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Peace? Democracy? Assessing liberal peacebuilding in Mozambique, 30 years on

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Carrie Manning
Professor of Political Science
Georgia State University

SECTION I:

Introdution

Your excellencies representatives of the government of Mozambique, esteemed members of the diplomatic corps, fellow panelists, distinguished guests…Ladies and Gentlemen…

My name is Carrie Manning. I'm a professor of Political Science at Georgia State University in Atlanta, Georgia. Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today and over the course of the next few days. I want to thank the conference organizers and to congratulate IESE on its 15th anniversary and on the holding of its 6th international conference, on the theme of 'Conflict, Violence and Development'.

For me, it is a special privilege to be here with you today –on the eve of 30th anniversary of Rome peace accords, in part because it was in Mozambique that I began my scholarly career, 28 years ago. I arrived as a doctoral student in August 1994 and had the opportunity to observe the first elections and transition to peace. This experience left an indelible and formative mark on my thinking – about peace, about democratization, and the relationship between the two. The insights I gained here have affected my choices of subjects to study and how I study them, throughout my career. I'm very grateful to the people in Mozambique who gave me so much of their time and energy to share their views, and whose work and whose insights have influenced my own work, some of whom are here in this room. I am both honored and humbled to be invited to give the keynote address.

This conference marks nearly 30 years since the signing of the general peace accords in Rome between the government of Mozambique and Renamo, putting an end to 16 years of war.

The organizers of this conference have assembled a set of papers that examine essential questions about the challenges facing Mozambique at this moment. Many papers examine the current conflict in Cabo Delgado – which seems like very fertile ground to interrogate the theme of conflict, violence, and development.

Another set of papers tackles profound questions about economic choices – through both historical and contemporary lenses. We will also hear research presentations about the role of the state and non-state actors in conflict transformation.

I look forward to hearing from all of the participants of this conference, and to engaging with my colleagues and learning from their research.

The title of my talk is Peace? Democracy? Liberal peacebuilding in Mozambique, 30 years on. In my address, I will examine the logic and the legacies of liberal peacebuilding, in a comparative context. I want to examine three questions.

1. What is the logic of liberal peacebuilding? IN theory and practice? Why should peace and democracy go together? This model has been pervasive, so this question matters.

2. How has this model worked in practice, around the world and over three decades? I focus on one aspect in particular, the inclusion of armed opposition groups as political parties.

3. How can we apply this to Mozambique?

- Liberal peacebuilding is the idea that peace can be built simultaneously with a process of formal democratization. Elections are front and center—although they aren't the only thing that matters.
- What do words like peace and democracy mean in this context? The starting points are procedural and minimalist – peace is the absence of conflict, democracy is a set of rules that allows for regular, periodic, and reasonably fair elections.
- Peace, democracy, and development do not always go together. On the contrary, there are important tensions between them.
- Perhaps most importantly, peace, democracy, and development are not short-term outcomes. And they might each be best understood as processes rather than outcomes. They occur over a long time horizon, and they happen at different speeds and their progress doesn't sync up and the path is not linear.
- Moreover, each of these processes operates along multiple tracks, at multiple levels, requiring many things to happen at once. So it's going to look messy at any given time. But, can electoral politics bring about the kind of substantive transition that we traditionally think of as 'real peace'? Can these processes produce substantive results? And if so how?

SECTION II:

<u>Liberal peacebuilding, its theoretical and practical basis, and Mozambique as an early case of that approach</u>

Mozambique has been considered by many to be an early success story for the model of liberal peacebuilding. In this model, electoral politics is placed at the core of the peace process. But elections by themselves do not make a democracy. And democracy does not equal peace

Mozambique's experience over the last 30 years offers very rich terrain for an exploration of these questions.

- After about 20 years of peace, there was renewed conflict between Renamo and the government in 2013, which lasted six years. Nevertheless, electoral politics was not abandoned. On the contrary, the peace deal that eventually ended the conflict was based on promises of greater inclusion for opposition and an expansion of electoral politics.
- Now experiencing an ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, which started in 2017 and gained momentum by 2019. While this is a different sort of conflict in many important ways from the one fought between Renamo and the government decades earlier, one could argue that it perhaps has some of the same root causes and dynamics.
- Today, Mozambique's political opposition parties face many challenges. We have seen the fracturing of Renamo following the death of its longtime leader, Afonso Dhlakama. The ruling party continues to return overwhelming electoral victories, controlling the majority of elected positions at all levels of government. Questions are routinely raised about the quality of elections.
- Finally, Mozambique's economy has undergone a structural transformation since 1994, moving toward an economy in which extractive industries figure in.

