

## Party building and bumpy roads to democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

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### Freedom fighters, revolutionaries or political parties?

With liberation movements and prodemocracy movements coming into power from the 1960s and 70s, Sub-Saharan Africa could finally turn its back to the colonial period. With a wave of democratisation in the early 90s, 'not a single *de jure* one party state remained in Africa' (Bratton & van de Walle 1997). Yet, multiparty politics remain on rocky soil. Looking back, electoral activity in the new democracies has gone in tandem with factual one-party rule and restrictions on civil society, media and oppositional activity. International media often blames suppression of democratic rights on individual political leaders. Leaders do, however, represent political *parties*. While considerable academic and political interest followed the "third wave of democracy" (Huntington 1991) in the south in the early 90s, little attention was given to the transition following the establishment of democracy, and to the agents, in many cases liberation movements and pro-democracy movements, that carried the process forward. Yet, their struggles to transform into political parties set a heavy mark on the political processes in present sub-Saharan Africa.

Institutionalisation of parties and party systems has generally not progressed from fluid to stable party systems in Africa like in other parts of the world. Several question in fact whether party systems in Africa can at all be conceptualized in line with the comparative literature (Lindberg 2007). While some argue that centrism and elitism in several parties in the south is caused by lack of pluralism in society at large, weak civil societies and/or the culture of African societies, this paper argues that the legacy of their organisational past sets its marks on many new political parties.

This paper looks at the African National Congress (ANC) and its internal transformation after being unbanned in 1990. The party that evolved in the early 90s was built on two legacies: the liberation movement in exile and the prodemocracy movement that had operated inside South Africa. Their characteristics, and the tension between the two, came to mark the transition and serve as stumbling blocks towards the building of an accountable, democratic party and in turn the consolidation of democracy. What specific challenges was the ANC confronted with? How does the "movement heritage" impact on the structure and system building of parties, their programme work, "value infusion" and the broader loyalty and support the parties and indirectly regimes receive in the populace?

### Party building in Sub-Saharan Africa

Parties and party systems form vital, but often overlooked roles in democratic transitions and consolidation (Sandbrook 1996; Diamond 1989; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Randall & Svåsand 2002). Parties provide the connection between politics and society, leadership and people. Democratic parties participate in the quest for political office, aggregate preferences and accountability, channel demands from voters, represent constituents, mobilize citizens and recruit and select leaders for government. It is the institutional strength and character of a *party*, not of the personal cabal that forms its' leadership, which lays grounds for democracy. However, while political science generally has considerable focus on party building and systems, most literature focuses on parties in Western countries. The legacy of liberation movements turned into political parties is even less illuminated.

Political parties in transition countries are often confronted with severe challenges when building, or institutionalising, their parties. Several are forced to build party structures while simultaneously exercising governance and state control. Combined with massive shortages of funds, high popular expectations to

delivery, and weak supporting structures, party institutionalisation remains a shattered attention field. Tensions around reconciliation; joint government structures; land demarcation; and redistribution put pressure on fragile parties. As experienced by several nationalist and liberation movements, transitions towards political parties entail costly and demanding processes towards openness, inclusiveness and transparency. Creating institutional structures of governance and changing overly centralised and secretive methods of decision-making inherited from guerrilla warfare or underground periods, is generally compounded by lack of funding, but also shortage of knowledge about and experience in governance. Furthermore, parties will only be able to fulfil their functions if the configuration of the party system remains relatively stable, which is highly unlikely in periods of transitions from authoritarian, or colonial, rule. Party building has often also been neglected by international donors who have found this to be either too political or of lower priority than poverty eradication etc. In result, party building has become the “weak link” in democratisation in the south (Carother 2006). At the same time, Manning (2005) and Hyden (2005) argue that if political parties do not ‘mature’ or ‘transform’ to be ‘real’ political parties in the sense assumed by democratic theory, then they are less likely to fulfil their democratic functions.

While there is agreement on the importance of democratic parties for the consolidation of democracy, there is less agreement on which qualities parties should have, or what kind of party system is most conducive. Parties have been criticised of centralism, lack of delivery, corruption and bureaucratisation in many countries (Carother 2006). Political parties are organisations set up more or less intentionally and with some kind of formal rules and objectives. Their first function is to compete for elections and, if winning, exercising political power. The process through which they become *institutionalised* is not identical with a party’s development in organisational terms. Party institutionalisation, or party building, entails both organisational and attitudinal dimensions as well as alliance building and policy work. Lindberg (2007) argues that a party takes on an integrated pattern of behaviour and of attitudes. Huntington (1968) identifies adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence as dimensions of institutionalisation. Panebianco (1988) sees it as the way the organisation becomes valuable “in and of itself”. Levitsky (1998) and Selznick (1957) argue that parties hence become ‘infused with value beyond the technical requirement of the task in hand’. Janda (1980) suggests that an institutionalised party is one that is also ‘reified in the public mind’. They all agree however, that institutionalisation, or party building impacts on the degree to which parties manage to perform their democratic functions.

Hyden (2006) divides African parties into broad categories. With Africa’s economic structure, class parties are not likely to occur.<sup>1</sup> After independence, differentiation has usually been made between mass parties and patron or elite parties relying on personal leadership (Morgenthau 1961; Hodgkin 1961; Coleman and Rosberg 1966). While the prior claim to represent all the people, have strong institutional leadership and discipline, the latter are less disciplined, and do not make the same concerted effort to foment a new nation (Hyden 2006). Manning (2005) argues that African parties are often formed as elite enterprises and vehicles of competition and control, built on different foundation from the one that undergirds advanced industrial democracies and the theories about party systems generated by their experience. Instead of crosscutting cleavages and flexible pluralism, Africa portrays polarisation and certain fixity of cleavage lines. Pluralism is limited by the challenges of state building, the circumstances under which electoral politics emerged, the predominance of state involvement in the economy and limited private sectors activities. Electoral politics came, not as the culmination of socio-economic change and social pluralism, but as a proposed solution to problems such as economic mismanagement and/or violent conflict.

The regimes that took power after the democratic changes of the early 90s may broadly be divided in three categories.<sup>2</sup> The first are countries where the armed nationalist liberation movements that secured

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<sup>1</sup> Except in countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia et al where mining and industrial enclaves have developed.

