be applied not only to the cases under study, but also to similar and comparable cases elsewhere.

The underlying normative framework behind PB: Three participatory promises

Goldfrank's (2007) discussion of four 'normative approaches' to PBs is a good place to begin to understand the apparent multiplicity of participatory promises. Only two of these approaches are actually pro-PB: the 'radical-democratic' approach, and the 'liberal' approach (pp.94–98). The first promotes and legitimates PIs and PBs for their ability to actively 'empower' otherwise disengaged and excluded citizens and, in so doing, to counter the normal elite-driven processes of contemporary representative democracies and thereby produce more 'emancipatory', majority-friendly public policies. The second approach is more conventional in that it sees PIs and PBs as useful mechanisms of citizen oversight in the construction and maintenance of functional (i.e. non-predatory and non-patrimonial) democratic-capitalist states; one study has called this 'the new accountability agenda' of mainstream political development theory and practice (Charlier & N'cho-Oguie, 2009: 221). I would argue that the differences between these two are mostly a matter of degree.[19]

18 'The Participatory Promise, celebrated in many of the first generation of studies of participatory budgeting in Brazil (from the 1990s to mid–2000s), resurrects the hope that human agency – democratic human agency – can and does matter even in the face of daunting historical, structural, and institutional rigidities' (Nylen, 2011: 481).

19 In my earlier work (Nylen, 2003: 29–34), I conflate these two into what I called a 'Neo-Tocquevillian' perspective: a combination of administrative decentralisation (increasing autonomy of local governments) and local-level civil society and partisan activism can create a more inclusive and pluralistic, less elitist, public sphere and dialog, ultimately leading to more inclusive and less elite-driven public policies.

Much of the so-called first wave (Nylen, 2011) of writings about PBs in the 1990s and early 2000s was infused with the same 'radical-democratic' discourse as was espoused by the Workers' Party activists and intellectuals in Brazil with whom most of this generation of scholars worked and studied both in the field and in university seminar rooms.[20] Scholarship entailed linking the emerging practice of PBs and other PIs with an appropriate theoretical literature about the inadequacies of real-world liberal representative democracy, or 'polyarchy,' and the 'empowering' and democratising qualities of more participatory institutions (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984; Habermas, 1989; Putnam, 1993, 1995). For some (e.g. Abers, 2000; Nylen, 2003), progressive political agents in the form of the Workers' Party and its activists were given prominence of place in PB's idealisation and construction. For others (Avritzer, 2002), PBs and PIs were seen as the fruits of a new political consciousness and activism (characterised as a new 'civil society' or 'public sphere') that emerged during and immediately following Brazil's protracted authoritarian rule, and that subsequently were drawn into the democratic regime and party institutions that these 'participatory publics' helped to construct. Whether 'top down' or 'bottom up' – or both (Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler, 2007), the underlying normative foundation of both PB scholarship and real-world PB proponents was solidly **'radical-democratic'**: participatory institutions were (and should be) designed to emancipate previously excluded citizens from their political lethargy and passive 'client-ship' (Taylor, 2004) – learned from generations of being treated as subjects of elite political manipulations – by 'empowering' them through practices of open deliberation over public policies that directly matter to their daily lives. Transformed in this way, once-passive subjects are seen to become active agents in the ongoing construction of the larger political and social systems as a whole (i.e. regime democratisation). 'Citizens play a lead role here, and social movements often make use of this model where they aspire to help bring about fundamental change' (Sintomer et al., 2010: 63).

In subsequent waves of PB writings, scholars tended to be less convinced of the more transformative dreams of radical democrats. While some explored the more 'rational' political-instrumental underpinnings of PB and PI implementation (to be discussed below), and others remained true to their radical-democratic roots (Chavez, 2008; Rückert, 2007; Cammack, 2004 – all cited in Goldfrank, 2012), a new literature emerged from practitioner-scholars of 'governance,' largely sponsored by such international organisations as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (Baud, 2004; Shah, 2007). **The 'liberal' participatory promise** of this literature can be seen in the presentation of 'political development' in terms of the decentralisation of decision-making authority, increasing citizen engagement and, ultimately, increasing government accountability:[21] 'One of the hopes for participatory budgeting initiatives is

20 'The early ideological motivations for adopting participatory budgeting represent only one of four distinct normative approaches to the subject (a radical democratic approach)' (Goldfrank, 2007: 94).

21 'The need for accountability is legitimised in the notion of representation, which in governance terms means that those selected to act in the name of the people are answerable to the people for their successes and failures. Accountability in turn rests on knowledge and information – transparency –

that with careful design and targeted support they can initiate positive change in the political and governance environment, particularly by whetting citizens' appetite for positive, empowered engagement with the state and contestable government' (Shah, 2007: 11). 'Social and political exclusion are challenged, as low-income and traditionally excluded political actors are given the opportunity to make policy decisions' that directly benefit them (Wampler, 2007: 22). While contributing to the reduction of poverty and social exclusion, PBs and PIs can act as additional 'checks and balances' against corrupt and bureaucratically bloated 'patrimonial' states. The latters' propensities to benefit state elites and their select allies at the expense of all others generate periodic explosions of social unrest and violence which ultimately threaten processes of economic and social development in those same states and undermine the stability of the international economy as a whole. I would argue that this ultimate concern for regime and systemic stability [rooted in a Madisonian/Dahlian pluralistic equilibrium (Held, 2006: 158-79)], rather than citizen emancipation and empowerment as ends in and of themselves or as means towards systemic transformation, constitutes the dividing line between these first two participatory promises – though, again, it is a somewhat blurred line, in my view.

A third participatory promise calls on academics/theorists, on the one hand, and public administrators/'engineers,' on the other, to recognise that, in the eyes of actual political actors overseeing the implementation of PBs and PIs (or those contemplating their implementation), radical-democratic and liberal promises are rarely convincing on their own merits.[22] The political rationality of such actors – elected or appointed officials, high-ranking public administrators, etc. – is one of staying in power and doing so in the easiest and most cost-effective ways possible. If they come to perceive PBs and PIs as useful in that regard (e.g. as a means to readily distinguish their party or candidacy from others, or as a means to construct a grassroots coalition of support, or as a means to garner resources

and on institutional arrangements that create incentives for public officials to act faithfully, efficiently, and honestly in carrying out the will of the people. The framework highlights contestability in the selection of public officials and the fostering of an ethic of public service as key ingredients in support of accountability' (Fölscher, 2007: 245).

Referring to Mozambique in the late 1980s and 1990s, Sumich (2008: 118) argues that 'International agencies and most donor countries operated under the assumption that ' democracy was expected to bring greater accountability, better governance, and improved economic management and performance' [quoting C. Manning, The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratisation, 1992–2000 (WestPoint & London, Praeger, 2002)].

For a useful review of the literature, as well as a history of the concept of democracy promotion 'from outside' (i.e. by external donors), see Reinhard (2010); Harrison (2001); Youngs (2001); Crawford (2003a, 2003b).

Ikelegbe (2001: 2–5) calls this the 'civil society paradigm' vis-à-vis the postcolonial authoritarian state and the 'democratisation project.' He also calls it Western 'romanticism'.

22 In the words of Shah (2007: 4): 'If the goal of participation is to have an impact on public sector decisions, then pro-participation arguments must understand the perspective of government and how it influences whether they are supportive of participation and willing to listen to public feedback. Understanding the administrative perspective raises the question of how participation can be fostered when the government is hostile to it.'

from international donors), then we can say that such policies are, indeed, 'rational' – or to stay within our conceptual framework, that they are politically 'promising'.[23] Meanwhile, in terms of political rationality 'from below,' '[c]itizens are willing to give their time to this process if they believe that the outcomes will benefit them' (Wampler, 2007: 35).

The rationalist/instrumental participatory promise pulls us away from a theoretical/philosophical or technocratic bias in some of the literature by forcing us to recognise the instrumental dimension of PBs and PIs, one in which participatory governance becomes 'a new way of networking' (Baud, 2004: 13) for all involved. In Brazil's Belo Horizonte and in the nearby industrial town of Betim, for example, I discovered that most active participants in their respective PBs in the late 1990s were civil society and partisan activists (Nylen, 2002); the PBs in which they took part could therefore be seen as a means of keeping such activists engaged with the party-in-government by elevating them to an official status of representing their respective neighbourhoods. In other cases of what I would call 'participatory grandstanding' or 'participatory window dressing,' PBs essentially provide a discursive cover and a new technique for carrying out traditional patronage-based clientelist politics (Selee, 2009) or simply for pleasing international donors currently enamoured with PBs and PIs (Sintomer et al., 2010).

Many times, however, PBs and PIs do not seem to make (instrumentally rational) sense at all. Talking about the PB experience in São Paulo, Brazil, for example, one high-level official commented, 'citizens, especially in poor neighbourhoods, were solely concerned with immediate material demands' rather than the promises and time-consuming complexities of the PB, (Singer, quoted in Tranjan, forthcoming: 224). In experiences of participatory planning in rural Botswana, Bar-On (2001: 62) similarly argues that 'as long as those on the edge are dependent on government for many of their needs, they are likely better to appreciate the service provider who can deliver 'the goods' than one who facilitates processes with uncertain products.' Such seemingly 'senseless' PBs and PIs, alert us to the dangers of adopting a one-sided instrumentalist bias. Why undertake PBs or PIs if the targeted beneficiaries do not really care – if all they really want is just a handout?

23 Peruzzotti and Selee (2009) argue that 'the reasons for implementation [of most PIs discussed in their edited volume] had little to do with ideology' and much more to do with 'short-term strategic considerations' on the part of embattled political elites in the hope that they might 'reaffirm their legitimacy or rebuild their political coalitions.' [pp. 10–11] Tan (2009: 98) clarifies the logic: 'As budgets have a direct impact on people's lives, through either taxation or public expenditure, political parties have sought actively to court the support of social groups or social movements, especially in revenue allocation policies, in order to build new political alliances or generate greater political support.' Similarly, Montero and Samuels (2004) point out the strategising behaviour of politicians supporting decentralisation reforms in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. In the concluding paragraph of her chapter, Shall (2007: 222) recognises that while increasing 'the number and range of projects implemented by local authorities that have a direct impact on communities involved in the participation process [...] participation has also improved relations between citizens and local authorities, as citizens feel that local authorities have become more transparent and trustworthy.'

It turns out that some real-world actors *really are* 'irrationally' motivated by radical-democratic or liberal participatory promises (Nylen, 2003: chap. 8; Rivera-Ottenberger, 2009). The passionate commitment to PBs and PIs on the part of government officials, for example, who put in long hours (evenings and weekends), travel to distant and/or dangerous urban zones, and who do so making significantly less money than they could in private sector jobs for which they are imminently qualified is all evidence of the 'irrational' power of deeply held beliefs, principles, values, ideologies, and 'promises.' If we are trying to understand the motivations behind the implementation of PBs and PIs in any given instance, we cannot simply assume *a priori* that all relevant actors are motivated purely for instrumental gain.

From universalism to comparable universes

> Though many scholars suggest generically that the design of participatory budgeting should be adapted to local circumstances, there is little theorizing about how context affects designs. (Goldfrank, 2007: 100)
>
> While there is a large and increasing body of literature *describing* the application of PB and its different variants in various countries, there is a lack of *systematic* approaches that would discuss the applicability and suitability of the various models of PB in different *contexts*. (Krenjova & Raqudla, 2012: 3)

In trying to understand the specific explanations behind a case like Maputo's PB, it is important to recognise that not all PB experiences are comparable. What makes Maputo's PB striking, for example, is precisely the fact that it occurs in the context of a competitive-authoritarian regime. Most of the literature on PBs and PIs is still rooted in Latin American cases – especially the Brazilian case – that would seem to offer little in terms of comparative implications. Certainly, the most celebrated case of Porto Alegre, with its pre-PB history of CSO activism and left-leaning politics, is now widely recognised to be of limited use as a model for cases where such factors are not present (i.e. almost everywhere else!) (See Baiocci, 2005; Wampler, 2008; Avritzer, 2009; Goldfrank, 2012). But the democratising context of most Latin American cases – particularly the existence of an electorally viable political opposition committed to electoral politics, and a relatively clean electoral process – is generally taken for granted in the literature; yet almost by definition such a political context is at best an open question in competitive-authoritarian regimes. By the same token, the 'critical' advocacy role played by many CSOs throughout Latin America (as opposed to the politically passive role of co-providers of public services), is also not likely to be shared in competitive-authoritarian regimes.[24] Meanwhile, conspicuous by their

24 'Advocacy-oriented' CSOs are in contrast to 'service-oriented' CSOs. The latter generally end up serving the ends of local governments for the delivery of services. Service-oriented CSOs may be part of civil

absence from most Latin American cases are the international NGOs and the donors' aid organisations that are ubiquitous throughout Africa, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe as the main advocates of PBs and PIs since the 1990s (Fölscher, 2007; Goldfrank, 2012).[25]

A read through the by now voluminous literature on PBs and PIs, in Latin America and throughout the world, reveals a dozen or so factors that turn up repeatedly as means to explain the successful or unsuccessful implementation of given cases of PBs and PIs. I have divided those factors into the familiar structure/agency dichotomy in Table 1 (below). It is not my intent here to test these hypothesised factors, but simply to list those that have already emerged, repeatedly in most cases, from such empirical testing and analysis. Set alongside these factors, are what we know, *a priori*, about the universe of competitive-authoritarian regimes, and what will be presented, below, about the Maputo case study. Without delving deeply into the details, it will suffice to point out the 'hybrid' nature of competitive-authoritarian regimes, as exemplified by the Maputo case study (again, details forthcoming). Some of the traits indicated in the literature as important in explaining the emergence and success of PBs and PIs are present in Maputo, while some are not – thus the importance of looking at this case in closer detail.

society, but they are far more functional to the maintenance of the political status quo than to any kind of transformation of that status quo based on advocating for the rights and interests of the otherwise underserved and underrepresented.

25 The main exception is Peru, as recognised by Goldfrank (2012), but left out of McNulty's (2011) analysis.

Table 1: Why implement and maintain PBs/PIs?

'[D]esigners' intentions and preexisting local conditions' (Shah, 2007: 5): Agency & Structure	Presence in C-A Regimes	PB-Maputo Case Study
STRUCTURE[26]		
Regime Type: democratic or democratising context [especially 'developed political party systems' {Shah, 2007: 7)]: PB & PIs as coalition-building & 'branding' project for electoral competition (rationality argument)	Minimal	Minimal (intra-party primary elections)
Agents' 'Location' within the Regime: Opposition agents 'from outside' the status quo power structure → 'transformative' PB/PIs versus Situation agents 'from inside' → 'conservative' PBs/PIs	Situation/ conservative (most likely)	Situation/ conservative
Historical-Institutional 'Critical Juncture' → window of opportunity for participatory reforms (helps explain the puzzle of reforms → devolution of power)	An empirical question	Yes: early 1990s to mid-2000s
Political Decentralisation: local-level fiscal & political/electoral autonomy → potential for local authorities to experiment with PBs/PIs; also allows 'bargaining between subnational and national political elites' (McNulty 2011: 11)	An empirical question	Moderate
Political-economy: sufficient budgetary resources must exist and be allocated to PB for it to function (i.e. for it to be rational for citizens to participate: they get something tangible out of participating)	An empirical question	Minimal
Local Political Culture: citizens and political leaders are 'driven by issues of public policy' (Shah, 2007: 9) or 'social capital' of cooperation	No	No
Ideas & Development Models (international 'ideational' structures): participatory developmentalism in 1980s and beyond	Yes	Yes
PBs or PIs Mandates: local governments are legally required to implement PBs or PIs, encouraged to do so, or merely allowed?	An empirical question	Allowed[27]

26 Structural factors are sometimes called 'environmental variables [...] that influence PB process and hence the choice of PB model' (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 11–16).

'We divide the variables that influence PB process and hence the choice of PB model into two main categories: country-level and local-level. The country-level variables include the degree of financial autonomy and political culture. These are the factors that influence which of the PB models could fit the local governments in any particular country as a whole. Also, these country level variables can be also regarded as conditions conducive to PB; i.e. they make it more likely that PB can be implemented. Next, since PB is primarily practiced on a local level, the second category of the environment variables concerns the characteristics of a local municipality: size, diversity, and prosperity. Depending on their variations on the local level different PB models can appear to be better applicable than others' (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 11).

27 'The Constitution of Mozambique defines the legal framework for decentralisation and the ways in which municipalities are set up. It enshrines civic participation as one of the national values for local development.

The legal and institutional framework for local authorities is set out in the Municipal Law. According to this law, municipal assemblies are to establish civic participation, promote accountability, and improve coordination between the central and local governments. The participatory development approach is not mandatory' (Shall, 2007: 193).

'[D]esigners' intentions and preexisting local conditions' (Shah, 2007: 5): Agency & Structure	Presence in C-A Regimes	PB-Maputo Case Study
Executive (Mayoral) Interest & Leadership	An empirical question	Variable
Civil Society: active and autonomous 'advocacy' CSOs → coalition partners (leadership and participating activists) with implementing Government ==> 'interactive participatory designs' (Avritzer, 2009: 65).	No	No
Administrative Dedication/Commitment: participatory ideology & professionalism among implementing public administrative staff	An empirical question	Yes
Absence of a 'Withering' Opposition (to nip PB in the bud) (Goldfrank, 2007)	Yes	Yes
Political Society: participatory democratic party (partisan mobilisation ≠ citizen participation): e.g. Workers' Party (Brazil), United Front (Uruguay)[28]	No	No
External Assistance (World Bank)[29]	An empirical question	Yes

28 While not all PBs emerge from such parties, most do. Some non-leftist mayors/executives can and do extract from the 'ideational structure,' international or local, ideas and models that one might not expect them to adopt.