Mozambique was one of the first countries to be put through the experience of international peacebuilding via democratization. This idea that democratization was not only possible for a country with Mozambique's political, social, and economic history, but indeed that it was the essential foundation for peace, was surprising and new.

Until the Cold War ended in 1990, democracy was seen as a form of government reserved for wealthy nations. There were a number of theories about why democracy and development went hand in hand, and conflicting ideas about why, and about the causal direction of this relationship. But bottom line, stability, and relative wealth, were thought to precede democracy.

However, in some sense these theories were simply descriptions of the ways that the West democratized, rather than universal laws of social, economic, or political change, as they were sometimes presented.

When the Cold War ended, many of the pressures generated by a world polarized between the Soviet bloc and the West shifted. Many insurgencies around the world drew to a close as external support dried up. International organizations like the UN, as well as Western donors saw an opportunity to re-think their aid relationships with less developed countries.

In parallel, political liberalization came to be seen by international financial institutions in late 1980s as a key part of correcting what was seen as economic mismanagement and misguided, state-centric policy. There was a renewed pitch for market-led solutions,

and market-led solutions were to be accompanied by political mechanisms to allow for transparency and accountability. Democratization was seen as a means to an end – it would bring good governance.

Ten years later, democracy would be proposed as a midwife of peace.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary General of the United Nations, wrote *An Agenda for peace* in June 1992. This was a report in response to a request from the Security Council to plan for a more robust role for the United Nations in promoting peace in the world. By the end of the Cold War, the number of conflicts *within* states far outnumbered the number of conflicts between states.

Boutros-Ghali noted that intra-state wars were more apt to bring state collapse, or at least a need for significant reconstruction not only of physical infrastructure of the state, but also a shoring up of state institutions and functions, and could address peoples needs and conflicting demands at a time when strong and capable states were more important than ever. So peacebuilding became bound up with statebuilding. And that state should include the essential elements of electoral democracy.

Why? Aila Matanock, in her 2017 book, *Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Electoral Participation*, writes that provisions in peace accords that called for elections in which former belligerents could face one another at the ballot box gave international actors – the UN and also bilateral actors – a handle they could use to engage effectively in countries recently in conflict.

Elections are highly visible, time limited, and consequential events. By monitoring elections and enforcing electoral standards, international actors were enforcing the peace agreement – in a way that seemed feasible and limited.

These are some of the pragmatic reasons why we end up with the model of liberal peacebuilding, why it has become so widespread. But what was the impact on the countries that were on the receiving end of this set of ideas, in practice?

Could a country with no experience in democracy, build such a system in the immediate aftermath of war, and could it serve as a basis for long-term stability.

Ways of thinking about democracy

The idea seems to fly in the face of what academics thought we knew about democratization up to that point. As I said, much of the conventional wisdom about democracy and democratization was based on a historical look back at contemporary Western democracies.

Because all well-established democracies have certain conditions, we assume that it is these conditions that enable democracy. According to these theories, we have to recreate these conditions in order for democracy to succeed.

But maybe it's the processes that led to these conditions that we need to examine. Maybe democratization starts long before those conditions exist. What we need to create is not the conditions that obtain in established democracies today, but the processes that led to them.

Consciously or not, this is the logic that underlies the policy of liberal peacebuilding.

It is consistent with the view of Swedish scholar Dankwart Rustow.

In an article in the Journal of Comparative Politics in 1970, Rustow proposed some startling ideas.

- This was a dynamic, non-linear model of democratization
- Conflict is the starting point, an integral part of the model, not a problem to be overcome first, before democracy can work
- Factors that make for a stable democracy are not the same as those that bring democracy about
- For Rustow, conflict is key
    - *"the dynamic process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle." (Rustow 1970, p. 352)*
- "A people who were not in conflict about some rather fundamental matters would have little need to devise democracy's elaborate rules for conflict resolution. And the acceptance of those rules is logically a part of the transition process rather than its prerequisite." (Rustow, 1970, p. 362)
    - *Entrenched conflict between elites is a catalyst for agreement to abide by democratic rules*

In order to put an end to protracted conflict, contending leaders agree to accept and institutionalize a set of procedures.