<sup>2</sup> Categories borrowed from CMI workshop presentation (Nov. 2008).

independence from colonial rulers are still in power (Angola and Mozambique 1975; Zimbabwe 1980; Namibia 1992; South Africa 1994). Then there are second-generation liberation movements that waged armed struggles against African dictatorships in the 90s, and have been in power since (Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea). Third, there are pro-democracy movements that have seen the establishment of multi-party political systems since the early 1990s in some countries (Zambia, Malawi). There has been a striking weakness of opposition in the new democracies. The pro-democracy party, once elected, has generally remained in power. As a striking contrast to global electoral policies and in spite of continuous criticism of abuse of human rights and/or low delivery on poverty eradication, African incumbents have seldom lost elections.<sup>3</sup> In practice, stable party systems in Africa seem to imply stable *one-party* dominance. The generations of nationalist movements, liberation movements as well as the later pro-democracy movements have to a large degree failed to fully implement the democratic aspirations that were important elements of the anti-colonial struggle and the support for the pro-democracy movement. The new regimes centred more on attaining power, and less on creating a democratic state and society.

Hyden (2006) argues that the movements left behind a legacy that has made transition to conventional party politics difficult. While the movements were guided by the liberation, nationalistic and/or democratic aspirations, they also carried forward organisational structures, traditions and culture, which were heavily shaped by the character and modus operandi of their organisations. In practice, however, there were in part some great differences between liberation movements on the one hand and the pro-democracy movements on the other. The former liberation movements have had difficulty adhering to principles such as transparency and accountability. Hyden argues that compared to the nationalist movements, their military component made the liberation movements more disciplined but also more rigid when dealing with dissent. While the liberation movements produced a hard core of committed and disciplined leaders, their ability to make a difference after independence soon faltered.

Liberation movements were armed movements and organised with highly centralised decision-making, secrecy and command structures. Their goal was not necessarily democracy, but independence and justice. The liberation movements modus operandi was the military struggle rather than the democratic political channels, their arena was “the bush” rather than political institutions and parliaments. Their means of mobilisation, targets and goals were similarly different from those of democratic movements or parties. The narratives and memories of war, secrecy, militant rhetoric and command structures shaped their organisations but also the new political elite. Many liberation movements also adopted a Leninist-inspired approach to organisation, emphasising the vanguard role of the leadership in (Hyden 2006). Coming into power, one-party systems followed, either by direct establishment or through elections. Nationalistic movements were less command-oriented, often urban based but also relatively elite oriented and centralised. The pro-democracy movements on the other hand were built on totally different organisational principles, culture and with direct aims of democracy interpreted as popular participation.

For all these three different categories of movements, political change implied a need to also look at party building and institutionalisation. Although their starting point and structures may have differed, they all faced new realities in having to prepare for formal channels of decision-making, governance and in some cases elections. They also shared another commonality in that most of them, irrespective of whether they fought with guns or on the basis of mass action in the streets, had aims of a social revolution. They fought for the people and/or for the poor. Whether their goal was independence or democracy, they would often have leftwing or socialist goals and claim to be revolutionaries. And all these revolutionaries would, however, also soon discover that bringing about drastic reform requires other skills and organisation than

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<sup>3</sup> See also material developed for CMI workshop Nov 2008: <http://www.cmi.no/research/project/?1273=transition-to-what>

those needed to run a government and build a parties. As Errol Flynn said about the Cuban revolution: “it is one thing to start a revolution, another to win it, and still another to make it stick”.<sup>4</sup>

## **Transition and party building in South Africa**

To the ANC, the challenges queued up after being unbanned in 1990 and set to operate from inside South Africa. The leadership was in London and party cadres spread throughout the world. Thousands of party supporters and liberation fighters were imprisoned in South Africa. Millions expected immediate change. Managing the negotiations for political change, while maintaining the military capacity and organisation, and simultaneously preparing for governance, were all top priorities in a risky and new environment. Party building was seen as a critical tool to assure strength in governance and predictable, stable electoral support. It was to the ANC, as for other parties, to entail a certain level of organisation and structure in order to make it capable of participating in legalised and formal political processes. Maintaining the mass character of the movement was another high priority. Furthermore, the ANC needed to become capable of organising constituencies for policy objectives. While the Freedom Charter (1956) assured the ideological basis for the movement, the Charter left a lot still to be decided in terms of operationalisation and policy objectives. Maintaining identification with the ANC’s ideology among millions of blacks, while developing support among new groups was seen as a difficult but important balancing act. Finally, alliance building was seen as a significant part of party building but also of reconciliation and nation building. With party structures being overwhelmed and understaffed, developing a strong negotiation machinery and later on a delivery-oriented government, while at the same time building the political party, was however both demanding and risky.

Panebianco (1988) emphasised the consequences for a party’s institutionalisation, of the manner in which it was founded and its origins. Did ‘party-building’ occur through a process of ‘penetration’ from the centre to the periphery (both in territorial and more organisational terms) or ‘diffusion’, in which the party emerged spontaneously from below (Lindberg 2007)? In the case of ANC, it was however not an “either or”. The ANC is Africa’s first liberation movement, formed in 1912 in response to the creation of the South African Union, which entrenched white minority rule. After the ANC was banned in the 60s, it set up its’ military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), committed to armed struggle and operated from exile. Simultaneously, and particularly through the 70s, the ANC transformed from the elite party it had originally been, based on educated Africans, to a more mass and youth based party. The years that followed saw increasing mass actions internally organised by ANC allies (trade unions et al), combined with an underground movement, military training camps abroad and exile representation towards international institutions and foreign governments. The peace negotiations from the late 80s, unbanning of ANC and other parties in 1990 and elections in 1994 finally led to the new democratic dispensation and the ANC in government. It also meant that “the many origins” of the ANC had to be merged: the exiles and the internal organisations; the military structures and the democratic movement; the youth movement and the educated elders and the left-wing revolutionaries and the business circles.

Hyder (2006) highlights a difference between nationalist and liberation movements in that the latter had to operate in exile, often in underground conditions and did not have the same access to the population as the nationalists had when campaigning for independence. Liberation movements relied on military means to achieve their objectives and did not come to power by way of a popular ballot. The nationalist movement on the other hand had the time to sort out the challenges of order, development, and control in sequential order. The distinction is however not as clear-cut. The ANC operated both internally and in exile and mobilised broadly among the black communities through its’ underground structures and alliance partners also inside the country.