29 The presence of the World Bank, or other international organisations, seems to be a crucial factor for most non-Latin American cases.

4. Three hypotheses: Why PB-Maputo?

So why *would* PB emerge in Maputo or in any other comparable competitive-authoritarian regime? And how would such a PB reflect its underlying participatory promise (and, therefore, its relative success or failure in practice)?

Given the nature of the competitive-authoritarian regime type and the economic context of a poor but 'dependent developing' country**, the first hypothesis** that readily presents itself in the eyes of most casual observers – and the one that I encountered most often among those unfamiliar with the actual policy – is that Maputo's PB is, and always has been, a façade: '*para o inglês ver*' (to impress/fool foreigners, especially donors) and/or '*para o povo ver*' (to impress/fool citizens, especially voters). Sintomer et al. (2010: 63) describe such PBs as 'largely of a symbolic nature and in which there is a yawning gap between the proclaimed objective and the reality. [...] Participation is designed to placate the population and/or international financial donors.'[30]

This hypothesis is validated primarily by the virtual absence of advocacy-style civil society organisations – one of the primary agents of PBs elsewhere – in competitive-authoritarian regimes like Mozambique:

> [T]he nature and organisation of the political system help determine the level and quality of participation of citizen groups or lobbies (the civil society environment) and the nature and power of the state (the local government environment). [...] Informal political systems affect the incentive structure for citizen engagement: if citizens perceive that participation is likely to be ineffective given the nature of power and the distribution of power in society, they are unlikely to engage.[31]

Another hypothesis-validating characteristic of competitive-authoritarian regimes is the 'partisanisation' of most if not all critical parts of the state (e.g. electoral systems, state bureaucracies, etc.) and even the partisanisation of many 'private' sector activities (Hanlon & Smart, 2008). There is every reason to believe that Maputo's PB would also be highly

30 'A more common perspective among developing-country governments sees participation in the budget process as being politically obligatory, or even politically advantageous, but of little practical significance. Governments use participatory rhetoric and limited gestures toward increased budget transparency and community budget consultations to assuage donors and reduce tensions with civil society, but they may not meaningfully engage with the process—at least initially' [Heimans (2002) cited in Moynihan (2007: 79)].

'Such processes can mask the undemocratic, exclusive, or elite nature of public decision making, giving the appearance of broader participation and inclusive governance while using public funds to advance the interests of powerful elites' (Shah, 2007: 1).

31 'When parties are still based on 'personalism and clientelism', lack policy platforms, and rely instead on the politics of identity, civil society groups are less likely to gain an effective voice' [Goetz & Gaventa (2001) cited in Fölscher (2007: 133–134)].

partisanised and, therefore, an instrument of partisan mobilisation or manipulation rather than empowerment or oversight.[32] Finally, in the literature on the nature of machine-style partisan politics in Mozambique, many observers note a clear sense of ownership of the country on the part of Frelimo elites.[33] Frelimo has dominated Maputo politics since national independence in 1974. The original leadership of the party itself was largely composed of people from Maputo and the surrounding southern provinces (Ncuomo, 2013; Sumich, 2008). Not only had Frelimo never come close to losing a municipal election in Maputo until November 2013, but its party structures (neighbourhood-level party headquarters and block-level party 'cells') are distributed throughout the city and are fully integrated into the local-level administrative structures of the municipal government (neighbourhood secretaries and block-level 'chiefs'). It is precisely these partisanised administrative structures that are the implementing agencies of Maputo's PB.

At the same time, Sumich (2008: 116) discusses how 'changing political circumstances that have accompanied the liberal transition have made it imperative for the state to appear legitimate in the eyes of the resource-providing international community.' Mozambique has relied on Western donors for a large percentage of the national government's operating budget; and municipalities rely on the national government for most of their operating budgets.[34] The donors, as discussed above, are driven by the 'liberal' participatory promise,

32 An illustrative example:
'Andrews (2004) finds that officials in Mozambique claimed that participation efforts, in the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – the PARPA process – during the 1990s, were consistent with a tradition of public consultation but were actually characterised by a bias toward including groups with technical or financial backgrounds and strong connections to government. Broader civil society, NGOs, local governments, and citizens were poorly represented. Government departments defended their approach by pointing to the difficulty of interacting with civil society within a limited timeline. NGOs that were consulted complained that they were included only to rubberstamp decisions that had already been made. This suggests that the involvement of some participants was for symbolic purposes only. Another indicator of the symbolic approach was the very limited time for consultation, which provided little room for actual dialogue. Local leaders had little sense of the purpose of the planning and little possibility to access resources. They were therefore not motivated to hold the government accountable for the way resources were allocated. 'Citizens have no idea that these funds even exist, or that a plan to improve their lives is in place, and thus they have no expectations or demands of government. Their relationship with the authorities can best be described as a 'hope and pray' approach (Andrews 2004, p. 27)' (Moynihan, 2007: 64).

33 *'No próprio entendimento do partido e da elite do partido no poder, o partido é quem molda, é o fazedor de facto da história contemporânea de Moçambique e é, assim, num certo sentido, o 'dono do país.'* (Weimer, Macuane & Buur, 2012: 38, 39–44)'. For a concrete example, see the explanation for the outcomes in Cuamba's 'participatory planning' exercise (with 75% of final vote in hands of party and government faithful) and Montepuez (where final votes are 100% in hands of party-affiliated neighbourhood-level 'leaders') as told by Canhanga (2009: 111–14). His conclusion: '*Como efeito, na falta de grupos independentes organizados e interventivos, associada ainda à ausência de uma consciência consolidada sobre a importância da participação, a organização da planificação participativa faz com que este processo seja um monopólio das estruturas do poder local, que, consequentemente, enfraquecem as noções de social accountability, colaboração e coordenação na formulação de políticas públicas*' (Canhanga, 2009: 113).

34 'Municipalities received on average 42 percent of their revenue from the central government in 2007'

in part, as a means to achieve greater accountability of their donations. Since the 1990s, they have invested greatly in instances of 'participatory planning' and consultation in Mozambique.[35] At the same time, they periodically warn recipients – especially the Mozambican government – that aid and support can be withdrawn if actual policies do not reflect that promise. Meanwhile, international NGOs perform or help to fund a wide variety of services in the areas of health, education, infrastructure ... just about everything that less donor-dependent governments carry out on their own. In short, bilateral and non-government donors (or 'foreign partners') are an integral part of the local economic and political systems. Local NGOs and CSOs often compete for international donor funds to deliver these services (and to receive the accompanying salaries and related perks such as international travel). There is an often-remarked tendency on their part not to stray from their funded issue areas, and certainly not to either 'get political' or otherwise jeopardise current or future access to donor and/or government funding.[36]

Such is the instrumentalist-rationalistic nature of this first hypothesis. If the foreign partners want more public participation, the foreign partners get *the appearance* of more public participation.[37] And a great deal of the local-level NGOs and CSOs are likely to simply go along with such appearances so as not to upset the apple cart. Obviously, if this hypothesis were to be true, the 'So what?' question would be clear: the 'private' benefits of the PB-Maputo (in terms of patronage, primarily, but also in terms of positive public image) would be plentiful, while the public benefits would be scarce.

A **second hypothesis** is equally 'rationalistic' but less laden with the cynicism of people and entire organisations simply going through the motions for their own short-term gains. This hypothesis begins with an observation that not all citizens (or donors, for that matter) are so easily fooled by appearances without substance. It proceeds by recognising that the contemporary urbanisation of poverty and insecurity throughout the world generates huge demands on states. A given state's failure to respond with adequate public policies, and/or to do so with a primarily repressive character, tends to result in increasingly violent

(Reaud, 2010: 33). Meanwhile, the central government '*gastou, em média, menos de 5% da despesa nacional ao nível subnacional (distritos e municípios)*' (Weimer, 2012: 72).

35 See Borowczak and Weimer (2012). For example, 'The Mozambican government on 25 May 2002 signed an agreement with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), under which these UN agencies will support for three years a project for decentralised planning and finance in the northern provinces of Nampula and Cabo Delgado. [...]In the short term, the project intends to increase access by rural communities to basic public infrastructures and services through decentralisation, participatory planning, and institutional and financial capacity building carried out locally' [Mozambique News Agency – AIM Reports, 5 May, 2002].

36 See, for example, cases in Eastern Europe (Fölscher, 2007: 143).

37 Goldfrank (2007: 93–94) lists the cases of Bolivia, Nicaragua and Guatemala implementing PB-like experiences 'in order to receive debt relief funds from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC II) programme starting in 2000.'

'civic conflict' – a legitimacy crisis with a vengeance.[38] This hypothesis is primarily rooted in the work of Beall et al. (2011), who argue that:

> violent civic conflict: a) is generally linked to state failures to provide security, growth and welfare in urban areas; b) consists of violent events that may be isolated or connected by a sustained organised campaign or set of political demands; c) rarely involves an attempt to take permanent control of the state, even in part; and d) is consequently less 'all or nothing' or 'indivisible' (Hirschmann, 1994; Di John, 2008, 2010) than sovereign and civil conflict and thus, in theory, more amenable to resolution. (Beall et al., 2011: 7)

Brown (2005: 189) argues that this is understood by donors and ex-pat communities as well:

> Unlike mass demonstrations for political reform in Eastern Europe in 1989–90, African popular mobilisations ignite a fear of the mob and the sense that anything could happen. Donors and domestic elites are concerned with potential violence, loss of life, populist or socialist policies, property damage, impaired production, interruptions of trade, increased refugee flows or missed debt repayments.

Referring explicitly to riots in Maputo in 2008 and 2010 that occurred due to government-mandated price hikes in food and transportation costs, 'FRELIMO's experience in Maputo illustrates how a loss of faith in the state after a period of raised expectations can drive civic conflict.' (Beall et al., 2011: 16).[39] The final point here is that 'contestation – understood as an inevitable condition and consequence of development and change – can either be channelled destructively through *conflict* (understood as violent conflict) or in a more constructive way through generative forms of *engagement*' (Beall et al. 2011: 7; 13–14).

The implicit hypothesis with respect to Maputo's PB, then, is one of 'defensive engagement' via participatory budgeting in the face of a growing legitimacy crisis of the local state.[40] As the city registers increasing levels of criminality and other forms of 'civic conflict', and as the

38 '... in relative terms at least, there is a global trend towards ... civic conflict. Fundamentally urban in character this form of conflict, when allowed to become violent and destructive, arguably represents an enormous contemporary threat to human security worldwide' (Beall et al., 2011: 3).

39 It is also important to remember that Frelimo was strongly challenged in the national elections of 1994 and 1999. In the latter year, it's highly probable that Frelimo won the presidency only through fraud (see Weimer, 2012: 43). Thereafter, fewer and fewer Mozambicans have bothered to vote in national elections (see De Brito, 2007, 2008).

40 'In the global North governance is understood as a response to the complexity of problems that cannot be solved by government alone, while in older and newer democracies across the North and South there is a concern to strengthen the democratic deficit. As a result of these developments, governments have been motivated to create 'new governance spaces' to which a range of non-governmental actors are invited' (Howard & Lever, 2011: 3).

A similar argument is made for the case of 'participatory rural planning' in Botswana in the early 1990s, in Bar-On (2001).

standard means of response – on the one hand, employment and partisan patronage, on the other, the police – are not sufficient, then the local state can step up to the situation with additional 'generative forms of engagement' to help defuse the situation. PBs and PIs can be seen in such a light.[41] The key to their success or failure lies in citizens' rational responses to such offers of participation 'from above'. The logic of the hypothesis is clear:

> Civic engagement and political mobilisation are not important simply for their own sake: they are steps towards developmental state building and transformation. [...] To achieve this in fragile states the challenge is to change the logic of politics from one which is either about violent conflict or its suppression to one involving a reinvigoration of creative political contestation, and this is where cities and metropolitan government become important. One side of the fragile state coin is the incapacity of states to respond to demands, but the other is that populations do not demand enough of the state, *largely because the mechanisms are not in place for them to do so.* (Beall et al., 2011: 21, emphasis added)

One can easily imagine that international donors, with their ever-present concerns for stability, would find it easy to promote or support such arguments. 'Conflictual processes of inclusionary adaptation,' after all, are not only entirely consistent with the liberal participatory promise of pluralistic accountability (discussed above), but they lie at the heart of the histories of democratic development in most Western democracies.[42] Under this hypothesis, the donors are not dupes, but partners in long-term crisis management.

Finally, Moynihan (2007: 83) reminds us that many public administrators in such a setting, regardless of their partisan affiliations, personally feel the impact of 'their' state's legitimacy crisis, and can be expected to 'rationally' promote PBs and PIs as well:

> Participation also increases public support of administrators and programs (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2000). Unpopular agencies can use participation to improve their image (Kweit & Kweit 1981; McNair, Caldwell & Pollane 1983). Participatory forums may be designed to increase the perception that public organisations are more consultative, lending an air of democratic legitimacy to the government's activities. (Frederickson, 1982)[43]

41 In Africa, for example, 'participation in budgetary processes [...] has increased the number of projects that directly benefit communities and correspond to the priorities identified through the participation process. Relationships between citizens and local authorities have improved, and citizens have a more positive attitude toward and better understanding of the local authority' (Shall, 2007: 213).

42 Reference is to Nylen (2003: 2–4) and is based on a 'process definition of democracy' or 'democracy as democratisation' ('a conflictual process of inclusionary adaptation'); similarly presented by Bobbio (1987), Dalton (2002) and Marshall (1950), among numerous others.

43 Similarly, 'civic participation has increased the number and range of local projects that have a direct impact on communities that are involved in the participation process. Participation has also improved relations between citizens and local authorities, as citizens feel that local authorities have become more transparent and trustworthy' (Shall, 2007: 10).

The answer to the 'So what?' question – the benefits of PB-Maputo – would depend on the level of public participation in the programme, and on the extent to which citizens are satisfied not only with the performance of the PB itself, but also with the city administration in general, given that this hypothesis sees the former as a means to improve the image of the latter.

A **third hypothesis** to explain the emergence and survival of Maputo's PB is rooted in the historical-institutional and 'path dependency' literature (Skocpol, 1979; Collier & Collier, 1991; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003; Fernandes, 2002, 2007; Falleti, 2010; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) and is the most hopeful of the three in terms of the PB's democratising potential.[44] This literature interprets institutional change, from reform to revolution, as emerging during historical 'windows of opportunity' when the normal course of institutional operations and social order is somehow disrupted – usually as a result of some kind of crisis. During such 'critical junctures,' the sociopolitical networks and institutional regimes constituting the previous status quo (the '*ancien régime*') become susceptible to previously unlikely or even unimaginable transformations. As 'old' elite coalitions falter, new previously excluded or 'effectively restrained' actors step into the fray attempting to inject their own ideas and interests into the temporarily uncertain political system. New elite coalitions and networks form – or old ones reinstate themselves – and work to establish a new set of institutional guidelines and practices, thereby shutting the window to further reforms. Thelen (2009: 474) calls this the 'punctuated equilibrium model of change.'

In the Mozambican case, such an analytical framework has been fruitfully used by Weimer (2012) to analyse and explain the country's liberalisation and decentralisation efforts starting in the late 1980s and continuing into the mid-2000s.[45] Identifying a 'reformist wing' and a 'conservative wing' within the Frelimo ruling party, Weimer argues that the Rome Peace Accords of 1992 that ended the 16-year war with Renamo constituted a critical juncture that allowed reformers, with ample international assistance and support from both academic circles and bureaucratic cadres (not to mention a war-weary public), to initiate a 'radical and inclusive' model of democratic decentralisation, among several other democratic reforms emerging at this time – for example *Lei de Imprensa de 1991* (Press Freedoms Law), *Lei de Associações de 1991* (Freedom of Association Law). This reformist coalition, according to Weimer, envisioned decentralisation as a means to construct meaningful and lasting links between the heretofore highly centralised party-state and the

44 'A path-dependent argument focuses on the sequence of events in any given historical account. Its basic assumption is that once a particular event transpires, be it a war, election, revolution, or important decision, the course of events that succeeds it is altered forever' [Landman, 2008: 103; also see Thelen's excellent and brief characterisation of the literature (2009: 474)].

45 Another version of this analytical framework can be found in the 'policy network' literature as applied to societies 'undergoing democratic transition,' as outlined by Lindell (2008: 1881–1882) and applied to Maputo's 'urban governance' in the 1990s and 2000s.

citizenry – links that had been severely tested if not broken during the war years.[46] Two years later, however, in the first general elections of 1994, Renamo received far more votes in the rural and minerals-rich northern parts of the country than had been expected. These 'threatening' results in the eyes of many Frelimo leaders sealed the fate of the reformers' version of decentralisation, though they did not end decentralisation, per se.