- *This is not a natural result of any set of structural conditions, or prior history.*
- *It is a conscious choice that leaders make in order to preserve their power, or at least to maximize their chances of staying in power.*
- *Democracy may not be the goal, it might just be the means to an end.*

- Next there is a habituation phase, in which politicians, and ultimately ordinary citizens, develop a vested interest in the new procedures:
  - *…experience with democratic techniques and competitive recruitment will confirm the politicians in their democratic practices and beliefs."* (Rustow 1970, p. 360)

The bottom line for Rustow is that to build democracy, we don't need committed democrats – we only need agreement to play by a set of rules.

1. Conflict, and a desire to end that conflict, creates that motivation to put these rules in place.
2. Over time, participation in a system creates actors who have a vested interest in the system. The longer they participate, the less likely they are to opt out of the system entirely.
3. Mutual vulnerability of these contending elites to one another is key here.

Results in practice – there are at least three possible outcomes for this model of democratization.

- Electoral politics might just provide legitimizing cover for former armed actors to regain their strength before attempting to gain dominance over the state, by force if necessary.
- Electoral politics may be practiced diligently, in good faith, but it has been laid atop existing patterns of politics and economic and political power structures, without much changing those patterns. They coexist-. This is sometimes referred to as neo-patrimonial politics in the democracy literature
- A third possibility – which could coexist with either of the first two, is that repeated participation in electoral politics over time itself builds norms, creates or strengthens new kinds of political and civil society actors, and changes expectations and behavior of all political actors? The key here is time and the offering of predictable, consistent incentives. When you have a system of regular periodic elections, each election presents parties with a choice. A party may seek to improve its electoral performance by adapting to the competitive context in which it finds itself – by for example changing its electoral appeals, recruiting candidates differently, or engaging in electoral coalitions. These changes increase a party's stake in participating in electoral politics and in ensuring rules are followed.

That, I think, is a theoretical basis for liberal peacebuilding.

Although I'm not aware of any international peacebuilding actor having read Rustow's article, it does a pretty good job of summing up what we have to infer are the underlying assumptions of a liberal peacebuilding model.

SECTION III:

Electoral inclusion and peacebuilding: Introducing our research project

So far, I have set out practical and theoretical reasons why liberal peacebuilding might be seen as worth trying.

In this section I want to present some ideas from work that I have been doing with two colleagues, that examines the empirical evidence for one of liberal peacebuilding's core elements – the electoral inclusion of armed insurgent groups, by inviting them to become political parties and compete in elections. (Manning and Smith 2019; Tuncel and Manning 2022; Manning, Smith and Tuncel 2022)

- Of course, putting democratization, however flawed or limited, at the center of international peacebuilding was also a decision of convenience – served both the rhetorical and material needs of the West in post-Cold War era. May or may not have relied on theories
- But we've also seen that there may be some theoretical support for the idea.
- But let's take it seriously by examining one of its central and essential elements, the inclusion of armed opposition groups as political parties who compete in elecitons..

In the aftermath of nearly all civil wars that ended after 1990, no matter when, where, or why they began, armed opposition groups had the opportunity to form political parties and to participate in post-war electoral politics.

But up to now, we know surprisingly little about post-rebel parties as political actors beyond the first election or two after war's end. Obviously the transition is far from complete in one electoral cycle.

Details of our study

Our study looks at all post-rebel parties formed after any conflict ending in 1990 or later that meets Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) criteria for civil war (large and small) and includes only those conflict episodes that are coded by UCDP as having ended.[1]

Our data cover both wars that began before 1990, and those that began after 1990. Key is they must end after 1990. We focus on post-Cold War era because more elections have occurred in post-conflict countries in the years since 1990 than occurred in all preceding years (Matanock, 2016).

Our data cover both the direct, primary successor parties formed immediately after war and parties that spin off from these (secondary successor parties).

We then track each party's participation and performance in each available national leg election) since the end of war.

Our data also includes details on how parties participate in elections. For example, we code parties' participation in electoral coalitions. When a party fails to participate, we also code the reason for lack of participation (boycott, banned, disbanded, merged with another party, etc.) which can allow for further qualitative study.

Our data cover up to three decades of post-war electoral politics, following post-rebel parties through as many as ten consecutive legislative election cycles.

In this historical period, we see a lot of variety in the kinds of states that end up in our set of cases. These include states formed after the dissolution of large multinational states like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, giving rise to a number of new independent republics – such as Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of these new republics in turn spurred further attempts at new state formation, resulting in unrecognized de facto republics, as in South Ossetia (Georgia), Transnistria (Moldova), or Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan).[2]

The end of the Cold War also brought conflicts in Africa and Asia to an end. Rulers who had relied on economic or military aid from the US or the Soviet Union to conduct counterinsurgencies had to find other strategies. Along with these, long running proxy conflicts in Latin America also came to an end as their Cold War patrons withdrew support in cases like Colombia and El Salvador.