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<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Peter Pavia 2006: The Cuba Project & Close and Prevost 2007.

The ANC presided, already from the early 90s, when re-establishing itself in South Africa, over a broad and complex coalition of organisations, formations and social movements. Yet, its position and strength was explained largely by the influence and power of the internal organisations that were generated by the patterns of black resistance in the 1980s. The banning of the ANC and the PAC in 1960 and the general repression of legal, political extra-parliamentary organisations had given rise from the late 70s onwards to collectively driven social movements inside South Africa. The United Democratic Front (UDF) with the trade union movement Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) was a driving force in this. While the changing international environment, the “fall of the Berlin Wall, international boycott as well as armed struggle may all have played a role in toppling apartheid, these were far less significant than the internal mobilisation of power against white rule in South Africa. The social movements stimulated collective action around local issues and interests and linked them to national political programmes aimed at dismantling apartheid, resulting very much in social movement politics driven from below. The internal social movement was in essence and character a pro-democracy movement waging a struggle for a democratic revolution, for some to be followed by a socialist revolution.

With the ANC unbanned in 1990, several of the political affiliates were absorbed into the ANC, while parts of the UDF established a national civics federation and separate organisations. The task of integrating the various groups, organisational modes and leadership styles within the broader ANC influence initially seemed to progress relatively well. How the integration and merger of forces was done, however, would critically influence the transformation from an exile-based liberation movement to a political party.

When ANC was unbanned, there were four leadership styles<sup>5</sup> existing inside the ANC, crosscutting and permeating all the formations under ANC “domination”. These styles reflected different leadership roles and represented different groups and cultures within the “family of forces”. The “exile leadership” was made up of the leaders from the National Executive Committee (NEC) and the MK<sup>6</sup> cadres. This group had spent most of its time juggling international alliances but also planning and carrying out the armed struggle inside and outside South Africa. The “prison leadership” was composed of the senior leaders jailed inside South Africa and centred around Nelson Mandela. The “internal leaders”, or “the 1980s generation leaders” was a new type of leaders with background in the community and workplace movements of the 80s. These leaders were generally recognised as effective and efficient organisers and negotiators, with a mass oriented style and favoured legal strategies. Finally, there was the underground leadership who had at great risk established underground cells to wage political struggle.

Many liberation movements are challenged by the same power battles as the nationalists that took control over governments (Hyden 1996). But where the “exiles”, or the most military oriented groups of the movement, win control, they seldom afford an open-door policy, because there is always the risk that opponents will try to infiltrate its ranks. Liberation movements (as nationalist before them) are generally secretive about their operations. And as Hyden rightly points out: once they come to power, they do not easily let it go. At point of departure, the transition seemed, however, to progress relatively smoothly in South Africa. The chances of a single authoritarian elite seizing a monopoly of power seemed, according to Rantete and Swilling (1991), remote because of the way the South Africa’s economic structure had generated a multiplicity of competing powers and the way its complex political culture had developed. Yet, while the prison leadership initially took power in the ANC from it was unbanned, there is no doubt that it was the exile leaders that were soon to gain control. The “1980s generation” dismantled their organisations and integrated into the ANC leadership in government and Parliament. Cosatu for example “sent off” about 50 of its senior leaders to government and key political positions for the 1994 elections.

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<sup>5</sup> The following has been influenced by Swilling and Rantete 1991

<sup>6</sup> Military Command, i.e. Umkhonto we Sizwe (the spear of the Nation) ANC’s military wing.

The integration of various leadership groups and structures was just one of the tasks ahead. Another was to marry the grass-roots social movement political tradition with the exile liberation movement modus operandi into party style political organising. The UDF organisations inside South Africa were characterised by democratic structures and principles. The black trade union movement, which to some extent spearheaded the social movement internally, was based on relatively strong principles of accountability, mandating, worker leaders and decentralised and democratic decision-making. The exile ANC organisational structure on the other hand was founded in centralised decision-making, secrecy, “need to know” principles, elitism and a military control structure. Emerging from 30 years of illegality, the ANC was confronted with the difficult task of forging unity among several generations of cadres, schooled at different sites in the struggle, and often with different political experiences. The new cadreship had a diversity of experiences - exile, the army, international or administrative work, and long terms in prison, the underground, and activism in broad social movements. The diversity was a strength for the movement, but it also posed considerable challenges.

During the first four years, the ANC also had to assume welfare and social responsibilities for thousands of returnees and other victims of apartheid. This came in tandem with the task of major recruiting and organisational consolidation trying to build, more or less from scratch, a large mass-based ANC, with an effective presence in every corner of the country. While progress was made in several areas in the first period, problem areas were also identified (ANC 1994) such as the lack of a Code of Conduct for ANC cadres and weak communication between national and regional levels. Effective management was lacking. While the ANC adopted sound and progressive policies on affirmative action for women, it was recognized that the movement failed to translate these policies into practice. Furthermore, organising efforts tended to concentrate in the major urban centres. While efforts were made to develop the organisation in rural areas, these efforts were hampered by the lack of rural infrastructure and an urban-centric method of organisation. And finally, it was recognised that the leadership was too far distanced from the ordinary membership and that many branches were weak in both resources and capacity.

### **Party organisation and recruitment**

The ANC held its first national consultative conference after it was unbanned in 1990. The conference was attended by 1589 delegates from 45 regions, the ANC Women’s League, the Youth League and the military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. Since the lifting of the ban on ANC, the party had established 14 regional organisations in four provinces and Transkei and claimed to have enrolled 700 000 members and 500 branches. Less than 3 percent of the 40 000 exiles had been repatriated by 1991. Close to 700 political prisoners were, however, released in terms of agreement between the ANC and the National Party in government at the time.

From the beginning, massive attention was invested in election campaigns and apparatus. Campaigns were premised on the assumption that direct contact was more effective than print or radio.<sup>7</sup> Before the 1999 election for example, branches were encouraged to establish “listening campaigns” in order to illicit grievances, concerns, fears etc. It was believed that the information would shape the thematic content of ANC electioneering and at the same time help strengthen branch structures, which in many areas were weakened or inactive. Simultaneously, this strategy would outflank the Cosatu/SACP calls for “a set of worker demands” to be included in the election manifesto.