> [T]o the extent that a full retreat from the reformist strategy of decentralisation was seen as a potential political embarrassment, considering, on the one hand, the widespread and popular expectations of a genuine reform of local government and, on the other hand, the support given to this process by key donors like the World Bank and the GTZ [Germany's development agency], Frelimo opted for a mixed commitment to deconcentration (for district governments) [administrative decentralisation at the district/county level, but no elections for leadership] and decentralisation (for urban areas/municipalities) [with elections for leadership] – the latter with a clear tendency to vote for Frelimo. (Weimer, 2012: 87–88; author's translation)

This story is illustrative of two important agency-centred dynamics implicit in this hypothesis: first, is the intra-party competition between party factions (in this case, 'reformists' and 'conservatives') and the availability of 'outside' allies that skew that conflict in favour of one group over another; second, is the fact that new institutions emerging from this critical juncture, even if subsequently altered, are rarely eliminated.[47] Accordingly, the answer to the 'So what?' question regarding the benefits of the PB-Maputo would relate to the contribution of the programme to the intra-party competition that helped to spawn it, and to the broader social and political implications (Who benefits?) of the continued existence of the programme six years after it began.

All three of these hypotheses reflect the broader transition in the literature on PBs and PIs from an initial emphasis on ideological and philosophical participatory promises to more instrumentalist-rationalist understandings of their origins and their practical appeal. All three hypothesise that participatory ideologies and philosophies – in a competitive-authoritarian context – are 'useful' towards attaining a desired 'rational' end *other than* citizen empowerment, pluralism or democratisation:

46 At this point, one should note the similarity between the logic underlying the actions of these reformers and the logic behind the second hypothesis discussed above. The difference is that this third hypothesis concentrates on the critical juncture as the 'opportunity structure' (Tarrow, 1994) that allows these reformers to act on that logic in the face of a diminished presence of 'conservative' elites in the party and military establishment.

47 Oft-observed organisational self-preservation dynamics are expressions of the interests of bureaucrats and others involved (e.g. party patrons and donors) in maintaining the salaries, prestige and perks that come with state employment, especially in a high-unemployment context, as well as the corresponding functions.

- To 'cynically' give the *appearance* of a functioning PB in order to impress the donor community and any voters who might value the liberal participatory promise; and, ultimately, in order to enjoy the salaries and perks, and to distribute the benefits to friends, family and partisan allies.

- To 'defensively' reconnect the local party-state to an alienated population increasingly subject to, and prone to, civic violence; and to do so in a face-to-face manner with benefits going beyond the usual partisans.

- To 'proactively' take advantage of a window of opportunity (a 'critical juncture') to connect reformist elements of the local party-state to an alienated population; and to do so in a face-to-face manner with benefits going beyond the usual partisans – with consequent institutions unlikely to be undone following a subsequent return to a 'new normal' ('path dependency').

Let us now turn to a close analysis of the case study history to see how these hypotheses stand the test of a real-world situation of a PB in a competitive-authoritarian regime.

5. Maputo's participatory budget

The city of Maputo, with a 2007 population of 1 094 315 inhabitants, is spread across 134 square miles and divided into seven *distritas* (districts or boroughs) and 63 *bairros* (neighbourhoods).[48] 'Maputo contributes over 30% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and has an estimated GDP per capita of US$ 1,457 compared to a national GDP per capita of US$ 332. However, it is also a city of growing inequality with approximately 70% of its residents living in informal settlements and 54% living below the poverty line' (Bowen & Helling, 2011: 1). The responsibilities of municipal governments in Mozambique 'include installation and maintenance of rural and urban infrastructures, such as markets and fairs and cemeteries, basic sanitation, distribution of electricity, transportation and communication, education, parks and recreation, health, care of vulnerable populations, and environmental management.'[49] A World Bank report written in the mid-to-late 2000s (Wampler, 2009) indicated that in many, if not all, of these areas, Maputo was in dire need of reconstruction:

> The low level of investments in urban areas of the city over many years had reduced the quality and quantity of service delivery, especially in the maintenance of existing infrastructure. Coverage rates were low for solid waste collection (25–50%), drainage (20–30%), road maintenance (15% of unpaved, 47% of paved) and cemeteries (80% exhumation rate due to inadequate capacity exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS scourge). (Wampler, 2009: 4)[50]

Like all of Mozambique's municipalities, Maputo relies on transfers from the national government for most of its budget.[51]

48 Conselho Municipal de Maputo (2010).

49 Teodoro Andrade Waty, *Autarquias Locais: Legislação Fundamental* (Maputo: ML Graphics, 2000: 111–112 [cited in Reaud, 2012: 71, no. 57]. The basic legislation is: *Lei das Finanças Autárquicas (Lei Nº 1/2008, de 16 de Fevereiro)*.

50 Wampler (2009) cites the following source*: Programme Appraisal Document for ProMaputo: The Municipal Development Programme* (21 December 2006).

51 'The Municipal Finance Act specifies how local finances are organized in Mozambique. Subnational governments are expected to prepare, approve, and control their own budgets, observing the general rules and principles of the national budgeting system. Revenue sources include taxes, levies, user charges, and transfers from the central government. Transfers from central government are calculated according to a formula based on population size, area, revenues collected by the local authority from the community, and level of development. These transfers are unconditional. The Municipal Finance Act allows subnational governments to borrow from banks and other financial institutions to finance capital expenditure. In practice this has not happened; instead the central government has borrowed on behalf of local governments' (Shall, 2007: 195–196).

'Despite own-source revenue authorities, *autarquias,* on average, receive at least 50% of their revenue from central government transfers' (Reaud, 2012: 27).

Mozambique's first municipal elections occurred in June of 1998 following two years of delays and ending with a boycott by the main opposition party, Renamo, and a wave of citizen disinterest as registered by a turnout of less than 15% nationwide and only 13.12% in Maputo.[52] Frelimo's candidate in Maputo, former governor of Manica province, Artur H. Canana, won with 65% of the vote against the candidates of three 'citizens' groups' (considered by many at the time to be a surprisingly low vote for the Frelimo candidate).[53] Frelimo also won a majority in the city's legislative body, the *Assembleia Municipal*. Canana's five-year administration is widely recognised as having been a disaster of incompetence, corruption and bad relations with the Municipal Assembly (Reaud, 2012: 24; Jenkins, 2000; Fauvet & Mosse, 2004: 429–450). Perhaps the most visible sign was the administration's inability to deal with the mountains of garbage piled up in streets and lots throughout the city, from the most 'noble' neighbourhoods to the expansive slums ringing the city's periphery. Canana's constant battles with the *Assembleia* and its president, fellow *Frelimista* Teodoro Waty, increasingly distanced him from local party leaders. In clear recognition of his failures, Canana lost the party's nomination for the 2003 elections to Eneas Comiche, a former head of Mozambique's Central Bank, former minister of finance, and at that time 'a senior Frelimo parliamentarian, and a member of the board of the country's largest bank, BIM' (AIM, 23/10/2003; also AIM, 8/2/2000; and Reaud, 2012).

Two years earlier, even before he knew he would be Frelimo's candidate for mayor of Maputo, Comiche became the party's representative in a UNDP-financed initiative called '*Agenda 25 Anos.*' He states that he became intrigued by the Agenda's 'participatory methodology': numerous open public meetings and discussions intended to gauge national public opinion about 'what the country should look like in 25 years.'[54] 'Both the content and the methodology

52 *Buletim sobre o processo de paz em Moçambique* (21/7/1998). According to Joseph Hanlon, writing shortly after the 1998 elections:

Em Maputo os partidos pelo boicote tiveram pouca influencia. e os cornicios da Renamo de apelo ao boicote foram tao fracamente concorridos como as outras reunioes políticas. [...]Eis um dos comentarios comuns das pessoas que nao votaram: 'Votarnos em 1994 e nao fez qualquer diferença; a nossa vida nao melhorou.' Os problemas económicos e a corrupcao eram referidos frequentemente: a elite prosperou mas o povo sentese cada vez mais pobre. [..]Para muitos, a abstencao foi um acto politico consciente. Nao se tratou de apoio ao boicote, mas sim de uma rejeicao a todos os partidos politicos. Foi uma utilizacao sofisticada do processo democratico em que as pessoas votaram 'nao '. Foi uma mensagem a elite politica de que as pessoas retiravam o seu apoio a um processo eleitoral que nao lhes trouxera quaisquer benefícios. ['Comentário: Por que é que as pessoas recusamam de votar?' Buletim sobre a processo de paz em Moçarnbique (21 de Julho de 1998): 2]

Also see Braathen & Jørgensen (1998 *:* 31–38).

In the following year's national elections for president and congress, in which Renamo participated, the turnout rate was 75%.

53 Only three out of Frelimo's 33 mayoral candidates performed worse than Maputo's Canana: Beira, Mozambique's second-largest city, where the Frelimo candidate obtained 58.51% of the 10.3% of voters who turned out; Inhambane, where the respective percentages were 62.91% and 18.93%, and Manhiça, with 58.71% and 30.35%. [*Buletim sobre a processo de paz em Moçarnbique* (21/7/1998: 14–15]).

54 Except where otherwise noted, information from a personal interview (2 April 2013); similar content also found/confirmed in Reaud (2010: 190–193). At the same time, Comiche was becoming aware of the many examples of 'participatory planning' promoted by European donors – primarily the Swiss and

of the report inspired me as a candidate to do something similar on the campaign trail.' Accordingly, during his campaign, he built his electoral platform around a series of open public meetings in many of Maputo's neighbourhoods. According to his eventual chief of health services, João Schwalbach, 'When Comiche met with his future government team, he was already thinking and acting along these lines: "How can you govern people if you don't actually ask them what they need?" His campaign rallies were more like town hall meetings and included future administrative leaders like myself.'[55]

Comiche was elected on 19 November 2003 with 76% of the vote (from a 26% turnout in Maputo), and with Frelimo even more firmly in control of the *Assembleia Municipal* (48 of the 61 Assembly seats) *(Boletim sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique*, 03/12: 11, 22). Comiche's electoral platform read 'like a veiled criticism of his predecessor,' with promises to fight corruption, to decentralise city government and to run a transparent and participatory administration (AIM, 6/11/2003).[56] He and his team soon discovered, however, that the resources of the city administration – both physical and human – were entirely inadequate to the task of effectively running a city of over a million residents, many without ready access to such basic city services as water and trash collection. Comiche and the World Bank had already been discussing a programme of administrative reform even before he was elected – a ten-year programme that would become known as ProMaputo.[57] True to the liberal participatory promise that was, by then, at its height within the development community, citizen participation was an integral component: 'The ProMaputo project's foundational premise is that traditional state reform (supply-side) and inclusive and participatory development (demand-side) governance interventions must play complementary roles during the overall state reform process.'[58] However, no CSOs were actually involved on the 'demand-side' because those that did exist were either extensions of the Frelimo party, or they were primarily service-oriented and not geared to playing a grassroots advocacy role. Instead, ProMaputo included provisions for annual 'Citizen Report Cards', beginning in 2005, 'to gather data on citizens' attitudes regarding their perceptions of services provided by the government' (Wampler, 2009: 8). Comiche also tried to reproduce his 'participatory' campaign strategy by holding periodic 'Public Forums' and 'Open Mayor' meetings out in the periphery districts and neighbourhoods, far from the city centre's imposing colonial-era City Hall, in order to share information about the administration's plans and policies and

the Austrians – in the central and northern parts of the country.

55 Personal interview (20 March 2013).

56 Also personal interview with Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013).

57 Personal interview with Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013).

Reaud (2010: 191) describes ProMaputo as follows: 'PROMAPUTO, a unified economic development strategy, which addressed the main concerns of [Comiche's] Electoral Manifest, was the result of three large consultations held from 2004 to 2008 of participants who were members of civil society, the private sector, academia and members of the public. The purpose of the consultations was to create a 10-year, multi-sector development strategy for Maputo. This was significant in scope because there were no planning documents of this kind in existence.'

58 Wampler (2009: 6).

to hear the concerns of citizens first-hand (Wampler 2009: 8).

At the formal-institutional level, 'ProMaputo initiated a process of gradual deconcentration of selected municipal responsibilities to municipal districts, linked to a programme of organisational reform and capacity building for district administrations' (Bowen & Helling, 2011: 4). Importantly, for the future development of the PB, 'the CMM's [Maputo City Government's] deconcentration strategy include[d] not only the strengthening of administrative and technical capacities but also the improvement of sub municipal governance by strengthening the role of citizens and civil society groups in decision making, service co-production, and oversight, especially at *bairro* [neighbourhood] level' (Wampler 2009: 8).

At precisely this time, both the World Bank and the UN-Habitat were engaged throughout the subcontinent in constructing different versions of a training manual for PB 'best practices for Africa', and Comiche as well as several members of his staff participated in a number of international meetings associated with these efforts.[59] Comiche began to consider the possibility of implementing a PB in Maputo. As early as 2004/2005, he sent two young city employees to intern in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Their efforts to adapt what they had seen to the Maputo context, however, ended up 'looking like a shopping list. There was no methodology for how to organize such a thing.'[60] The idea was put on hold, and Comiche focused on his Public Forums and Open Mayor meetings ('This was participatory planning to me at that time. This is what I had learned.')[61]

In the meantime, Frelimo's Armando Guebuza won Mozambique's presidential elections of 2004. As general secretary of Frelimo since 2002 and as one of the party's earliest leaders, he had already spearheaded efforts aimed at strengthening Frelimo's organisational reach throughout the nation (including into the districts and neighbourhoods of Maputo) – more to the point, strengthening his own supporters within Frelimo at the expense of those seen

59 The end results of these meetings were two 'how-to' manuals: Avritzer & Vaz (2009); and UN-Habitat & MDP-ESA (2008).

Personal interviews with Sonia Massangaia (14 March 2013); Nelson Diaz (5 April 2013); Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013).

60 Personal interview with Eduardo Nguenha (26 September 13).

61 Personal interview with Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013).

According to World Bank consultant in charge of ProMaputo's operations (Equipa Reestruturção/ Governação dentro do Programa ProMaputo), Louis Helling, Comiche's most innovative reform initiative was his success in replacing government-appointed *Administradores Distritais* (city district or borough administrators) with *Vereadores de Distrito* (district-level *municipal* administrators) appointed by, and therefore working for, the mayor. By law, he had to appoint half of his City Cabinet from among those elected into the Legislative Assembly. So, by choosing all of his *Vereadores de Distrito* from Frelimo's assembly delegation 'due to their proven relationship with the grassroots and the neighbourhood-level party and administrative leadership,' he was also able to appoint technically qualified personnel – rather than politicians – for the substantive Cabinet positions (e.g. Health, Transportation, Education, etc.). Personal interview with Louis Helling (11 September 2013).

as aligned with former President Joaquim Chissano (1986-2004).[62] Following his election, Guebuza began to embark on what many would call a 'partisanisation' (*partidarização*) of the Mozambican state, but with a distinct personalist feel.[63] In the Province of Maputo, which shares certain administrative functions with the municipality of Maputo, for example, Guebuza appointed a '*Guebuzista*' governor who frequently and openly clashed with Mayor Comiche, widely seen to be a member of the so-called 'Chissano wing' of Frelimo.

In March of 2008, 'after a delegation [including Comiche] took part in the Africa Regional Seminar on Participatory Budgeting organised in Durban by MDP-ESA, UN-HABITAT, the World Bank Institute and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the municipal council of the Mozambican capital announced that a new and more organised participatory budgeting pilot process would be launched.' (Sintomer et al., 2010: 48).[64] Comiche came back from the Durban conference and put together a team headed by Eduardo Nguenha, a young economist who had worked as a consultant for several of the donor-funded participatory planning exercises in the centre and north of the country including the well-known case of Dondo in Sofala Province (Weimer & Nguenha, 2008), had visited Brazilian PB sites, and was then working as a consultant for the ProMaputo project.[65] In Nguenha's words:

62 'From 1998 to 2009, the FRELIMO government made voter outreach and enrollment a priority. The intent was to consolidate FRELIMO leadership of municipalities, which it did, increasing the number of FRELIMO municipalities from 28 in 2003 to 42 in 2008' (Reaud, 2012: 209).

President Chissano is widely seen as a more reformist president than Guebuza. It was Chissano, for example, who oversaw the transition from socialism to capitalism, the 1992 peace accords with Renamo, and the transition to multiparty democracy.

63 See CIP (2013).

64 The importance of the Durban Conference as the moment when Mayor Comiche fully committed to the implementation of the PB-Maputo is confirmed in several personal interviews: Sonia Massangaia (14 March 13), Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013), Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2013), and Eduardo Nguenha (26 September 2013).

65 Personal interview with Eduardo Nguenha (26 September 2013). For the positive view of 'the Dondo model,' see Cabannes (2010); for a more mixed view, see Reaud (2012, especially chap. 6). The Dondo model is described in Nuvunga, Mosse & Varela (2007, 13–14) as follows:

> Each bairro has a consultative council, which articulates proposals to the [Municipal Government of Dondo] for community funding priorities. The council has a representative to a specific town councilor who in turn is also charged with representing that neighbourhood. They have annual consultations to help formulate the budget allocations for funds [...] While this process is considered to be a national model, local researchers have concluded that it is not clear how the input from the neighbourhood councils is incorporated into the final resource allocations in Dondo's municipal budget. (See also Reaud, 2012: 134 ,198).

Sintomer et al. (2010: 49) speak of the Dondo model as:

> ... the participatory planning system tried in Dondo (population 71,600) and other processes co-funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation [e.g. Manica, Catandica, Moatize, Maxixe e Beira]. Dondo became one of the reference points in the Training Companion manual (UN-HABITAT and MDP). The strong influence of the *community development* model in the discussions on the budget plan is balanced by the connection with investments that are co-decided on by citizens and private-sector actors. In other words, we are talking here about a multi-stakeholder model.

As described by Canhanga (2009: 104–106), the Dondo model is not only 'top down' but also 'outside in' (meaning heavily influenced by its external donors/partners, the Swiss).