So, the end of the Cold War saw a lot of conflicts ending, soon after that many new ones beginning, and in this whole period we had a new model of peacebuilding that put democracy-building – at least in a formal sense – front and center.

Our data includes information on 81 post-rebel parties derived from 58 distinct conflict actors in 40 countries. It includes conflicts that vary in duration, intensity, incompatibility, and several other factors.[3]

Yet, while the parties in our dataset represent tremendous diversity in terms of their origins, experience, resources, and environments, we find that their patterns of participation and performance are remarkably stable over time.

Our findings – the key ones:

1. We found that in the aftermath of civil war, most (more than half) armed opposition groups have the opportunity to form a political party and to compete in post-war elections. Unless they are legally banned from doing so (a very rare outcome), the overwhelming majority of these groups do form political parties, and nearly all that do form parties go on to participate in the first post-war general elections.

2. Moreover, most of those that engage in those first elections go on to participate in every available election thereafter. Sixty-five percent of these parties have gone on to compete in all available post-war legislative elections (up to 2020).

3. Additionally, electoral performance of these parties tends to remain fairly consistent over time. First election sets a precedent. If a party fails to participate in the first post-war election, it rarely recovers. Stays in performance band.

4. And twenty-two percent of post-rebel parties formed have competed in at least five electoral contests over two decades or more. These we call our long-haul parties. Very few parties (only around 13 percent of them) never contest a single election (Manning, Tuncel and Smith, forthcoming.).

5. And participation by these parties is not dependent on the quality of electoral competition, suggesting that post-rebel parties find electoral participation valuable regardless of electoral quality (Manning, Tuncel and Smith, forthcoming 2022.).

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[1] To identify conflicts, we used UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 20.1 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson & Öberg, 2020).
[2] We use regional-level electoral data for parties that exist primarily in autonomous regional governments.
[3] For full details on the dataset, see Carrie Manning, Ian Smith, and Ozlem Tuncel, 'Introducing the Post-Rebel Electoral Parties dataset', Journal of Peace Research, Special data feature, forthcoming in 2022.

5. And participation by these parties is not dependent on the quality of electoral competition, suggesting that post-rebel parties find electoral participation valuable regardless of electoral quality (Manning, Tuncel and Smith, forthcoming 2022.).

6. Parties returning to conflict after two or more elections is an extremely rare event (2 in our dataset, Mozambique and Yemen.)

To me, this degree of consistency in participation over time suggests that the conversion of armed groups to electoral parties — is a strategy that is viable across disparate contexts and actors.

- Why do so many rebel groups find electoral politics a satisfactory substitute for war?
- The explanation for initial party formation is relatively straightforward:
- Low startup costs. External actors supporting peace processes in the last 30 years have often expected and supported party formation by rebel groups. Many rebel groups that already had strong brand recognition from the war and they would compete in political arenas with few or no strong existing parties.
- Moreover, transforming into an electoral party provided a legitimate position at the peace table and sometimes a say in the design of the post-war political system. It was a sort of ticket for admission
- So, the decision to participate was maybe just a low risk way to keep going. while keeping their options open. Placeholder.
- The real puzzle is explaining consistent participation over time. But it turns out that the majority of parties that participated in the first post-war elections went on to participate in *all available elections thereafter*.

Questions:

1. Not all parties continue to participate in elections over time. But two thirds do. *Which parties continue to participate in elections over time*? Is their long-term participation tied to their electoral performance, to organizational legacies from the past, or to institutional characteristics of the political arena?

2. We've talked about participation. But what factors affect these parties' performance?

Factors that make these parties more or less successful in elections. (From Manning and Smith, 2019)