Branches form a key component of the “direct contact strategy” of the ANC election campaigns. More importantly, the branches (organised mainly on the basis of wards) are seen as the primary vehicle for maintaining and enhancing the mass character of the movement (ANC 2007). The branches are the basic

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<sup>7</sup> At the same time, the ANC campaigning was heavily influenced by advertising agencies. The ANC also spent considerable more on election campaigns than any other party.

unit of political activity for members. The party's presence on the ground was, however, found from early to be very uneven and numerous local branches to be inactive. Canvassing could not happen without lively branches. By 1998 the ANC held a general conference to assess the state of the organisation after new reports had shown that membership figures had dropped from about one million to around 400 000 since 1994. It was decided to deploy "agents of change" within the state apparatus to address issues such as land redistribution and unemployment. By 1999 therefore, ANC branches were exhorted to become more assertive in their neighbourhoods; assisting pensioners to obtain grants, helping people obtain housing permits or participating in school governance. Displeasure with local council performance was said to be a chief reason for declining branch membership. However, branches do still not have a strong impact in their communities as seen in the mushrooming of local social movements, often opposed to ANC-led local authorities and the increasing numbers of service delivery protests in the past years. ANC branches have been affected by insufficient party political education, administrative work and by the party giving priority to the challenges of governance rather than to party building. The ANC's local structures struggle to participate actively in the definition of the government's agenda. The party in public office increasingly gains ascendancy (Darracq 2008).

By 2001, it was realised that a number of weaknesses had developed with regard to the ANC organisational capacity. The removal of layers of the most experienced activists and organisers (from the ANC, unions, women's organisations, youth etc.) to take up responsibilities in government had weakened the movement. Furthermore, the new democratic dispensation was seen to have impacted on the culture and attitudes of cadreship (ANC 2001) with the emergence of tendencies such as careerism and a 'know-all' attitude in engaging with those outside of government. These weaknesses impacted not only on the state of organisation of ANC structures (branches, especially), but also on the ability to organise and unite behind a common programme. Finally, the criticism increased in some quarters that the Mbeki government itself had interests in maintaining a centralised party with weak branches and hence directly undermined the democratic character of the mass movement ANC was intended to be.

Membership had gained more impressive figures by the end of 2007 with more than 620 000 card-carrying members.<sup>8</sup> However, branches were still weak. The Secretary-General's Office's report for the 2005 National General Council (NGC) was alarming: only 50 per cent of the branches were functioning and of good standing.<sup>9</sup> Although there was a slight increase in branches in good standing since then to about 60 percent (2007), many branches are not able to sustain any solid community activity, display little political life and do not have the capacities to implement and carry on political programmes. There is also minimum branch work outside of the election campaigns and elective meetings of the constitutional structures. The ANC itself (2010) recognises that elective meetings have become weaker in terms of the political content, since all energy is spent on lobbying for positions. Few branches have heeded the call to work with various organisations, forums, structures and NGOs operating in the same communities. Where branches meet regularly the focus is on administrative work, with little attention given to consolidating organisational work (ANC 2010). Weak branches, low membership figures and tensions in the alliances continued, however, to haunt the organisation.

Recruitment of leaders forms a key component of party building. The representativity of leaders, and their effectiveness, determines the party's ability to deliver, its' legitimacy among the population and thereby electoral support as well as organisational survival. While democratic movements and parties generally follow democratic processes in order to elect their leaders, liberation movements select leaders among

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<sup>8</sup> Secretary General's Report to ANC Polokwane Conference 2007. The numbers must, however, be treated with caution. ANC membership records are in disarray (ANC 2010). While the absolute numbers of members may seem impressive, the number of members vis-à-vis voters is also low and testifies of difficulties to be an organisational shelter for supporters.

<sup>9</sup> The ANC audit criteria for 'good standing' are: having more than 100 members, having held an Annual General Meeting (AGM) and holding regular branch meetings.

the “important few”. “Struggle credentials” rather than efficiency and competence is generally rewarded among liberation movements. While the ANC has a quota for women and generally assures that the key decision-making structures have balanced representation of all population groups, regions, African languages etc., the selection of new leaders is generally determined among the few senior and powerful ones. Under Thabo Mbeki, an increasing number of positions were also appointed in his “kitchen cabinet”, or by him personally, rather than of the government or NEC. Positions who had previously been elected democratically at the local level (such as majors and premiers) or through professional recruitment into senior positions in government departments were also increasingly screened and appointed by him directly. The impression spread that only “loyalty to Thabo” would give access to a career in the party or in the state structures.

In a dominant one-party system like South Africa, the ways in which parties assemble their candidate lists merit consideration. Internal party democracy may help to compensate for the authoritarian effects of the kind of national list systems used in South African political representation (Lodge 1999). There are, however, no laws that govern the way the parties put together their candidate lists. Most parties, including the ANC, adopt a combination of delegate elections and executive decision-making. The ANC lists are put together in part by democratic procedures (branch level voting) and in part by a committee system.<sup>10</sup> The first stages of the process allow considerable room for the expression of rank and file preferences. However, because the lists remain secret until their approval and possible amendment by list committees and the NEC, the extent to which they represent democratic mandates can only be guessed at (Lodge 1999). And the most prestigious National Assembly list is not compiled through electoral procedure. The names on it and their respective ranking are the result of consensus politics within the NEC or during the “Thabo reign” under his control.

In 1999, several of the lists for provincial legislatures had to be changed due to Mbeki’s choices for the ANC’s nominations for provincial premierships. Increasingly the national leadership intervened in the provincial structures. Mbeki dismissed several premiers and heads of provincial governments and directly appointed several others. In 2000, the national leadership announced the dissolution of two other provincial governments. While the NEC itself stated that this was for the best of the party, critical voices argued that it was done because of severe tensions internally around policy, direction and leadership. People who suggested that they might be available for leadership quickly pulled out, or where pushed out. When three senior ANC leaders mentioned in the late 90s that they might at some stage consider to stand for election as party leaders, they were put under police investigation. In contrast to the practices of the democratic movement internally from the 80s, the new ANC usually only had one candidate standing for elections to positions in the party - at least until Polokwane.

### **Political programmes and policy development**

Several underline the importance of “value infusion”, i.e. the attitudinal aspect of party building, referring to the extent to which party actors and supporters (members and broader supporters) acquire an identification with and commitment to the party, which transcend more instrumental or self-interested incentives for involvement. It has to do with the party’s success in creating its own distinctive culture or value-system and can be seen as an important aspect of party cohesion. Development of party programmes and ideological foundation should represent the parties/movement’s constituency, but is also a pillar for mobilising new support for the party in an open democratic setting.