> Once I came on board, Comiche said, 'This time we've got to do whatever it takes to get a PB going.' And the World Bank also started to become interested at just this time, saying 'We will help.' From the political standpoint, the political field was fertile because the Mayor was interested. And we had someone [i.e. the World Bank] who could help in terms of offering technical assistance and training. So we went ahead with it.

Nguenha and his small group of municipal *tecnicos* (specialists) settled on a combination of the Porto Alegre model and the 'Dondo model' as their preferred PB 'methodology'.[66] This hybrid model entailed decentralising PB prioritisation and the deliberation process to both the *distrito*/borough level and to the *bairro*/neighbourhood level:

- Citizens would meet in each of Maputo's 63 neighbourhoods to propose, discuss and vote on three public works projects ('priorities');
- Each neighbourhood meeting would elect two representatives to attend a district-level PB council meeting, chaired by the appropriate district *Vereador* (Cabinet-level manager), where all neighbourhood representatives and neighbourhood secretaries would negotiate the top three district priorities from among those proposed at the neighbourhood level; and
- Each district would elect two citizen representatives and one neighbourhood secretary to accompany their district *Vereador* at the city-wide PB council meeting, presided over by the mayor, and intended to formally approve and commit to the final PB priorities before sending the complete budget proposal on to the *Assembleia Municipal*.

Once again, it is worth noting that CSOs were conspicuously absent in this process, as all local-level organisational spaces were effectively filled by existing administrative structures: the neighbourhood secretaries and block chiefs, both of which remained nominally non-partisan but effectively partisanised.[67] Meanwhile, lacking any guiding precedent,

66 Personal interview with Eduardo Nguenha (26 September 2013); also Nelson Dias (15 April 2013).

67 In the words of Eduardo Nguenha (personal interview, 26 September 2013):

> ... there are two sides of the PB coin: the side of the government, and the side of civil society. So from the side of the government, we say 'We have resources, what do you want to do with them?' They need to know how to organize themselves, how to discuss things, etc., etc. What we ended up doing is a mixture: the government is going to help them to organize themselves. But in the middle of that process of organisation, a lot of mistakes were made. [...] We said, 'OK, this civil society; we want to work with the representatives of the community.' A structure already existed, but we wanted to create another one. The Consultative Councils were run by the city administration. You look for a 'pure' civil society, and what you're going to find is the Block Capitain [*Chefe de Quarteirão*] and the Neighbourhood Secretary [*Sectretária do Bairro*], which are also part of the city administration. At the district level, it's the *Administrador* or *Vereador*: same thing.

According to Paulo et al. (2007: 28):

> *Não são claras as fronteiras nos bairros entre o estado e o Partido, como indica o facto de os secretários do bairro serem sempre membros do partido Frelimo. Alguns bairros mantêm também um nível intermédio de células, que provém da história política do partido Frelimo. Finalmente, os funcionários*

Nguenha's group 'invented' a PB budget of roughly 12 to 15% of the city's investment budget to be spread out among the seven municipal districts.[68] On 12 May – less than two months after they started – the PB-Maputo was officially inaugurated in the municipal district of Catembe (AIM, 12/5/08).

The speed with which Comiche's and Nguenha's PB proceeded in those final months of 2008 suggests a two-pronged logic that was not always internally consistent. On the one hand, Nguenha and his team were faithfully attempting to adapt the Porto Alegre and Dondo models of the PB to Maputo's circumstances; this was, after all, a *tecnico*-academic's dream of constructing a model programme from scratch, a dream clearly communicated in two hopeful papers Nguenha wrote at the time (2009) and shortly thereafter (2011), and from a student thesis he later supervised (Langa, 2012).[69] Nguenha wanted Maputo's PB to be a case of 'real' PB, not just another instance of 'participatory planning' such as those undertaken in Dondo and other municipalities in the north of Mozambique.[70] On the

dos escritórios, a todos os níveis, são utilizados na mobilização dos residentes na comunidade no que diz respeito a manifestações políticas. De facto, o escritório do secretário do bairro alberga frequentemente um membro do partido Frelimo, que pode aí trabalhar numa base regular. É nossa impressão que nem os funcionários do escritório nem os representantes do partido (que em alguns casos são uma e a mesma pessoa) vêem isto como um potencial conflito de interesses, o que realça a necessidade de uma mais clara definição de papéis e responsabilidades, de modo a melhorar a eficiência e responsabilidade e reduzir o favouritismo ou exclusão políticos na prestação de serviços com base na filiação política.

According to other analysts:

Ao nível de cada bairro, o papel do Secretário de Bairro é importante. Todavia, as suas relações com o secretário do Partido e células do Partido que funcionam em paralelo permanecem pouco claras e representam um problema em termos de responsabilização. (CMI, 2011)

For a detailed and insightful analysis of Maputo's local-level administrative structures – *Vereadores*, neighbourhood secretaries, block chiefs and consultative councils – see Bowen & Helling (2011: 5–15).

68 Personal interview with Eduardo Nguenha (26 September 2013).

'*Para efeito, de acordo com Nguenha (2009), em 2008, o Município de Maputo colocou para discussão com a população cerca de 43 milhões de Meticais - um valor correspondente a 12% do Orçamento Municipal*' (Langa, 2012: 22). Bowen & Helling (2011: 19–20) interpret the same M$43 million – 'at the time equivalent to approximately US$ 1.8 million' – to be 15% of the 2009 budget. The M$43 million figure is also found in Conselho Municipal (2009).

'Initial allocations of these dedicated resources for each municipal district (i.e. preliminary PB ceilings per district) were based on a formula which took into account population, area, level of infrastructure development, and fiscal revenue effort (2008 Manual), subsequently simplified to include population, area, and poverty index (2010 Manual)' (Bowen & Helling, 2011: 19).

69 Nguenha (2009, 2011). It would not be an exaggeration to say that Nguenha was *the* PB expert in Mozambique at this time.

70 '*A leitura das experiências de Orçamento Participativo em Moçambique deve ter em atenção o aspecto da participação directa dos cidadãos em todas as etapas do ciclo do processo orçamental ou pelo menos ao nível de discussão de recursos e da execução dos projectos definidos. Não sendo isso efectivo, então, corre-se o risco de chamar de Orçamento Participativo a simples participação dos cidadãos na definição das suas necessidades que resulta no plano e não no orçamento, daí se chamar de Planificação Participativa. Existe diferença entre Planificação Participativa e Orçamento Participativo. A diferença é que a primeira centra-se na expressão de vontades ou preferências colectivas sobre um futuro desejado e caminhos de alcança-lo enquanto que o segundo centra-se na discussão do socialmente possível, isto é, da definição das necessidades ou preferências em função de recursos disponíveis ou a dispor* (Nguenha, 2009)' (Nguenha, 2011: 3).

other hand, Comiche was in campaign mode coming into the November 2008 municipal elections, clearly attempting to bolster his credentials as the peoples' candidate with one more instrument of 'Inclusive and Participatory Development' (his government's official slogan). While PB meetings were held in all 63 neighbourhoods and seven districts with varying levels of participation, the city's budget and budgetary constraints on PB priorities were simply not discussed at these meetings (Langa, 2012: 23). And the municipal-level PB council was never implemented because to do so, according to Nguenha, 'would have required a huge mobilisation and expense of time.'[71] In the end, many of the priority projects were ignored (or delayed for several years) in favour of a large-scale road-building project in a particularly congested part of town (Chamanculo) (Bowen & Helling, 2011: 21–22).

But why was Comiche so worried about visibility and re-election? A public opinion poll taken three months before the 2008 elections showed him coasting to victory with no effective opposition (AllAfrica, 20/8/2008). By all accounts, he was a popular mayor. And he belonged to the 'party in power': Frelimo.

As it turned out, Comiche's electoral concerns lay within Frelimo itself. He had applied his reformist impulses in ways that did not endear him to many within the party. These included putting a stop to construction projects approved by his predecessor without proper permitting and zoning – projects that involved powerful economic groups with ties to party leaders (Panapress, 12/8/2004), firing public employees (most of whom were also party members) who stole or otherwise 'appropriated' city property or who held redundant positions,[72] and not giving 'special status' to Municipal Assembly members when distributing relocation land titles to families affected by an armoury explosion several years earlier (Savana, 18/7/08; Reaud, 2012: 200). Comiche's rushing the PB into existence begins to look very much like an effort to curry favour with district-level and neighbourhood-level party leaders, allowing the latter to associate themselves with a significant amount of high-visibility patronage and a popular candidate. Most party leaders, however, were not impressed, and they responded by nominating David Simango, then-minister of youth and sports and former governor of Niassa Province, as the party's nominee to succeed Comiche. The silence of President Guebuza and the national party leadership in this intra-party contest indicated where their allegiances lay. In the party's primary elections in August of 2008 (where only local party leaders vote in closed session), Comiche received just 32% of the votes to Simango's 67%.[73] Simango went on to win the November 2008 elections with

71 Personal interview (26 September 2013).

72 Personal interview with João Schwalback (20 March 2013); also Reaud (2012: 190).

73 Reaud 2012 (especially chap. 6) shows how the Comiche reformist administration was hampered by party bosses and intra-Frelimo politics. The fact that Maputo is effectively a Frelimo-dominated political space meant that the 'normal' competition-for-voters dynamic of democracy was replaced by a competition-for-party-support dynamic (mayoral candidates emerge from intense intra-party culminating in a primary election). 'The mayor did improve services to voters in the 2003 mandate, but in challenging the dominant party's access to resources, he jeopardized his nomination and was subsequently not re-nominated in 2008' (184).

85.8% of the vote (and a 46.6% voter turnout in Maputo) (*Boletim sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique*, 15/12/08: 27).

Comiche was gone, but Nguenha remained to promote Maputo's PB to the leadership of the new Simango administration.[74] It was, after all, a part of the ProMaputo Programme, which Mayor Simango had accepted early on as the basis for the city's five-year development programme (Bowen & Helling, 2011: 3). But if Simango did not actually oppose the PB, he had none of Comiche's enthusiastic support for it either. And there was even some active resistance within his Cabinet, particularly from the new *Vereador* (Cabinet-level chief) of finance.[75] Clearly, the expense of the first PB's road-building project – to name but one among several such projects – was difficult to ignore.[76] And these were projects associated with Comiche's name, not Simango's. So Simango asked the team to 'soften the methodology' – meaning, essentially, to reduce the amount of the municipal budget subject to PB deliberations, and to have those deliberations even more formally connected to the city's district and neighbourhood-level administrative structures.[77]

> Dr Comiche gave an interview in which he acknowledged a divide within the FRELIMO party between an old and a new generation in what was dubbed [in the press] as an open war. The new generation supported Dr Comiche and pointed to the cement city's infrastructure and services as proof of why his continued candidacy is merited whereas the old guard were dissatisfied with the progress the Comiche Administration had made in the peripheral shantytowns and advanced David Simango as the alternative. [...] However, according to one prominent opposition politician, Dr. Comiche was part of the [ex-President] Chissano wing whereas Simango was a part of the [then-President] Guebuza wing, which some felt was ascendant (Reaud, 2012: 200, fn. 201).
>
> See also Nhamirre (2008); also Chichava (2008).

The party's substitution of Comiche for Simango was 'uma forte mensagem as fileiras do partido: preferências locais baseadas na melhoria da governação municipal e prestação de serviços não seriam toleradas se isso entrasse em choque com interesses associados com os segmentos dominantes da elite do partido' (Weimer, Macuane & Buur, 2012: 68, fn. 9).

74 Simango and Nguenha knew each other from Simango's days as governor of Niassa (2005–2010) when the two would meet periodically, along with Nguenha's colleague, Sônia Massangaia, to hear about the latters' participation in donor-funded efforts to promote participatory planning in the province. Simango even asked Nguenha to become his *Vereador* of finances, an offer that Nguenha turned down in favour of continuing with his World Bank-funded ProMaputo consultancy. Personal interview with Sônia Massangaia (14 March 2013).

75 World Bank consultant, Louis Allen Helling, indicated that opposition came primarily from the financial side of the administration:

> Like everyone else, they say they want 'participatory governance'. Any electoral platform these days says 'I want participatory governance. I want to govern with the people'. But they don't know how to actually do it. So we come at them with an essentially technical policy – the PB – and it's a difficult task to clarify the policy. [...] At this point, there were people who were very reluctant to go forward with the PB. People who said, 'I think this is just going to complicate things.' [Personal interview (11 September 2013)]

76 According to World Bank Consultant, Louis Allen Helling (personal interview, 11 September 2013), 'that project ballooned totally out of control. It came out to be a two and a half million dollar road at the end of the story. But it kept growing gradually and eating up other pieces of the PB, and then eating up other pieces of the municipal budget. It just became a monster.'

77 Personal interview with Eduardo Nguenha (26 September 2013).

Nguenha and his team – including one high-level Simango appointee invited to oversee the process – put together a second PB methodology, similar to the first but with some significant changes to accommodate Simango's concerns, including initiating a two-year process of only 32 neighbourhood meetings per year (rather than trying to accommodate all 63 neighbourhoods in a single year), and, most importantly, limiting the scope of neighbourhood meetings to the discussion and election of three priority project 'areas' (e.g. pre-school education, sewer systems, libraries, recreation zones, etc.) and the election of representatives[78] who, along with the neighbourhood secretary, were free to be 'guided' by the neighbourhood priorities or to ignore them altogether at the district-level consultative council meetings where actual projects were to be decided upon.[79] This second version of PB-Maputo debuted in 2010/2011. But the lack of support from the administration's leadership, alongside these and other changes in the PB methodology, took their toll. First, many of the 2008 PB priority projects had not yet been built,[80] and this had a dampening effect on participation levels, reinforcing a sceptical sense among many citizens that the PB was simply yet another partisan '*para o povo ver*' exercise (Langa, 2012: 27). Secondly, while Nguenha may have envisioned district-level consultative councils as deliberative spaces for elected neighbourhood delegates and local-level officials, in practice, the thoroughly partisanised leadership of these administrative structures – the district *Vereador* and the neighbourhood secretaries – ended up dominating the discussions and the actual voting processes.[81] Curiously, given Simango's initial concerns about the costs of the 2008 PB,

78 The number of elected neighbourhood-level PB delegates to participate in the district-level selection process was to be determined by the number of neighbourhood-level participants attending: the more attendees, the more delegates. According to Langa (2012: 23), this change was systematically ignored in practice.

79 '*Tendo sido eliminadas as sessões públicas que permitiam o envolvimento directo dos cidadãos na escolha de prioridades para o seu bairro através do debate e votação de propostas de investimentos, eles perderam o pouco poder que tinham de influenciar directamente o rol de investimentos a serem efectuados pelo Município para o desenvolvimento dos seus bairros*' (Langa, 2012: 26).

For the methodology itself, see Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo (2009); also Langa (2012: 20–26).

Two relevant passages from the methodology are worth emphasising here (p.8):

- '*Respeitar e potenciar as formas existentes de organização local de base comunitária, estabelecendo mecanismos de envolvimento no processo de OP*'
- '*Identificar em conjunto com os representantes e lideranças locais mecanismos de mobilização da comunidade para participação no processo de OP*'.

80 For example, in the Kamavota District, street paving had been prioritised, but was never carried out (personal interview with Mavalane 'A' Neighbourhood Secretary, Jeremias [25 July 2013]); and in the Maxaquene District, a prioritised pedestrian bridge was also never built (personal interview with Maxaquene PB Moderador, Neves [5 August 2013]). In the case of the Chamanculo road-building project, the multi-million-dollar project was only nearing completion by 2013.

81 Conselho Municipal (2009) Langa (2012: 26–27); also Bowen & Helling (2011: 13–14 & 21–25).

In the words of Nelson Dias, World Bank Consultant beginning in 2012 (personal interview, 15 April 2013), 'The neighbourhood meetings functioned merely to hear opinions about priority areas and projects: education, health, transportation. The content of these discussions would then be taken to the *Conselhos Consultivos*, and this is where decisions were made about investment priorities and projects.' Later, Dias called the CCs, 'fully a party structure.' Diaz and Allen concluded that Nguenha's Belo Horizonte-based methodology 'was completely captured by the party' and that 'PB *delegados*

the official document outlining this second PB-Maputo methodology refers to a large *increase* in the percentage of the city's overall investment budget allocated to the PB (65%); meanwhile, PB field documents (*atas*) of district consultative council meetings indicate the absence of any practical upper limit on the costs of prioritised PB projects in spite of a complicated needs-based formula to distribute such limits on a district-by-district and neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood basis.[82] In the end, citing a lack of funds, Simango and his Cabinet did not include the new PB priorities in the 2011 budget.[83] Discouraged, several members of the PB team transferred into other areas of the administration and the PB-Maputo appeared to be on its deathbed.

Enter the World Bank. During the PB's hectic inaugural months in late 2008 (when Comiche was still mayor), the World Bank had contracted Brian Wampler, a noted specialist on Brazilian PBs, to assess how Bank 'Team Task Leaders' were incorporating 'demand-side' mechanisms into their projects, including ProMaputo.[84] With respect to the PB component of ProMaputo, Wampler's report could be described as 'guardedly optimistic' with full disclosure of the fact that the process had only just got under way, and that Comiche and his team (with whom Wampler was clearly impressed) were soon to transition out of the mayor's office. Several years later, World Bank consultant for the ProMaputo mission, Louis Helling, cited what he interpreted to be Wampler's deceptively 'super-positive findings' to explain the Bank's absence during the second round of the PB-Maputo. Suddenly – or so it seemed to Helling – Maputo's PB was on the verge of collapse in 2010.