- One factor that helps explain the performance of these parties is how the war ended, most important whether it ended in a decisive victory for one side, or in a negotiated settlement. Post-rebel parties formed by opposition groups that won the war tend to win 60% or more of legislative seats across all elections. Parties formed out of rebel groups that lost the war are rare, and they win few or no seats.
- But most parties lie somewhere in the middle. For many of them, a key part of the equation is whether or not wartime cleavages continue to be relevant. When wartime cleavages remain relevant in the post-war period, they can provide a ready mobilizing framework for parties to attract voters and build loyalty. Parties that can continue to compete against their wartime rival based on the wartime cleavage do not have to work as hard to adapt to electoral politics. This is evident particularly for the case of Renamo in Mozambique, as we will discuss in a few minutes.
- The political context that these parties enter also matters, but maybe not in the ways we expect. In the presence of older parties with prior political experience, post-rebel parties tend to get 'crowded out.'
- Specific electoral rules actually have less impact on post-rebel party performance than expected, especially for the first few post-war electoral cycles. This is perhaps not surprising, as institutional effects become stronger the more that competitors come to see these rules as definitive and lasting. In the short term, manipulation or expected manipulation of electoral processes is more likely to shape party behavior than the stated rules of the game.
- In addition to the effects of inclusion on individual parties, electoral inclusion can have systemic effects. Long-term participation in elections by a consistent set of competitors tends to entrench a cleavage structure. On the one hand, this encourages stability and predictability in the party system. Perennial participation by these post-rebel parties can embolden the entry to new parties to the electoral game. These new competitors often include breakaway parties formed by former militants of the main post-rebel party, who believe that they can compete even more successfully than their 'parent' party.

What these findings show, I think, is that electoral inclusion has been an effective means of political integration for non-state armed groups. Ultimately, addressing the political aspirations of conflict actors through electoral inclusion can help support lasting political peace. But this is not a foregone conclusion.

And of course, elections are not always guarantors of democracy. Autocrats also use elections to legitimize their power. And even if new parties formed out of armed opposition groups do embrace electoral politics, they often retain the capacity to mobilize organized violence, or can quickly regain it. Renamo's return to arms after two decades of peace shows this clearly. And yet, the return of peace after that coincided with the expansion of electoral politics and promises of more inclusion in electoral administration for opposition parties.

We find that even problematic elections are serving a purpose for these parties. External legitimation may play an important role. (Aid and investment may suffer if the ruling party were to dispense with elections altogether, and opposition parties would lose

access to even meager benefits by not participating.). So the system sticks, and the opportunity costs of opting out of it remain high, even after thirty years.

By and large, even if other aspects of democracy have not materialized, electoral politics has integrated into peaceful politics groups that took up arms against the state. And this arrangement appears to have some staying power.

In a significant number of cases then, maybe we are not building democracy with electoral politics, but maybe we are building a path toward peace, or at least stability.

SECTION IV:

Mozambique's experience

In October 1992, Mozambique's ruling party, Frelimo, signed a comprehensive peace agreement with Renamo (National Resistance of Mozambique)..

The peace agreement provided for the inclusion of Renamo as a legal political party in a multiparty political system that was just two years old. Since independence, the country had been governed under a one-party state led by Frelimo.
There have been six legislative and presidential elections, Renamo has participated in all of them. The party has averaged just over 30% of the legislative seat share across all elections. From the end of the civil war in 1992 until 2009, Renamo and Frelimo were the only two parties that mattered in Mozambican politics. Renamo ran on the identity it had established in wartime – as the representative of all those excluded from the ruling party's monopoly on political and economic opportunity. This had continued resonance.

Because it could do this, and because political arena so polarized between these two parties, Renamo did little in the way of organization-building. Internally, Renamo relied on the charisma of its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, to keep order in a party that remained highly personalized and centralized. The development of institutions that would create predictable paths to leadership in the party was not countenanced under Dhlakama's leadership, and the party's elected legislators had no real autonomy from party leadership. Thus, paths to organizational development and growth were effectively blocked.

Fifteen years after the civil war ended, a third party, Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), emerged that was able to cut into Renamo's electoral base. Renamo's legislative seat share fell to just 20% in the fourth national elections in 2009. At the same time, Mozambique's economy, was transforming into one based on significant reserves of coal and natural gas, among other things.

Renamo's declining electoral fortunes, combined with a lucrative new economy and the ruling party's increasing willingness to compromise electoral integrity to maintain its grip on power, seemed to foretell the imminent disappearance of Renamo as a political force. Would-be democratic reformers in the party pushed for changes to make it more competitive, but those voices did not prevail.

Meanwhile, as the economic stakes of maintaining political power spiked with the extractive resource boom, Frelimo's commitment to electoral politics also seemed to wane. Both parties were willing to return to war to revise their 1992 political settlement.

Instead, the party decided to use its capacity for violence to renegotiate the terms of its political inclusion. In 2013 it returned to arms and began a five-year, low-intensity insurgency.

Legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for 2014, and with the aid of international negotiators, Renamo and the government reached a temporary agreement that included limited electoral administration reforms to allow them to go forward.