As laid out by Manning (2005) the role of ideology in party formation and competition tends to be weak in African third-wave democracies, not the least because, with the advent of structural adjustment and high aid dependency, all political contenders are constrained by the same economic model and policy

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<sup>10</sup> Half the lists for national Assembly representatives would come from lists put together by the National List Committee, the other half from “provincial to national” lists (which have already been screened by the provincial committees).



parameters. The range of alternative economic policy positions parties can realistically offer is limited. Yet, part and parcel of the democratic functions of parties is to develop policies and programmes, ensuring that there are different options and alternatives in the political marketplace – both in terms of candidates and ideas. South Africa does offer a multitude of centres of power and economic interests groups in order to provide competing policy options. Yet, in practice, policy alternatives are more limited between parties than maybe what one would have expected.

The ANC has always prided itself on being more than just a party, seeing itself as a “big family” and a manifestation of a bigger struggle and ideas. Hence, it also includes within it many different strands of opinion, containing Africanists, socialists, businessmen and trade unionists that all united for a common goal - the elimination of apartheid as encapsulated in the Freedom Charter. Uniting all these groups behind one common programme operationalising the Freedom Charter after 1990 would, and has, not, however, been an easy task.

The Freedom Charter, developed by the progressive anti-apartheid parties and forces at the People’s Congress in Kliptown 1956, gave ideological direction to the anti-apartheid struggle as such, but limited detail to the whole range of concrete issues that confronted the new government from 1994. More importantly, the broad and important questions as to whether the Charter provided “sufficient” basis for a platform of socialism or a “two stage revolution” had been left unresolved. While Cosatu and the SACP clearly supported a radical left-wing agenda, others within the ANC favoured a more liberal and/or even rightwing economic platform. And while the space was left open for a while to fight out economic policy issues within the ANC, this space was soon to narrow.

Inside the Alliance of the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP, there seemed for a few years to be fairly broad agreement around most political issues. In 1996, the ANC endorsed most of the Cosatu “non negotiable” demands for a Workers Charter, worker access to company information, the right to picket etc. Simultaneously, the employers’ right to lockouts was not included in the Constitution. Furthermore, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) endorsed by the ANC was to a large extent developed by Cosatu, a fairly radical Constitution, human rights regime, protection of workers interests in new legislation and generally redistributive agenda was endorsed within the Alliance. Critics will argue that this to some extent was an effect of the left-wingers, who to some extent corresponded with the internal pro-democracy movement, being needed by the new ANC leadership coming in from exile. From the mid 90s, the left found less space to operate in the Alliance and most of the worker and “1980 generation” leaders who had been integrated into political positions had given up, were pushed out of left better domains. Those in favour of a more liberal economic policy had gained ground in parallel with Thabo Mbeki taking over the reign of the ANC and officially as president from 1996.

President Mbeki made no bones about his distaste for the left within his party (Plaut 2009). Through a variety of programmes he opted for a conservative set of economic measures. This became known to his critics on the left as the ‘1996 class project’, which had its origins in the negotiations of the 1980s leading to the ending of apartheid (the ‘1988 class project’) (Plaut 2009). The critique was summarised by Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General-Secretary of the SACP<sup>11</sup>:

“Certainly, the ‘1988 class project’ of big capital managed to achieve a strategic dominance within the new democratic state from around 1996. This, of course, reflected in part the global and domestic balance of power (the ruling ideas of an epoch tend to be the ideas of the ruling class). But this successful (if always challenged) hegemony was also secured thanks to the impact of new realities upon, and subjective errors within, what emerged as a dominant leadership axis in the ANC and state. This dominant axis was constituted basically of a new stratum of technocratic state managers and (sometimes overlapping with them) an emerging black capitalist

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<sup>11</sup> See Jeremy Cronin, *The Post-1994 South African State*, 2007 as summarized in Plaut 2009.  
<http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=docs/misc/2007/misc1001.html>

stratum. A political centre within the state and ANC was forged around this axis, and it drove what we have called, in the SACP, the '1996 class project'."

The 'class project' was resisted by the left within the ANC, as well as the unions and the SACP, but too little effect. Mbeki saw off the left in no uncertain terms. Speaking at the ANC's policy conference in 2002, he rejected what he called the work of "ultra-left" factions to transform the party into a socialist movement, saying that this was something the ANC had always opposed:

"The essence of their assault against our policies is that these policies do not advance the socialist agenda. This is despite the fact that our movement, like all other national liberation movements throughout the world, is, inherently and by definition, not a movement whose mission is to fight for the victory of socialism."<sup>12</sup>

In 1996, the RDP was sidelined in favour of the new economic policy embodied in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan (GEAR), which was presented to the Alliance partners and the broader public as non-negotiable. Over the next decade, South Africa was to see a liberalisation of economic policies, reduction in tariffs, privatisation of state enterprises and continuous attempts at creating a more flexible labour market. The Mbeki governments gave high priority to affirmative action, black economic empowerment and a developmental state with massive reform packages. But while considerable achievements were made in certain areas (building of houses, water, sanitation, electrification et al), HIV/Aids, unemployment and poverty levels exploded. And in parallel with the emergence of a black middle class and a small group of wealthy, there was relatively little attention to redistribution. By 2007, South Africa hit world records in terms of inequality. Throughout the decade, corruption exploded, centred around the Arms Deal (2000), and other major state contracts and sale of state enterprises. The party programmes and thinking that provided the basis for the policy-shifts from the mid 90s, were increasingly developed by the "Thabo Mbeki group" and "state-centred party officials" rather than by the party. Increasing criticism emerged of the party structures not being respected in the development of policy, the Alliance not being consulted and the party itself being sidelined in favour of those in state functions and positions.