Believing the PB to be an important complement to ProMaputo's ongoing deconcentration efforts, Helling set out to discover what went wrong. He and another long-time World Bank consultant, Nina Bowen, produced a 'diagnostic study' (Bowen & Helling, 2011) that focused, at least in part, on the 'deconcentrated' neighbourhood-level and district-level institutions that actually implemented the 2008 and 2010 PBs' public meetings. Their report criticised the process whereby suggestions coming from neighbourhood meetings with citizens were

were not responsive from below' (personal interview with Louis Allen Helling, 11 November 2013). These interpretations are shared by Langa (2012).

This is highly reminiscent of the fate of legally mandated 'consultative councils' at the district level throughout Mozambique: 'Embora a descentralização tenha aberto novos espaços de participação das comunidades na gestão pública, ela não trouxe necessariamente uma mudança qualitativa na relação entre estruturas locais e as comunidades mais pobre. Os espaços locais criados pela descentralização estão fortemente dominadas pelas elites político-administrativas locais e organizações com forte ligação com o partido no poder.' Plataforma do Olho do Cidadão (2013); Forquilha and Orre (2012) reach the same conclusion.

82 Conselho Municipal (2009); field research in PB-Maputo archives (26 November 2013).

83 Personal interview with Eduardo Nguenha (26 November 2013).

> Spending outcomes are important indicators of the success or failure of a programme, because they link the demands of participants to the municipal government's commitment to implementation. Governments that are able to follow through on spending decisions send clear signals to participatory budgeting participants and the larger community that they value the choices made within the participatory budgeting process [and vice versa]. (Wampler, 2007: 35)

84 The end result: Wampler (2009).

'interpreted' and translated by officials at the district level into investment priorities (including, for example, new office machinery for district offices). Helling contracted a PB specialist from Portugal, Nelson Dias, to make his own assessment. In part, according to Helling, Dias was chosen precisely because he *was not* wedded to the then-predominant Brazilian PB models (Dias & Allegretti, 2009).[85] Dias' subsequent analysis confirmed that of Bowen and Helling: with its minimal role for substantive citizen participation, Maputo's PB could, at best, be called a case of 'partisanised' consultative planning rather than participatory budgeting.

> Nelson's [Dias'] view is that unless the people are deciding about resource allocation, you're not doing participatory budgeting; and that's not universally accepted: there are all kinds of models in Brazil that are not as *vinculativo* [binding] as that [...]. And with all these hybrid models, you start slipping back. So Nelson took that very strong view, that we're going to allocate money and the people are going to decide, and the first principle is 'Respect the Decision of the People'; you can never change the order of their priorities; you may not be able to implement their priorities for technical reasons – then come back and explain why; but their priorities are there and they're sacred (which was not happening).[86]

In June of 2011, Helling and Dias presented their findings to Mayor Simango and his Cabinet. And they ended with a proposal: the Bank would fund a technical assistance grant to pay for an ongoing consultative role for Dias and a full-time local consultant to assist in the PB's marketing and communications, but *only* if the government agreed to a list of basic principles.[87] These included:

- Participants in neighbourhood meetings need to discuss and decide upon actual 'micro-projects', not broad areas of need. Their decisions need to be coupled with a commitment to actually implement the elected priority projects (within financial and technical constraints).

- Neighbourhood secretaries, *Vereadores* and block chiefs should no longer control the PB decision-making processes or outcomes. Their tasks should be exclusively to organize the meetings and to help execute the projects. The PB needs to become disentangled from (partisanised) district-level decision-making institutions and actors.

- Resources for the PB need to be written into the annual budget, providing both an upper limit for project funds and insurance that the government will not back out from PB projects due to 'budgetary constraints'. And the PB budget had to be entirely locally sourced: not dependent on outside donors. The World Bank's proposal was for a fifty million metical annual PB budget (roughly US$ 1 555 000 at the time), to be allocated to half of Maputo's eligible neighbourhoods each year.

85 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2009).
86 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2009).
87 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2009).

- *Grupos de Monitoria* (project oversight groups) need to be elected from the ranks of 'ordinary' citizen-participants – two men and two women per neighbourhood – to help assure that projects are completed on time and in accordance with criteria of quality.

- The PB needs to become institutionalised – to have 'an address' within the city's administration, 'so as not to be an orphan or an add-on, but an actual programme that is part of the planning process and activities carried out by the Administration.'[88]

In the debate that ensued, once again, the Finance *Vereador* was the most vocal opponent, arguing that it would be much more efficient to use PB funds in select public works projects that 'everyone knows are important.' This relates to the fundamental debate about what it's about. Is it about governance or is it about investment planning and management?'[89] In response, Helling argued that 'PB is more about "participatory" than it is about "budget". This is a *governance* initiative that is linked to the investment planning process, not the other way around.' Others were concerned about the human resources needed to administer the programme. Dias' role was primarily to provide the necessary training and assistance in precisely this area. In the end, Helling tried to convince Mayor Simango and his Cabinet that a good PB was simply good politics. 'The basic argument is one that I cite all the time: the best way to "buy votes" is by good governance and providing services to people [...] Good governance is good politics.'[90]

Simango eventually agreed to the Bank's proposal, with the significant caveat that the fifty million metical request be cut in half 'to reflect budget realities' ($M 25 million representing 1.7% of Maputo's total investment budget), but with a provision in the final document 'that as revenues increased, so would the amount going to the PB'.[91] In a nod toward the PB as an instrument of social justice, but also in recognition of patterns of participation in the two previous PBs,[92] the new methodology ruled out the richer parts of town (e.g. the central 'cement city') as well as those receiving funds from elsewhere (e.g. Catembe and Nhaca districts). A series of need-based formulas were also applied to determine which neighbourhoods were eligible and which were not. Starting in 2012, this third version of the PB-Maputo would rotate through 16 neighbourhoods each year on a three-year cycle to eventually cover 48 eligible neighbourhoods of the city, with

88 Personal interview with Dr Alda Saide, Directora do Gabinete de Desenvolvimento Estratégico e Institucional, Maputo (28 May 2013).

89 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2013).

90 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2013).

91 Quote is from personal interview with Alda Saide (28 May 2013). Maputo's 2012 budget included $ M1 496 922 888 for investments (what some call the city's 'discretionary budget'). Budget information provided by Rui Mate (26 September 2013).

92 '*Nos vimos aqui no Maputo nas reunioes, nas sessoes do lancamento do OP, o pessoal que vinha nao era o pessoal que vive aqui [no cimento]. Era o pessoal la da periferia que vinha para as sessoes de saber como remover lixo nesses bairros aonde nao tem aruamento, e o pessoal la' da Catembe da outra margem do oceano, etc.*' (Personal interview with Sonia Massangaia, 14 Mach 2013).

each neighbourhood able to spend up to 1.5 million meticais (roughly US$ 50 000) on their priority project(s).[93]

This third version of the PB-Maputo made its public debut in April of 2012 when 2 706 citizens from 16 neighbourhoods (0.68% of a combined population of 399 601) participated in neighbourhood PB meetings.[94] The following year, 3 446 citizens in 16 different neighbourhoods participated (0.90% of a combined population of 383 936). Some of the identifying characteristics of these participants are presented in Table 2 on page 40. A critical piece of information that is missing from Table 2, however, is the partisan makeup of this population. While hard data are not available, in interview after interview, it became clear that the majority of participants in PB neighbourhood meetings were either members of Frelimo or belonged to families with Frelimo roots and history. In the words of one District Administrator, for example, 'Most participants are closely connected to the administrative apparatus of the neighbourhood – the block chiefs, the Neighbourhood Secretary – people who are more active in politics by way of the party [Frelimo].'[95] In the words of a PB facilitator from another district, 'Most are party members even. There are some who are not. But the majority are party members.'[96]

Neighbourhood residents are informed in the weeks leading up to the Saturday morning PB Day meeting primarily through personal contacts with their block chiefs, who are tasked to this effect, and through posters put up in public places throughout their neighbourhoods.[97] Block chiefs are supposed to hold meetings during the week prior to the PB Day to discuss possible PB projects, but this rarely seems to take place in practice. As participants arrive to the PB Day meeting – usually held in a public school or a neighbourhood centre – city staff and local volunteers collect participants' basic information (the data for Table 2). Meetings usually begin about an hour late to accommodate latecomers (normal for Mozambique) and they last for two-to-three hours. The process formally begins with a call to order by the neighbourhood secretary and/or district *vereador*. After a set of introductory remarks (supposedly, but not always, non-partisan), the secretary hands the meeting over to one of the two PB 'facilitators' trained to conduct these PB meetings.[98] For the next 15 to 20

93 Given the two-year span between a neighbourhood's PB Day and the inauguration day of the completed project, this 'three-year cycle' actually takes four years to complete, with the second year of the last third of the neighbourhoods to benefit overlapping with the first year of the next cycle.

94 Data gleaned from Conselho Municipal. Departamento de Finanças (2013b).

95 Personal interview with anonymous (27 May 2013). Repeated/confirmed by two neighbourhood chiefs in two different districts (personal interviews, 15 July 2013 and 26 July 2013).

96 Personal interview with anonymous (29 May 13). Repeated/confirmed by another PB facilitator from a different district (personal interview, 5 August 2013).

97 The following information is gleaned from fieldwork undertaken between March and November 2013.

98 In two instances during the 2013 cycle where neighbourhood secretaries acted in blatantly partisan fashion (one of which I observed, the other was reported to the Coordinating Group by a facilitator), the reactions of the Coordinating Group leaders were part exasperation ('We need to hold a pre-meeting meeting to avoid this') and part resignation (not only are neighbourhood secretaries elected, but they are almost always 'unimpeachable' local-level party leaders, with allies in the party and in the administration).

minutes, the facilitators explain the basic concepts: budgets, participatory budgeting, micro-projects, prioritisation of projects via voting, and elected project oversight groups. Pointedly, the entire municipal budget is not discussed so as not to distract from the task at hand: to prioritise a micro-project for the neighbourhood. Discussion is often entirely in the indigenous language most commonly spoken in the neighbourhood, or there is sequential translation, first in the indigenous language, then in Portuguese. Care is taken to explain that one-and-a-half million meticais is only enough for micro-projects (a series of hand-drawn representations of types of projects are included in the presentation: school chairs/desk replacements, school-building repairs, market repairs or upgrading, drainage ditches, parking lots, covered bus stops, etc.), and to explain that these micro-projects will only be built at the end of the following year. Participants then have an opportunity to ask questions about the process.[99] Once all questions have been addressed, participants are randomly divided into groups of 15 to 20, taking care to break up pre-established groups of friends or family, and given anywhere from 20 minutes to a half hour to discuss and reach a consensus, or a majority vote, on their priority micro-project for the neighbourhood. In most instances, choosing someone to take notes and then write down the names of all participants takes from a quarter to half of the allotted time. Discussion must move quickly. PB officials wander from group to group offering assistance and further information as needed. But the discussions are free and, at times, lively between any and all who want to contribute (not all do, of course). Once all groups have voted on their 'priority' project, participants regroup for a plenary session to hear a representative from each group announce their results. PB administrators write all nominated proposals down on a blackboard or a large sheet of paper to help guide subsequent discussion. When all the group priority projects have been presented, the floor is open for discussion, lobbying and questions. Volunteers are then requested to become members of the neighbourhood's PB project oversight group, and a by-hands vote is taken if there are more nominees than the requisite two men and two women. Each participant is then issued a piece of paper representing their vote for a specific project proposal. In an improvised voting space – a classroom, a corner with a curtain placed in front, etc. – participants place their vote in a ballot box next to a hand-drawn representation of their preferred project proposal (one by one, to provide some sense of a secret ballot).

99 In all meetings I either attended or heard about second-hand (e.g. in weekly coordinating group meetings I attended from April through June of 2013), there were always some complaints about the small budget (these are neighbourhoods with huge problems, after all) and about the one-and-a-half year delay in completing the projects.

Table 2: Characteristics of PB-Maputo Participants (2012 and 2013)

Year	No. of participants	% of relevant population			
2012	2 706	0.68%			
2013	3 446	0.90%			
	Male	Female	No Response re: Sex		
2012	1 300 (48%)	1 366 (50%)	40 (1%)		
2013	1 570 (46%)	1 772 (51%)	104 (3%)		
	Up to 35 years old	35–59 years old	60 years and older	No Response re: Age	
2012	1 023 (39%)	1 108 (41%)	535 (20%)	40 (1%)	
2013	1 063 (31%)	1 372 (40%)	822 (24%)	189 (5%)	
	Employed	Un-employed	Student	Retired	No Response Re: occupation
2012	1 211 (45%)	915 (34%)	221 (8%)	109 (4%)	210 (8%)
2013	1 319 (38%)	1030 (30%)	546 (16%)	366 (11%)	n.a. (5%)
	Primary Education	Secondary Education	Pre-University Education	University Education	No Response Re: education
2012	1 417 (52%)	466 (17%)	264 (10%)	103 (4%)	416 (15%)
2013	1 466 (43%)	806 (23%)	511 (15%)	226 (7%)	n.a. (12%)

With the last vote cast, all votes are publicly counted and the winning project is announced. A sizeable number of participants do not actually stay until the end of the process.[100] For example, in seven of the 16 neighbourhoods for which I have numerical data for the 2013 round, on average only 54% of participants actually voted, with the highest rate being 78% (Bagamoio) and the lowest being 39% (Malhazine). In two additional neighbourhoods, facilitators spoke of high rates of 'voter abstention' and 'much fewer actual votes' than participants, but they provided no concrete numbers.[101]

As Eduardo Nguenha reminded me, PB is not an event, but a process or a cycle.[102] Each year's 16 PB Days – four are held each Saturday for four successive weeks in April/May – are simply one among many noteworthy points in the process. Prior to the first PB Days in the 2012–2013 cycle, for example, the World Bank's consultant, Nelson Dias, met on numerous occasions with the director of the PB-Maputo, Laura Parruque (of the Finance Department), and the PB coordinating team spanning seven different departments within the city administration, to hammer out the details of the new methodology and its upcoming implementation. More such meetings ensued following each of Dias' biannual visits to Maputo for minor 'tweakings' of the methodology. Training sessions for district PB moderators, district administrators, neighbourhood secretaries, and weekly meetings during the months surrounding the most intense PB activity – PB Days (March–May) and inauguration days of completed projects (November-December), are also part of the process. Successful project proposals need to be properly designed and engineered, then vetted out for a competitive bidding process among numerous small construction companies. Project oversight groups – so-called '*olheiros da comunidade*' (the eyes and ears of the community) – need to be trained (two or more sessions per year) and mobilised to follow their projects. Periodic site visits need to be planned and coordinated, as do one or more end-of-the-year inauguration ceremonies.[103] As the second half of the 2012–2013 process overlapped with the first half of the 2013–2014 process, 32 neighbourhoods were

100 Information is from field notes taken in PB Coordinating Team meetings in 2013 (30 April 2013) and (7 May 2013), and in PB Day meetings in Mavalane 'A' (13 April 2013), Bagamoio (20 April 2013), Polana Caniço 'B' (27 April 2013), and Munhuana (4 May 2013).

101 In some meetings, officials literally shut the exit doors and would not let people leave until the vote was over. In one meeting, there was such an uproar over this tactic that they had to open the doors to a rush of over half of participants. Most who left were women arguing that they needed to return home to prepare lunch. Others felt that they knew from the tenor of the plenary meeting which project would win.

102 Personal interview (26 September 2013).

103 Once projects are inaugurated, the PB process/cycle is effectively over. At that point, the neighbourhood-level consultative council, headed by the neighbourhood secretary and composed, mostly, of block chiefs, takes over the management and/or maintenance of the newly-constructed micro-projects. Unlike in the Brazilian cases that I am aware of, PB-Maputo inauguration 'ceremonies' are not festive neighbourhood-wide events. Instead, they tend to involve just the neighbourhood secretary, the project oversight group, and a handful of district and municipal officials from the PB coordinating group. The exception is the very first project, which is announced with much fanfare and includes the presence of the mayor, other administration officials, and the press.

engaged in various stages of PB at the same time.[104] The coordination efforts alone are daunting.

Watching Mayor Simango inaugurate the 2013–2014 round of the PB-Maputo, it was clear that he had come a long way in accepting the programme. He spoke enthusiastically and knowledgably, without notes, to a large crowd of apparently sympathetic listeners about the basic outlines of the PB and about its participatory promise (interpreted in essentially liberal fashion). Clearly, this was also an opportunity for him to take advantage of the politician's participatory promise: to be able to stand up in front of potential and actual supporters/voters (and a bevy of local media) and associate himself with 'popular participation' six months before his re-election bid.[105] When his moment was done, he was treated to a performance of local women singing and dancing. He remained for several minutes at the head of the table as the PB facilitators commenced their functions. Then he and his retinue quietly retreated to his official convoy and the process continued without him. That day, the majority of participants voted to refurbish one of the neighbourhood's local primary schools.

