


Islamist insurgencie in Africa


- ***African violent Jihadist movements***

Cases

Al Qaeda (the Sudan years)

- ***Harakat Al Shabaab (Somalia/Kenya)***
- ***Al Hjiira (Kenya/Tanzania)***
- ***Islamic State in Somalia (Puntland in Somalia)***
- ***Nusrat-ul-Islam, (the union between Ancar Dine , al-Mourabitoun (the Al Qaeda loyalist faction), parts of AQIM and Macina Liberation Front), Mali***
- ***The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)***
- ***ADF (Congo, Uganda), Kamango 18 April, Mitopy, 4 june***
- ***The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad) (Islamic State in greater sahara)***
- ***Boko Haram, Shekau faction,***





- **The riddle: These organisations are not defeated, they transform their type of territorial control : Semi-Territoriality is the key to understand why they survive**
- **‘Ungoverned spaces’ do influence territorial control , but jihadists are in other places as well**
- **The local is most important , yet there is no excuse to forget the global, the dichotomy is false...**
- **Where there are older Al Qaeda affiliates, then IS will be on the fringes**

Accepted presence	Clandestine network	Semi-territoriality	Territoriality
The degree of state control is relatively normal in the main areas of jihadist operations (but jihadists can be delegated responsibility to govern)	The degree of state control is relatively normal in the areas of Jihadist operation	State penetration (or of allied forces) is weak. Capacity, Strategy, and/or Geography hinders it.	The state/ allied forces is absent
The state wants to control its territories	The state wants to control its territories	The state does not always want to control territories	The state does not always want to control territories
The state accepts the violent Jihadists	The state do not accept the violent jihadists	The state do not accept the violent jihadists	The state do not accept the violent jihadists


The Accepted presence

- States do tolerate, sometimes sponsor jihadists
- States do have capacity and will to control its own territory at least in the violent jihadist organizations main area of operation

Be aware: The state acceptance can be initiated at a local level

Be aware: In an African context, the will to delegate power into non—state actors, Jihadists can function as a part of the state implementation

Examples Al Qaeda in Sudan 1991-1996, Boko Haram in Nigeria 2003-2009, (Shabaab in Somalia 2005-2006?)





Consequences for countermeasures

International pressure important , it will change the trajectory

Regional cooperation

Intelligence important, the group might be most important at a local level

De-radicalization programs are hard to implement, but not impossible

After 2009, harder to happen, but lessons might be forgotten, and such strategic use have led to a legacy of conspiracy theories

The classical example; The clandestine network

*The state has a relatively functioning police force and security apparatus.
(relatively efficient investigation capacities)*

It wants to wield territorial control, and can wield it.

The state is hostile to the violent jihadist organization.

Example; This is in many ways the type of territorial presence wielded by organizations as Red Army Faction, Weathermen, but also as Al Qaeda's pre-September 11 presence in the West.

*In Africa, **Al Hijra** (Kenya in its central areas, Tanzania)*

Semi- Territoriality

The state lacks capacity to handle the jihadist organization

The state lack the capacity to fully secure the vast territories, opening up for organizations like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The state lacks will

Casualty averse strategies, attempting to minimize losses by creating strongholds and staying inside those strongholds.

- **Example** , the **Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)** in Congo /Uganda, **Shabaab** today, **Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM)**



The background of the slide is a photograph of several soldiers in military uniforms standing in a field. One soldier in the foreground is holding a flag with a circular emblem. The text is overlaid on the top half of the image.

Semi- Territoriality ; Organisational dynamics

Taxation; Large

- Sanctions against exit, large (De-radicalization programs does not function)***
- Ability to channel money; Moderate***
- Command Hierarchy, Strong***
- Small-Group dynamics, less important***
- Training capacity, moderate***
- Proximity to terror targets, low***
- Operational freedom, High***
- New problem , Embeddedness, Opportunism***

A relatively permanent territorial presence

The state lacks the will /capacity to contest the territory at all, no state penetration

'Jihadi state' Brynjar Lia,

Governance , and alternative to anarchy

In the past;

Shabaab 2009-2012

Ansar Dine 2012-2013

Boko Haram, 2015

Always result in international (regional) action

Permanent territorial control


Taxation; Large potential

- Sanctions against exit, Large***
- Ability to channel money; Large***
- Command Hierarchy, Strong***
- Group dynamics, less important***
- Training capacity; High, Foreign fighters can be trained***
- Proximity to terror targets ; low***
- Operational freedom= High***
- New problem , Embeddedness, Opportunism, Good governance and crime prevention results (Golden age)***

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Some notes on diffusion

- -The role of diffusion; Foreign fighters, territoriality, accepted presence...
- -The role of religion
- -The global vs the local: Reinterpretation of local narratives
- -The role of poverty, and of entrepreneurship
- The role of truth and justice.....
- -----
- -The role of transformations



Conclusions

- *The various types of territorial presence influence the organizations, countermeasures need to be adjusted (CVE and semi territoriality,)*
- **“What do your victories lead to”= Transformation, be prepared.**
- *Hedging vs full victory,*
- *Negotiation vs Ideology, vs local fragmentation*