While there has been high correspondence between voter concerns and the ANC election campaigns in the post-apartheid setting, there is not necessarily high correspondence between voter concerns and actual government progress in these areas. With poverty and inequality increasing under the ANC government, it may be surprising that the party continuously receives massive support in elections at both national and local levels (between 60 and 70 percent) in the post apartheid period. Lack of other legitimate alternatives as well as an overwhelming loyalty to the ANC for their role in the liberation struggle explains this as picked up in several surveys throughout the past decades. Party reification refers to the extent to which a political party becomes installed in the popular 'imaginary'. The ability of a party to establish itself in this way will partly depend on the particular historical place and symbolic values it can successfully claim to represent. It will also depend on the party's strength and access to effective means of communication (see among others Randall & Svåsand 2002 & Lindberg 2007). The ANC has invested major resources in "branding", election campaigning, communication and media campaigns. More importantly, however, the ANC as a liberation movement (representative of both internal and exile forces) carries great symbolic significance, trust and loyalty among the populace, a huge advantage when it comes to party support. "The ANC" is seen as something more, and to some extent different, from the party, which established itself in government after 1994. "The ANC" is the embodiment of the struggle and the sacrifices paid by the millions in the apartheid period.

It was the liberation movements that liberated people from the dehumanising and derogatory manners the colonial and apartheid masters treated their African subjects. The first generation of movements and

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<sup>12</sup> Thabo Mbeki, Address to the ANC policy conference, 2002 as summarized in Plaut 2009  
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=ancdocs/history/mbeki/2002/tm0927.html>

party leaders have been found to carry enormous power in several countries on that basis. The willingness, ability and sacrifices of the early nationalists and freedom fighters continuously appeal to Africans. The symbolic power of settler colonialism and the ANC's role as the freedom fighters make people still give them support in 2009 in spite of weak delivery on poverty and employment. How long such loyalties last is however unclear and with other more "legitimate" black political parties now emerging from 2009, such loyalty may wear thinner.

### **Tensions in the Alliance**

The ANC defined from early on the nature of the revolution as a "people's war", i.e. as a war fought by the combined forces of mass mobilisation and armed combat. The Tripartite Alliance forms an important part of this. The SACP remains a vanguard party with overlapping membership and leadership with the ANC and Cosatu. At the time of the unbanning, estimates put the number of SACP members on the ANC NEC at a minimum of 20 percent. The Tripartite Alliance was formally established in 1991, but relations between the three organisations were close also before. The overall objective of the Alliance is the broad-based organisation around a common programme based on the Freedom Charter. It was also established in 1990 that the ANC was the leader of the Alliance, although it would be consensus based and each component would be independent. Most extraordinary maybe was that the SACP decided to not set up independently in elections, but rather operate within the ANC.<sup>13</sup>

From the end of the 90s, tensions started to rise in the Alliance. Within the Tripartite Alliance, tensions grew during the Mbeki reign over macro-economic policy, but also a whole range of other issues such as his "quiet diplomacy" towards Mugabe, HIV/Aids policies, the increasing centralisation of party structures and lack of consultation within the Alliance etc. Economic policies, however, became the main strain. In 1998, the ANC secretary general said to Cosatu workers that they should actively hate capitalism. The year after, Mbeki said that the country *needed* black capitalists. In 1999, the ANC chairman told the Cosatu Congress that some "highly placed comrades" exhibited a lack of revolutionary discipline. While there was a need for a debate to be conducted within the structures of the Alliance, only consensus positions should be made available to the public (SAIRR 2001). This, and several other statements made by ANC high officials, was broadly seen as attempts to whip Cosatu and SACP into line.

The 2001 general strike against the ANC government, in the midst of South Africa hosting the third World Conference against Racism, and public statements by Alliance partners around the strike, further strained Alliance relations. This came against the backdrop of increasing problems in the Alliance over the past five years; blamed on a range of ideological, policy, strategic, structural and tactical differences (ANC 2001). The ANC NEC examined the questions at its meeting in September 2001 and decided on a course of action to ensure that the Alliance was placed back on a proper footing. Among the decisions taken by the NEC was to engage ANC structures at all levels on these matters, among others through countrywide general councils. It was clearly expressed from the ANC side, however, that relations were not to be solved by joint consultation over, or agreement on, policy. Rather, the Alliance partners had to be convinced or instructed.

The ANC saw the mobilisation by the Alliance partners as attempt by 'left' tendencies to detach the working class from their organisation, the ANC, and as such a new experience for both "the movement and workers themselves" (ANC 2001). Historically, the Congress Movement has never been challenged by a left rebellion. Throughout history, threats to unity had always come from those who opposed its policies from the right. In the 2001 NEC deliberations, attempts were made to "understand" this phenomenon in order to enable the party to do what "we have to do to ensure that our movement, the workers and the masses

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<sup>13</sup> Opinion polls have shown that the SACP would have gathered considerable support if it has decided to contest elections independently. Before the 2004 elections, polls showed SACP to have support of about 15 percent without even campaigning.

of our people as a whole, defeat this 'left' offensive" (ibid). It was underlined that the ANC needed to be especially vigilant in a global situation that contained within it real dangers of rightwing resurgence as a response to the "ultra-left" attempts to take power. The overall goal stated was to avoid self-destruction of the "national democratic revolution" through carelessness, populism and the excitement of ultra-leftism that believed that the task in the country was to wage a class struggle. This kind of behaviour was presented by the ANC as the surest way of isolating the working class from the rest of the motive forces of the revolution, and thereby of creating conditions for a counter-revolution.

In spite of these attempts to whip the "ultra leftists" into place, tensions continued to hunt the Alliance and the party. And Cosatu and the SACP repeatedly criticised the ANC for lack of delivery on redistribution, job creation and lack of poverty eradication in what became referred to as the ten years of cold relations within the Alliance and continuous outbursts by Mbeki on the "ultra-leftists". The reaction, or "revenge" of the unions, the Communist party, as well as the left within the ANC, took years to come, but when it came, it was devastating (Plout 2010). Throughout this decade, Cosatu had continuously regained organizational strength and rebuilt a layer of leadership after the brain-drain it struggled with in the post-apartheid period (having sent off large parts of their leadership to political positions). And rather than looking for other parties to support, leaving the Alliance or hoping for policy changes in the ANC leadership, Cosatu and the SACP gave priority to the struggle to "win the ANC back" and the hunt for candidates that could challenge Thabo Mbeki. The candidate was to become Jacob Zuma.