As this paper is being written (late 2013 and early 2014), the third version of PB-Maputo is at the end of its second year with one year left to complete its first three-year cycle. The PB-Maputo inter-agency 'team' had been constructed at both the municipal level (the 'coordinating group') and in each of the districts, complete with new hires, extensive training, and weekly meetings throughout much of the year. The process has become thoroughly institutionalised (though that could be reversed if Simango or a future mayor were so inclined). Mayor Simango, however, agreed in October of 2013 to increase the funding of the 2015/2016 PB-Maputo by 32%, from 25 million to 33 million meticais a year (US$ 830 000 to US$ 1 100 000).[106] Even with increased revenues for the city in 2013, this represented a slight increase in the percentage of the city's investment budget dedicated to the PB-Maputo from 1.7% to 1.9%. Table 2, above, shows a slight increase in the number of participants in 2013 compared with 2012, with that number representing a slightly higher percentage of neighbourhood residents as well. The real test of the PB's popularity, however, will be whether both sets of numbers increase in subsequent rounds relative to these numbers here, but that information will only be forthcoming with the 2015–17 cycle.

My own sample of site visits for PB Days demonstrated moderately high levels of participant engagement, especially in the small-group discussion stage (the most participatory and least 'guided' part of the exercise) but with significant drop-offs of enthusiasm in subsequent stages, including the final voting or 'project prioritisation' stage. Meanwhile,

104 Details on the actual administration of the PB-Maputo (the 'methodology') are not the focus of this paper. What is given here is intended to give a 'flavour' of the proceedings.

105 'The mayor finally came fully on board last year. He started to go to the PB meetings. First, he started to get feedback that this is going on and people are talking about him' (Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling, 11 September 2013). See Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo (2012).

106 Personal correspondence with Louis Helling.

of the 16 projects from 2012 scheduled for completion by the end of the year, only one had actually been inaugurated by that time, two more were on schedule, six were 'under construction' but behind schedule, and seven were still in the stage of being bid out to contractors (i.e. over six months behind schedule). In telephone interviews with members of the project oversight groups (all of whom were also members of Frelimo), about half showed a reasonable knowledge of their project's status, while half could only be described as uninformed. Of those that were knowledgeable, few felt that their participation in their oversight group was influential, though all felt that the PB was a 'good thing for their neighbourhood.'[107]

107 Based on author's participant observation in a small but representative sample of participants in the meeting, '*Formação de Grupos de Monitoria*, 3ª Edição (2012–2013),' held in Maputo's City Hall on 2 August 2013. Telephone interviews were carried out between 18 and 29 August 2013.

6. Identifying the PB-Maputo

Before we can assess the three original hypotheses for why the PB-Maputo exists given the apparent barren soil for participatory policy-making (i.e. a competitive-authoritarian regime), we need to answer a prior question: Is the PB-Maputo really a PB at all? Keeping in mind that there is no single template for a PB (i.e. that context matters in terms of different parameters for the limits of participation and contestation), there are still some basic essential characteristics that all PBs share:

> Sintomer, Herzberg & Röcke (2005) [...] define PB in the following way: 'participatory budgeting allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances'. Additionally they propose five criteria: (1) the financial dimension has to be discussed;[108] (2) the city level has to be involved; (3) the process has to be repeated; (4) there has to be some form of public deliberation; (5) some accountability is required. Within this broad definition, PB can, of course, take on different forms and the models of PB can vary significantly. (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 3)

The history of the PB-Maputo recounted above shows that the most general criteria of PBs as presented by these analysts – 'participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances' – is met under all three methodologies. So on that basis, we could say that, yes, the PB-Maputo *has* been a 'real PB' from its outset. But let us look at the authors' more specific criteria for a more nuanced and telling analysis.

Regarding discussions of the 'financial dimension' at the 'city level' (the first two criteria), one of the consultants hired by the PB-Maputo Coordinating Team to turn the PB project proposals into formal architectural designs voiced a pointed critique regarding the process (the premises of which are entirely true from my own observations and analysis of the process): 'This isn't really a participatory budget at all. No one discusses the municipal budget. They only vote on a pre-determined amount of money once every three years.'[109] According to Eduardo Nguenha, Mayor Comiche's original idea was for PB deliberations to

108 'Though the PB initiatives can also address the overall financial health of municipalities, the focus is on discretionary spending (Wampler, 2007)' (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 12). Across the broad range of PB experiences, especially in Africa, this is not unusual: 'In some countries, citizens participate in decision making only with regard to the capital budget, which represents a small part of the entire budget. They are not included in discussions of revenue sources or the setting of rates and tariffs' (Shall, 2007: 217).

109 Field notes regarding a conversation with anonymous (30 July 2013).

have included city-wide budget information and a broad range of municipal investments even outside of those coming from the PB.[110] However, these aspirations were never translated into actual practice. In conjunction with Mayor Comiche's pre-existing Public Forums and Open Mayor meetings, this *prestação de contas* criterion of PB was at least partially addressed, albeit in a manner not coordinated with the PB.[111] The Open Mayor meetings continued under Mayor Simango, although I cannot vouch if budget issues are discussed in the same manner as under Comiche.[112] Under the third and current PB-Maputo methodology, discussion of wider financial and budgetary issues is deliberately taken off the agenda so as not to 'confuse the process' of the neighbourhood meetings. At least one set of researchers has called such a model 'community participatory budgeting' (Krenjova & Raudla, 2012: 9–11). Whatever citizen learning and 'empowerment' that might occur in such a model is restricted to the locality (the actors and the processes) involved in the specific PB project; that's why Krenjova and Raudla (2012: 9–11) call such designs a 'cogoverning partnership' between participants and local-level administrators. The resources for the project, as well as the budgetary process itself, are handed down 'from above' rather than negotiated or even discussed.

The third criterion – iteration of the process – is clearly satisfied. In spite of Mayor Simango ignoring the results of the second round, he agreed to the PB's reform under guidance from the World Bank and even agreed to increase its budget in the subsequent 2015–2016 round. The third methodology/round initiated its third year of operation in late 2013.

The fourth criterion, as written, is essentially the same as the more general one discussed above: 'participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances.' Nguenha's academic writings on the PB-Maputo lay out a slightly more demanding requirement regarding the 'sovereignty' of citizen participation in the process – the extent to which the results of citizens' deliberations are actually incorporated into public policy outputs:

> [T]he aspect of direct citizen participation at all stages of the budget process, or at the very least, in the discussion of available resources and in the implementation of defined projects. If this does not turn out to be the case in actual fact, then we run the risk of identifying as Participatory Budgeting the simple participation of citizens in discussing their needs in the context of some planning document and

110 Personal interview (26 September 2013).

111 Personal interviews with Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013) and with João Schwalbach (20 March 2013). Also Wampler (2008: 8).

112 '*O PRESIDENTE do Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo, David Simango, dirige hoje, na Escola Secundária Josina Machel, uma reunião de auscultação das principais preocupações dos citadinos, por ocasião do primeiro aniversário da tomada de posse do Executivo da cidade. Deverão participar no encontro, inserido no âmbito da Presidência Aberta, para além dos vereadores, todos os secretários dos bairros de todos os distritos municipais, empresários, dirigentes partidários e outros representantes de grupos sociais*' (*Notícias*, 6/2/2010).

> not in the actual budget; in which case, we should be calling this Participatory Planning.[113]

In the context of a competitive-authoritarian regime, one could argue that, although participatory planning may be a 'lesser' version of PB in terms of citizens' sovereignty, it could still represent a potentially significant learning opportunity for participants and a check on otherwise elite-driven political processes. The facts of the case, however, force us to question the first and second PB-Maputo methodologies as having constituted even 'participatory planning'. Effective sovereign decision-making over PB priority projects took place, first, within the district-level consultative councils (effectively controlled by administration officials) and, second, within the mayor's Cabinet (e.g. Comiche's decision to prioritise a road-building project over and above elected PB priorities, and Simango's decision to ignore the PB priorities altogether). At best, then, the first two methodologies of the PB-Maputo can be called 'consultative planning' – an even 'lesser' version of PB than Nguenha's 'participatory planning'. The PB-Maputo's third methodology – the 'World Bank model' – abandoned Comiche's and Nguenha's lofty aspirations and partisanized decision-making institutions in favour of a minimalist 'micro-project model', with built-in annual and per-neighbourhood budgets and a deliberate effort to reconstruct the deliberative proceedings around neighbourhood residents rather than party-state officials: discussing, voting for and, then, overseeing the construction of 'their own' neighbourhood-specific micro-projects. The fact that several projects in the 2013 cycle emerged from the process in spite of the obvious (to participants) preferences of the respective Neighbourhood secretaries is some indication that sovereignty has been effectively transferred to the citizen-participants under the third PB-Maputo methodology.[114] The addition of project oversight groups whose members cannot be part of the administrative apparatus was meant to provide a sovereign presence of citizens beyond the PB Day decision-making process into the year-and-a-half process of project implementation. In many instances (not all), some members of these groups (not all) have played an informed observer's role in the implementation of their neighbourhood's PB project alongside the neighbourhood secretary and the district-level administrative staff.

The final criterion – accountability – is a challenge in any competitive-authoritarian regime, and it is certainly a challenge for Maputo's PB. The effective absence of an electoral accountability mechanism (i.e. Frelimo always wins) means that poor performance in this and other public policies does not (or cannot) translate into public disapproval at the ballot box.[115] This can only be reinforced by the absence of oppositional voices (or autonomous

113 Nguenha (2011: 3; author's translation). This conclusion is echoed in Langa (2012).

114 Information from the author's participant-observation and field notes.

115 It is broadly argued that poor performance and Frelimo's ability to always win elections have contributed to Mozambique's chronically high rates of voter abstention: people don't vote because they don't see the point. See, for example, De Brito (2007, 2008).

This may be changing. The 2013 elections in Maputo gave the official victory to Mayor Simango (Frelimo). But there are indications that widespread fraud ended up reversing the actual results that

advocacy voices) at the level of organised civil society. The effects of such lacunae in participatory innovations like the PB have already been noted in the literature and can be observed in the Maputo case study: partisanisation of the process[116] and ineffective implementation of the projects (e.g. delays in implementing projects and failure to include PB priorities from the first and second methodologies in the final budget). While the third PB-Maputo methodology has put decision-making sovereignty into the neighbourhood meetings, thereby removing it from party-state leaders, the fact that the vast majority of participants in PB Days are Frelimo members and supporters (*camaradas*) questions the ultimate accountability implications of such a change.[117] It stands to reason that the narrowness of representation would be directly associated with the lessening of accountability to those outside the process.[118] By the admission of local leaders and administrators surveyed, participants also tend to be confidants of the local party-state leadership: block chiefs and neighbourhood secretaries. Similarly, the fact that all members of the project oversight groups surveyed were Frelimo members further undermines the accountability of the project implementation process, at least on the dimension of administrative performance (though it might serve to reinforce accountability pressures on the private contractors building the projects). That all members of the PB Coordinating Team as well as the District-level implementing teams surveyed/interviewed by the author are also party members even further undermines public accountability measures. Last but not least, perhaps, that the Municipal Assembly is overwhelmingly *Frelimista* (58 out of 67 seats during Mayor Simango's first term, 2009–2013), would help explain why legislative interest in and oversight of the PB-Maputo has been practically nil. Meanwhile, almost all of the information about the PB-Maputo is produced and disseminated either 'in-house' (i.e.

would have given the victory to the candidate for the Mozambican Democratic Movement party (MDM), Venáncio Mondlane. Even with fraud, the MDM still ended up with the largest opposition bloc in the history of Maputo's Municipal Assembly (27 out of 67 seats), effectively diminishing the Frelimo delegation by 21 votes (from 58 to 37).

116 For example, Canhanga (2009: 113) regarding northern Mozambique models of participatory planning:

> *Como efeito, na falta de grupos independentes organizados e interventivos, associada ainda à ausência de uma consciência consolidada sobre a importância da participação, a organização da planificação participativa faz com que este processo seja um monopólio das estruturas do poder local, que, consequentemente, enfraquecem as noções de social accountability, colaboração e coordenação na formulação de políticas públicas.*

117 Again, Canhanga (2009: 110) found this to be true in the cases of participatory planning he analysed as well.

118 If the process is not representative (i.e. lacking the pluralism found in the 'represented' population), participants cannot be expected to be accountable to the excluded population. This is why multiple analysts of PBs and other PIs tout the need for representativeness among participants. One illustrative example comes from Shall (2007: 221):

> Careful identification of all key stakeholders to ensure broad-based representation of all segments of society, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, is essential in facilitating the participatory process. [...] The community must be part of driving the process if it is to be sustainable. In order to accommodate diversity, it may be necessary to adopt different strategies for the various groupings so that each may participate in the way that is most appropriate.

via the city's website and Facebook) and thereby available to a relative handful of followers, or reproduced via the 'official' (i.e. *Frelimista*) daily newspaper, *Notícias*.[119] There seems to be no critical media coverage of the PB-Maputo that could help to contribute to a culture of accountability among PB administrators and participants. Having said all of that, however, the transparency of the PB process – with its defined budgets and open decision-making procedures – does make it virtually impossible for this small portion of Maputo's investment budget to be waylaid or otherwise compromised. Similarly, the clarity of ascribed functions and the chain of command under the third methodology provide for a degree of administrative accountability that did not exist previously. Within the administrative apparatus, at least, bottlenecks and poor performance now have a clear 'address.' The fact that the inhabitants of some of those addresses may be politically protected – as 'clients' of more powerful players or as loyal *camaradas* within the party – simply points back to the ubiquity of the challenges of accountability under any competitive-authoritarian regime.[120]

In defence of the PB-Maputo, for all its shortcomings, several of its administrators argue for the need to think of it as an evolutionary process that began with Comiche's and Nguenha's ideas, is currently in the World Bank micro-project stage, and is slowly evolving in the direction of a Brazilian-style PB.[121] This view recognises many of the faults of the process as currently configured (rather than ignoring them), but sees them as realistic building blocks for something better down the road. This is voiced even with respect to partisanisation and bureaucratic inefficiencies. In the words of one high-ranking official in the process, for example:

> The PB is partisanised and everyone knows it. And most people don't expect the PB to be able to deliver projects on time if at all, partly because of the past history of rounds one and two. The party-state context *does* make it difficult to move towards the ideal of a Brazilian-style PB. But we can begin to get there by surprising everyone and delivering the projects on time and of high quality.[122]

The support of the PB-Maputo 'team' for the World Bank's successful reforms of the process can be interpreted in this light: to take the PB away from the debilitating and policy-

119 For Maputo's government website, see, for example, Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo (2013a); also Conselho Municipal da Cidade de Maputo (2013b). For the *Notícias* newspaper, see, for example, *Notícias* (2013). Noted observations supported by personal interview with former World Bank media consultant to the PB-Maputo, Orlando S Matenga (5 December 2013).

120 The example of a poorly performing neighbourhood secretary in one of the neighbourhoods during the 2013 round of PB meetings is a case in point. Turnout was poor on his neighbourhood's PB Day, planning of the meeting was chaotic on the logistical side for which he was responsible, he punctuated his opening comments with blatantly partisan rallying cries, and he openly participated as a leader of one of the small group discussions. PB administrators were effectively powerless to do anything in response.

121 Personal interview with Laura Peruque, Directora, Orçamento Participativo, Maputo (28 February 2013 and 25 October 2013); also PB-Maputo Coordinating Group meetings (30 July and 2 August 2013).

122 Personal interview with Anonymous (14 May 2013). Of course, this mirrors the view held by World Bank officials, Allen and Dias.

defeating influence of local-level party and administrative elites (and to do so without them feeling that they have had their authority diminished), to raise the consciousness of citizens that their participation in neighbourhood-level public affairs is worthwhile, and to have them attribute this successful operation of the PB-Maputo to the city government's 'good governance'. Testing whether or not these efforts have borne fruit over the long term has been beyond the scope of this study; and, of course, it is impossible to see into the future to fully test this evolutionary argument. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that there has been *some* 'evolution' over the course of moving from the first to the third methodology. For example, using McGee's (2003) criteria for types/quality of PB participation (called 'sovereignty' above), the PB-Maputo has clearly evolved from mere 'consultation' to 'joint decision-making', albeit on a micro-local scale.[123]

PB-Maputo is a case of 'community PB,' highly circumscribed at the micro-local in terms of citizen participation and deliberation, and finely focused on the production of micro-projects. It has become an ongoing part, albeit a small part, of Maputo's public administration as measured by the percentage of discretionary budgetary resources encompassed (1.7% in 2012/2013). While the decision-making processes of the PB Day now place decision-making sovereignty in the preferences of neighbourhood-level participants, participation is still restricted in terms of partisan identification. This partisanisation, alongside the partisanised state institutions on which the process relies, represents a major challenge to the ultimate accountability – and broad legitimacy – of the PB-Maputo.

123 'McGee (2003) distinguishes four types of participation: information sharing, consultation, joint decision-making, and initiation and control by stakeholders' (Fölscher, 2007: 134, 137).

Krenjova and Raudla (2012: 6) offer a similar framework for labelling types of participation: 'Depending on the extent of civil society's influence on the final decision the PB literature suggests three levels of empowerment: 'selective listening', co-governing partnership and de-facto decision-making competence (Fung, 2006; Herzberg, 2011)'. Again, Maputo's PB would appear to be closer to the second, but only on the micro-level of the neighbourhood.