Voter support for Renamo surged in the 2014 elections, with the party winning 36% of legislative seats. This result seemed to validate the party's return to arms. Negotiations between Renamo and the government continued, now focused on improving the inclusion of Renamo personnel in the defence and security forces. Dhlakama reached agreement with President Nyusi in 2017 on creating elected provincial government, a long time Renamo demand that the party expected would expand its representation in government significantly.

Dhlakama died in May 2018, and without established procedures in place for leadership succession, a power struggle ensued. The party split into two factions. The leader elected at the party's hastily convened conference was a wartime cadre who had gone on to become a legislator in the national assembly. The other faction comprised a group of Renamo military leaders who had never been

integrated into political life, but who had instead been part of the party's strategy to reserve the capacity for violence. This second wing, claiming to represent 'Dhlakama's Renamo,' launched a low-intensity armed conflict with the government in the centre of the country.

The peace agreement was eventually reached between Renamo and government that allowed the October 2019 general elections to go forward. Renamo suffered major defeats in provincial and national elections , Hanlon and others point out that elections have been subject to increasing levels of fraud and manipulation and 2019 was no exception.

Renamo's experience shows that post-rebel parties can remain committed to the electoral process as a part of a long-term strategy without making adaptations that would allow the party to withstand major challenges. At the same time, Frelimo doubled down on its efforts to secure its grip on power by controlling elecitons. Once it became clear to Renamo militants that elections were no longer a reliable avenue to political inclusion, the party turned instead to violence.

Formally, the new peace deal *reaffirmed electoral politics* as the core of the settlement, putting an end to this conflict episode.

Nevertheless, is not at all clear that electoral results are accepted by either of the two major parties as the last word in the allocation of power. Renamo has routinely contested the results of each election, while consistent problems with transparency and other irregularities of election administration suggest that the ruling party is not eager to surrender its fate to the uncertainty of 'free and fair' elections.

The lines between the ruling Frelimo party and the state have remained blurred at best over the years. Frelimo has now controlled the Mozambican state for nearly 50 years. That has implications for economic power and links economic and political power in important ways.

To a considerable extent, the interests of the party define those of the state, and the fortunes of state actors follow those of the party. In 2014/15 Afrobarometer survey, 73% of Mozambicans surveyed said they did not perceive a difference between the party and the state. In 2019, about half of those surveyed said corruption was getting worse, and that the government was doing a poor job of combating corruption. In the natural resource sector, transportation, construction, and other key economic realms, political connections to the ruling party are key. Not all prominent private sector actors are closely tied to the ruling party, but many are.

SECTION V:

Some concluding thoughts

The results of our broad comparative study show, I think, that electoral inclusion of former armed opposition groups can bring stability and perhaps lasting peace.

And this does not depend on past experience with democracy, or strong political parties well versed in electoral politics at the outset. Electoral inclusion can lead to enduring stability even where elections are consistently flawed. It can prevail in highly polarized environments, where the only viable parties are those that participated in the war as armed actors.

But there is a breaking point. When incumbents consistently manipulate elections to retain dominance, elections no longer provide a potential route to power for anyone else. Electoral politics becomes a mechanism for electoral exclusion. This signals the incumbent's withdrawal from the post-war political settlement.

This withdrawal will likely not become evident immediately. Several electoral cycles will likely be necessary for the ruling party to demonstrate its unwillingness to invest in electoral politics.

In short, the model of liberal peacebuilding can function, albeit limping along, for a very long time, but it continues to work only so long as no party abandons the game altogether.

I want to add here that this is a huge challenge. In any democracy, whoever controls the state today is also a contender for power tomorrow. The temptation to ensure that the rules and procedures of electoral competition will not prevent you from holding on to power is great. I give you the example of former president Donald Trump and the majority of the leadership of the Republican Party in the US right now as an example.

Excellencies, distinguished guests and participants, ladies and gentlemen…

There is a lot to unpack in what I have said. I have sought to review both theoretical and practical reasons for the emergence of the liberal peacebuilding model. I have drawn on research into one aspect of this practice, the electoral inclusion of armed actors who are expected to develop a stake in peaceful politics. I've shown, I think, that a surprising number of these actors find this arrangement satisfactory. And by looking closely at the case of Mozambique, we find this model is very resilient, up to a point.

I hope that I have given you something to think about that you might find relevant as we move into a much fuller discussion of the dynamics of violence, development and conflict.

To the conference organizers, thank you once again for this opportunity to share some of those thoughts with you. To members of the audience,

Thank you for your attention.

Maputo, 19th September 2022.

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