### **The Palace Revolt in Polokwane and a new Regime**

Jacob Zuma seemed to be the total antitheses to Thabo Mbeki. Where Mbeki is well educated and an expert in long rhetorical philosophical statements, Zuma is a populist, with low education but high charm and popular appeal. Where Mbeki comes across as a Western educated Africanist, Zuma comes across as an African well established in African ethnic traditions and culture, including controversial practices of polygamy and views of women, homosexuality etc. More important for Cosatu and the SACP however: Mbeki was known as a loner dependent on his "loyal kitchen cabinet" and prone to the liberation movements' secrecy and command structure whereas Zuma was more collectively oriented with a consultative style and likely to listen to the Alliance partners. Furthermore, Zuma had the resources it would take to challenge Mbeki, or as some would say was desperate enough to take on the battle<sup>14</sup>. And it became increasingly clear to the Alliance partners that a power change had to take place in order to also see policy changes in the ANC. Criticism and opposition had continued to grow inside the ANC from the beginning of the millennium. Increasingly the party structures and branches also engaged in the mounting opposition to Mbeki, in parts to be explained by the influence of strong mobilization of local level Cosatu shop stewards and structures (influencing the ward based branches of the ANC). The revival of the ANC's mass character and institutional structures lies at the heart of the intra-party battles during the run-up to, and conduct of, the December 2007 National Conference (Darracq 2008).

Zuma's populist appeal resonates strongly amongst ordinary people and workers. The explanation may be found in the limited nature of South African democracy in the post-apartheid era, the demand for market-friendly macroeconomic orthodoxy and a modern liberal constitution which has left some of the ANC's core constituencies feeling deeply alienated and underrepresented (Darracq 2008). To workers and Cosatu, the lack of democracy under Mbeki had been particularly troublesome. South Africa's black trade unions developed strong traditions of democratic organisation during the struggle, with a rigorous commitment to shop floor democracy and accountable union leadership. These traditions were deeply rooted within the union movement's organisational culture and remain clearly evident. The commitment to shop floor accountability within the unions themselves is reflected in workers' expectations to and

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<sup>14</sup> Jacob Zuma has been faced with corruption charges linked to the Arms Deal. His supporters have argued that they are politically constructed in order to take him out of the battle with Mbeki over the leadership over the ANC. Others argue that the charges actually formed the background and motivation for why he entered the power battle in the first place.

demands of parliamentary democracy: they want participation and influence. The perception of Zuma as an empathetic listening ear who is sensitive to the economic plight of these workers and the association of him with a particular depiction of 'African' masculinity, also lead many to perceive him as the perfect antidote to Thabo Mbeki's aloof leadership and 'foreign' values system (ibid).

To the surprise of many, and not the least, the Mbeki block, Zuma and his "team" received an overwhelming victory at the Polokwane Conference. The same Conference underlined the need for the rebuilding of the democratic mass nature of the ANC. Several Resolutions were also developed which call for stronger redistributive policies and democratisation. With their victory at the ANC's Polokwane conference, the left believed their time had come. The rightwing in the party (some of whom had left to join the newly formed Congress of the People or COPE) would, they thought, be isolated and their own candidates be safe in power.

With the new "Zuma regime", a Cabinet was indeed appointed that brought together all the different strands of opinion within the ANC. However, there is still a struggle over the future direction of economic policy. President Mbeki was openly willing to face down the radical demands of the left in the wider national interest, by ignoring or isolating them. President Zuma is more tolerant of the left, which supported his ousting of Thabo Mbeki, arguing that the discussion is little more than healthy debate. Yet, by early 2010, the battle is not over. Billy Masetha, a member of the NEC openly attacked the left at the end of 2009 arguing that: "I will have a problem with someone trying to impose a communist manifesto on the ANC. We fired a lot of [comrades] in the past that wanted to do the same thing. The ANC was not founded on a socialist agenda. Socialism has no space within the ANC" (Mail & Guardian 9 October 2009). The leftwing got renewed criticism with the decision to recall president Mbeki in September 2008 and deciding to replace him with Kgalema Motlanthe, the ANC vice-president<sup>15</sup> awaiting the election results April 2009. Although the ANC is in its full right to decide who has its confidence and trust to act as its representatives and President, the NEC decision was regarded as another act of (undemocratic) revenge from the left and from Zuma's supporters. However, the left seems to have won for now. The ANC also issued a statement arguing that the notion that the ANC is under threat from the push by Cosatu and the SACP for a socialist agenda is unfounded and regrettable.

There is little doubt that those with background in anti-apartheid struggle internally, and those demanding the development of, or rebirth, of a mass party, have gained power in the past few years, which in turn explains the success of the "Polokwane revolt". Cosatu and SACP in particular have more influence at present than they had during Mbeki. Yet, the opening up of space caused by Mbeki's departure has also made it possible for several other groups to enter the power battles. Some of them come with real political concerns, others to protect individual interests or business deals. The desperation and bitterness "on the ground", due to the shortage of delivery and poverty eradication, has also given space to people with individual agendas that do not necessarily correspond to political wings or representation within the party. The ANC Youth League has mobilised heavily over the past few years. The League was one of the key supporters behind Zuma and continues to be. However, some of the youth league's agenda is now increasingly suspected of being driven by other than political interests with the Youth League president Julius Malema having become known for his continuous calls for "radical redistribution" while simultaneously making reference to struggle songs of "kill the Boers".<sup>16</sup> Cosatu seems adamant to keep the control with a focus on a redistributive agenda and not for the left's success to be hijacked by business interests and competition over economic interests and contracts. New tensions hence emerged when Cosatu announced a demand for life audits of politicians and their business interests and Malema with his considerable business interests

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<sup>15</sup> The decision was taken after judge Nicholson threw out the corruption charges against Jacob Zuma and suggested there had been political meddling in the case.

<sup>16</sup> Which South African courts in March 2010 barred Malema from singing arguing that it would possibly incite racial hatred and violence. The ANC has appealed the court's ruling arguing that the song is part of its' struggle history.

and incomes was exposed.

The ANC itself (2010) recognises that the influence of money in its processes is having the biggest potential to change the character of the movement from being people-centred and driven to one where power is yielded by a narrow circle of those who own and/or control resources. The threat of corruption to the fabric of the party is in part about double interests of politicians having simultaneous business interests and in part about the major business interests of, and contributions to, the party itself. There is no law for example against politicians such as Julius Malema tendering for state contracts and in so doing becoming multimillionaires. Political parties are also not obliged to disclose the sources of their funding so any estimates of party spending for elections or campaigns would also at best be conjectural. The ANC receives support for elections from public money distributed by the Independent Electoral Commission, which for the 1999 election for example constituted about R30 million. In addition there is considerable (and probably more) support, from private sources both for elections and other purposes. The local Chinese community was rumoured to have contributed R22 million in order to persuade the government to upgrade relations with Taipei (Lodge 1999). There has also considerable financial backing from other countries, especially sourced by Nelson Mandela. Last but not the least, the party receives considerable funding from the business sector, including “empowerment ventures” targeted by the ANC fundraising efforts. On this basis, the ANC has invested considerable sources in infrastructure projects, media and other businesses.