7. Explaining the PB-Maputo: Addressing the hypotheses

The evidence presented here – based on a process-tracing research design involving an exhaustive reading of relevant primary and secondary sources, extensive interviews with administrators and participants, and almost a full year of participant-observation – is that the PB-Maputo began as a top-down 'from-the-inside' reformist effort to adapt an innovative foreign model of participatory local governance to the specific circumstances of competitive-authoritarian Mozambique. Its two main initial protagonists – Mayor Eneas Comiche and Eduardo Nguenha – had been well schooled in PBs and other PIs then spreading throughout the world by means of their participation in multiple conferences and other opportunities to see the policies first hand. Both were 'true believers' in these processes. But both were also solidly Frelimo, and Frelimo's history had long conflated the practices of citizen participation and party mobilisation.[124] Even to this day (2013), as a Frelimo legislator, Comiche can speak of his periodic fact-finding trips into the interior of the country – organised by the partisanised administrative structures of provincial and municipal governments and, therefore, attended primarily by party members and sympathisers – as 'popular consultations' and exercises in 'participatory governance.'[125] These were Frelimo-style *técnico* 'reformists', not radical democrats or even liberal-pluralists. Comiche and Nguenha wished to decentralise and professionalise Maputo's public administration while, at the same time, constructing

124 Immediately after independence and during the civil wars, mobilisation around the personalities, institutions and symbols of Frelimo was the only way to demonstrate patriotism. To be anti-Frelimo was tantamount to treason. Today, the party continues to disseminate this ideology, which alongside its control of the state, serves to keep its members loyal and to keep dissidents quiet.

125 Personal interview with Eneas Comiche (2 April 2013).

In an 11 September 2013 personal interview, World Bank consultant, Louis Allen Helling, analysed Frelimo's 'contradictory' understanding of citizens' participation and discussed how it is revealed in high-level discussions about the PB-Maputo. It is worth citing here since it influenced my own interpretation of events and processes:

> Frelimo has a very complicated set of traditions around participatory governance, some of them extremely interesting and positive from the early days, and then later on [whistle and hand gesture to indicate a more authoritarian turn]. It varied a lot across the country and it was mixed always. Here in Maputo it was more mobilisation, but on the other hand you had a lot of Frelimo militants who came from the *bairros indigenas* of Maputo. So there was ambivalence about the PB at the level of the territorial governance system, but with some interest. [... One] thing that confounded them, and this goes back to Comiche and is part of the more general system, is this whole business with the *Presidencias Abertas* [Open Mayor] and these big meetings. And so their view was, from Finance, and also this was partly what confused Comiche about the whole story, and Simango, was that 'ALL of our budget is a Participatory Budget. Because we consult the people.' So this line, a) 'We're elected, and that makes it a PB,' and b) 'We go out and have these mass meetings and people tell us what they want, we listen, we come back, and we write it up.' So the idea of decision-making versus consultation as one of the critical criteria of participatory budgeting [...] was not clear. And so, therefore, there was some resistance because it was, 'What's the problem? We're doing fine already. Everything here is participatory.'

or reconstructing solidaristic ties with the city's most needy residents (and still the party's most loyal supporters) through these 'new' participatory means. The fact that the initial methodologies of the PB-Maputo were built upon the existing institutions of the *Frelimista* party-state (rather than against them) should not be surprising.

The rushed eleventh-hour implementation of the PB-Maputo at the very end of Mayor Comiche's term can be explained, first, by an unsuccessful tentative effort earlier in his term (i.e. the interns sent to Porto Alegre); secondly, by the fact that Comiche and his Cabinet long assumed that they would be in office for two full terms (so there was time to 'do it right');[126] and, thirdly, in the context of the intra-party struggle over his own succession in the 2008 elections, by Comiche's apparent belief that a highly-visible PB would attract citizens and, more importantly, local party leaders to rally around his 'Inclusive and Participatory' vision of public administration. Comiche's loss in this intra-party struggle meant that the PB was orphaned shortly after its inception. The in-coming mayor, David Simango, did not enthusiastically embrace the embryonic policy, though neither did he kill it outright. Nguenha and a small group of technocrats attempted to press forward with a slightly revised methodology in 2010. But when Simango and his Cabinet ignored the results of that round, the PB-Maputo seemed doomed to oblivion.

It is safe to say that the World Bank saved the PB-Maputo while, at the same time (2011), transforming it from a 'maximalist' Brazilian-style model (albeit modified and never realised in practice) to a 'minimalist' micro-local and micro-project model: a 'community PB.' World Bank officials involved in this process argue, along the lines of the liberal participatory promise, that whatever could be done to break up the decision-making monopoly of the party-state was worth doing, even if only in a relatively tiny portion of the city's overall budget and operations. In the words of World Bank consultant, Nelson Dias, this is just an integral part of what the World Bank does – standard operating procedures:

> Yes, these are just tiny amounts of money. But good governance and transparency are the goals, and they are present in all of the work the Bank does. [...] There is no hidden agenda. No one is under the impression that the PB is going to fundamentally change things, but it's part of the path to getting there.[127]

PB-Maputo officials within the city administration, having retained their jobs (itself an unspoken but obvious part of the explanation), also argue that the policy helps make the city – themselves, their political leaders (Simango and his Cabinet, in this case) and the neighbourhood-level administrators – look good by delivering needed infrastructure projects that a 'representative' group of citizens have said they actually want. City officials seem to have understood that such promised benefits were not forthcoming under the previous methodologies, and that they were more likely to be realised by redirecting

126 Personal interview with João Schwalbach (20 March 2013).
127 Personal interview (15 April 2013).

decision-making sovereignty from local party-state leaders to participating citizens at the neighbourhood level. That the majority of these citizens are party members makes such a reform relatively unthreatening in the eyes of these disenfranchised party and partisanized officials (and is justified or rationalised by both World Bank and municipal leaders as a first step – if not a 'necessary evil' – in an evolutionary process of moving from the Mozambican reality of single-party dominance of all state-society interactions towards a possible future of democratic pluralism). Finally, the political leadership (e.g. Simango) seems to have understood the immediate political promise of the PB: that the other side of 'transparency' and good governance is high visibility, especially in an election year.

We can now look into the extent to which this empirically based explanation of the rise and transformation of the PB-Maputo can contribute to an assessment of the hypothesised explanations offered at the outset of this analysis.

The **first hypothesis** was that the PB-Maputo has always been simply '*Para o Inglês Ver*' – in other words, that it has been 'cynically' constructed and administered to give the *appearance* of a functioning PB in order to impress the donor community and any voters who might value a participatory promise, and, ultimately, in order for its administrators and accomplices to enjoy the salaries and perks, and to distribute the PB's benefits to friends, family and partisan allies. The facts of the case do not seem to bear out this hypothesis:

- First, it is hard to see the cynicism behind the main protagonists of this case study: Comiche, Nguenha or the World Bank's consultants. Just because Comiche and, later, Simango, embraced the politician's participatory promise (that PB wins votes) does not automatically constitute a cynical bargain: politicians want to demonstrate service in any number of ways in order to get re-elected. That is simply part of the internal logic of electoral democracy. Similarly, that PB administrators and World Bank consultants get paid to do their jobs, AND that they actually do their jobs (i.e. PB Days are planned and implemented, project proposals are turned into architectural renderings, contractors are hired in public biddings, etc.), has nothing to do with cynicism and everything to do with the individual-level rationality of public administration; indeed, 'good governance'. Meanwhile, it helps to remember that the PB-Maputo, unlike most of its famous predecessors in Brazil, was never a 'transformative' PB spearheaded by opposition forces intending to establish a new set of grassroots institutions, thereby isolating traditional clientelist institutions and their leadership while, at the same time, providing an alternative space for allied grassroots groups and leaders and a possible recruiting ground for new supporters. Instead, Maputo's PB, instituted from within the status quo party-state institutions, needs to be recognised and understood as a 'conservative' effort to revitalise and reinvigorate those institutions at the grassroots levels.[128]

128 The differences may be summarised as follows:
- 'Against the machine': like the PT in Brazil, using the PB as a means of fighting against, or getting around, machine politics, and by articulating and demonstrating essential differences of political

- Secondly, the difficulties that all three methodologies of the PB-Maputo have had with turning PB priority projects into completed public works might invite a cynical interpretation. But far from these difficulties being rooted in any deliberate efforts to fool the public, this particular problem would instead appear to lie in the efforts of Comiche and Nguenha to push a 'maximalist' version of PB before all significant players were on board. All three methodologies have suffered from any number of technical problems and administrative inefficiencies in bringing PB projects to completion. Examples are too numerous to list, but include severely overworked district managers crucial to the process of project implementation, complex legal issues involving land rights at project sites, and problems with the capacities of contractors to fulfill their obligations on time. [129] The ease with which these same difficulties can be discovered – that is, the openness of the process itself – argues against any concerted effort or ability to pull the wool over the eyes of donors or voters.

- Thirdly, one could argue that the PB-Maputo's first and second methodologies were 'cynically' designed to benefit Frelimo's local-level leadership and *camaradas*. But I prefer to make an historical-cultural argument about the mental legacies of post-liberation one-party rule (e.g. Comiche's conflation of participation and mobilisation), and an historical-institutional argument about corresponding institutional legacies (e.g. the inevitable utilisation of 'partisanised' neighbourhood secretaries and block chiefs as key grassroots-level administrators of the process, and the need for Frelimo incumbents to be more worried about appeasing party leaders/activists who vote in the party primaries than about appealing to a plurality of citizens in the general elections). The final methodology, more or less imposed by the World Bank, with its decision-making sovereignty in the hands of neighbourhood participants, removes the ability for PB benefits to be 'distributed' in any way other than through convincing argumentation and a plurality of participants' votes in a secret ballot. This is a clear advance, albeit a relatively small one when set alongside the more maximalist participatory promises most observers bring to the table.

The **second hypothesis** was that the PB-Maputo was designed to 'defensively' reconnect the local party-state to an alienated population increasingly prone to civic violence; and to do so in a face-to-face manner with benefits going beyond the usual partisans. In other words, the PB-Maputo could best be understood as an effort to stave off a palpable crisis

ideology and approach, to construct a participatory democratic counter organisation/mobilisation in alliance with similar-minded NGOs and progressive parties/groups/individuals.

- 'Of the machine' (or 'In the machine'): like FRELIMO in Mozambique, using the PB as a means to bolster and complement clientelistic organisation/mobilisation and citizen support through the rhetoric and the instruments of participatory democracy; in so doing, to coopt or preempt counter-organisation/mobilisation along such lines.

129 Personal interviews with two anonymous district managers (25 July 2013) and (27 May 2013), and with World Bank Consultants Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2013) and Orlando S. Matenge (4 December 2013).

of legitimacy, along the lines of the liberal participatory promise (in which, as stated above, 'the decentralisation of decision-making authority, increasing citizen engagement and, ultimately, increasing government accountability' constitute a means by which to achieve an 'ultimate concern for regime and systemic stability'). The World Bank's Louis Helling makes the connection explicit:

> One of the issues that you have in Maputo is that the compact between the governing authority and the citizens is fragile. And one of the ways to reinforce that [compact] is by trusting the people to make decisions, and then fulfilling your role in helping them to implement those decisions.[130]

However, even in the context of the Maputo riots mentioned in Beall et al. (2011: 16), from whom this hypothesis is drawn, there is no evidence that Maputo's civic violence was a motivating concern for the original protagonists of the PB-Maputo. There *is* evidence, though, of concern over a palpable malaise within the population, especially regarding the performance of Mozambique's political-administrative institutions. As mentioned, Mayor Comiche certainly seems to have seen the PB as part of an overall revitalisation and rejuvenation of the existing municipal institutions – in the case of the PB, via greater citizen participation in the things that matter most to them: neighbourhood infrastructural improvements and public works projects (in the case of other aspects of the city's public administration, via 'good governance' reforms that translated into better performance of such public services as trash collection, street maintenance and revenue collection).[131]

The problem with Comiche's vision was that it clashed head on with the darker side of the party-state system he hoped to reform: the propensity of party-based clientelism to easily morph into corruption and exclusion. Like many if not most non-competitive systems, the Frelimo party-state is constructed upon and maintained through the continuation and even expansion of this 'darker side', all at the ultimate expense of a more generalised or universalised *public* service.[132] To some, this even suggests the *impossibility* of meaningful reform.

In this context, the solution proposed and initiated by the World Bank – removing a very small portion of the municipal investment budget from the hands of local party leaders and cadres – is a small but arguably significant victory. Helling's quote, above, demonstrates clearly that he understands the premises behind this second hypothesis. The literature, and Helling's continued work with the Bank, suggests that his understanding reflects the Bank's as well (i.e. the liberal participatory promise). Only time can tell if such small reforms become more meaningful in the long run.

130 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2013).

131 For these latter, see Wampler (2008) and Reaud (2012).

132 'Clientelist cooption may allow the local state to consolidate by including a wide range of elites in rent-sharing networks that stave off conflict; but the very establishment of this equilibrium may prevent the state from effectively transforming because inclusive development will rarely be a priority' (Beall et al. 2011: 19–20).

The **third hypothesis** was that the PB-Maputo is an example of reformist elements of the local party-state 'proactively' taking advantage of a window of opportunity (a 'critical juncture') to connect themselves to an alienated population; and to do so in a face-to-face manner with benefits going beyond the usual partisans. Wampler (2007, 40) lays out the political logic of this hypothesis as it pertains to PBs in general: 'Participatory budgeting programs subvert clientelism [the status quo] by providing open, transparent policy-making processes. Reformist governments gamble that by delegating decision making to citizen participants, they will weaken old clientelistic politics and strengthen their own positions.'[133]

Historical-institutionalist argumentation can be used to explain significant transformative policy innovations ('critical junctures' and subsequent 'path dependencies') as well as stubborn policy continuities in the face of long-standing institutional legacies.[134] The framework is also applicable to the more-or-less normal ebbs and flows of power and influence among groups and individuals within a given regime. Applying it to the case of Maputo's PB in the context of Mozambique's competitive-authoritarian regime requires an understanding of factions within the governing party – a difficult task given the oft-commented upon opacity of the Frelimo machine.[135] As mentioned, however, Weimer et. al. (2012) fruitfully use the historical-institutionalist framework to explain the emergence of decentralisation reforms in Mozambique in the early-to-mid-1990s, as well as their subsequent dilution beginning in the late-1990s.

In the case of the PB-Maputo, a critical juncture and subsequent path dependencies are recognisable in a two-stage model of reform, but they do not necessarily explain the dynamics of the case at hand:

- A 'critical juncture' (but not necessarily *the* critical juncture for the PB-Maputo):[136] under Mayor Canana (1998–2003), corruption and ineptitude got so bad that a trained economist, financial manager, and noted 'good governance' reformist, Eneas Comiche, was brought in to become Frelimo's candidate for mayor in the 2003 elections in which the main opposition party, Renamo, was participating for the first time.

- A temporarily weakened anti-reform coalition: In an executive-dominated system, Mayor Canana's demise signified the dissolution of his governing coalition and its

133 See Moynihan, 2007 (especially pp.58–60) for the explicit connection between participation and 'reformist' efforts to improve public administration in developing countries.

134 For example, as outlined above, 'the darker side of the party-state system [Comiche] hoped to reform: the propensity of party-based clientelism to easily morph into corruption and exclusion,' and 'the continued predominance of party members and sympathisers among the PB-Maputo's citizen-participants (i.e. "the usual partisans") represents an ongoing challenge to its capacity to bridge the gap between a sceptical public and a partisanised state.'

135 Frelimo's '*pluralismo na discussão e unicidade na acção pós-decisão ... obriga a uma posição mais 'low profile' em público*' (Macuane, 2013: 17).

136 The 'crisis' that actually precipitated the PB-Maputo, as discussed below, was the increasing loss of support for Mayor Comiche within the local party affecting his re-election bid in 2008.

prominence within the local party. Comiche stepped into this space. Following Mayor Comiche's reforms that effectively – not just rhetorically – attacked bureaucratic perks and other party privileges (i.e. 'corruption' or the 'benefits of party loyalty'), a new pro-party/anti-reform coalition began to form within the Frelimo-dominated Municipal Assembly and the local party organisation. This pro-party/anti-reform coalition was bolstered by the election of President Guebuza in 2004, who continued his efforts to establish the hegemony of his own loyalists within the party-state (Comiche was a member of the faction of outgoing President Chissano). These two processes led to Comiche's replacement by David Simango in 2008.

- Two reformist coalitions: Comiche's Cabinet of primarily trained professionals was supported by international donors (e.g. pro-Maputo) and popular opinion – but, as pertains to the parameters of a competitive-authoritarian regime, no autonomous civil society participation or organised party faction. The PB was implemented at 'the eleventh hour' of Comiche's administration as an effort on his part to (re)construct a winning coalition among local-level party leaders and activists for Frelimo's nominating convention. When that effort failed, the PB limped along under Eduardo Nguenha and a handful of bureaucrats until 2011 when the World Bank proposed, and Mayor Simango accepted, a 'reformed-reformist' coalition behind a fundamentally transformed 'minimalist' PB methodology.

- A 'new normal': The first two PB-Maputo methodologies were constructed in a political vacuum, by a mayor 'on the out' (Comiche), and by a technocrat without effective support from the new mayor (Nguenha). Their ultimate failure reflected the closing of the 'window of opportunity' for reform that had only briefly opened in 2003. The third version of the PB-Maputo 'stuck' beginning in 2011 when the earlier maximalist intentions (with minimal impact) were transformed, under World Bank guidance, into a community PB, highly circumscribed at the micro-local level in terms of citizen participation and deliberation, and finely focused on the production of micro-projects.