The 2009 election manifesto identified five priority areas - creation of jobs, decent work, and sustainable livelihoods; agrarian and land reform; education; health and a fight against crime and corruption, all commitments in line with the demands of the Freedom Charter. At the same time, uniting the party was seen as a top priority behind the manifesto. For the first time ever, Cosatu and the SACP also had direct influence on the election manifesto of the ANC and were parts of the development of the priorities and manifesto itself.

The challenge, according to the ANC itself (2010), is that of maintaining the ANC as a truly multi-class movement where all the people, irrespective of class, race or gender, are at home. There was a general need for rebuilding of the party after the 52<sup>nd</sup> Congress at the end of 2007. Branches were in disarray, membership systems weak and national departments not operational. But while there is a strong commitment among many to rebuild the party, and simultaneously launch the mass party with strong internal democracy, the power battle is on again for the soul of the party and the future leadership with Zuma himself having announced early that he would only be sitting for one period.

While Malema was first in line for the life audit demands, the Cosatu demands also exposed new tensions between the trade union movement and the youth movement. Simultaneously, Cosatu remains on its’ toes and at high alert with mobilisation and pressures on the new Zuma government seemingly intent on getting deliveries on job creation and poverty eradication. Remembering well the lessons of the mistakes from the early 90s when “sending off” all its leaders to ANC political positions while the trade union movement remained fragile and weak, Cosatu now is adamant that it needs to keep its mobilisation potential and its role as a watchdog over the government. The trade union federation has only sent one worker leader off as its representative to government and mobilised heavily behind him and the call for redistribution.<sup>17</sup>

## **In conclusion**

The ANC that took control from the early 90s was dominated to a large extent by the exiles (i.e. to a large extent the past liberation movement) while those that had their background in the pro-democracy movement internally disbanded and gave over power to the ANC in trust that the exiles would administer

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<sup>17</sup> Ebrahim Patel (previously secretary general to SACTWU) as minister for economic development.

the legacy of the struggle in a responsible way. Hence, the ANC from the mid 90s under Thabo Mbeki came to be influenced first and foremost by the bequest of the liberation movement. Party building or institutionalisation, i.e. the development of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of the party, became heavily influenced by the legacy of the past liberation movement and its command structure, centralisation and secrecy. Gradually this also became subject to increasing criticism in the ANC itself. It was in many ways the “internal prodemocracy movement” spearheading an ideal of a new mass party, which arranged the palace revolt at this ANC Congress in Polokwane December 2007.

The ANC case is not unique. Dominant executives, weak democratic institutions and shrinking space for critical contestation of power characterise many sub-Saharan countries, despite democratic constitutions and multi-party elections in many places. There has been an increasing tendency to identify the party with the government and the government with the state. The movement legacy lives on as a source for gratefulness and loyalty among people after independence. Hyden (2006) highlights how movements initially established party states, anxious to secure control at the helm of the state. Boundaries between party, government and state have become increasingly blurred and dissent considered hostile to national interests. Hyden argues that the full impact of the “movement legacy” across Africa has not always been appreciated. The liberation movements that set up the new governments were influenced by their previous command structures, exile politics and superpower rivalry, which made transition to conventional party politics and especially democratic or “mass parties”, difficult. With parties more and more taking the shape of elite parties lacking transparency and democratic participation from “below”, they also increasingly gave space to or facilitated corruption, “double agendas” and political competition for business interests.

While differing in several aspects, the sub-Saharan African countries share important characteristics of being transitional countries. They have experienced major economic liberalisation with increasing unemployment and poverty. They share a history of conflict, repression, settler colonialism and more importantly the heritage of nationalist and liberation struggles, which hitherto have been largely overlooked when it comes to democratic consolidation of the regime changes in the early 90s. Radical militancy and the “ethos of the struggle” continue to some extent to form the parties *modus operandi* in post-liberation settings in the region. And the political developments in Sub Saharan Africa cannot be understood without also understanding the minds and thoughts of the leaders with background in the “military struggle”. The legacy of liberation struggles sets its mark on transitions and party building in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Sudan, South Africa and on the Horn of Africa.

These experiences are however also not uniquely African. Some argue that a special typology of parties and party systems is necessary for African politics, and that analysing the regularisation of party competition using mainstream comparative concepts will be misleading. Lindberg (2007) underlines however, that there are drawbacks by to arguments that Africa is fundamentally different and requires special concepts, but also to approaching African politics assuming that mainstream categorizations apply. Many African political parties are not mass movements but rather the creations of personal or elite rule, but that does not necessarily mean that they cannot develop into more broad based, deep-rooted parties. Deonandan (2007) argues that several tendencies and challenges faced by post guerillas, now politicians are similar in countries both in Africa and Latin America. The tendency to some form of authoritarianism is one, another is to behave as revolutionaries in elections but not in power. A third tendency is to develop some sort of one-party dominance while another is for centralisation of leadership.

Nationalist movements and liberation movements do have totally different *modus operandi*, goals, structures, and decision-making systems from democratic political *parties*. While movements were set up as military command structures, democratic parties aim for relatively flat and open structures. While movements were centralised, parties aim for more decentralisation. While movements mobilised on the basis of conflict, injustice and human rights, parties mobilise on the basis of democratic principles. Hyden (2006) points out that movements will have no formal limits as to their claims to resources, while parties

will be constrained by the rule of law. Movements will have “the cause” as their orientation and mobilising ideas; parties will have “issues”.

All in all, it is not necessarily the weakness of democratic traditions, the flaws of civil society organisations or any elitist and centralist traditions in African culture, that form the major challenges for the transition towards accountable, transparent, democratic parties in sub-Saharan Africa, but the legacy of the liberation struggle itself. This also implies that far more attention should be given to party building among both international donors and local civil society organisations if the goal is to facilitate the consolidation of democracies and sustainable development.

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