In the end, Comiche's candidacy and reformist administration, as well as his decision to implement a PB, can certainly be understood in historical-institutionalist terms. The PB-Maputo, however, emerges not from the same critical juncture that brought Comiche into office (as originally hypothesised), but from his response to the resurgence of the anti-reform factions within his own party (described in historical-institutionalist terms as institutional legacies inherent if not dominant within any competitive-authoritarian or single-party dominant regime). In other words, Comiche's PB was a defensive reaction to the *closing* of the window of opportunity for reform, not to its opening. And the policy seemed to be aimed more at mobilising the support of local-level party elites (which he clearly needed) than at mobilising the support of the population at large (which he already had). With the ensuing hegemony of the pro-party/anti-reformist factions of the party (Guebuza/Simango), the PB-Maputo was doomed to political insignificance even if it limped along under bureaucratic inertia for a few years. The subsequent 'reform of the

reform' – in which the moribund Comiche/Nguenha version was transformed into the World Bank version – was carried out with significant 'external' intervention (the World Bank), and *that* is not part of the essentially endogenous historical-institutionalist model.

The case study backs up a two-part explanation requiring a careful mix of, first, the historical-institutional model to understand the dynamics of the Frelimo party-state (and, therefore, the decisions of individuals within that context) and, secondly, the liberal participatory promise to understand the motivations behind the World Bank's intervention. Unlike PBs that arise in democratic or truly democratising regimes (e.g. most of the Latin American cases), civil society organisations and non-government organisations are conspicuous by their absence from this case.

8. Beyond creation, transformation and survival – Success or failure of the participatory promise in Maputo (So what?)

This research has been most concerned with explaining the emergence of Maputo's PB in the surprising context of Mozambique's competitive-authoritarian regime. Having accomplished that task in the preceding pages, it is worth dedicating a few more pages to a discussion of how Maputo's PB fares when set alongside the participatory promises that form the normative foundation of the PB literature (and that often serve to justify the policy in its real-world applications).

First, it is important to reaffirm that the PB-Maputo was never intended by its architects to be a transformative policy innovation along the lines generally associated with the Porto Alegre model.[137] Despite being inspired by certain components of that model – like having citizens participate in neighbourhood meetings alongside local authorities – it is abundantly clear that all versions of the PB-Maputo were ultimately meant to mobilise support behind the status quo authorities in power. Citizen empowerment and civil society autonomy were certainly not part of the agenda of the first version (2008–2012), even though the policy emanated from a 'reformist' wing of the Frelimo party/state. Mayor Comiche turned out to be a proponent of reviving Frelimo's top-down mobilisational 'participatory' culture of the years of early independence and one-party rule (and a good dose of personalism) – a 'culture' or style that could be considered definitional to competitive-authoritarian regimes more generally. Even the second (World Bank) version, for all its efforts to reserve decision-making sovereignty for actual citizen-participants, ultimately had to function within the institutional boundaries of the Frelimo party-state (as manifest in the fact that most 'citizen-participants' were Frelimo loyalists and members). Clearly, then, the PB-Maputo is in a completely different universe of cases from the PBs of Porto Alegre and most of the rest of Brazil. So it is both inappropriate and unfair to judge Maputo's PB by referring to the 'radical' participatory promise often associated with those models – and popularly associated with the policy more generally.

Having been born as an unsuccessful effort to consolidate partisan support behind a 'reformist' candidate and faction of the ruling Frelimo party, even the 'pragmatic' politicians' participatory promise based on political rationality (PB for votes) did not play out at the initial

137 Making explicit use of the 'radical democratic' participatory promise (i.e. citizen empowerment, civil society autonomy and an 'enabling' state), Porto Alegre's PB functioned to cement a political coalition between an upstart opposition party and a bevy of 'contentious' civil society organisations aligned against a status quo coalition of traditional political and economic elites and their networks of clientelistic linkages. Thus, in Porto Alegre, the 'radical' ideological promise dovetailed perfectly, at least for a time, with the 'rational' political promise (i.e. political support for administrators and participants alike).

stage of the process. Like many, if not most, PBs (Fölscher, 2007: 143–147), Maputo's first two PBs were marked by raised expectations, out-of-control expenses, and uncompleted or long-delayed projects. In this case, the politically-rational participatory promise to citizen-participants (participation for projects) also went unmet. Using Wampler's definition of PB success and failure (2007: 7–9), Maputo's PB had clearly failed:

> The successful programs delegate real authority to citizens and implement a range of public policies selected by PB participants. The failed programs are notable for their lack of delegation and the limited number of PB projects implemented by government officials. […] Therefore, the principal criterion for success is the scope and efficacy of authority that citizens exercise.[138]

Until its transformation under the auspices of the World Bank, the politically rational participatory promise of the PB-Maputo resided in a handful of politically isolated bureaucrats and intellectuals (PB for status/jobs and a belief that a broader PB-based political coalition was possible and even beneficial to Maputo's underserved citizens). With the World Bank's eleventh-hour rescue, the policy was 'downsized', and in its most recent incarnation as a community PB, it finally gained the active support of Maputo's administration and local-level Frelimo leadership as well as a small but not insignificant number of mostly partisan citizen-participants. Mayor Simango's eventual embrace of the PB signals a broadening acceptance of the 'political' participatory promise – albeit on a still-small scale, as measured by the budget resources dedicated to the process. Simango has come to see it, as Mayor Comiche did and as most politicians would, as a platform to '*mostrar serviço*' (demonstrate effectiveness) not only to rank-and-file party members but to non-partisan electors as well. As Maputo's local elections have become more competitive in recent years, and if that trend continues into future elections, such political logic should become increasingly compelling.

None of this will be of much interest, however, to those analysts of democracy who hold out greater democratising promises of participatory public policies than the simple facilitation of winning political coalitions.[139] But such analysts should remember that none of their concerns for democratic empowerment, autonomy and accountability hold much interest for politicians necessarily concerned with getting elected and staying in office, or for public administrators concerned with supporting their political bosses and/or in furthering their

138 Avritizer (2009: 14) defines success in similar terms as an 'increase in the number of social actors involved in policy-making' and 'democratisation of access to public goods'; also 'enforcing social policies at the local level' (i.e. greater local-level 'accountability'). These did not happen in the case of the PB-Maputo until the World Bank version in 2012.

139 For example, Canhanga (2009: 110) concludes that similar outcomes in Cuamba and Montepuez '*pode levar-nos a entender que o processo de planificação participativa está sendo encarado como um simples acto político e não, necessariamente, como um efectivo exercício democrático da governação e modus vivendi daquelas instituições de poder local*'.

own career development. Indeed, one of my arguments throughout has been that we need to cover all relevant sides of the story.

But the final takeaway argument here is that the PB-Maputo is not *just* about political rationality and strategy. While radical democratic aspirations are precluded by competitive-authoritarian institutions, the liberal participatory promise – the 'accountability agenda' – is reflected in the World Bank version of the PB-Maputo, which pushes decision-making sovereignty in a less clientelistic direction, away from the local Frelimo leadership that dominated the neighbourhood meetings in earlier stages and towards the mostly-Frelimo rank-and-file members/supporters that come out to participate on the PB Days. The PB-Maputo in its current state can thus be seen as a liberalising effort to deconstruct one small part of the authoritarian legacy of local party leaders and local administrators being one-in-the-same.[140] At least with respect to PB projects, neighbourhood-level officials have been transformed from PB decision-makers to PB project administrators, and they are the ones accountable to constituents' concerns about the pace and quality of project implementation.[141] Overall, then, the discussion and spending of PB-Maputo funds are more open and transparent today than ever before.

The limitations of these changes, however, are strikingly obvious. PB Days occur once every three years (once every two years, after 2014). Only a limited range of citizens participate in those PB Days (mostly Frelimo supporters/members).[142] Project oversight groups (whose members are also almost exclusively from the Frelimo rank and file) play only a minimal oversight role and do not tend to see it as their responsibility or 'place' to challenge local partisan administrators and party leaders. And, of course, Mayor Simango and his eventual successor could eventually do away with the programme altogether, World Bank

140 Following up on Wampler's definition of PB success/failure (2007: 9), 'a second criterion for success is based on how the delegation of authority affects the extension of accountability and citizenship rights.' Also (p.31), 'one of the important reforms associated with successful participatory budgeting programs is that participatory budgeting projects are implemented through a regularized, bureaucratic process. Administrative procedures are followed, replacing the direct intervention of politicians into bureaucracies.'

141 According to Canhanga (2009: 97): '*Em termos pragmáticos, uma vez que através da descentralização se organiza a participação dos cidadão na solução dos seus problemas definidos a nível local, exige-se dos dirigentes e funcionários nestes sectores mais responsabilidade e qualidade dos serviços produzidos e prestados ao público.*' This is all the more necessary in this case because neighbourhood-level officials have historically been prone to corruption and abuse of power: '*Os secretários do bairro passarem a ser os mais propensos a receber pagamentos ilícitos dos munícipes para a obtenção de declarações de residência. Estes são seguidos pelos chefes do quarteirão*' (Conselho Municipal de Maputo/COWI, 2013: 17).

For the argument that PBs can stimulate administrative modernisation/development (e.g. developing 'cross-departmental cooperation' within the administrative machine, bringing administrative cadres closer to neighbourhoods and citizens, etc.), see Sintomer et al. (2010: 64).

142 'The range of involvement is narrow when only a handful of citizens or a particular socioeconomic group dominates decision making. The range becomes broader with the involvement of interest groups' (Moynihan, 2007: 61). The outcomes in Maputo on this score are similar to those in the Cuamba and Montepuez case studies of participatory planning (see Canhanga, 2009).

displeasure and 'bureaucratic inertia' notwithstanding. The lack of autonomous civil society participation/support makes the policy particularly vulnerable to such a political 'shock'.

So ... is such a small and fragile change actually noteworthy?

One answer is voiced by the World Bank's Louis Allen Helling, who reminds us that PBs facilitate a basic public-service function – delivering public services that citizens actually want and that bureaucrats and politicians might not otherwise understand:

> A little bit of money spent at the very most local level can make a big difference. It can make a difference in practical terms by serving a need that is not visible as a priority from further up the system. That's the basic argument for decentralised management of anything.[143]

It helps to remember that this 'substantive' dimension of the policy – public works 'micro-projects' – is the primary concern of neighbourhood-level participants and non-participating resident-beneficiaries. Analyses of the impact of these projects on the day-to-day lives and livelihoods of Maputo's citizens along the lines of those carried out, for example, by Leubolt et al. (2009) in Porto Alegre[144] are well beyond the scope of this analysis here. But they would be extremely helpful in assessing the PB-Maputo from the perspective of the policy's purported beneficiaries.

But, again, what about the contribution of the PB-Maputo to Mozambican democracy, and to democratic theory? What I earlier identified as 'the evolutionary argument' of the PB-Maputo's administrators finds its academic counterpart in the literature when, for example, Selee and Peruzzotti (2009: 8) speak of participatory innovations generating 'incremental changes that may reinforce the promise and practice of representative democracy.' Similarly, the work of Kathleen Thelen (2009: 475–476) on institutional change – most particularly, on 'the most important way institutions change over time … gradual but cumulatively transformative'– is potentially applicable here. Underlying structural and macro-political dynamics, according to Thelen, can fundamentally transform initially small reforms when they get caught up in the day-to-day struggles of 'normal' politics, be they partisan/electoral, inter-bureaucratic, intra-partisan, and/or distributional in terms of the state's allocation of resources and services. In other words, not all significant institutional changes come during crisis times ('critical junctures') only to get subsequently 'locked down' in 'path dependencies' until the next crisis comes along – for example the 'punctuated equilibrium' model of change (Thelen, 2009: 474) of our third hypothesis, above. Unfortunately, Thelen's predictive model of change (Thelen & Mahoney, 2010) seems not to apply to an institution like the PB-Maputo, as the latter has not motivated potentially powerful veto players (a key component of Thelen's 'political coalitional theory of institutional change' [2009: 476] to

143 Personal interview with Louis Allen Helling (11 September 2013).
144 Leubolt, Novy & Becker (2009); also see Peixoto (2012).

enter into any significantly contentious politics of institutional reform focused around the PB. Instead, all involved or potentially involved have acquiesced in the World Bank's alliance with the PB-Maputo's bureaucratic players to transform the failed original programme into a community PB and, more recently, to have doubled its funding and shortened its cycle from three to two years. Only time will tell if the PB-Maputo, thus transformed in a 'small' way, will be caught up and further transformed in the context of the larger transformations that seem to be roiling the waters of contemporary Mozambican politics.

9. Conclusion

The case study of Maputo's PB has emphasised a two-part explanation requiring a mix of, first, the historical-institutional model to help understand the dynamics of the Frelimo party-state (and the decisions of individuals within that context) and, secondly, the liberal participatory promise to understand the motivations behind the World Bank's intervention. The case study suggests that PBs can emerge 'top down' in competitive-authoritarian regimes as a function of intra-party competition (in the absence of opposition parties and civil society organisations with deep grassroots support) and bureaucratic buy-in. However, such regime components as clientelism and corruption, historically enabled if not encouraged by a fully partisanised state, easily combine to isolate and ultimately sideline reformist groups who threaten to derail the gravy train. External assistance can shore up a non-confrontational PB if it can help promote the efficient delivery of PB projects to primarily partisan supporters that municipal authorities can claim as their own.

Participatory budgeting was born in late-1980s Brazil in the context of democratic competition: the Workers' Party of Porto Alegre attempted to shore up its precarious hold on executive power through ongoing 'grassroots' co-participation with local NGOs, party activists and anyone else willing to constructively participate in PB processes. On the surface, nothing could be more different from the origins of Maputo's PB some 20 years later. Maputo's PB was initiated in the context of the complete hegemony of the ruling party; opposition parties, civil society organisations, and non-government organisations were conspicuous by their absence.[145] Accordingly, the genesis of Maputo's PB was intra-party political competition within the ruling party (Frelimo) in the mid-2000s. Mayor Eneas Comiche adopted the idea as a means to connect with Frelimo-dominated neighbourhoods and their leaders (who vote in party primaries). When Comiche's efforts failed, Maputo's PB floundered. Without the next mayor's active support, bureaucratic

145 The celebrated case of Dondo's PB would appear to be the same. Not so in many of the other towns in the central and northern parts of the country that received support from the Swiss and other European donors for their PBs. In those cases, reconciliation of former combatants was a key goal, if not the key goal, of the NGOs promoting the process. The idea was to construct an inclusionary process even as the standard institutions of local public administration were firmly in the hands of a single party, whether that party be Frelimo or Renamo.

As this was going to press, Nelson Dias (the World Bank consultant), with funding from the UK's Department for International Development (via the NGO, Dialogo), was taking the 'Maputo model' to the cities of Nampula and Quelimane, both administered by the opposition party, the Mozambican Democratic Movement (MDM). Clearly, these 'Against the machine' cases will differ greatly from the Maputo case. In the words of Louis Helling (correspondence with the author dated 23 July 2014), 'the MDM municipal reform agenda and the complexity of contestation at the *bairro* [neighbourhood] level with FRELIMO over the legitimacy of various local leadership structures (*secretários de bairro, "líderes communitárias",* and various local committees and associational structures including those linked to the PB) are much more complex and interesting than the relatively straightforward single party "competetive authoritarian" context in Maputo.'

inertia from the PB's administrative 'team' (apparently including some sincere commitment to PB principles) and eventual inclusion/buy-in from neighbourhood-level party and administrative leaders (neighbourhood-level 'partisanisation') were not enough to keep the process going, especially given the significant price tag left behind from Comiche's initial effort. On the brink of collapse, local representatives of the World Bank gave Maputo's PB a new lease on life, albeit in altered form. The World Bank's model of PB intended to professionalise (i.e. departisanise) the neighbourhood-level administration of the PB while rebuilding links between the PB team and the city's political leadership (both in the name of enhanced 'accountability' and 'good governance'). The end result: on the one hand, a more transparent and fiscally responsible administration of the participatory prioritisation and implementation of neighbourhood-level 'micro-projects' (a 'community PB'); on the other hand, only a slightly altered form of the partisanisation of the PB process, as various institutional rigidities conspired to keep Maputo's PB largely confined to party members at every step of its implementation (e.g. a still-partisanised PB administrative team, partisanised micro-level institutions responsible for the PB's neighbourhood-level administration and recruitment of participants, mostly partisan citizen-participants, and the seemingly inevitable Frelimo-style 'script' of participation-as-mobilisation).

Maputo's experience with participatory budgeting, while clearly different from that associated with the Workers' Party in Brazil, does share a basic similarity: PB processes serve political processes of building or sustaining networks and alliances of political support for the mayors who implement them, far more than they serve such lofty democratic ideals as 'democratic empowerment' and 'budgetary transparency' – thus confirming the arguments of Peruzzotti and Selee (2009) regarding 'short-term strategic considerations' behind most 'second-generation' Latin American cases of PB.[146] These latter may be primary motives for certain PB partners, such as Porto Alegre's NGOs or Maputo's World Bank officials. To the extent that these partners are important to a mayor's political survival, such ideals cannot be dismissed out of hand, especially as they can be transformed (as has been the case in many of Brazil's PB experiences) into public policies beneficial to normally ignored or underserved sectors of the population. Even without such civic-minded partners, however, PBs can survive and even grow if the mayor perceives them to be politically useful, and if his/her administration and/or party can deliver a respectable number of neighbourhood-level participants – as has been the case in Maputo. The key point is this, however: notwithstanding the arguments of academic textbooks and development agency handbooks, real-world PBs are fundamentally about politics, and this is true whether we are looking at a multiparty democracy or a competitive-authoritarian regime. Only by understanding the nature of a given political regime – at both the national and the local levels – can one can begin to understand the nature of a given PB operating within that regime.

146 See fn. 23.

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